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ABSTRACT 
 
The goal of this dissertation is to increase our understanding of 
domestic policy responses to initiatives and expertise as provided by 
international health organizations. Although following international 
recommendations often improves domestic public health, in certain 
circumstances resistance to adopting them persists. My core theoretical 
argument suggests that a strong societal agreement about what 
constitutes the ―common good‖ served by state (e.g., ―social purpose‖) 
informs how domestic policy-makers evaluate the benefits of adopting 
international recommendations. This agreement also affects how 
governments frame the provision of treatment, decide which 
subpopulations should benefit from the consumption of public good, 
and choose their partners in policy implementation. To demonstrate 
the impact of social purpose I examine how, why and with what 
consequences Russia and South Africa adopted the external best case 
practices, guidelines, and recommendations in regard to the HIV/AIDS 
treatment. In doing so, I investigate how major international health, 
developmental, and financial organizations formulated the global 
HIV/AIDS policy, and devise a set of indicators operationalizing this 
policy. Then, I use these indicators to design a structured, focused 
comparison of the domestic HIV/AIDS policy responses and 
  
 
empirically demonstrate that governments in both states created policy 
environments sanctioning a highly selective approach to international 
policy guidelines and recommendations. Rather than responding to the 
epidemic as a pressing public health issue Russia‘s ―Sovereign 
Democracy‖ prompted the government to respond to HIV/AIDS as the 
issue of demographic survival and criminal drug abuse. This choice 
subsequently eroded the human rights component from the official 
policy, overcommitted the government financially, and frustrated the 
cooperation with private sector and civil society. The imperatives of 
―African Renaissance‖ reframed the HIV/AIDS epidemic as a local 
developmental problem. As a result, the Cabinet supported 
substandard biomedical treatments and indigenous healing practices, 
consistently resisted the universal and free rollout of treatment in order 
to avoid the undesirable governmental expenditures and redistributive 
strategies. In both countries, these policy choices resulted in the 
adverse consequences for public health and prompted a protracted 
contestation among various state and non-state actors around the 
principles of the desired public health policies. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the early 2000s international journalists and academics exposed 
South African HIV/AIDS policy to the international audiences. They 
put forth evidence that President Thabo Mbeki questioned the relation 
between the human immunodeficiency virus and the acquired 
syndrome of opportunistic diseases, as well as evaded rolling out 
almost universally adopted life-saving antiretroviral treatment therapy. 
These actions went against the key recommendations and guidelines of 
the core international health actors, including the World Health 
Organization and the professional health care community. While this 
critical exposure proved to be eye-grabbing, many outside observers 
remained puzzled why Mbeki chose to pursue these counter-intuitive 
and, as it turned out later, disastrous policies. Mass media and general 
public reasoned that it must have been Mbeki‘s complex personality 
and leadership style that could explain what at the time was going on 
in South Africa. This major theme took on many variations. Critically-
minded scholars and political observers underscored Mbeki‘s personal 
contrarian streak with a taste of going against the prevailing notions 
and ideas, his injudicious use of internet resources of dubious 
expertise, and his beliefs in conspiracies surrounding contemporary 
2 
 
South Africa. Health policy scholars and domestic treatment activists 
kept raising the degree of an outrage, if not an undiluted hatred, to the 
president and his policies. 
Mbeki‘s supporters continued perceiving him as a brilliant 
political leader, committed to the intellectual sophistication and always 
making a thoughtful analysis of complex issues a case in point while 
crafting domestic policies. In their eyes, President‘s health 
policymaking amply confirmed his reputation of an independent 
thinker in a search of sensitive, innovative, and unorthodox health 
policies, all breaking the western monopoly on scientific truth. In 2007 
Ronald Suresh Roberts offered a book-length justification of this 
approach. In this book Roberts reinvented the President as a very 
insightful politician, whose complex sensibilities and intricate 
policymaking are bound to be misunderstood. Mbeki is indeed a 
person of many colors: his stress on the African return to the roots 
does not preclude him from including the profusely long quotes from 
the assorted Victorian poets in his political speeches and having his 
wardrobe stocked with the standard British business suites. Thus, there 
always will be some confusion, about who the ―enigmatic‖ Mr. Mbeki 
truly was.  
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I agree that Mbeki contributed to the country‘s inconsistence 
with international best practices. At the same time, I assert that the 
unqualified stress on his personality as a key explanatory factor 
simplifies and obscures a more complex story of HIV/AIDS policy in 
South Africa. Indeed, Mbeki‘s specific policy blunders included his 
public denial of the causal links between the HIV and AIDS and an 
overt courting of AIDS dissidents. Yet other persistent deviations from 
the international consensus originated and evolved beyond the scope 
of his direct control. Local healers offered various alternative 
medications, indigenous concoctions, and dietary supplements. 
Provincial-level health administrators kept restricting the use of the 
antiretroviral therapy, in several cases refusing to prescribe it. 
Generally, ―[a] persistent tolerance or even acceptance of heterodox 
view of HIV and AIDS among the party‘s leadership‖1 complicated 
bringing domestic practices in consistence with the global 
prescriptions. 
Even the sharp turnaround in the top political leadership in 
2008 did not imply that all the tribulations with South African health 
policy would be over for good. Two years after Mbeki‘s ousting, a 
prominent treatment activist Nathan Gaffen warned that South African 
                                                     
1
 Lieberman 2009: 140 
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policies were still sidetracked from the international best practices.
2
 
The following presidents Kgalema Motlanthe and Jacob Zuma 
understandably distanced themselves from Mbeki‘s health policies and 
appeared to be more in a policy mainstream. On the other hand, 
Zuma‘s prior policymaking and influence on AIDS policy had been far 
from exemplary. For instance, while Zuma served as a head of the 
South African National AIDS Council (SANAC), this organization 
turned into a rubber-stamp institution and defied its own purpose. 
Zuma personally put together a colorful performance in front of the 
Union Building, during which the HIV-infected teenagers cheerfully 
claimed that despite their seropositive status, they had been healthy, 
happy, and productive. This performance intended to lure those 
members of the parliament, who, like Barbara Hogan and Pregs 
Govender, expressed distrust in the official health policy. While 
defending himself against the rape charges, Zuma offered highly 
controversial insights about his particular choices in preventing from 
getting infected with HIV. This blunder prompted a famous South 
African cartoonist Zapiro to draw Zuma‘s satirical character with a 
showerhead protruding from his cranium.  
Mbeki, of course, is not the only leader who heavily influenced 
domestic health policies.  George Bush, Kofi Annan, Yoweri 
                                                     
2
 See Gaffen 2010 
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Museveni, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Lula da Silva, and Vladimir 
Putin put their stamp on the HIV/AIDS campaigns and initiatives in a 
variety of ways. Yet, as Evan Liberman insightfully observed, we 
often tend to attribute the success and failure in HIV/AIDS policies to 
those individuals, whose ―presidencies postdated aggressive action on 
HIV/AIDS.‖3 Thus, attributing the development (or stagnation) of 
national HIV/AIDS policies to leadership as primary explanatory 
variable is not always warranted. Simply put, pointing fingers at some 
leaders‘ policy triumphs, failures, mistakes, or breakthroughs is not a 
compelling explanation.  
If not solely individual and personal, what factors drove these 
strange approaches to a seemingly straightforward and technical 
HIV/AIDS policy as promoted by various international agencies? A 
broad range of variables can feasibly appear on the list of potential 
explanations. The legacies of the apartheid, the rise of neoliberal 
governmentality, the lack of proper disease identification and 
statistical data, the overwhelming burden of other problems, and 
simply the lack of health care professionals could feasibly contribute 
to the state‘s inability to respond to the epidemic in accordance with 
the international recommendations.
 
Not surprisingly, many policy 
articles and edited volumes either blend all these variables into a single 
                                                     
3
 Lieberman 2009: 140 
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explanation, or toil to sort out their distinct effects on the HIV/AIDS 
policy.
4
 In order not to get lost in the gamut of all these accounts, it is 
useful to take a step back and remind ourselves that HIV/AIDS goes 
well beyond any ordinary health crisis.  The scope and nature of threat 
pushes domestic elites to realize that the physical survival of 
population as well as the future of the state as autonomous political 
organization are at stake. In this context, curbing HIV/AIDS becomes 
a question of ―ontological security.‖ This demands that elites view 
what needs to be done to curb HIV/AIDS from the vantage point of 
their conception of common good. Moreover, from an outset of my 
research, I observed that that in South African the resistance to the 
core international HIV/AIDS guidelines happened during the time 
when the country‘s political and cultural elite actively sought to find, 
or build, a new social purpose – a conception of common good served 
by the post-apartheid state. This project examines whether or not this 
plausible connection indeed should be considered as an explanation for 
cross-national variation of HIV/AIDS policies.   
 
ARGUMENT IN BRIEF 
                                                     
4
 For a recent example of an eclectic approach, see Ndinga-Muvumba and Pharaoh 
2008. 
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My dissertation contributes to the study of deep-seated and socially 
legitimate conception of common good served by state (e.g. ―social 
purpose‖), examining its effects on the content of national responses to 
policy crises, such as rapid spread of emerging infectious diseases. 
Domestic policy-makers (the extant elite in-group) may interpret the 
crucial questions of public policy through the conceptual lenses of the 
common good they embody. Providing common good means to 
address such core policy issues as how to frame the provision of a 
particular public good, which populations should benefit or be 
excluded from the consumption of public good, and who gets to 
participate in shaping the policy. The strong societal agreement about 
conception of common good can potentially shape the overall 
domestic policy environment and even dominate it. In this case wider 
audiences are likely to perceive and support the official policies as 
inherently unproblematic. In terms of theoretical development, today 
we have an insightful literature to build on, especially the work of 
John Gerard Ruggie, Christian Reus-Smit, and Rawi Abdelal.
5
 
Today intergovernmental organizations and professional health 
community play increasingly important role in formulating 
sophisticated policies, providing expertise and service. In this context, 
                                                     
5
 Abdelal and Ruggie 2009: 151; Johnston 2005: 1032-1033; Abdelal 2001: 1; see 
also Reus-Smit 1999: 31; Ruggie 1982: 198. 
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international prescriptions become almost universally recognized as 
instrumental to improve domestic policies, including public health. 
Under certain circumstances this can lead to policy convergence.
6
 
Under a different set of circumstances, a strong domestic commitment 
to the particular conceptions of common good might politicize 
international public policy, or even become hostile to it. In this 
research project I examine how, why and with what consequences 
social purpose affected domestic adoption of the external best case 
practices, guidelines, and recommendations. Answering this question 
is helpful to explain variation in cross-national responses to the 
emerging infectious diseases, otherwise attributed to a plurality of 
situational and individual-level factors. In this dissertation I use the 
metaphor of ―filtering‖ which indicates the domestic selection of and 
change in the internationally prescribed substantive components of the 
health policy. Rather than testing a set of particular hypotheses this 
project endeavors to document and map out various ways how social 
purpose factors in the provision of public good to be delivered in the 
domestic arenas.  Ascertaining the explanatory power of social 
purpose is relevant not only to explain the kinds of actions the existing 
elite (in-group) considers appropriate, but also to take stock of the 
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broader policy environment which this conception of social purpose 
underpins. 
Why HIV/AIDS? Presumably there are several policy issue-
areas which might be profoundly influenced by intervening social 
purpose. First, HIV/AIDS is a very special case. It is argued here that 
the spread of HIV/AIDS threatens the very existence of the state, the 
physical survival of their populations, and inhibits necessary 
prerequisites for general well-being. All this makes the antiretroviral 
treatment a fundamental common good, providing which is likely to be 
mediated by the broader country-contingent conceptions of common 
good as expressed in elite‘s political obligations and legitimized 
among wider public. Today very few political leaders would deny that 
curbing HIV/AIDS is connected to some broader political, economic, 
and cultural concerns.  
Second, there are clear international policy guidelines and set 
of international best practices, which allow us to establish how 
HIV/AIDS policy should look like domestically. Breaking down the 
general HIV/AIDS policy in a set of core components and indicators 
allows to increase the number of observations and make more detailed 
claims about the impact of social purpose on the health policy as 
transferred into domestic political contexts. The international 
10 
 
consensus urges domestic political leaders to provide a particular 
biomedical solution (Highly Active Anti-Retroviral Therapy, HAART, 
most commonly referred to as antiretrovirals—ARVs), to commit to 
the principle of universality of access that everybody should benefit 
from the consumption of public good, and to ensure a meaningful 
inclusion of international actors, private sector, and civil society for a 
mutual productive improvement of the public policy. All these 
components either in combination, or individually, may turn the global 
consensus is a potentially contested policy, and may result in 
observable policy variations at cross-national level.  
To evaluate these ideas, my dissertation empirically examines 
how, why and with what consequences the strong commitment to the 
newly emerging social purpose in Russia and South Africa politicized 
and sometimes challenged the external best case practices, guidelines, 
and recommendations in regard to the HIV/AIDS treatment 
(antiretroviral therapy). My argument proceeds in several steps. First, I 
trace how major international health, developmental, and financial 
organizations came to envision the HIV/AIDS treatment as a 
fundamental common good to be provided by states. I document the 
key components of this vision and devise a set of indicators 
operationalizing the global HIV/AIDS consensus (independent 
11 
 
variable). Second, my dissertation offers a generalizable model of 
social purpose (intervening variable), traces how domestic political 
elites constructed their conception of common good and made it 
attractive to wider audiences to influence domestic policy 
environment. Third, utilizing a previously devised set of indicators of 
global health policy, I design a structured, focused comparison of the 
domestic HIV/AIDS policy responses in Russia and South Africa 
(dependent variable). I demonstrate how governments in both states 
changed the content of the prescribed international policy in 
accordance with the socially legitimate conception of common good as 
embraced by political elites and accepted among wider audiences. 
Fourth, in my concluding chapters I sharpen my theoretical focus by 
locating social purpose into three causal mechanisms of policy transfer 
and summarize the effects of social purpose on public health policy. 
External influences, coalition-building and learning each have strong 
explanatory logic of how external prescription of change and 
innovation are adopted domestically to solve local problems. I assert 
that the strength and consistency in political elites‘ commitment to the 
formulated social purpose may alter or sharpen the theoretical 
predictions of policy transfer, otherwise being viable baseline 
explanations for transformation of the international policy in domestic 
politics. 
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My empirical findings strongly suggest that in responding to 
the domestic epidemic of HIV/AIDS the key decision-makers in both 
countries have significantly transformed the international standardized 
policy prescriptions to the pandemic in accordance with the social 
purpose‘s content. Rather than treating the epidemic as a pressing 
public health issue, Russia‘s Sovereign Democracy prompted the 
government to respond to the domestic epidemic as the issue of 
demographic survival. The imperatives of African Renaissance 
reframed the HIV/AIDS epidemic as an African developmental 
problem to be best addressed by African solutions. In both countries, 
these policy choices resulted in the adverse consequences for public 
health and prompted a protracted contestation among various state and 
non-state actors around the principles of the desired public health 
policies.  While I am not claiming that social purpose to be treated as 
the single explanation of the variation in national responses to the 
emerging infectious diseases, on balance it tells us an important and 
previously overlooked story about the political determinants of 
domestic policy responses.  
Table 1.1 Variables and cases 
 
WHY HIV/AIDS?  
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The global spread of HIV/AIDS raised pivotal concerns about how to 
control the epidemic both at international and domestic levels. The 
baseline consensual policy measure revolves around the provision of 
anti-retroviral therapy, which international actors came to understand 
as a common good. More specifically, the global consensus indicated 
governmental responsibility to provide the antiretroviral treatment, 
ensure the universality of access, and bring all relevant stakeholders in 
the policy-making process. Antiretrovirals or ARVs is a blanket name 
for different combination of drugs and therapeutic cocktails. In this 
study the global consensus on the HIV/AIDS treatment policy is the 
independent variable, which is disaggregated into set of three general 
components and nine more specific policy indicators (listed in Table 
1.2). From the empirical standpoint, my dissertation contributes to the 
current debates about the cross-national variation in responses to the 
emerging infectious diseases in the context of health crises, which 
transcend boundary, authority, and capacity of nation-states. In this 
section I briefly operationalize international consensus on the 
HIV/AIDS policy and spell out how it compares to domestic variation 
of HIV/AIDS policy in Russian and South African public policies. At 
this point I do not discuss how and why the domestic conceptions of 
common good factor in domestic health policy variations.   
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The stress on universal treatment and health as a fundamental 
human right followed the Alma-Ata spirit, yet was undermined by the 
lack of effective biomedical solutions.
7
 The invention of Highly Active 
Antiretroviral Treatment (HAART) in 1996 stimulated the 
international consensus on HIV/AIDS treatment as a common good. 
Although curbing AIDS obviously requires a variety of health 
interventions, the biomedical solution is a necessity in order to have a 
set of policy initiatives with tangible indicators of success. The 
lessening prices of life-saving medications reinforced the importance 
of ARVs as a consensual biomedical intervention. The dropping costs 
of treatment made it possible to provide treatment almost universally, 
without resorting to any severe restrictive measures. The simplicity of 
the fixed-dose combination regimen made it relatively simple for 
governments to procure and distribute these drugs.
8
 It also enabled 
international health bodies to provide the uniform technical expertise 
and advice. Simultaneously, the new generation of AIDS organizations 
began assisting countries with limited resources to provide treatment 
and motivating them. Thus, the biomedical innovation of 1996 flagged 
the emergence of ARVs as a key policy solution, conjoined with the 
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stress on the universality of access to treatment, and necessitated the 
involvement of all the relevant stakeholders in formulating and 
implementing the domestic policy. In other words, without the ARVs 
there is no clear policy baseline.  
Breaking down the general HIV/AIDS policy realm in a set of 
components and indicators allows ascertaining how this policy looks 
like and what it is not supposed to be. The first core component of the 
international policy is to provide the antiretrovirals to mitigate a public 
health crisis.  If policy-makers do not respond to HIV/AIDS crisis as a 
public health problem, they are likely to be at variance with the 
international vision of treatment as a particular public good. 
Substituting or skewing basic policy response by giving a political 
priority to other issue-frames, such as demographic crisis, military 
security, human rights, poverty and inequality, property rights, is the 
first signal that the HIV/AIDS policy got invested with situational and 
local conceptions of common good. A strong adherence to any 
alternative issue-framing choices may potentially lead to further 
deviations from the international consensus, including a public denial 
of the epidemic, underscoring the uniqueness of the domestic 
characteristics of the epidemic (see Indicator 1a), attempts to enforce 
various substandard treatment protocols (see Indicator 1b), or simply 
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inaction in securing the price-saving generic pharmaceutical products 
(see Indicator 1c). Whether or not these alternate frames are ―justified‖ 
to meet the specific conditions on the ground will be discussed later. 
The second core component is the universality of access to 
treatment. It intends to stress both the moral imperative and economic 
cost-efficiency in providing access to ARVs to all the infected and 
vulnerable populations and thus reflects the notion that nobody should 
be intentionally excluded from the consumption of public good. 
Additionally, prioritizing the access to treatment even to the negatively 
constructed populations is cost-efficient as it lowers the virus 
transmission to the generalized population and thus will likely to 
diminish public health spending in the long run. At the face value, 
universality is very costly. Yet with the technological breakthroughs in 
biomedicines achieved in 1996 even a small increase of average yearly 
costs of treatment allowed to increase the number of treated patients 
significantly.  Since the costs of treatment are becoming relatively low, 
scaling-up is attainable even in the countries with lower GDPs. The 
first potential challenge to the global policy consensus consists of 
policy-makers choosing to provide only a selective access to treatment, 
either excluding any vulnerable subpopulation or, in contrast, 
including any societal group at the expense of the others (see Indicator 
17 
 
2a). The second potential challenge is to resist ―scaling up‖ (see 
Indicator 2b). Third, the notion of universality presumes that providing 
the access to treatment will go together with aggressive prevention 
campaigns. While the appropriate balance between these two health 
interventions has been long in the center of controversy, at this point 
suffice to say that prevention should not become a dominant substitute 
for the antiretroviral therapy, nor should it be completely ignored as 
irrelevant for curbing HIV/AIDS (see Indicator 2c).     
The third core component of the internationally recommended 
policy is building partnerships between governments and all relevant 
stakeholders. The idea that the most effective health policy responses 
depend on inclusive participation in health policy formulation and 
implementation underpins this recommendation. This recommendation 
is especially relevant for the countries that either lack requisite 
financial and infrastructural capacities to curb the epidemic on their 
own, or require assistance to increase the capacity of public health care 
sector, institutionalize and routinize financial flows, or have to 
improve service quality and outreach. For the purposes of this 
dissertation, the group of relevant stakeholders is analytically divided 
to private sector, international organizations, and domestic civil 
society sector, including various issue-advocacy and health service 
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groups.  When governments start selectively including or excluding 
certain stakeholder partners which get to participate in policy process, 
it signals that the international consensus on partnership becomes 
invested with situational and local characteristics.   
From the health policy perspective, the described HIV/AIDS 
policy was desirable as it provided both international and domestic 
policy-makers with clear [technocratic] policy goals of how many 
people should receive treatment within certain time period, as well as 
straightforward guidelines what the standardized treatment protocol is 
and how to manage the logistical control of drugs.
9
 It was attainable 
because the post-1996 ARV treatment indeed proved to be very 
effective and increasingly cheaper a biomedical invention supported 
by some uniform biomedical expertise and in various forms sponsored 
by international health, financial, and developmental organizations and 
pharmaceutical sector, especially its generic-producing segment. 
Although international health community eventually elevated these 
three core policy components to a common intersubjectively held 
understanding, for a long time they were either actively contested, or 
simply ignored. In the second chapter I trace global convergence 
around HIV/AIDS as a specific public policy realm and discuss how 
the international actors set to agree on them. Despite some occasional 
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relapses in observing the mainstream approach (for instance, 
protecting human rights and reintroduction of restrictive measures, 
such as travel bans for persons with HIV), governments commonly 
follow the global consensus. All this does not mean that the 
international consensus as I describe it here will remain intact forever, 
but it was clearly more or less attainable and desirable for the period I 
am interested in.  
Table 1.2 The HIV/AIDS policy baseline indicators 
 
SOCIAL PURPOSE: A BRIEF DISCUSSION 
Social purpose as a concept 
Social purpose is the core concept of this dissertation. I define social 
purpose as a socially legitimate and politically contingent conception 
of common good.  Since the unit of analysis is nation-state, the 
adjectives ―national‖ and ―social‖ are used somewhat interchangeably. 
This definition builds on a conventional constructivist insight that no 
conception of common good can exist independently from political 
actors which develop and uphold it. Thus, the primary focus is on 
those social groups which are adequately positioned to develop 
politically meaningful conceptions of common good and can commit 
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significant amount of resources to act on it (domestic political elites).  
Committing to social purpose reaffirms elite‘s sense of self-efficacy 
and self-esteem; casting it as a necessary condition for the country‘s 
sustainability makes elites indispensable for the country‘s survival. On 
the other hand, not providing this common good might jeopardize their 
reputation and political survival. Of course, elites do not exist in a 
political and social vacuum: they are likely to face domestic actors 
which embrace alternative conceptions of common good. As the 
members of extant elite strongly attach the conception of common 
good to its own identity, reputation, sense of worthiness, and political 
fate, its opponents are most likely to be designated as the Other with a 
spate of negative characteristics attached. Since they challenge the 
advocated conception of common good, the Other is cast as 
undermining the country‘s political sustainability and survivability. 
Since social legitimacy of social purpose notably depends on its public 
acceptance, the further attention goes beyond the exclusive emphasis 
on elites (for details on three types of agency see Chapter 3).  In sum, 
social purpose describes the broader interactive policy environment, 
through which the global flow of policy initiatives and 
recommendations is filtered.    
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Social purpose should not be confused with the notion of state 
ideology.  Contrary to state ideology, social purpose does not exist 
independently from contesting political actors, their identities, and 
outside of the contending domestic discourses about common good. 
This also implies that its causal effects, while strong in the short-term, 
might be not lasting in the long haul.  This explains why scholars and 
political observers who tried to ―fit‖ Putin‘s and Mbeki‘s political 
regimes in the tenets of any universal ideology soon realized the 
futility of the task. These political leaders‘ behavior and policy choices 
clearly fell outside the ideological divisions and were not informed by 
them without strong qualifications. 
What elements count as substantive components comprising a 
social purpose in a given country, where do they come from, and how 
they become politically meaningful? The earlier (and perhaps still 
dominant) literature describes domestic elites‘ political obligations as 
being attached to the value of the ethnic self. Thus, national purpose is 
equated with the goals of ethnic nationalism, i.e. ―a principle which 
holds that the political and national unit should be congruent.‖10  
Another set of literature stipulated possibility that ―the reasons that 
historical agents hold for organizing their political life into centralized, 
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autonomous political units‖11 may go well beyond the value of 
maintaining an ethnic state. It indicates that specific goals for the 
nation can be attached to the self, which is a result of a more 
contingent political debate.
12
 In South African context, for instance, 
the ruling elite (the African National Congress, ANC) maintained the 
inclusive South African identity, trying not to politicize it along the 
ethnic lines (although it was frequently viewed as the Xhosa-
dominated). This dissertation follows the latter approach, as it allows 
registering wider variation in proposed national purposes, especially 
when politicization of ethnicity is not available for elites as a nation-
building option due to complex ethnic composition.  
  The starting point of social purpose formation is the 
exogenous shock –the collapse of the previous political regime or the 
whole international system, sometimes aggravated by protracted 
transitional periods. During these transitional periods, political elites 
and smaller sub-national policy entrepreneurs (following Brudny, I 
define them as ―articulated audiences‖) embark on searching, 
formulating, and later disseminating a new conception of common 
good for the country. In Chapter 3 I discuss in greater details how to 
turn social purpose from a significantly underexplored factor to a 
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variable, which may potentially explain variation in the content of 
cross-national domestic responses to the international policy 
prescriptions. In the next section I give an overview of social purpose 
as an explanation. 
 
Social purpose as an explanation 
While finding core substantive components might be seen as relatively 
easy inductive work, other aspects of social purpose, including its 
explanatory power, are much less theorized and demonstrated. 
Problems arise when scholars start making broad claims about social 
purpose‘s causal impact or its lack. The wide-spread research practice 
is the underspecified conjecturing about social purpose‘s impact on 
behavior.
13
  Often, studies cognizant of the problem of tautology 
remain somewhat indeterminate and evasive about making specific 
and falsifiable claims. This approach comes short of explicit 
discussion about causality, and merely chronicles the emergence of 
social purpose as an independent variable and its loose temporal 
connection to dependent variables (hence stress on conjecturing). Both 
in Russia and South Africa there are many specific public policies, 
which might have been profoundly influenced by the emerging social 
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purpose. In Russia, for instance, its internal political commitment to 
reestablish the great power status stimulated its more assertive role in 
creating regional alliances to balance NATO,  partnership with Iran in 
the nuclear sphere, and even a regional war with Georgia.
14
 In South 
African context, the elite‘s commitment to provide continental 
leadership was central in emergence of the New Economic Partnership 
for African Development (NEPAD). In the cases above social purpose 
remains compounded with the subsequent political choices, leaving 
almost no space for considering behavioral alternatives. Descriptively 
illustrative, this account can benefit from stronger research design. 
First, examining the explanatory role of social has to keep 
social purpose and policy outcomes separate.  To deal with these 
issues in this dissertation I start my work empirically examining how 
HIV/AIDS treatment policy looks without the impact of social purpose 
(at the international arena, see Chapter 2) and with such an impact (the 
structured focused comparison the domestic HIV/AIDS policies in two 
selected countries). In both countries social purpose was formulated 
separately from the international standardized recommendations about 
the HIV/AIDS treatment and for the most part prior to the policy 
entering domestic arenas. Therefore it is possible to separate social 
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purpose as an intervening variable from its presence in the domestic 
policy of treatment as a dependent variable.  Second, and more 
importantly, I demonstrate how distinct graspable substantive 
components of social purpose impact on the specific components and 
indicators of HIV/AIDS policy (my dependent variable in process of 
HIV/AIDS policy transfer). Thus, in general, doing so will enable us 
not only to claim, but to demonstrate and sort out the constitutive 
impact of social purpose on public policies.  The summary of my 
empirical findings is given in the Table 1.3.  
Second, examining the explanatory role of social has to capture 
variation in measuring (ranking) social purpose.  In chapter 3 I 
delineate between absent, fractured, restrained, and consolidated 
rankings of social purpose. This ranking builds on Abdelal‘s insights 
that social purpose is has to be examined not only by revealing its 
content, but also by the degree of contestation around it. His National 
Purpose in the World Economy tentatively delineated between absence 
and presence of such political contestation.  
Elites habitually legitimize a new social purpose by spreading 
the belief that country‘s political sustainability depends on providing 
it. In essence, this activity shapes domestic policy environment, 
making some policies to be held as ―natural‖ and self-evident, while 
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alternative behavioral choices to be either delegitimized, not 
considered as viable alternative options, or even chastised as criminal 
among the wider audiences.  As a result, for the political opponents of 
the extant elite it will be more difficult to effectively challenge and 
change the enacted public policies. At the same time, wider audiences 
might inherently disagree with the promoted conception of common 
good, but for a variety of reasons might conform to it and if chooses to 
dispute it publicly, does so in a very subdued manner. At the margins, 
other sub-elite groups and political parties keep advocating radically 
different set of political obligations, engrained in a different set of 
values.  
Third, this study of social purpose directly responds to the 
current empirical debates (often very heated) whether or not the 
official formulation of social purposes is simply a public relations 
stunt, a strategic popular eye-grabbing device with a little real meaning 
beyond it. Even though the discourses of the African Renaissance and 
Sovereign democracy were deployed by key political leaders and their 
advisers, many observers remained very skeptical about whether these 
concepts had any profound policy implications. Peter Vale and Sipho 
Maseko, for instance, questioned African Renaissance impact on 
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public policy.
15
  Similarly, the liberal critics of Russia‘s current 
political regime flatly claimed that Sovereign Democracy was a thin 
veil over Putin‘s autocratic turn, institutional underdevelopment, 
clientelism, and corruption.
16
 In principle I agree that simply stating 
social purpose to be politically relevant is neither irrefutable, nor 
compelling a claim. In my empirical chapters I go into further details 
how and why social purpose is more than a mere propaganda.  
Fourth, obviously many factors continue to inform and shape 
domestic HIV/AIDS politics. In Russian case, for instance, the issues 
of state capacity, state efficiency, and corruption might and do explain 
a lot. In Africa, these factors might include the incapacitating role of 
traditional patriarchy, the dependence on international financial 
resources, the lack of political and economic commitments, and the 
inability to design and implement long-term treatment and prevention 
programs.
17
 This list, of course, can be easily expanded to include 
many other regional and national factors. Since it is not easy to fold all 
these diverse factors into one explanation, the literature often questions 
whether a parsimonious explanation is warranted. A typical article 
from Social Science and Medicine, for example, evades 
generalizations and talks only about very specific variables even when 
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looking at the regional dimension of public health in general.
18
 The 
explanation offered in this dissertation seeks to overcome this 
limitation and cover previously overlooked domestic determinants of 
HIV/AIDS politics.  
Finally, in terms of health policy, strong societal agreement 
about what constitutes the ―common good‖ served by state (e.g., 
―social purpose‖) under certain circumstances profoundly influences 
the overall domestic policy environment, which might politicize 
international public policy, or even become hostile to it. My core 
theoretical argument suggests that social purpose informs how 
domestic policy-makers evaluate the benefits of adopting international 
recommendations and underpins the kinds of actions domestic policy 
environments are likely to sanction. More specifically, it affects 
decisions how to frame the provision of a particular public good 
(treatment in the case of health policy), who should benefit or be 
excluded from the consumption of public good, and who gets to 
participate in shaping the policy. On balance, however, I do not claim 
that social purpose is superior to any other explanations of how, why 
and to what extent the global consensus on the HIV/AIDS policy was 
adopted in Russia and South Africa. In the relevant empirical chapters 
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I will briefly discuss which health policy indicators are not explained 
by social purpose and why.  
 
Social purpose and constructivism 
Since my research project sprung from the constructivist turn in 
International Relations, in this section I spell out how studying social 
purpose contributes to the [still] burgeoning literature on norm 
diffusion derived from constructivist international relations. In fact, 
social purpose is an interesting and underexplored dimension of 
identity. Probing it also contributes to our understanding of what 
constitutes domestic logic of appropriateness.  
A significant portion of constructivist literature asserts that the 
process of norm diffusion in one way or another is driven by norm 
congruence. Different accounts explore building purposeful norm 
congruence by means of framing, evoking prior similar norms, as well 
as grafting, pruning, and transplantation.
19
 Intentional and purposeful 
match-making, captured in these gardening metaphors, may lead to 
either radical, or partial local norm displacement. In turn, normative 
clash, if not alleviated, can lead to domestic opposition to an 
international norm. Amitav Acharya called attention to the so-called 
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―localization,‖ a process of an active reconstruction of a foreign norm 
to meet domestic standards, which are part of legitimate domestic 
order: ―… processes of reconstitution to make an outside norm 
congruent with a preexisting local normative order… in which some 
key characteristics of the preexisting normative order are retained 
rather than displaced wholesale.‖20 Yet as Ted Hopf correctly 
indicates, making claims about normative congruence or mismatch 
requires a solid theory about what constitutes the domestic 
appropriateness and why.
 21
  Without this theorizing, it would be 
tempting to select on dependent variable and simply ―assign‖ some 
domestic political, economic, or social circumstances as the factors 
determining this appropriateness. In addressing this analytical gap, the 
examination of social purpose helps establishing what constitutes the 
legitimate social order in a given polity and provides the framework of 
cross-national and cross-regional comparisons. More specifically, it 
gives us conceptual lenses to answer two interrelated questions. First, 
what specific set of specific obligations in providing common good 
elites uphold as the core political and social values, i.e., it specifies 
what normative features which reconstitute a foreign norm. Second, to 
what degree there is a societal consensus (measured via ranking social 
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purpose) and how deeply it is embedded in the collective articulations. 
Thus, the examination of social purpose helps ascertaining what 
constitutes general domestic appropriateness, which under different 
conditions may frustrate or facilitate norm diffusion.  
Another broad strand of constructivist research on international 
norms broadly indicated that bringing domestic norms and policies in 
consistence with international prescriptions is linked to domestic 
actors‘ identity.22 Michael Zürn and Jeffrey Checkel, for instance, 
noted that identity can either facilitate norm diffusion, or hinder it.
23 
Yet, in the same International Organization volume, Alastair Iain 
Johnston admitted that identity remained too blunt of an instrument 
and was often used to make sweeping claims without specifying the 
concrete ways how identity can make a difference.
 24
  In general, it is 
feasible that external norms, policies, and policy recommendations are 
strongly associated with the political imagery of the Other, are less 
likely to be adopted at the domestic level. In this context, we may 
conjecture that identity as an intervening or explanatory variable can 
filter international norms, providing a political rationale to challenge, 
resist, cherry-pick, or adopt some best case practices if compatible 
with it.   
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Acharya started exploring this relation in greater depth, noting 
that for successful norm diffusion ―[t]here must be willing and credible 
local actors (insider proponents). These actors should not be seen as 
―stooges‖ of outside forces.‖ 25 This analysis definitely invites us to 
think about the impact of self-Other dichotomy on the process of norm 
diffusion. The question persists: How, why and to what extent some 
domestic proponents of change are viewed as foreign-inspired Others, 
while other actors that pursue policy change are received more 
favorably? Moreover, in his model local elites become active 
borrowers of foreign ideas and norms in order to fulfill the domestic 
demand of boosting legitimacy. But are domestic political elites 
always likely to be unconditionally supported when they pursue this 
kind of change? In other words, the question here is about the 
determinants of domestic actors getting treated and publicly perceived 
as either the credible upholders of local values and identity, or as 
―agents‖ of outside forces. As the notion of social purpose in large part 
is based on the political imagery of who the contending political actors 
are (see the previous section), I assert that domestic self-Other 
dichotomy generated by social purpose can be helpful in providing an 
analytical, rather than purely empirical, response to the question how, 
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why and to what extent identity might factor in norm diffusion 
processes.  
Another version of self-Other dichotomy is implicit in the 
socialization research program. Socialization is a compliance with 
outside norms in the context when entering international political 
communities, intergovernmental institutions, or a new regulative 
regime is highly desirable.
26
 In essence, socialization is an ideal case-
scenario, when domestic actors take legitimacy of international norms 
and practices as granted and start emulating them instantly.
27
 This 
analysis was exceptionally successful in empirically explaining how 
and why Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries eventually 
adopted the European Union‘s policies in the process of democratic 
transition, as they envisioned themselves as a part of European self.  
While it is conceivable that CEE would not see its principal 
norm-giver as the Other, it is less likely, first, that regional hegemon 
can find an external Self with the same ease. Here I argue that studying 
social purpose (as a promising dimension of identity) can potentially 
explain global or regional leaders‘ behavior in regard to taking 
external norms. Second, this explanation has a hard time capturing the 
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potential dual role of domestic leaders as both norm-givers and norm-
takers. This explanation generally tends to gloss over the relationship 
between multiple domestic agents of change and may overlook 
broader political processes behind multiple entrepreneurs struggle to 
spread their interpretation of norm. 
 
Social purpose and identity 
It can be argued that social purpose in fact is an interesting and 
underexplored dimension of identity, as well as the determinant of the 
domestic logic of appropriateness. My theoretical analysis of social 
purpose builds on a conventional constructivist insight that no 
conception of common good can exist independently from domestic 
political actors. Thus social purpose is likely to be based on the 
political imagery of who the contending political actors are. When 
actors strongly define themselves through their commitment to 
common good, they also compete with other groups promoting 
different conception of common good. This generates self-Other 
dichotomies, which can be found in the discursive formations.  
My presentation here overcomes still existing tendency to 
essentialize and reify identity. For example, preexisting patriarchal 
gender norms, intolerance to religious adherence, or xenophobia to 
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migrants in host societies may be considered to imply inherent identity 
positions with fundamental and universally recurring political 
implications.  My theoretical and empirical analysis, on the contrary, 
presents identity as politically contingent way for domestic elites to 
assert their self-efficacy and self-esteem through their commitment to 
common good, which later may or may not strongly inform domestic 
policy choices.  
On the other hand, many previous accounts of identity 
generated sometimes intuitive, sometimes almost trivial findings. It is 
not (or should not be) surprising, for example, that negatively 
constructed target populations would fight against stigma, 
discrimination, and injustice. Consider, for instance, the Lesbian, Gay 
Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) community opposing the ban on 
the same-sex marriage in the United States, or People Living with 
HIV/AIDS (PLWA) promoting HIV/AIDS awareness in the Russian 
Federation or South Africa.  In other words, previous studies of social 
purpose remained somewhat limited to examining how actors define 
the purposes of the existing in-group relevant to the kinds of actions 
the group considered appropriate.
28
 
The final general consideration concerns studying identity 
politics as related to the HIV/AIDS issue-area. This dissertation also 
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calls for innovative ways to look at identity in the context of 
HIV/AIDS. So far, studying identity politics as related to HIV/AIDS 
issue-area was limited to investigating how policy makers constructed 
the individual characteristics of vulnerable sub-populations and how 
this construction affected public-health interventions. This research 
was closely connected to international health activism, aimed at 
overcoming stigma as related to the etiology of HIV/AIDS. The 
prescriptive outcome of this research agenda was to devise policies 
boosting the global agenda of human rights to health and access to the 
affordable medicines for anybody who needs them. So far, only a few 
scholars delved in exploring the links between national HIV/AIDS 
policies and variables loosely resembling what might be identity-like 
factors on a national level.
29
  Ascertaining the role and place of social 
purpose in HIV/AIDS politics provides a framework for taking stock 
of the factors which shaped the commitment to fight HIV/AIDS, as 
insights for the future of sustainable and robust partnerships between 
governments and the proliferating domestic and transnational nonstate 
organizations. 
 
A FURTHER LOOK AT CASES AND COMPARISONS 
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This study examines South Africa and Russia. Since this study is an 
exploratory account of social purpose, first and foremost I choose my 
cases on the expectation that social purpose indeed influences public 
policy and generates tangible implications for public health. This 
insight builds on those scholars, who tend to claim that identity-related 
variables in Russia and South Africa are of special political import. 
This study pushes this insight further: It tries to explain how and why 
identity informs and inhibits certain kind of policy choices, while not 
compounding identity with subsequent policy choices. Here I did not 
consciously select on the dependent variable, although my empirical 
results show that public policies in both countries got diverted from 
best international practices. In fact I claim that social purpose in 
principle might help implementing global policy initiatives 
domestically. 
Second, during the 1990s both countries underwent major 
transition from post-communist and post-colonial regimes, which 
challenged elites to articulate new conceptions of common good. 
Among the universe of transitional cases, these two countries do not 
qualify for the unconditional ―embrace of the West,‖ nor for a 
complete ―aloofness‖ from or hatred to it. This makes them standing 
out of the majority of other post-communist and post-colonial states. 
Furthermore, I consciously select two countries from different regions, 
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continents with an expectation of the content of national purpose in 
Russia and South Africa to be very different. This will allow me to put 
social purpose in comparative perspective and theorize its causal 
importance not resorting to some contingent explanations.   
Moreover, examining South Africa and Russia can tell us 
important things about social purpose as well. In the recent years both 
countries have undergone the processes of dramatic political transition 
with considerable political struggle and traceable political discussions 
about the nature of common good. These discussions were consciously 
triggered by extant political elites. Thus, these two cases give ample 
material to examine the formation of social purpose in greater details. 
This part of my dissertation work helps expanding traditional 
academic focus placed on subnational, smaller identity entrepreneurs 
and social movements as the agents of change to the exploration of 
elites‘ purposeful attempts to link the idea of the nation to specific 
political goals and prescriptions pinned on the vision of self and the 
Other. 
Looking at Russia and South Africa through the conceptual 
lenses of social purpose can significantly contribute to the existing 
explanations of the HIV/AIDS politic. I have started this chapter 
discussing President Thabo Mbeki‘s allegedly imposing presence in 
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South African health policy. I made a case that we can benefit from 
reexamining of a broader spectrum of HIV/AIDS policies pursued 
under Mbeki‘s leadership. Let us glance at the Russian case. 
Russian scholars tend to pinpoint the broad processes of 
securitization dominating the Russian health agenda.
30
  The nub of this 
view is correct. The question persists, however, where this 
securitization is coming from. One explanation points out the 
Millennium Summit and the United Nations General Assembly 
Security Session (UNGASS) as major driving forces behind this 
reformulation.
31
 However, securitization is not necessarily linked to 
the global prescriptions and formulations. First, the links between 
HIV/AIDS and military (state) security have been the focal concerns 
of many leaders even before the human security perspective gained its 
global momentum. For instance, Yoweri Museveni‘s fear to lose 
Ugandan military force prompted him to learn from Cuban example of 
early detection of and response to the disease.
 32
 Second, securitization 
of AIDS—whether or not states have genuine concerns for the military 
preparedness—may become a discursive tool governments with 
limited resources use to put the issue higher on international agenda in 
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order to attract international attention, financial resources and 
logistical assistance.
33 
This means that the security frame is used 
strategically with the realistic expectation to gain certain benefits, even 
though getting funding from major international donors in not 
contingent on framing HIV and security issue. Thus, reexamining 
HIV/AIDS policies in Russia is still of importance. In Chapter 6 I will 
demonstrate that the Russian case of AIDS securitization was an 
instance of deploying its historically contingent social purpose.
34
   
In this case selection, I will hold constant two important things. 
First, since 1996 policy-makers in both countries had an abundant 
exposure to the global consensus on HIV/AIDS and the set of 
international best practices. In other words, exposure to the 
international best practices does not vary. Both in Russia and South 
Africa the epidemic unraveled after its devastating epidemiological 
consequences became obvious elsewhere. In essence, they are 
―second-wave countries‖ which can learn about the successful choices 
with very tangible results of the ―first-wave countries,‖ including 
Brazil, Uganda, and Thailand.
35 
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Second, both countries possess significant but not 
extraordinary material capacities. This is important since wealthier 
countries potentially can act as leaders, norm-givers at the 
international arena. Higher health spending, more developed 
infrastructure, and better pharmaceutical sector can lead to the 
diversity of policy options. Less affluent countries which lack the 
requisite amount of material resources, suffer from insufficient 
technical expertise, and do not benefit from an advanced 
pharmaceutical sector, are more likely to act as followers, norm-takers 
at the international arena. Where does it leave us in terms of Russia 
and South Africa? Both are middle income countries; both are less 
dependent on the international community as compared to any heavily 
indebted, failing, or failed state. At the same time, comparing to 
Thailand, Brazil, and India, neither of them possesses the requisite 
material characteristics so that they can convincingly launch a 
successful large-scale independent challenge and contribute to the 
international consensus. Russia is in especially precarious position. 
Despite its temporary petrowealth, the general health care 
infrastructure and medical-industrial capacities have been constantly 
deteriorating. The rapidly increasing governmental spending in most 
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cases lagged behind the need to renovate the infrastructure, purchase 
up-to-date medical equipment, and tangibly improve the health care 
services (majority of people remain highly dissatisfied with their 
quality). South Africa, while boasting some degree of wealth, 
especially compared to the rest of the continent, has feeble public 
health sector with dismal health care capacities. Although both 
countries are expected to be sensitive to the external recommendations 
and assistance, even in the context of the lack of direct pressures, both 
Russia and South Africa chose to act as international leaders in 
response to HIV/AIDS. As this leadership was not founded on material 
capabilities or technological advantages, it gives us at least initial 
reasons to believe that domestic choices were influences by some 
domestic political determinants, other than material and financial 
power. 
 
DISSERTATION STRUCTURE (THE REST OF THE ARGUMENT) 
My dissertation investigates how, why and when did Russian and 
South African governments challenge the international norms of the 
HIV/AIDS treatment. In these two countries the generalized epidemic 
occurred simultaneously with the advent of a new conception of 
common good (national purpose), which domestic elites presented as 
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vital for the existence and survival of the state as an autonomous 
political organization. Exploring the effects of social purpose on the 
adoption of global policy prescriptions and norms is novel in political 
science. From the empirical standpoint, my dissertation offers a 
comprehensive analysis of the political processes leading to the advent 
of a consolidated and publicly accepted national purpose, as well as 
the HIV/AIDS policies in Russia and South Africa. From the policy 
analysis perspective, it helps understand which domestic factors can 
potentially facilitate or frustrate the global governance of health crises 
and why. 
The dissertation structure reflects the evolving logic of the 
questions asked. This introductory chapter introduces the core themes 
and debates in the study of both social purpose and cross-national 
HIV/AIDS politics, and gives an overview of the core argument as 
substantiated in the empirical body of the dissertation. It justifies the 
selection of cases, international policy issue-area, and the time-frame. 
In essence, this chapter makes connections between variables, explains 
the links between projects‘ various parts and introduces general 
readers to the broader theoretical literatures.  
International consensus on HIV/AIDS is as an independent 
variable in my dissertation. In Chapter 2 I discuss the international 
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view on HIV/AIDS treatment as a common good and spell out key 
indicators of HIV/AIDS treatment policy. I discuss how the 
independent variable looks like without social purpose factoring in it. 
To do so, I historicize international approaches to AIDS policy to 
establish the variance in the variable (absence/presence of the 
consensus), as well as demonstrate that it heavily hinges on the 
biomedical innovation of effective ARVs.    
Chapter 3 defines and advances the usage of social purpose as 
an analytical tool. I build on the insights originally spelled out by 
Christian Reus-Smit, who conceived social (moral) purpose as a deep-
seated and socially legitimate ―conception of common good served by 
autonomous political organization.‖36 The subsequent empirical 
chapters demonstrate how Russian and South African elites formulated 
and promoted their conceptions of common good. Social purpose is an 
interesting but often overlooked dimension of identity, which captures 
both the kinds of actions elites consider appropriate and the kinds of 
actions domestic policy environments underpin. The latter explains 
what kind of policies will be publicly held as ―natural‖ and self-
evident and why. The overall intention of this chapter is to make social 
purpose specified, valid, and analytically useful. The chapter provides 
a necessary analytical framework for the following cross-national 
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comparisons of various historically and country-contingent contents of 
national purpose. The minor point of the chapter is to refute the typical 
claim that content of various identities/social purposes is incomparable 
in principle.   
Chapters 4 and 5 explore the national purposes in the Russian 
Federation and South Africa separately from the HIV/AIDS policy, 
using the model advanced in Chapter 3. In the context of these 
empirical chapters, I do not make a claim that there is an innate, 
undisputable, and long-lasting public consensus on Russian or South 
African social purpose. Quite the opposite, it is likely that social 
purposes in these two countries will change once extant elites fall out 
of power. 
 Russia‘s elite (Chapter 4) strongly committed to the strong 
state as an ultimate political value, emphasized the primacy of state in 
economic delivery and regulation, and trumped up a vision of Russia 
as a great power in global politics. All these components of common 
good are sometimes subsumed under the heading of Sovereign 
Democracy and attest to the revival of the autocratic myth and the 
delusion of grandeur. Subsequently, Putin‘s entourage painstakingly 
strove to embed this conception of common good by holding the 
democratic politics of the 1990s responsible for the collapse of the 
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state, loss of national self-efficacy and self-esteem. As a result, the 
obsession with strong state created a policy environment, which 
delegitimized liberal approaches to the looming health crisis.  In South 
Africa (Chapter 5) the notion of the African Renaissance gained some 
political currency. In all its fuzziness (which also might be viewed as 
its richness) the notion can be narrowed down to three core organizing 
prescriptions. They include indigenousness (sometimes labeled as 
Nativism, or Africanism) as the ideology of returning to the roots and 
revitalizing the genetic resources and traditional practices; 
marketization as the strategy of economic empowerment; and the quest 
for shared humanity and communal solidarity interpreted as the 
country‘s exceptionalism  (ubuntu) in the context of globalization.  I 
explore how a particular proposal for nation was pinned on elite‘s self-
understanding, linked to the broader collective understandings of the 
nation, outreached to broader audiences, as well as whether elite‘s 
formulation of national purpose was congruent with meanings 
transmitted by the popular culture. 
In both countries, social purpose significantly affected the 
content of the HIV/AIDS policies. In Chapters 6 and 7 I examine the 
HIV/AIDS policy and document these effects. I capture how national 
policy responses challenged and ―filtered‖ the internationally 
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prescribed range of choices. In other words, I document and explain 
when, how and why the domestic policy choices became inconsistent 
with the mainstream international health consensus. On balance, I do 
not contend to explain all minute details of the domestic HIV/AIDS 
policies, yet I claim that provided analysis both contributes to the 
existing explanations and covers important elements of the domestic 
HIV/AIDS politics not covered before.  The comprehensive summary 
of social purpose‘s impact on domestic HIV/AIDS policy is provided 
in Table 1.3 at the end of this section. 
Chapter 6 argues that Russian HIV/AIDS policies were shaped 
by the deployment of the Sovereign Democracy--the historically 
contingent and country-specific content of social purpose. The most 
important outcomes of this impact include three broad clusters of 
effects. First, the commitment to the strong state affected the general 
political understanding and framing of the domestic epidemic and 
linked it to the highly desired demographic security as the major tool 
in having a strong state. It also impinged on the human rights 
principles in providing ARVs to the key vulnerable populations and 
limited the permissible role of civil society in combating against 
HIV/AIDS. Second, the emphasis on the state-led development 
contributed to the significant increase in public spending for healthcare 
48 
 
and infectious diseases and efforts at universal and free medical 
coverage, and shunning the private sector as a potential partner. Third, 
bearing down on the vision of great-power status stimulated the 
Kremlin to act like a donor/leader on the international arena, fend off 
the expertise and resources of well-established international health 
organizations, and attempting to revamp the country‘s position in the 
pharmaceutical markets.  
Chapter 7 argues that South African HIV/AIDS policies were 
shaped by the deployment of the African Renaissance--the historically 
contingent and country-specific content of social purpose. The most 
important outcomes of this impact include three broad clusters of 
effects. First, indigenousness (Africanism) impinged on the 
standardized protocol in treatment, stimulated the production of 
traditional medicines, and subsequently institutionalized their national 
governance. It also contributed to the politicization and filtering the 
desirable pool of partners, as well as shaping their permissible role in 
curbing HIV/AIDS. Second, marketization (economic neo-liberalism) 
undermined the universal rollout of the antiretrovirals in public health 
sector and protected the private sector from sharing the burden of 
health response. Third, exceptionalism (ubuntu) led to the general 
politicization of the domestic epidemic, putting it in the context of 
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colonialism. It empowered and legitimized the counter-epistemic 
community of AIDS dissidents. Not only the government acted on 
these core components of social purpose, but it also empowered 
multiple domestic and international actors to express their radicalized 
political views, as well as promote and apply their substandard 
biomedical convictions.    
While I see my argument about social purpose as helpful to 
advance the conventional constructivists‘ take on norm diffusion, this 
dissertation is more concerned with another cluster of explanations.  In 
Chapter 8 I will continue this discussion in the context of policy 
transfer models derived from comparative examination of the Eastern 
European transformation.
37
 To sharpen my theoretical focus this 
research locates social purpose in the context of relevant literatures. I 
also examine whether and to what degree my emphasis on social 
purpose as an intervening variable is robust to major alternative 
explanations derived from policy transfer models.  In Conclusion I 
summarize my empirical and theoretical results, systematize and spell 
five major effects of social purpose on public policy. 
Table 1.3 Summary of comparisons and explanations 
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CHAPTER 2. INTERNATIONAL POLICY INITIATIVES 
AGAINST HIV/AIDS: OPERATIONALIZING THE CONSENSUS 
 
From the empirical standpoint, my dissertation contributes to the 
current debates about the cross-national variation in responses to the 
emerging infectious diseases in the context of health crises, which 
transcend boundary, authority, and capacity of nation-states. Before 
thinking about this variation, we need to analyze and operationalize 
what constitutes an international mainstream for HIV/AIDS policy 
response. I define this mainstream consensus as governmental 
responsibility to provide the antiretroviral treatment, ensure the 
universality of access to it, and bring all relevant stakeholders in the 
policy-making process. In this study the global consensus on the 
HIV/AIDS treatment policy is the independent variable, which is 
disaggregated into set of three general components and nine more 
specific policy indicators (listed in Table 1.1).  
The international policy consensus around HIV/AIDS would 
not have been achieved without effective antiretroviral drugs (ARVs). 
Multiple accounts of AIDS history lament about the ―quiescence‖ in 
international responses to AIDS due to the lack of an effective and 
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relatively cheap biomedical product. In fact, most international players 
talked about the necessity to provide the HIV/AIDS treatment, yet 
perforce were unable to promote it globally as the solution to the 
pandemic.
1
 Starting from 1996, intergovernmental organizations and 
the professional health community gained momentum in formulating 
sophisticated policy initiatives in response to HIV/AIDS and spreading 
them across the globe. The creation of new generation of AIDS 
organizations in the early 2000s proved to be an additional step in 
cementing the global consensus. The new generation of AIDS 
organizations structured its financial assistance around AIDS first and 
foremost as a public health crisis with a strong emphasis placed on the 
universal access to the life-saving medicines. Thus, in the early 2000s 
international recommendations have become almost universally 
recognized as important tools in improving domestic policies, 
including public health. 
This chapter operationalizes this policy consensus and briefly 
historicizes its evolution. The exact number, sequence, validity, and 
substance of these indicators might not be accepted without 
hesitation.
2
  Yet this operationalization is rather reliable as it broadly 
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reflects major points in the HIV/AIDS policy literature. Breaking 
down the general HIV/AIDS policy in a set of components is 
important to ascertain how this policy looks like and what it is not 
supposed to be. It also helps to increase the number of observations 
and set up a template for the structured focus comparison of domestic 
HIV/AIDS policies. At this point I do not discuss how and why the 
domestic conceptions of common good factor in health policy.    
Table 2.1: Global policy consensus on HIV/AIDS    
 
TREATMENT  
The first core component of the international policy is to provide the 
approved antiretroviral treatment as a biomedical response to an acute 
public health crisis.  Most importantly, policy-makers should respond 
to HIV/AIDS crisis as a public health problem--a preventable 
communicable disease and a manageable chronic infection. 
Substituting or skewing basic policy response by giving a political 
priority to other issue-frames, such as demographic crisis, military 
security, human rights, poverty and inequality, property rights, is the 
first signal that the HIV/AIDS policy got invested with situational and 
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local conceptions of common good. A strong adherence to any 
alternative issue-framing choices may potentially lead to further 
deviations from the international consensus, including a public denial 
of the epidemic, underscoring the uniqueness of the domestic 
characteristics of the epidemic (see Indicator 1a), attempts to enforce 
various substandard treatment protocols (see Indicator 1b), or simply 
inaction in securing the price-saving generic pharmaceutical products 
(see Indicator 1c). Whether or not these alternate frames are ―justified‖ 
to meet the specific conditions on the ground will be discussed later. 
 
Indicator 1a: The pandemic as a public health crisis 
The first indicator of the substantive component of treatment is 
framing the issue as a public health crisis. The opposite of this 
recommendation includes being in denial of the epidemic, pointing up 
the uniqueness of the domestic epidemic, or linking the root causes of 
the epidemic to the negatively constructed populations. 
Important international actors not always addressed the 
pandemic as a public health crisis. Conservative governments typically 
framed AIDS in terms other than public health. President Ronald 
Reagan‘s administration, for instance, understood AIDS in the context 
of medical competition with France, ideological struggle with the 
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USSR, and the diminishing role of Africa in the global power politics. 
Reagan was generally reluctant to speak about the disease in public 
and to request any HIV-related funds from the Congress.
3 
At the same 
time, intergovernmental cooperation was riveted to collecting better 
evidence on AIDS from Africa and studying a variety of clinical 
manifestations of the disease among different subpopulations.
4
 Thus, 
National Institute of Health (NIH), Center for Disease Control (CDC) 
and the Belgium Institute of Tropical Medicine (BITM), and the 
Zairian Ministry of Health did not confront the disease as [global] 
public health crisis. At the same time, many intergovernmental 
programs helped overcome poor technical equipment and inadequate 
provision of medical health care abroad.  Multiple international 
programs included the provision of mobile health care to the remote 
rural areas (African Medical and Research Foundation, AMREF), 
relief and development assistance (World Vision, Ford Foundation, 
Rockefeller Foundation), health personnel training (Project HOPE), 
assistance in blood transfusions and needle exchange (Prevention 
Point, the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies—
LRCRCS), and awarding small grants for innovative local initiatives 
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(People-to-People Health Foundation, Human Rights and Governance 
Program).  
The history of cooperation in response to HIV/AIDS prior to 
1996 demonstrates that the development of policy consensus for its 
own sake was hardly sustainable. Major involved actors had little or no 
incentives for the actors to reconcile their differences and agree on the 
specific framing of AIDS. The arrival of effective antiretroviral 
therapies in 1996 changed this. To use conventional constructivist 
terminology, it was a tipping point, which signaled a shift towards 
policy consolidation. The technological breakthrough of 1996 gave 
international actors a new common ground to overcome seemingly 
irreconcilable differences in their agendas and approaches. By the 
early 2000s the health benefits of providing the universal ARV 
treatment in public sector became clear due to internationally praised 
success stories (model cases, best practices) from Brazil, Thailand, 
Uganda, and so on. Applying the conventional constructivists‘ 
parlance, the norm cascade occurred at the XI International AIDS 
Conference in Lusaka (Zambia), when the majority of African nation-
states publicly committed to address HIV/AIDS as a public health 
crisis and began deploying the life-saving ARVs. Furthermore, these 
states turned things around by seizing the initiative in arguing for a 
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broader international assistance from the global health organizations, 
thus to a certain degree acting as norm entrepreneurs themselves. 
The most recent challenge to frame the pandemic as a public 
health crisis was embodied by the Agreement on the Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS). TRIPS was often seen as a 
vehicle to advance the profit-seeking behavior of the industrialized 
world including giant international pharmaceutical corporations.
5
 
These corporate actors understood treatment in terms of intellectual 
property and trade to be regulated via the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
Simultaneously, many developing states (including Brazil, India, 
Thailand and South Africa), as well as advocacy organizations 
(Oxfam, MSF) fought for subsuming the issues of treatment under a 
public health rubric, which in turn implied only secondary importance 
of intellectual property and trade. South African and Brazilian legal 
disputes with 39 pharmaceutical manufacturing giants and the WTO 
are well-documented.
6
 The Fourth Session of the Ministerial 
Conference of the WTO (Doha, Qatar, November 2001) adopted the 
foundational document, which reaffirmed the primacy of public health 
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frame in dealing with HIV/AIDS treatment.
7
 In essence, the 
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health allowed developing countries 
to adopt necessary measures to protect public health as long as it was 
pursued through the TRIPS safeguards. Tracing the details of 
international political contestation around TRIPS is outside the scope 
and purpose of this chapter. Suffice to say that global treatment 
activists were instrumental in making TRIPS more flexible and 
generally permissive to the expansion of the international access to the 
ARVs.
8
 
Today international health and financial organizations signal 
their continuing commitment to the public health policy approach 
against HIV/AIDS.  In 2007, the Institute of Medicine of the National 
Academies of Science published a comprehensive report ―PEPFAR 
Implementation: Progress and Promise.‖ According to this report, 
PEPFAR—on of the most important international AIDS 
organizations—treats HIV/AIDS as a preventable communicable 
disease and a manageable chronic infection, rather than a terminal 
illness generated by some contingent socio-cultural characteristics.
 9
  
Similarly, in 2008 the WHO‘s regional branches, including its South-
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East Asia Regional Office, reaffirmed their committed to HIV/AIDS 
as a public health crisis.
10
 In sum, public health approach to 
HIV/AIDS  
 …promoted by WHO underpins the successful 
experiences of several countries in scaling up 
HIV/AIDS services and is based on the principles of 
simplification, standardisation, decentralisation, equity, 
and patient and community participation, and has been 
pivotal in unlocking the treatment agenda, and starting 
to close the treatment gap between rich and poor 
countries. 
11
 
Today there is a legitimate plurality of frames and approaches 
attuned to the nuances of the local epidemiological conditions.  As the 
understanding of the pandemic and its impact improved, for both 
governments and international bodies it is acceptable to view 
HIV/AIDS as a problem of socioeconomic issue related to 
development, military or human security, human rights, intellectual 
property, and so on.
 12
 The availability of multiple frames suggests 
different emphases in health care responses, yet it does not imply that 
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  SEA/RC61/12, available at <http://www.searo.who.int/LinkFiles/RC61_12-
pa_Item-14.pdf>  
11
 Gilks et al 2006: 509, available at 
<http://www.who.int/hiv/events/artprevention/gilks.pdf> 
12
  Jönssen and Söderholm 1995: 461-466.  
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the epidemic ceases to remain an immense public health care crisis and 
should be understood in other than biomedical and scientific terms. In 
other words, there is nothing ―wrong,‖ puzzling, or unusual when 
governments start talking about HIV/AIDS as a national demographic 
issue exacerbated by widespread narcotic abuse (Russia), or a deeply 
engrained socioeconomic problem with links to poverty and 
malnutrition (South Africa). However, in some circumstances 
governments jeopardize or thwart the provision of the standard 
biomedical treatment (ARVs) as approved by international bodies, 
they overexaggerate societal, rather than medical, conditions and start 
addressing them outside the biomedical and scientific framework. This 
selective approach is indicative not of governments‘ sensitivity to the 
local epidemiological situation, but rather of their sensibility to other 
non-medical factors in the policy environment.    
 
Indicator 1b: Standardized protocol in treatment 
The second indicator is the acceptance of the internationally approved 
antiretrovirals (ARVs) as biomedically effective and cost-effective 
intervention measure to address the public health emergency. 
According to the WHO, two fundamental objectives for the proper 
management of the ARV treatment include: ―Standardization and 
60 
 
simplification of ARV regimens to support the efficient 
implementation of treatment programmes in resource-limited settings; 
[and ] Ensuring that ARV treatment programmes are based on 
scientific evidence, in order to avoid the use of substandard treatment 
protocols which compromise the treatment outcome of individual 
clients and create the potential for emergence of drug resistant 
virus.‖13 The opposite of this recommendation is either the rejection of 
the ARVs as toxic and ineffective, stressing complementary and 
alternative medicines as the primary substitution to ARVs, or selection 
of the second-line regimens over the first line. From a public health 
approach to HIV/AIDS, the use of subpar or substandard treatment 
protocols and distribution services is very dangerous, as it could 
compromise the treatment outcomes and even trigger the wide spread 
drug resistance. 
The public announcement of the discovery of the Highly 
Active Anti-Retroviral Therapy (HAART) in 1996 at the 11
th
 
International AIDS Conference in Vancouver established treatment as 
the key in an effective and decisive response to the pandemic. The 
efficacy of the earlier drug azidothymidine (AZT), which at first was 
offered as a monotherapy, was confirmed in principle the late 1980s. 
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 WHO 2004: 7  (―Scaling up antiretroviral therapy in resource-limited settings: 
Treatment guidelines for a public health approach,‖ 2003 revision) 
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Yet, while the drug‘s benefits outweighed its negative side effects, the 
results of treatment with the AZT were not always efficient and 
consistent. Moreover, the prices of medications remained very high. 
The major biomedical difference of HAART from earlier treatments 
was that a new drug was designed to contain the infected cell by 
targeting a different enzyme and was also offered in a combination of 
other medications, which diminished chances of developing drug-
resistance. In 1997 GlaxoSmithKline produced Combivir, the first 
two-drug fixed-dose combination of AZT and lamivudine (3TC). 
ARVs are retroviral inhibitors, which do not cure AIDS, yet 
significantly delay the development of opportunistic diseases and save 
human lives. The results were stunning: Observers captured the 
excitement about the ARVs by noting that ―rapid uptake of 
antiretroviral treatment gave rise to the so-called Lazarus syndrome, 
with treatment almost miraculously restoring the health of many 
people terminally ill with AIDS.‖14 The current regimen prescribes 
lower dosages of the AZT in combination with other drugs as a part of 
HAART.
15
 By December 2003, the WHO officially recommended 
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 Schwartländer et al 2006: 541. 
15
 Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) provides further guidelines for 
Industry - Fixed Dose Combination and Co-Packaged Drug Products for Treatment 
of HIV, available at 
http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm125278.htm 
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seven different three- and two-drug fixed dose combinations.
16
 The 
importance of fixed dose combination is that it helped to alleviate 
potential adherence problems and simplifies its distribution. 
In general, all these breakthroughs contributed to a rapid 
decrease in the cost of treatment. Although the actual costs of treating 
patients with AIDS were difficult to estimate, in the early 1990s 
reliable cost studies gave a colossal average sum of $147,000 per 
person per year. Yet only several years later, by 1996, the cost of 
therapy dropped down to $15,000.
 
In 2001 the prices for combination 
ARV therapy fell again from over $10,000 to less than $300 a year 
(per patient).
17 
Between
 
2001 and 2005 the prices fell again for the 
fixed two-dose medications.
18
  All this emboldened many international 
organizations to endorse the norm of HIV/AIDS treatment with triple 
antiretroviral therapy (ARVs) as feasible and cost-effective 
centrepiece of international policy consensus how to respond to the 
pandemic. This policy initiative, however, did not go unchallenged. 
Two principal challenges to ARVs as a standardized biomedical 
solution to HIV/AIDS sprung from AIDS reappraisal hypothesis and 
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 WHO 2004: 60 (see Annex D). 
17
 Smith and Siplon 2006: 82. 
18
 The price of stavudine, lamivudine, and nevirapine decreased from $350 
(annually) in 2001 to $132 in 2005. The price of combinations of 
zidovudine-lamivudine and efavirenz also decreased.  
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the political emphasis on traditional and complementary medicines 
enrooted in the indigenous knowledge systems.  
First, as early as in 1987 Dr. Peter Duesberg and his supporters 
opened the controversial debate concerning the nature of the 
retroviruses and their relation to AIDS. This triggered the AIDS 
reappraisal movement, whose members described themselves as AIDS 
dissidents, realists, rethinkers, heretics.
19
  The central point of their 
self-proclaimed ―dissidence‖ from the majority of the professional 
medical community was questioning the usefulness of ARVs in the 
context when the HI virus allegedly did not cause AIDS as medical 
condition. This position won them a pejorative tag of AIDS denialists. 
Dissidents advocated the multifactorial etiology of AIDS, indicating 
that the lifestyle issues and drug abuse could have been the primary 
cause of the retrovirus.
20
 More specifically, the repertoire of 
dissidents‘ arguments is as follows: 
a. the spread and implication of the epidemic has been overstated, 
while the accuracy of the statistical data should be reevaluated; 
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 Besides Duesberg, the movement included such individuals David Rasnik, Harvey 
Bialy, Sam Mhlongo, and Mattias Rath . To a large degree it was shaped not by 
professional medical community, but rather by a number of controversial journalists, 
including John Lauritsen, Celia Farber, Russell Schoch, Jad Adams and others. For 
the full critical and historical exposition of the AIDS denialism, see Kalichman 2009. 
20
 See Epstein 1996: 105—113. 
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b. ―invested interests‖ hypothesis stated that the contemporary 
biomedical research is not questioned because of the profits 
generated by the drug companies, while individual ―virologists had 
‗invested‘ in the HIV hypothesis—not just financially, though this 
was true in some cases, but personally, professionally, and 
psychologically;‖21  
c. ―AIDS without HIV‖ argument referred to the idea that HIV is not 
a sufficient condition for AIDS and thus the real cause of AIDS 
has been misidentified. Furthermore, since AIDS included many 
opportunistic diseases, the correlation between  AIDS and HIV 
was an artifact of the definition itself;
22
  
 
d. ― drug-AIDS‖ hypothesis stated that ―AIDS is a collection of 
chemical epidemics, caused by recreational drugs, anti-HIV drugs, 
and malnutrition;‖23     
e.  ―poison by prescription‖ argument pointed out that the AZT is 
toxic and dangerous, or at best useless; AZT also contributed to 
immune overload and result in immune suppression, which it 
                                                     
21
 Epstein 1996: 113; see also Jad Adams, Virus Hunters 1989, available at  
<http://www.virusmyth.com/aids/hiv/javirus.htm>. 
22
 Epstein 1996: 132; Duesberg and Ellison 1990.  
23
 Duesberg, Koehnlein, and Rasnic 2003: 383. 
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should have prevented. Dissidents, for instance, attributed the 
famous dancer Rudolph Nuriev‘s death to AZT.24 
The professional medical community does not endorse their 
views. Since the early 1990s the founder of retrovirus Dr. Robert 
Gallo, immunologist Dr. Anthony S. Fauci of National Institute of 
Health (NIH) and many others repudiated all their claims with absolute 
certainty.
25
  The heyday of the dissident skepticism was rather brief: it 
peaked and waned before 1996, which in part was a result of their 
physical extinction due to the refusal to take the life-saving 
medications. The remnants of denialists still strive on Internet sites 
with questionable legitimacy and in such obscure groups as ―Alive and 
Well‖, ―HEAL‖, ―Perth Group‖, ―Group for the Scientific Reappraisal 
of the HIV-AIDS Hypothesis.‖26  Despite their marginal status, the 
AIDS dissidents in certain circumstances might be able to empower 
various non-mainstream domestic perceptions of the pandemic and 
legitimize some obscure local beliefs.
27
  In other words, they can 
potentially offer certain expertise and justifications for those actors, 
including governments, which chose to stall the ARVs and refuse to 
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 John Lauritsen, Did AZT Contribute to Nureyev's Untimely Death? New York 
Native, 1 Feb. 1993. 
25
 Epstein 1996: 117—123. 
26
 The dissident bookshelf is available at 
<http://www.virusmyth.com/aids/books.htm> 
27
 See, for instance, Sitze 2004; Youde 2007; Nattrass 2008; Kalichman 2009. 
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accept the role international pharmaceutical sector plays in developing 
life-saving drugs.  
The second potential challenge to the ARVs stems from the 
perceived necessity to preserve traditional medicines and promote 
genetic medical knowledge in the context of indigenous knowledge 
systems (IKS). The WHO defined traditional medicine as a 
comprehensive concept including various forms of indigenous 
medicines, both medication and non-medication therapies.
28
 An 
Encyclopaedia of African Folklore states that: 
Ethnomedicine is a component of a people‘s culture and 
refers to the beliefs and practices relating to diseases that 
result from indigenous cultural evolution… refer to medical 
resources that are indigenous to the Africans, holistic  
environments. This is the medicine that existed before the 
introduction of Western medicine and was suited to the 
needs of African cultures.
29
 
All these topics recently became very popular at different 
international and domestic venues. This revival of interests to 
                                                     
28
 See WHO/EDM/TRM/2002.1: 1; for the broader discussion of terminology and 
the concept of indigenous knowledge, see for instance Ellen, Parks and Bicker 2000: 
1—33; 36—54. 
29
 For the succinct description of the African traditional medicines and their links to 
African spirituality, see Mulemi 2003:  492—498, 500—506. For useful overviews, 
see Bye and Dutton 1991; Edwards 1986; Cocks and Dold 2000; Cocks and Møller 
2002. 
67 
 
traditional medicines in part is based on the understanding that in the 
developing countries there is likely to be a persisting challenge of 
access to the modern health-care system and that only traditional 
healing practices are likely to remain accessible and affordable for the 
overwhelming majority of local populations. Hanspeter Reihling 
underscored that international development organizations viewed local 
knowledge as helpful in increasing bottom-up participation and 
reducing the costs for health care in resource poor settings.
 30
 
A closer look on the definitions, guidelines, and objectives as 
formulated by several intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) 
demonstrates that nearly all international guidelines concerning 
genetic medicinal knowledge were by and large vague, cautious, and 
did not offer any definite answers how to integrate traditional 
knowledge into the modern-day healthcare system. It is often 
underscored that there can be different potential models of integrating 
traditional healers into the health care system without going anti-
treatment.
 31
 Yet even smooth logistical integration of the two health 
care systems is likely to generate grave problems related to regimen 
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 Reihling 2008  
31
 See, for instance, the WHO-sponsored ―Resolution Promoting the Role of 
Traditional Medicine in Health Systems: A Strategy for the African Region‖ 
(AFR/RC50/R3); on the problems of safety, efficacy and quality, see, for instance, 
WBG IK Monthly Notes 26, 37, 65, 68; the broader discussion on the relations 
between African traditional medical practices and international institutions, see 
Langlois-Klassen, Kipp, and Rubaale 2008; Liddell, Barrett, and Bydawell 2005.  
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adherence. At the very least traditional knowledge should not be 
pitched against the Western medical profession, especially as a 
substitution for internationally approved pharmaceuticals.
32
 
 
 
It is true that documents streaming from such international 
bodies as the WHO, WBG, WIPO, and UNCTAD commonly welcome 
regulation and protection of indigenous knowledge.
33
  Very often 
intergovernmental organizations place genetic medicinal resources 
under the broader rubric of preserving culture and heritage 
(―Traditional Knowledge, Genetic Resources and Traditional Cultural 
Expressions/Folklore‖).34 In this context, various ethno-medicines are 
viewed more as an indigenous anthropological resource as opposed to 
proper biomedicine. These recommendations do not imply substituting 
contemporary biomedical products with either alternative or traditional 
medicines.  
 
Indicator 1c: Check on prices and the availability of generics 
                                                     
32
 See for example, the 2003 PEPFAR/USAID the project ―The Saving Lives: 
Biomedical and Traditional Healing Collaboration on HIV/AIDS‖ with an objective 
to integrate traditional healing into health care system. 
33
 UNCTAD/DITC/TED/10, AFR/RC50/R3 
34
 See the set of documents prepared for the WIPO Intergovernmental Committee on 
Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, 
2003—2008., especially WIPO 2003, WIPO 2006, WIPO 2006a. 
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The third indicator is to keep the prices on the pharmaceuticals low 
and broadly use generics in the resource-poor settings. This can be 
achieved through the bilateral agreements, slashing prices for 
individual countries, or achieving the differential pricing on drugs for 
developing countries in general, and implementing the safeguards as 
formulated in the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS). The opposite of this recommendation is to 
discard the relevance of the antiretroviral generics, while stressing 
only the brand-name medications. On the other hand, the global 
consensus does not imply developing a full ―pharmaceutical 
sovereignty‖ (i.e., a full replacement of relevant medicines with 
original domestic pharmaceutical products) as an ultimate goal in 
resource-poor settings. 
In July 2000—June 2001 generics became widely available. 
First, the products produced in India, Brazil, and Thailand became 
competitive with the brand-name pharmaceuticals. Second, the 
international community reached an agreement on the standards for 
approval of fixed dose antiretroviral combinations, as well as agreed 
on their safety.
35
 Third, certain generic regimens proved to be highly 
                                                     
35
 I refer to an agreement, reached on March 30
th
 2004 in Gaborone, Botswana. 
Studies subsequently proved fixed-dose generic AIDS drugs  effective,  see 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/15/health/15aids.html> 
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successful in suppressing the viral load.
36
  Fourth, the industrial 
competition set forth by companies like Cipla drove the prices of drugs 
down. 
In the late 1990s—early 2000s TRIPS remained a major 
roadblock for the access to generic pharmaceutical products in the 
developing world.
 37
  Yet a group of developed countries in Draft 
Ministerial Declaration (October 2001) accepted the importance of 
TRIPS ―to ensure that medicines for treatment of HIV/AIDS and other 
pandemics are available to their citizens who need them, particularly 
those who are unable to afford basic medical care.‖38 A group of 
developing countries, not surprisingly, pressed for the state control 
over intellectual property rights. HIV/AIDS turned out to be is a 
special case in TRIPS negotiations. TRIPS ―safeguards,‖ including 
Bolar provision, compulsory licensing and parallel import, allowed 
governments to enjoy larger flexibility in their national drug policies.
39
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See 
―
Effectiveness and safety of a generic fixed-dose combination of nevirapine, 
stavudine, and lamivudine in HIV-1-infected adults in Cameroon: open-label 
multicentre trial,‖ Lancet 364: 3-4; 29-34 (2004). As the authors explained, this 
study was specifically designed to sway the major donor agencies, which refused to 
deploy generic fixed-dose combinations in resource-poor settings due to scarcity of 
clinical data on effectiveness, safety, and quality, despite the WHO 
recommendations. 
37
 For the useful overviews of TRIPS impact on public health, see Lee, Buse and 
Fustukian 2002: 84—85; Thomas 2002; Danzon and Towse 2003; Orsi 2003; May 
2007 in Ostergard 2007: 171—193. For a detailed record of the protracted struggle 
over the TRIPS agreements, see Sell and Prakash 2005; Sell 2007.  
38
 IP/C/W/313. 
39
 The use of safeguards had been previously backed up by the WHO‘s World Health 
Assembly, see WHA 52.19 
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Initially there was a lot of disbelief in the practical implementation of 
these safeguards.
40
 Yet the subsequent governmental actions proved 
otherwise.  We have critical amount of evidence to suggest that 
developing countries successfully implemented these safeguards. This 
dynamic pushed the private sector to expand their political 
commitments to fight HIV/AIDS: Merck, GlaxoSmithKline, Bristol-
Myers Squibb began reducing the prices on the essential ARVs. They 
slashed costs for the fixed dose combinations and offered the 
differential pricing for drugs for select developing countries. Finally, 
under the pressures of treatment activists, big for-profit corporations 
joined the campaign for the access for the life-saving medicines.
41
 The 
change in their strategies might have resulted from a perception that 
loosing the developing the developing world market was inacceptable, 
even taking into account the dwindling profits. For my line of 
argumentation it does not really matter if the pharmaceutical sector 
genuinely committed to mitigate HIV/AIDS. The point is that generics 
gradually became part of the global consensus.  
In 2004 the US government allowed the generic manufacturers 
to apply for the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval. This 
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 Sell (1999: 174 in Cutler, Haufler and Porter 1999) reasoned that developing states 
and governments posses less expertise in these highly technical questions comparing 
to the private sector. 
41
 Smith and Siplon 2006: 125, 130—137. For the corporate human rights scrutiny, 
see Joseph 2003. 
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meant that the new generation of AIDS organizations was no longer 
dependent on the brand-name drugs for their health programs. The 
evolution of PEPFAR‘s approach to drug procurement illustrates this 
point. At first, the drugs for Africa were to be purchased from the U.S. 
pharmaceutical giants at the American price and cheap generics were 
not allowed. Former administrator Randall Tobias, for instance, argued 
that only safe and regulated drugs should be disbursed for the 
PEPFAR needs. In 2007 the new U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator Mark 
Dybul announced the reversal of the approach. He reported to the 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs that PEPFAR ―increased its 
purchasing of generic versus branded ARVs from 72 percent from 
April to September 2006 to 88 percent (by volume) from January to 
March 2007.‖42 The establishment of Supply Chain Managements 
System (SCMS) as an integral part of PEPFAR provides continuous 
flow of essential high quality cost-effective medications and supplies 
generic ARVs.
43
  Thus, generics became fully allowed in PEPFAR‘s 
operational plans. According to GFATM‘s purchase price report 
mechanism, as early as in 2004 brand-name products comprised only 
40.7% of the ARVs.
44
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 PEPFAR press release # 83466 
43
 For more information on SCMS, visit http://scms.pfscm.org/scms 
44
 See GFATM 2005.  
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In the future the described achievements might be undermined 
by the increasing demands of the newer lines of medicines in the 
context of the diminishing incentives for the firms producing the 
generic supply for the nations lacking industrial capacities, 
overburdened by the incessant spread of HIV/AIDS and the increasing 
drug-resistance.
45
 
 
UNIVERSALITY 
The second core component is the universality of access to treatment. 
It intends to stress both the moral imperative and economic cost-
efficiency in providing access to ARVs to all the infected and 
vulnerable populations. It reflects the notion that nobody should be 
intentionally excluded from the consumption of public good. Because 
vulnerable subpopulations are tightly linked to general public, aiming 
at universal treatment at country level is the most reliable undertaking 
to curb the pandemic. Additionally, prioritizing the access to treatment 
even to the negatively constructed populations is cost-efficient as it 
lowers the virus transmission to the generalized population and thus 
will likely to diminish public health spending in the long run.  
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 On the future constraints to the sustainability of generic supply and the case study 
of India as the largest producer of generics, see Shadlen 2007: 569—576.  
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At the face value, universality is very costly. Yet with the 
technological breakthroughs in biomedicines achieved in 1996 even a 
small increase of average yearly costs of treatment allowed to increase 
the number of treated patients significantly.  Since the costs of 
treatment are becoming relatively low, scaling-up is attainable even in 
the countries with lower GDPs. The first potential challenge to the 
global policy consensus consists of policy-makers choosing to provide 
only a selective access to treatment, either excluding any vulnerable 
subpopulation or, in contrast, including any societal group at the 
expense of the others (see Indicator 2a). The second potential 
challenge is the resistance to ―scaling up‖ (see Indicator 2b). Third, the 
notion of universality presumes that providing the access to treatment 
will go together with aggressive prevention campaigns. While the 
appropriate balance between these two health interventions has been 
long in the center of international health policy debates, at this point 
suffice to say that prevention should not become a dominant substitute 
for the antiretroviral therapy, nor should it be completely ignored as 
irrelevant for curbing HIV/AIDS (see Indicator 2c).   
 
Indicator 2a: Providing ARVs to key vulnerable groups 
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The first indicator of the substantive component of universality is the 
aggressive intervention to provide ARVs to the key vulnerable 
populations. Dependent on the country, this category of individuals 
may include intravenous drug users (IDUs), commercial sex workers, 
prisoners, men who have sex with men (MSM), HIV-positive mothers, 
women and girls, youth, people living in poverty, migrants and 
migrant laborers, people in conflict and post-conflict situations, 
refugees and displaced persons. Providing treatment to these and other 
key risk groups is desirable for the long-term impact on decreasing the 
infection prevalence in the general population and consequently saving 
significant amount of resources and human lives. From the public 
health perspective, these seemingly isolated and marginalized but 
often overlapping groups typically transmit the disease to the 
generalized population. Thus, treating these ―bridge populations‖ is 
imperative. In the beginning of the outbreak, especially in the domestic 
context of resource scarcity, these interventions can be particularly 
successful. The opposite of this indicator is to deploy either severe 
restrictive measures, or criminalize vulnerable populations, while 
denying them treatment or access to it. Ordinarily stigmatizing 
particular target populations is the first sign that the principle of 
universality is being challenged.   
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The described approach to the pandemic heavily hinged on the 
biomedical understanding of the disease.
46
 The international 
community travelled a long way before accepting this indicator as a 
part of global consensus.
47
 At the outset of the epidemic the disease 
was associated with deviant and promiscuous minorities with almost 
100 percent mortality rate. In the 1980s AIDS was understood as ―gay 
cancer.‖ These attitudes were succinctly captured in the first semi-
official, yet short lived, nomenclature of the disease as GRID—―Gay-
Related Immune Deficiency,‖ and an additional pejorative nickname—
―the four H disease‖ (homosexuals, hemophiliacs, heroin addicts and 
Haitians).
48  
In this context, the US administration believed that the 
epidemic should be contained through severe regulative measures, 
including quarantine.
49
  One of the most high-profile restrictive 
measures was barring the entry of affected foreign nationals into the 
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 On the history of epidemics and major controversies after the discovery of HIV 
virus in 1981, see Shielts 1987; Grmek 1990; Cohrane 2003. For the historical 
overview of the medical and debates about appropriate medical response to the 
disease, Fee and Fox 1988; Epstein 1996; Finkel 2007:  31—54.  
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 See Grmek 1990: 30. On the evolution of scientific understanding of the disease 
from the ―gay disease‖ and lifestyle argument overturned by retroviralogy, see 
Epstein 1996: 45—79. 
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 Nichols 1989: 11—55; Farmer 1992; Brown 2000: 1274.     
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 On the quarantine as a discussed solution to AIDS crisis, see Musto in Fee and 
Fox1988: 67--85. For a brief discussion of ballot initiative to quarantine people with 
AIDS, while barring them from a range of jobs, see Shepherd 2007 in Harris and 
Siplon 2007: 175. 
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United States.
50
 This regulation, adopted by Senate and passed by the 
House of Representatives, had a profound international effect as it was 
later followed by the similar legal provisions in more than 50 
countries. As Murphy indicates, in 1987 ―this ban was supported by 
some health professions organizations worried about the public health 
of the nation and the costs of publicly supported care for people 
with AIDS.‖ 51  
On the other hand, travel restrictions led to the famous San 
Francisco AIDS Conference boycott of 1989, during which AIDS 
activists were able to mobilize international public opinion against 
such restrictive measures and advocate medicalization of the disease.
52
 
Jonathan Mann, the head of WHO‘s Global AIDS Programme (GPA, 
1987—1990) backed up these mobilization efforts and advocated 
human rights as a comprehensive framework to facilitate the 
transnational effort against HIV/AIDS.
53
 In essence, the most 
important outcome of the boycott was the emerging understanding 
among domestic and international decision-makers that key vulnerable 
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 Rosen 1987: 64-73; Nelson 1987; on the role of senator Jesse Helms sponsoring a 
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Murphy 1994:  130—144. 
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 Murphy 1994: 129.     
52
 On the best detailed account of the boycott and its impact on international 
approaches in response to AIDS, see Gordenker et al 1994: 113—133. For the 
broader overview of LGBT advocacy efforts, see Mertus 2007. 
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 Mann 1992; Mann 1999. For broader perspectives on AIDS and human rights, see 
Gordenker et al 1994: 62—65; Epstein 1996: 208—235; Siegel 1996: 246—250; 
Soderholm 1997: 79—82; London  2002. 
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groups cannot be excluded from treatment. It also demonstrated that 
severe restrictive measures cannot be a solution around which 
expectations how to fight the epidemic can converge. The greater 
involvement of the key vulnerable populations in the International 
AIDS Conferences (IAC) helped to promote this achievement even 
further.  
Treating key vulnerable groups cannot be implemented without 
the governmental commitment to observe human rights, which also 
had to be recognized as a cornerstone principle of the global 
consensus. The majority of intentional financial and health 
organizations confirm the necessity of providing a non-exclusive 
treatment to vulnerable groups. In 1993 the World Bank indicated that 
―the cost-effectiveness of interventions drops sharply when infections 
cross firm high-risk groups to the general population.‖54  In 2005 the 
World Bank called for comprehensive programs to include ―an 
increased number of interventions targeted to virtually all groups in 
society,‖ and ―address gender and other dimensions of equity such as 
access for poor and marginalized groups and in rural areas.‖55   In 
2004 the WHO‘s Regional Office for Europe‘s prepared the Dublin 
Declaration on Partnership to Fight HIV/AIDS in Europe and Central 
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Asia, in large part stressing the fight against the local-level stigma, 
discrimination of and prejudice to the vulnerable populations. The 
declaration noted ―that the respect, protection and promotion of human 
rights is fundamental to preventing transmission of HIV, reducing 
vulnerability to infection and dealing with the impact of HIV/AIDS.‖56 
In essence, its signatories reaffirmed that observing human rights and 
treating vulnerable population is crucial for preventing HIV/AIDS to 
move into the general population. European Centre for Disease 
Prevention and Control (ECDC) monitors the Eurasian countries‘ 
progress in the implementation of the principles and commitments as 
expressed in this Declaration.
57
  GFATM uses the UNAIDS definition 
of key affected populations in order to evaluate country‘s eligibility for 
its funding.
58
  
Providing the ARV treatment to the key vulnerable populations 
rests on the assumption that targeting (or at the very least not 
excluding) various marginalized high-risk populations can prevent the 
spillover of the epidemic to the generalized population. Such measures 
as providing the ARV treatment for the IDUs, stopping the 
institutionalized prosecution and harassment of the narcotic users, 
implementing harm reduction, medically assisted therapy (MAT), 
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  The text available at <http://www.unicef.org/ceecis/The_Dublin_Declaration.pdf>     
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 ECDC 2010     
58
 See <http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/eligibility/#3>.  
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needle and syringe exchange programs (NSP), and opiate substitute 
treatment (OST) with methadone as the most effective withdrawal 
technique and hinge on observing human rights principles. For 
instance, according to the study published in AIDS, ―[E]xclusively 
treating non-IDUs provided the least health benefit, and was the least 
economically efficient.‖59  Since recent, the Global Fund has been 
promoting harm reduction programs.
60
 
Today we witness the emergence of the new clusters of 
vulnerable target populations and new links between AIDS and other 
grave socio-economic problems, precluding or hindering development 
and good governance.
61
 Expanding knowledge about particular target 
populations helps upholding the universality of treatment as a key 
component of fighting AIDS. Many activists and practitioners still 
pessimistically talk about many complexities of overcoming stigma, 
which negatively impact on domestic governments‘ efforts to launch a 
broad-based response to AIDS. In many cases the issues of 
discrimination, resentment, and hatred still endure.
62
 Nevertheless, 
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excluding certain groups is a significant breach of the standardized 
policy and put the general population at risk.  
 
Indicator 2b: Scaling up as a proxy for universality 
The second indicator of the substantive component of universality is 
the aggressive intervention to rollout the ARVs to anybody who needs 
it, or cover as much infected population as possible, depending on 
local constraints. As achieving the 100% treatment coverage is hardly 
attainable in the developing countries with limited resources, the 
relevant international guidelines use the notion of the scaling up as a 
proxy indicator of the commitment to achieve the universality of 
treatment. According to the WHO 2003 revised guidelines, the term 
―scaling up‖ refers to the process of increasing numbers of a target 
audience with the ultimate objective to provide access to ARVs for all 
those who need.
63
 The opposite of this indicator is either discontinuing 
ARVs rollout for any other reasons than patients‘ death, or officially 
rejecting the cost-efficiency of scaling up.  
Over time, the number of key international health players used 
different approaches to trigger domestic awareness about the urgency 
of scaling-up. The UN provides general targets and guidelines how to 
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evaluate the commitment to and achievement of the universality of 
treatment.
64
  The agreement on scaling up is reflected in the following 
documents and initiatives: UNGASS Declaration of Commitment on 
HIV/AIDS; Guidelines on construction of Core Indicators; Millennium 
Development Goal #6; WHO 3 by 5 initiative; Abuja Declaration on 
HIV/AIDS, TB and other infectious diseases; UNAIDS intensifying 
prevention guidelines.
65
 The United Nations Millennium Declaration 
adopted at the Millennium Summit in September 2000 is typically 
mentioned as the key among those. It clearly expressed its support for 
the notion of universality of treatment.
66
 The Summit also set forth a 
number of specific goals, including combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and 
other diseases (Goal 6, Target for 2015: Halt and begin to reverse the 
spread of HIV/AIDS and the incidence of malaria and other major 
diseases).  One of highest profile initiatives of scaling up belonged to 
the WHO. In 2003, commissioned by UNAIDS an international panel 
of the leading AIDS advocates, put together a report Access to HIV 
Prevention: Closing the Gap.
 
The GAP called for filling the estimated 
$3.8 billion HIV-funding gap by 2005. The so-called ―3 by 5‖ program 
is designed to accelerate delivery of ARV treatment to three million 
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people by the end of 2005 within 34 priority countries.
67
 Although the 
initiative fell short of these targets, it nevertheless set scaling-up as a 
feasible approach. Other optimistic advocates of scaling-up include 
Accelerate Access Initiative (AAI), the Global HIV Prevention 
Working Group (PWG), and Treatment Acceleration Project (TAP).   
Scaling up, of course, was hardly possible without keeping the 
prices on the life-saving medicines low. Thus, scaling-up is based on 
maintaining the cost-efficiency of the ARVs. According to Marion 
Rauner and Margaret Brandeau, the fundamental problem in relying on 
pharmaceuticals in resource-limited settings was stipulated by a sheer 
fact that as late as in 2001 ―large-scale antiretroviral drug treatment 
was still not affordable in most developing countries.‖68 According to 
Greg Behrman, the absence of the cheap pharmaceuticals precluded 
the universality of access to treatment to be an integral part of 
international action in response to the pandemic: ―The US global 
effort, therefore, consisted entirely of prevention efforts…As an option 
for fighting global AIDS, treatment was dismissed as not being cost 
effective.‖69 Dwindling costs of therapy disable the arguments of those 
who questioned the economic feasibility of rolling out treatment 
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anywhere, save for the wealthiest countries. The harshest skeptics 
typically indicate that the rollout of the ARVs should reflect the 
particular capabilities of a given country, including the health care 
infrastructure, percentage of the infected population, GDP and general 
state of economy.
70
 Pushing this argumentation to the extreme, some 
commentators insist that ARVs burden state budgets and in the long 
haul hinder states‘ performance in health care. The nub of the 
reasoning is that governments have to provide newer and newer lines 
of pharmaceuticals to adapt to the domestic epidemiological conditions 
and the increases in drug resistance.
71
 All these considerations 
notwithstanding, the invention of HAART unburdens state budgets 
and makes treatment economically efficient. Strong treatment 
intervention is most efficient at the outset of epidemic (no drug 
resistance and thus it requires only the cheapest first line regimen).   
In 2002 the Policy Project and Merk, Inc. sponsored a special 
conference on AIDS and economics, which summarizes the major 
point of this subsection: the adverse economic impact of HIV/AIDS 
outweighs the costs of treatment.
72
 The nature and scope of present-
day massive international sponsorship also very tangibly shows that 
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intensive scale-up efforts are likely to bear fruits. All these activities 
add up to the governmental resolve for the universal coverage and 
alleviate their financial and logistical inabilities to live up to the 
promise of scaling-up. 
 
Indicator 2c: Treatment as an integral part of prevention 
The third indicator of universality of access to treatment is based on 
the understanding that providing the antiretrovirals alone is not enough 
to curb HIV/AIDS. In some circumstances treatment is prevention: 
consider the vertical prevention, i.e., mother to child transmission 
prevention programs (MTCTP). In most cases, access to treatment 
should be combined and complemented with various locally-sensitive 
preventive strategies. The opposite of this recommendation is either 
the rejection of the importance of ARVs as an integral part of 
prevention, or the hypothetical strategy to completely replace 
treatment with education, abstinence, and so on.  
Very recently the global medical community has reached a new 
more decisive formulation which asserts the primacy of treatment in 
comparison to prevention strategies. Prompted by continuous failures 
in finding the AIDS vaccine, the co-discoverers of the HI virus Robert 
C. Gallo and Luc A. Montagnier called for the universal testing and 
86 
 
universal treatment as the most reliable method of prevention.
73
 This 
suggests that treatment in the observable future will remain the integral 
part of prevention strategies. It is true that only treatment can 
substantially prolong the lives of the 40 million people who already 
carry the human immunodeficiency virus and allow them to return to 
productive work. However, under certain circumstances treatment 
alone, although crucial, is not a ―silver bullet.‖ In the highest 
prevalence countries, only urgent expansion of treatment will forestall 
continued catastrophic rates of illness and death and the attendant 
social and economic devastation.
74
 Even strong proponents of 
universal and free treatment agree that only a combination of 
prevention, care, treatment, as well as efforts to embed HIV/AIDS 
responses in the broader and longer-term work of strengthening public 
health, promoting development, and respecting and protecting human 
rights can mitigate the pandemic‘s effects.75 Global HIV Prevention 
Working Group (PWG) suggested that approximately half of the 
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newly infected people could be saved with adequate health services, 
integrating preventive and treatment strategies.
76
    
More generally, balance in allocating funds between treatment 
and prevention still remains a hottest topic of the current political 
debates. PEPFAR, for instance, had been in the center of treatment vs. 
prevention debate for a while. As activists point out, the former head 
of PEPFAR Ambassador Tobias on many occasions noted that AIDS 
is a fully preventable disease, which should be curbed by the so-called 
ABC principle (abstinence, being faithful and condoms).  Many critics 
of PEPFAR claimed that the organization prioritized abstinence at the 
expense of treatment due to President George W. Bush‘s stress on the 
so-called evangelical approach.
77
 This argument has only a limited 
credibility, as the provision of treatment was indeed an indispensable 
part of PEPFAR‘s strategy. According to the Kaiser Family 
Foundation (KFF) data, the Presidential emergency Fund (PEPFAR) 
allocations for antiretroviral therapy in FY 2004/2005 reached $34 
surpassing the funding for prevention and abstinence (funding up to 
$20 million). In FY 2006, approximately $819 million were spent to 
support ARVs, which consisted about 46% of total focus country 
resources for AIDS. Number of people receiving treatment increased 
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from less than initial 50,000 to more than one million people as of 
May 2007. Additional PEPFAR funding also confirms its commitment 
to ARVs‘ provision: PEPFAR funded training of 52,000 people to 
provide ARV services and supported 1,912 ARVs sites.
78
 All these 
figures indicate that PEPFAR takes funding for treatment seriously 
and exercises a balanced funding between ABC (abstinence, be 
faithful, correct and consistent use of condoms) and ARVs. 
Bearing down on prevention and pro-life beliefs sometimes 
result into serious funding restrictions. For instance, one of the most 
effective programs in Africa—Marie Stopes International (MSI)—was 
defunded because of its abortion advice. Subsequently, the White 
House also overturned a Congressional award to the UN Population 
Fund because of its joint work with MSI.  Yet prioritizing ABC at the 
expense of treatment remains relatively rare.  For instance, Ugandan 
officials attempted to draft and enforce the abstinence-only policy with 
adverse consequences for curbing AIDS.
79
 There is no solid agreement 
on the outcomes of the ABC policy: Sometimes the possible reversal 
of success in curbing HIV/AIDS is suggested, sometimes, on the 
contrary, its practicality and success.
80
 Independently of what exact 
concerns observers, practitioners or treatment advocates might claim 
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about the ABC policies, it is highly unlikely that it can undermine the 
broader international consensus on the role of ARVs.  
 
PARTNERSHIPS 
The third core component of the internationally recommended policy 
is building partnerships between governments on the one side and all 
relevant stakeholders, on the other. The idea that the most effective 
health policy responses depend on mutual efforts underpins this 
recommendation. For the purposes of this dissertation, the group of 
relevant stakeholders is analytically divided into private sector, 
international health organizations, and domestic civil society sector, 
including various issue-advocacy and health service groups.  When 
governments selectively exclude certain stakeholders from the policy 
process, it signals that the international consensus on partnership 
becomes invested with situational and local characteristics. This 
recommendation is especially relevant for the governments that either 
lack requisite financial and infrastructural capacities to curb the 
epidemic on their own, or require assistance to increase the capacity of 
public health care sector, institutionalize and routinize financial flows, 
or have to improve service quality and outreach. 
 
90 
 
Indicator 3a: Public-private partnership 
The first indicator of partnership is the increasing the capacity of the 
health care sector and the quality of response to HIV/AIDS via 
fostering a Public-Private Partnership (PPP, P3s). The National 
Council for Public-Private Partnerships (NCPPP) defines PPPs as   
… a contractual agreement between a public agency 
(federal, state or local) and a private sector entity. 
Through this agreement, the skills and assets of each 
sector (public and private) are shared in delivering a 
service or facility for the use of the general public. In 
addition to the sharing of resources, each party shares in 
the risks and rewards potential in the delivery of the 
service and/or facility.
81
 
Since HIV/AIDS presents an enormous challenge for everyone, 
governments are expected to invite private sector to fight the epidemic 
jointly. The opposite of this recommendation is either intentionally 
trying to safeguard the private sector by excluding it from solving 
problems of common good, or purposefully over-committing to fight 
the pandemic exclusively with the framework of the domestic public 
                                                     
81
The definition available at < http://www.ncppp.org/howpart/index.shtml#define> 
91 
 
health sector. Both choices can turn out truly detrimental especially in 
the countries operating in resource-poor settings. 
Similar to the evolution of the other recommendations and 
guidelines, PPPs were not part of the global consensus for the most 
part of the 1990s. Prior to 1997, the focus of the professional medical 
and developmental community was to make governments recognize 
the gravity of the problem and provide necessary political leadership. 
Without reliable treatment and vaccines, the World Bank focused on 
providing information about the epidemiology, advocated prevention, 
and projected the cost-effectiveness of treatment with AZT.
82
 
Immediately following the technological breakthrough, a number of 
international actors stressed the importance of ARV treatment, as well 
as distribution and logistical control of drugs at country level.  The 
staggering evolution of the World Bank‘s approach is the best 
illustration of the shifting emphasis to understanding the priority of the 
public health sector.
83
 It framed the provision of treatment as a 
precondition to sustainable development, realizing that health 
programs require a significant financing.
84
 Subsequently, the World 
Bank became not only one of the largest international funders in the 
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fight against the pandemic, but also a promoter of treatment and 
advocate of governmental responsibility to provide drugs in public 
health sector.
85
   
With a 1997 seminal report, Confronting AIDS: Public 
Priorities in a Global Epidemic framed AIDS as a public health 
problem and stressed national governments‘ responsibility to provide 
antiretroviral therapy, palliative care, and the treatment of 
opportunistic infections.  Governmental responsibilities also include 1) 
setting national-level programs with clear priorities in resource-scarce 
settings; 2) distribution and logistical control of drugs to alleviate 
problems with non-adherence to treatment regimen and erratic supplies 
of drugs; and 3) ensuring to the expanded, multisectoral response. The 
last recommendation implies cooperation between governments and 
non-governmental organizations, as well as strengthening cooperation 
between states and major industrial pharmaceutical corporations. In 
general, these guidelines intend to raise the level of political 
commitment of the national governments and motivate them to 
intervene more aggressively. In the most straightforward formulation, 
―governments should ensure that HIV-infected patients benefit from 
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the same access to health care as other patients with comparable 
illnesses and a similar ability to pay.‖86  
Circa 2000 the priority on governmental delivery shifted to 
stress PPPs. The late Ambassador Richard Holbrooke galvanized the 
Global Business Coalition on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria 
(GBC).
87
 This consortium of organizations mobilizes business to 
sponsor public health emergencies and advocates a broader 
involvement of business in HIV/AIDS as a matter of national and 
human security. Merk & Co, for instance, joins and sponsors many 
global and regional PPPs as well.
88
 Christer Jönsson captured the 
increasingly important role of the private sector by noticing that there 
is no one lead agency in coordination of all health-related actors, rather 
the fight against HIV/AIDS is governed by diffused PPPs.
89
  
In sum, the emphasis on the public sector in the 
implementation of the treatment policy is placed high on international 
agenda. Most developing countries cannot fully exercise the 
responsibility to provide access to treatment without entering PPPs. 
  
                                                     
86
 For the more detailed outline of governmental priorities and key responsibilities, 
see Ainsworth 1998; Ainsworth and Teokul 2000.   
87
 http://www.gbcimpact.org 
88
 The list of Merk’s HIV and AIDS Partnerships and Programs is available at < 
http://www.merck.com/corporate-responsibility/access/access-hiv-aids/access-hiv-
aids-partnerships/global.html> 
89
 Jönsson 2010 in Bexell and Mörth 2010 
94 
 
Indicator 3b: Partnerships with international health organizations  
Governments are expected to follow guidelines and recommendations 
provided by the international health organizations, and use the 
financial and logistical aid of the international donors. For resource-
limited countries the success in curbing the disease is often directly 
dependent on the quality of partnership with these international AIDS 
organizations.
90
 This type of partnership is indispensable for having an 
access to the modern epidemiological expertise, an uninterrupted 
supply of effective medications, and simply various grants and 
funding. The opposite of this indicator is either to challenge the 
expertise and recommendations of these organizations, attempt to 
proffer alternative health organizations, or to refuse any external 
logistical support and financial aid. All this might result in truly 
devastating consequences especially in the resource-limited countries.  
Today, multiple international institutions provide international 
recommendations and guidelines on the principles of resource 
allocation, evaluation and monitoring of national health budgets, 
adherence protocols, and so on. The biomedical breakthrough was 
complemented with the inception of the United Nations Joint 
Programme on AIDS (UNAIDS, 1996).  UNAIDS was created to 
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bring together a number of HIV/AIDS programs, run separately by 
different UN agencies. The first important contribution of the 
UNAIDS‘ secretariat was a yearly publication of unambiguous and 
reliable epidemiological statistics, adequately capturing the state of 
emergency and projecting the future epidemiological trends. Later on, 
UNAIDS became also instrumental in developing relevant guidelines 
for resource allocation, funding, budget control mechanisms in the 
developing countries. In 2005, for instance, UNAIDS/UNGASS 
presented new guidelines how to construct the core indicators for the 
countries with generalized epidemic.
91
 The United Nations Millennium 
Project also provides guidelines (a set of goals and targets) to track the 
cross-national progress in curbing HIV/AIDS. The UNGASS uses 
National AIDS Spending Assessment (NASA) as a resource-tracking 
mechanism to measure commitment to the comprehensive framework 
to achieve the MDG goals. Of course, there is some debate about the 
UNGASS indicators, including the unrealistic expectation of success 
in stopping the spread of the pandemic and sometimes unreliable 
measurement of the achieved progress. Yet these concerns do not 
imply that governments across the globe should ignore these 
recommendations.  
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The new generation of AIDS organizations provides direct 
sponsorship for the ARV treatment and therefore gives strong 
incentives for governments to follow the global consensus. Recently, 
the Global Fund against AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM, 
the Global Fund) and President‘s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief 
(PEPFAR) became two most important global instruments of 
providing treatment for the nations operating in recourse-limited 
settings. These organizations help overcome the problem of the erratic 
supplies of drugs, which undermines the outcomes of treatment and 
spreads drug-resistance. For the developing nations, on the other hand, 
gaining these resources is contingent on their well-articulated national 
HIV/AIDS policies being put on paper and on the existence of special 
domestic bodies as a precondition for receiving the transfers from 
GFATM. Thus, the multilateral HIV/AIDS organizations become truly 
indispensable as they provide mechanisms to translate some generic 
political pledges of the developed nations to fight HIV/AIDS into 
institutionalized and routinized behavior, which is not easily 
reversible.
92
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For the remainder of this subsection I briefly discuss PEPFAR, 
which is to date the biggest global program dealing with HIV/AIDS 
pandemic. In his 2003 State of Union Address, President Bush 
announced the commitment of $15 billion over five years to fight 
AIDS globally. Targeted countries included 12 African (Botswana, 
Cote d‘Ivoire, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, 
Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia), 2 Latin 
American and Caribbean (Haiti and Guyana) and 1 Asian state 
(Vietnam).
93
 Note that although Russian Federation is not technically 
PEPAFR‘s focus country, in 2006 it became the second tier of the five 
additional ―countries of interest,‖ receiving additional bilateral 
funding. The selected countries are estimated to account for 
approximately 50% of the world‘s HIV/AIDS infections. Among these 
countries, Uganda, Kenya, and South Africa are receiving the lion 
share of contributions. In June 2007 President Bush pledged $30 
billion more to support the Plan in the future. The emergency plan was 
re-authorized by the Congress and signed into law in 2008. President 
Barack Obama equally supported the Plan. 
More specifically, PEPFAR purports to develop local 
infrastructure to promote self-sustainable local health programs. The 
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program helps create health infrastructure of central medical centers—
primary satellites—secondary satellites—rural satellites and remote 
mobile units continuum, covering geographically the whole country. 
There is a clear hierarchy and division of labor in conducted activities: 
general HIV/AIDS expertise—treatment—test on infectious 
diseases—distribution of treatment and medication pack refills, 
respectfully. Primary satellites are envisioned as focal venues where 
many private and public clinics run by faith-based groups and non-
governmental organizations will be in this category. Judged by its 
general design, this infrastructure-building plan looks relevant for the 
long-term combat against AIDS and helpful in scaling up states‘ 
capacities and the quality of their response.  
From a more utilitarian viewpoint, governments in resource-
limited settings should be pleased to accept aid from the developed 
industrialized nations. Yet accepting aid and expertise of international 
actors should not be confused with donor-dependency, which 
describes the processes of fully delegating logistical support and 
responsibility to distribute drugs to international institutions, as well as 
privileging foreign-sponsored programs over domestic ones.
94
 Rather, 
it means maintaining good working relationship with organizations 
providing and advocating ARVs, as well as coordination and 
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integration of domestic and international programs.  In contrast, under 
certain conditions states might challenge the expertise and 
recommendations of these organizations, institutionalize alternative 
health organizations, and officially refuse to accept logistical support 
and financial aid. This behavior, especially if these states do not 
possess the requisite capacities and are constrained by the resource-
limited settings, provides a first signal of some societal challenge to 
the global consensus. 
 
Indicator 3c: Partnership with civil society sector    
States are expected to support the work of transnational and domestic 
NGOs in order to increase the number and diversify the types of health 
organizations responsible for providing effective health care 
interventions. The integral part of this indicator is to pursue closer 
links with international and domestic civil society sector, which should 
serve both as the linking-pin organizations for broader partnerships 
with transnational health sector, and facilitate a more flexible rollout 
of the ARVs. The opposite of this indicator is to restrict civil society 
sector legally, exclude its members from the policy formulation and 
implementation process, and undermine their role as AIDS service 
organizations by either seizing the international grants earmarked for 
100 
 
them, or any other available ways. Restricting partnership, while 
privileging governmental programs is a significant deviation from 
international consensus on AIDS policy. Ultimately, this can impinge 
of the success of domestic responses to HIV/AIDS. 
First efforts to build sustainable partnership models belonged 
to WHO‘s Global AIDS Programme (GAP, 1986—1995). GAP‘s 
primary focus was on surveillance, the national AIDS plans, human 
rights advocacy, and fund-raising. The literature praising GAP‘s 
contribution to international effort against AIDS sees its primary 
achievement in becoming an indispensable linking-pin to other active 
organization in the health policy network, thus teaching governments 
to be connected with other sub-national actors and civil society sector. 
GAP was able to link international donor organizations (including 
USAID) to domestic recipients.
95
 Another big contribution was GAP‘s 
(and its head Jonathan Mann‘s personally) stress on the importance of 
involving civil society to protect human rights as a pivotal element in 
providing an adequate response to the widening health crisis. Despite 
all these achievements, the absence of an effective medication 
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triggered donor fatigue and lessened an interest in developing strong 
partnership with civil society organizations.
96
  
The invention of HAART resulted in irrevocable commitment 
to the partnership with civil society sector: the abstract principles of 
cooperation got infused with into some tangible reasons to do so. On 
the other hand, the discussed technological breakthrough empowered 
activist advocacy organizations and the civil society in general. The 
list of the most known and renowned organization includes ACT UP, 
the Treatment Acton Campaign of South Africa, the Grupo Pela 
VIDDA of Brazil, the Agua Buena Human Rights Association of 
Costa Rica, the Kenya Coalition for Access to Essential Medicines, 
Thai AIDS Treatment Action Group, Thai Drug Users Network.
97
   
Today, domestic civil society and AIDS service organizations 
across the globe enjoy the generous financial support from GFATM. 
In essence, GFATM‘s funding makes CSOs important partners for 
governments (especially if these CSOs do not command any resources 
of their own). This funding is based on merits of their proposals for 
treatment and service, as well as their subsequent implementation. 
―The Framework Document of the GFATM‖ indicates that this 
                                                     
96
 See Chin 2007: 204—205. The argument that GAP failed primarily because of 
Mann‘s exit from WHO is after uncritically accepted by academic literature, see, for 
instance, Soderholm1997: 160—165.  For detailed description of GAP under the 
leadership of Michael Merson in 1990—1995, see Behrman 2004: 79—86.  
97
 On treatment activist network, see, for instance, Siplon 2002; Smith and Siplon 
2006: 84—96. 
102 
 
organization supports simplified, rapid, and bottom-up disbursement 
mechanisms, which are intended to ―reflect national ownership and 
respect country-led formulation and implementation processes.‖ 98  
GFATM was launched in 2001 by the UN Secretary-General, the US 
and Nigerian Presidents, based on UN General Assembly resolution 
1308.
99
 It became operational in January 2002. GFATM is a financial 
instrument ensuring a sustainable funding for the local projects and 
leveraging additional financial resources form a variety of 
governmental and private sources. The received funds are 
subsequently disbursed to sponsor various domestic programs. The 
core principle of the Global Fund is performance-based funding, 
driven by the local needs.
100
 In this capacity, GFATM works primarily 
to fund all the NGOs and ASOs that can do some decent ground work 
that focuses on the creation, development and expansion of 
partnerships, and thus strengthen the participation of communities and 
people affected by HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis.
 101
  
The external evaluation showed that the Fund‘s spending on 
ARVs is consistent with other UN and WHO initiatives. The 
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expenditure targets to provide drugs and related commodities have 
been consistently 48% of all granting commitments, which is by far 
the largest spending priority over Rounds 2 to 6.
102
 In 2007 alone the 
grand total of disbursed resources amassed to almost $4 billion.  
According to treatment activists, the Global Fund is better positioned 
than other funding mechanisms to scale up the AIDS response, 
harmonize national efforts, and support a comprehensive approach to 
AIDS that integrates development concerns and addresses the needs of 
marginalized communities.
103
 Ironically, the local organizations and 
activists will be never truly satisfied with GFATM, because the 
financial volume of the multiple of local service organizations is 
higher than GFATM can possible fill. Nevertheless, GFATM remains 
pivotal in empowering civil society sector and thus creates incentives 
for government to cooperate with it. 
Besides funding, the GFATM operates through the Country 
Coordinating Mechanisms (CCMs), which institutionalized 
governmental partnership with the civil society sector. According to a 
report prepared by the International Council of AIDS Service 
Organizations (ICASO), 
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…through the establishment of Country Coordinating 
Mechanisms (CCMs), the Global Fund has affirmed 
and legitimatized the critical importance of the 
involvement of a full range of stakeholders in proposal 
development, implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation. Where the CCMs are working well, they 
provide unparalleled opportunities - often not available 
elsewhere - for the full range of stakeholders to work 
together in partnership. These stakeholders include 
governments, bilateral and multilateral donors, the 
private sector and civil society (including NGOs, 
affected communities and faith-based organizations).
 104
 
 
CONCLUSION 
From the health policy perspective, the described HIV/AIDS policy 
consensus was desirable as it provided both international and domestic 
policy-makers with clear [technocratic] policy goals of how many 
people should receive treatment within certain time period, as well as 
straightforward guidelines what the standardized treatment protocol is 
and how to manage the distribution and logistical control of drugs. It 
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was attainable because the post-1996 ARV treatment indeed proved to 
be very effective and increasingly cheaper a biomedical invention 
supported by some uniform biomedical expertise and in various forms 
sponsored by international health, financial, and developmental 
organizations and pharmaceutical sector, especially its generic-
producing segment. Although international health community 
eventually elevated these three core policy components to a common 
intersubjectively held understanding, for a long time they were either 
actively contested, or simply ignored. All this does not mean that the 
international consensus as I describe it here will remain intact forever, 
yet it definitely means that the policy consensus governs international 
approaches to AIDS and strongly suggests the content of domestic 
policy responses.   
In the following chapter I devise an analytical framework to 
examine societal agreements about what constitutes the ―common 
good‖ served by state (e.g., ―social purpose‖), which under certain 
circumstances might profoundly challenge the international consensus 
on treatment as public good, including its major indicators as 
described above. 
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CHAPTER 3. SOCIAL PURPOSE: A FRAMEWORK OF 
ANALYSIS 
 
Social purpose is the core concept of this dissertation. I define social 
purpose as a socially legitimate and politically contingent conception 
of common good. Social purpose underpins the kinds of actions the 
dominating elite considers appropriate and the kinds of actions the 
domestic policy environment stimulates and sustains. Its impact can be 
isolated, when examining how a policy environment in a particular 
country ―filters‖ the international flow of policy recommendations and 
initiatives. 
This chapter theorizes the social purpose as the core concept of 
this dissertation. To illustrate its core features, it supplies some 
examples taken from the relevant literatures. Often, but not always, 
these examples are directly relevant for the further discussion of my 
cases. The first section briefly addresses the methodological debates 
on identity. In the context of my work, these debates are analytically 
relevant considering that social purpose is identity‘s dimension. My 
discussion, however, contributes to and clarifies the elite-society 
connections, commonly underdeveloped by this literature. In the 
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second section I develop a general theoretical framework of social 
purpose (visually represented in the Figure 3.1). It can be applied 
cross-nationally and is subsequently used to structure two empirical 
chapters on social purposes in Russia and South Africa. This 
framework sorts out various discursive activities to facilitate 
understanding how certain elite-driven conceptions of common good 
become socially legitimate. I distinguish tree types of agency, 
including domestic political elite, articulated audiences, and general 
public. I also delineate between several types of activities, which help 
understand relationship between elite and a society mutually 
generating social purpose. Subsequently linking these dimensions 
together will provide a coherent framework of political construction of 
national purpose (see Figure 3.1).  
In the final section I briefly spell out theoretical conjectures 
about the effects of social purpose on policy actions (see Table 3.2). I 
contend that policy-makers evaluate the benefits of international policy 
initiatives from the vantage point of their commitment to a certain 
conception of common good. This evaluation (or ―sorting through‖) 
impacts on the flow of external policy recommendations through 
domestic policy environment. At minimum, elites have an ability to 
bring the content of the external recommendations in consistence with 
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their vision of social purpose, thus investing them with the clearly 
discernible local characteristics. Furthermore, the degree of public 
contestation about the policy substance might be determined by the 
degree of societal agreement or disagreement on the conception of 
common good. Depending upon wider audiences‘ perception of this 
social purpose as natural and self-evident, domestic policy 
environment might ―immobilize‖ the proponents of alternative 
conceptions of common good, which renders their policy proposals 
inconsequential.   
 
MUDDLING THROUGH THE CORE DEBATES 
The overall intention of this section is to figure out whether my 
emphasis on elites and intentional construction of social purpose is 
warranted or should a methodological priority be given to the 
inductive recovering of discursive formations. Going into the details of 
these debates will help define the strength and limits of two 
approached to identity formation. At the same time, I am not likely to 
fill in all the lacunae of theorizing about identity here. The central 
point of this section is that an emphasis on intentional elites does not 
rule out the study of collective articulations. 
109 
 
Theorizing elite-society connection is the first step in 
understanding how elite-driven conception of common good becomes 
socially legitimate and politically consequential. The literature is 
divided into two camps. One group of scholars tends to concentrate on 
the intentional and purposeful domestic elites, promulgating a 
particular conception of common good, while paying only a superficial 
attention to the study of deeply enrooted cognitive structures in which 
all the members of society are socialized. Another group of scholars 
pursues the opposite track. Both approaches seem to produce a 
somewhat skewed picture of how national identity is generated. Both 
approaches are empirically feasible, but they both have hard time in 
unambiguously explaining whether the national identity is fully 
enrooted, or remain a superficial edifice of public debates, or turn into 
something consequential for the national policies. Currently available 
middle-ground models leave too much of a space to speculate on the 
relations between agency and structures in the process of developing 
social purpose. The discussion below will clarify these limitations of 
the both approaches, while the subsequent section will offer a decisive 
framework to overcome their deficiencies.  
  
Discourse and oversocialization 
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The first approach scrutinizes how discourses form a cognitive 
structure, which constrains and/or enables elites to enact certain 
political choices as legitimate and desirable.
1
 Scholars argue that a 
detailed examination of the popular culture is helpful to start 
conceptual and empirical work, because recovering domestic 
discursive formations it safeguards scholars from imposing the outside 
categories on the complex webs of meaning, which inform certain 
kinds of actions and inhibit the others. As Weldes argues, ―official 
representations depend on the cultural resources of society.‖2   
This approach builds on hasty assumption elites and audiences 
are invariably oversocialized.
3 
 Agency is treated as a passive reader, 
not an intentional producer of these discourses. First, this approach 
rejects the possibility that identities and purposes are ―intentionally or 
deliberately chosen, used, and/or strategically manipulated,‖4 or 
―planned by intentional behavior.‖5 From my perspective it is 
unwarranted to treat both elites and general public as incapable of 
conscious and intentional interaction with available discourses. After 
all, it is national elites and/or wider audiences which make some 
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discourses politically consequential: common discursive streams can 
be purely negative and thus not conducive to any socialization.
6
Some 
empirical examples also suggest this possibility. In South Africa, for 
instance, the broad discourse of ubuntu over the course of time was 
deployed by elites to support the notions of reconciliatory justice, 
market-friendly neoliberal orthodoxy, and even the South African 
benevolent hegemony on the continent.  
Second, with the exception of the pure totalitarian regimes, a 
collective level of articulation is likely to comprise of more than one 
discursive stream about identity and polity. Consider the following 
examples directly relevant for the discussion in the subsequent 
chapters. In South African context several overlapping and competing 
principal discursive streams included South Africanism, Africanism, 
pan-Africanism, black consciousness, and ethnic tribalism.
7
 In Russian 
case, as Kathleen Smith has convincingly demonstrated, after the 
demise of the USSR the formulation of the national identity (and thus 
the universally accepted conception of common good) was trapped at 
least in two mutually exclusive political mythologies.
8
 Ted Hopf 
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 On the discursive genre of litany/lament, see Reis 1997: 84—91, 91—105. In 
exploring overwhelmingly negative collective articulations in Russia during and after 
perestroika, Ries noticed that all the discourses--the anti-Soviet, pro-Soviet, populist 
and Russophile—were not conducive to ―positive‖ socialization. 
7
 See, respectively, Neuberger 1989; Sizwe 1979; Vail 1989, Ayittey 2005 
8
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documents the presence of New Western Russian, New Soviet 
Russian, Liberal Essentialist and Liberal Relativist identities, each 
entailing alternative social purposes. Astrid Tuminez gives a detailed 
description of five major contending variants of Russian nationalism in 
the 1990s.
9
 From all these descriptions, it becomes clear that in the 
1990s‘ Russia building a common social purpose was debilitated by 
the multiple discourses, none of which had an exclusive hold on 
agency. 
The plurality of parallel discursive formations is not as rare as 
it might seem. It most likely indicates that the nation/society embraces 
a variety of alternative conceptions of common good, while its 
national identity is fragmented or fractured. In a case of a highly 
fragmented collective consciousness, political elites are expected to try 
to transcend this fragmentation, offering a broader and more 
encompassing imagery of the national purpose. Furthermore, with the 
exception of states strictly exercising social control and censorship, 
many alternative discoursers are likely to remain available for wider 
audiences. For instance, while anti-communist sentiment today is 
broadly articulated in the popular culture, including movies and 
literature, so is the pro-communist stance (as the older soviet films and 
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books still available and to a certain degree popular in Russia). Even if 
submerged, or ―frozen,‖ alternative discursive formations might 
permeate society and might hinder the official conception of common 
good among wider audiences. 
The availability of various parallel discourses and public 
cultures, of course, is not a problem, unless we start making claims 
about their political salience for constituting the logic of 
appropriateness. If we claim that all these discourses simultaneously 
shape the kinds of actions considered legitimate, then we are likely to 
lose an analytical leverage in developing credible conjectures about 
discourses‘ specific and falsifiable effects on behavior. If we claim 
that only one out of many competing discourses becomes salient 
politically, then we have to ascertain how and why this discursive 
stream became dominant. Thus, instead of bracketing all non-dominant 
discourses, we have to explore the reasons why particular discourses 
about the nation become more attractive than others.   
Third, Hopf indicates that reducing the study of national 
purpose to the explicit (public) and internal debates about the goals of 
the nation and power struggle inside domestic elite can be misleading 
as it offers only a truncated version of the national purpose at best. In 
other words, he argues against a very thin notion of societal collective 
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self-understanding, in which discursive formations, historical 
narratives, commemorative practices and collective memories are 
reduced to a very specific proposal for the content of the national 
identity/social purpose as offered by national (governmental, 
parliamentary, bureaucratic) elite.
10
 In his view, the problem in all this 
is losing the analytical protection from imposing the outside categories 
on what appears to inform certain kinds of actions and inhibit the 
others.  
Yet taking stock of all potential discursive formations on the 
basis of unsizeable number of texts, often containing complex, 
contradictory, or even arcane meanings, seems to be unmanageable. It 
will be always tempting to sneak in the questionable baggage of the 
literary theory, offer highly idiosyncratic renditions of these texts, and 
ascribe whatever meaning an analysts renders relevant. In the absence 
of agency, using JM Coetzee‘s words, ―there is no dominating, central 
authorial consciousness, and therefore no claim to truth or authority, 
only competing voices and discourses.‖11 This means that excluding 
agency from our analysis is prone of losing a grip on diverse and 
multifaceted popular culture. A feared reduction, on the other hand, 
might be a solution to avoid the massive work on collecting and 
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interpreting popular culture texts and thus proves to be 
methodologically more efficient.   
 
Agency and intentionality 
The second approach treats identity as intentional, which is helpful to 
explain the selection among alternative discursive formations and an 
increasing dominance of one of them.
12
 This perspective instructs us to 
examine the direct political proposals for national/common good, 
assessing how the public debates and political contestation shape the 
resultant social purpose.
13
 This approach makes clear that individuals 
and groups in authoritative positions in the political system are more 
privileged at least in the initial spelling out and spreading their 
versions of social purpose. Domestic political elites as such are able to 
commit significant amount of resources, push their preferred policy 
decisions, and override others. To refer to elites‘ primacy in building 
politically suggestive discourses, Eric Hobsbawm, for instance, 
brought out the notions of inculcation, semi-fiction, forgery, and 
grafting.
14
 In her meticulously researched book Recovered Roots: 
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Collective Memory and the Making of Israeli National Tradition, Yael 
Zerubavel demonstrated that the articulations at a collective level were 
straightforwardly authorized and legitimized by the Israeli state and 
religious elite.
 15
 Thus, Zerubavel empirically found that ―the concept 
of invented tradition suggests a more conscious attempt to produce 
new cultural forms that seem as if they are of older origin.‖16  
The major caveat here stems from the apparent tendency to 
overestimate the power of elites in imposing the invented ―traditions‖ 
on their nations and manipulating their constituents. Scholars seem to 
be conscious about this problem, yet often admit having no analytical 
tools to qualify the limits of this alleged imposition of elite-generated 
set of beliefs, symbols and traditions on society.
17
 Many a scholar 
working in the ―invented tradition‖ paradigm examined cases, in 
which domestic contestation of alternative discourses was simply 
lacking. Thus, they were empirically restrained from ascertaining 
contending and equally suggestive ―traditions.‖ This limitation still 
lingers. Achille Mbembe‘s argument is a case in point. He reasons that 
political elites possess enormous power in creating and unleashing 
politically meaningful discourses. Yet he remains quite elusive as to 
how they make these discourses and concepts effective: ―...the 
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champions of state power invent entire constellation of ideas; they 
adopt a distinct set of cultural repertoires and powerfully evocative 
concepts; but they also resort, if necessary, to the systematic 
application of pain.‖18 
Let us put these considerations in the context of my units of 
analysis. In Russia circa 2000 President Vladimir Putin and his 
entourage spend significant efforts to build the new social purpose, 
styling it as the ―Sovereign Democracy.‖ In the similar way, South 
African President Thabo Mbeki called to ―bring into being a unified 
and common South African identity‖ under the label of African 
Renaissance.
19
 While these two articulations are clearly intentional and 
innovative, they nevertheless are grounded is some previous political 
symbols and articulations. Russian political elite tapped into the old 
―textbook‖ themes (strong state, state-led economy, and great power 
complex), which had been abundantly represented in public culture. 
Similarly the African Renaissance flatly drew on very broad and 
variegated anti-colonial discourses of Pixley ka Isaka Seme, Frantz 
Fannon, Sheik Anta Diop, Léopold Sédar Senghor, Kwame Nkrumah, 
Steve Biko, and Mahmood Mamdani. One thing remains clear so far: 
the efficacy of offering unfamiliar (or highly innovative) political 
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proposals and discursive resources to wider audiences is likely to be 
costly and time-consuming.
 20
  In this sense, popular culture is so much 
a pliable building-block, as a factor which increases or decreases the 
appeal of elite‘s message to wider audiences.   
The second principal limitation of this approach is its inability 
to capture the role of wider audiences. Overstressing the role of elites 
turns wider audience into mere recipients and carriers of some elite-
generated proposals for the nation. Audiences, however, possess a 
capacity to collectively generate and maintain different proposals, as 
well as select or reject the elite-driven conception of social purpose. In 
doing so, audiences put significant constraints on elites: As persistent 
as elites can be in promoting their narrow conception of common 
good, in certain circumstances they have to ground their discourse into 
what is available and popular at the level of collectivity. From these 
shortcomings it becomes clear that without examining collective 
articulations at a broader level of collectivity, we will be unable to 
ascertain why a particular social purpose gains a wide-spread social 
legitimacy.      
Finally, to use this approach more effectively we have to define 
what types of agency do we have and how various agencies are 
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connected in their mutual shaping of social purpose (see Figure 3.1). I 
distinguish domestic political elite, articulated audience, and general 
public, each with its own particular type of discursive activity. Elite is 
defined here as a small group of people with a very high position in the 
political system (ruling class), which generally formulates the 
conception of common good and triggers the process of its 
legitimation. Elite is supported by those who make politics their 
profession (e.g., ―articulated audiences,‖ ―political class‖). I use this 
term to point up its meaning as ―a body of adherents,‖ acolytes and 
devotees of domestic political elites, rather than a passive group of 
spectators, listeners, and consumers. This category is an assemblage of 
those scholars, journalists, belletrists, opinion leaders, TV hosts, 
documentary producers, who are not free (or chose to not be) to 
articulate any discourses, who accept the limits of officially sanctioned 
formulations. The attention to articulated audiences helps properly 
theorizing the connection between decision-making elites and 
domestic society. Building on Yitzhak Brudny, I prefer this neutral 
definition instead of rather pejorative tags such as court intellectuals 
and ―spin-doctors.‖ 21  
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Wider audiences ―participate actively in the formation of both 
identity and interests,‖22  inasmuch as public culture (in its various 
popular genres) supports of rejects the elite-generated conception of 
common good (or any of its particular substantive components). In the 
second section of this chapter I offer the framework overcoming the 
limitations of both approaches, while building on their stronger sides. 
Figure 3.1: Major processes in social purpose 
 
 
THE FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS  
This section develops a general theoretical framework of social 
purpose, which can be applied cross-nationally and is subsequently 
used to structure two empirical chapters. I distinguish tree types of 
agency, including domestic political elite, articulated audiences, and 
general public, each connected to each other in mutually generating 
social purpose. To facilitate understanding how certain elite-driven 
conceptions of common good become socially legitimate I also 
delineate between several types of activities. Subsequently linking 
these dimensions together will provide a coherent framework to 
analyze political construction of national purpose (visually represented 
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in Figure 3.1).    The proposed framework is not only a template I use 
to progress through next two empirical chapters of this dissertation, 
but also a broader tool to make sense of a set of interrelated discursive 
activities in a society (which previously have not been put together 
into one comprehensive framework).  This framework is helpful to 
compare social purposes, overcoming many profound differences in 
their country- and time-contingent contents. At the end of each 
subsection I would provide four indicators, designed to rank each 
discursive activity separately.  In the last section of this chapter I will 
bring all these rankings together in order to define possible variations 
in social purpose as a variable. As social purpose varies in its domestic 
acceptance, its various rankings imply different ramifications how 
external policy prescriptions and initiative are likely to be filtered 
through the domestic policy environment. 
Because national purposes are constructed via discursive 
activities, discourse analysis is the methodology employed in the 
relevant empirical chapters. The so-called ―canonical texts‖ are very 
importance since political actors anchor their understanding and 
discussion of national identity to them. Canonical texts include 
original texts elaborating on the desired conception of common good 
for the purposes of generating the subsequent discussion. Most 
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notably, they include presidents‘ addresses to domestic elite and key 
statements of its chief ideologists.
 23
  More specifically, they comprise 
available public statements, white papers, political party platforms, 
parliamentary debates, newspaper articles. The sampling of supportive 
texts is stipulated by the standard consideration of their position inside 
political discourse as secondary to canonical texts and their time-
extensive impact on wider audiences as the primary target. The 
sampling allows the variation of sources, i.e., statements, interviews, 
articles from different leading newspapers and journals, as well as 
variation in authors. Other important sources may include various 
debates among top political leaders, key intellectuals, highly acclaimed 
public persons, and prominent political observers. For the following 
two empirical chapters, I have drawn on 200 textual sources for each 
case. Two other basic options used by the discourse analysts—either to 
use the most controversial texts as the primary object of analysis, or 
use ethnographic/anthropological approach in inductively 
reconstructing the social identification—are not employed here. The 
first option limits the scope of articulation and debates inasmuch as it 
describes only the borderlines of public discourse. i.e., provides a list 
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of necessary, but not sufficient texts for research.
 24
 The second gives 
somewhat arbitrary aggregation of the individual discourses to the 
collective level (it is also hardly falsifiable).
25
 The canonical texts and 
supportive materials embrace a wider spectrum of articulations than 
either borderline or individual articulations.
 26
  My research is 
especially interested in foundational proposals, which are centerpieces 
of elite‘s thinking about national purpose.   
 
Social purpose and elite‘s commitments 
The notion of commitment to providing common goods is used here to 
describe an extant elite‘s explicit articulation of a certain conception of 
common good as a necessary condition for the country‘s sustainability 
and even its survival as an autonomous political organization. 
Commitments are expressed in publicly available discourses, political 
programs, interviews, and so on.
27
 Strong commitments and 
[successfully] acting on them powerfully reaffirms elite‘s sense of 
self-efficacy and self-esteem. At the same time, elites might become 
ultimately vulnerable: Not providing this common good might 
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jeopardize their reputation, sense of worthiness, and political fate.  
Elite‘s commitment is a tip of the iceberg in terms of whether or not 
this conception of common good truly becomes a socially accepted 
and legitimate. Yet it is a good starting point to evaluate the 
emergence of social purpose.  As social purpose is intentionally 
projected by elites onto domestic constituency as the primary target 
audience, it might be erroneously viewed as a kind of governmental 
propaganda.  
As I empirically demonstrate in Chapter 4, Russian political 
elite was spearheaded by siloviki, i.e. the members of the so-called 
power ministries with law enforcement, military, and secret police 
backgrounds.
28
 Siloviki unequivocally styled themselves as the 
champions of the strong state as the core political value with a strong 
state apparatus (vlast‘, gosudarstvennost‘), emphasizing the role of 
state in economic delivery, and ensuring Russia‘s great power status in 
global politics. Siloviki claimed these prescriptions were vital for the 
existence and survival of the country. In South Africa (Chapter 5) I 
discuss the concept of the African Renaissance. In this country, the 
leading role in articulating social purpose belonged to the so-called 
―Mbekiites,‖ or loyalists (who sometimes called themselves nativists, 
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for the lack of the better term). This subset of domestic political elite 
committed itself for indigenousness as a core political value, explicitly 
promoted marketization with the increasing undesirability of spending 
and redistribution, and unleashed the rhetoric of the country‘s 
leadership role on the continent (ubuntu). Notwithstanding the 
richness, complexity and diversity of the multiple societal 
interpretations attached to the term, these three core organizing 
prescriptions clearly stood out as the principal themes.   
Where do these specific substantive components of social 
purpose come from? In the framework of this research I will be able to 
give only tentative answers (the summary of core substantive 
components of social purpose in two countries is given in the Table 
1.3 below). The starting point of social purpose formation is the 
exogenous shock–the collapse of the previous political regime or the 
whole international system, sometimes aggravated by protracted 
transitional periods. During these transitional periods, political elites 
embark on searching a new conception of common good for the 
country. Certainly, political elites both draw on and respond to their 
immediate global environments and to the backdrop of a dismantled 
political regime. At the same time, their proposals in essence spring 
from a range of contingent beliefs about common good as related to 
the extant elite‘s identity.   
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First, various forms of cultural and political homogenization—
which we often subsume under the rubric of globalization—trigger the 
formulation of the primary political component of social purpose. 
More accurately, the perceived threat of homogenization (or, in some 
cases Westernization) stimulates domestic elites to reformulate and 
reassert what makes their extant in-groups and polities distinct in the 
world where the spheres of authority and borders are increasingly 
blurred. In the context of South Africa, the national elite reclaimed the 
meaning of being ―African‖ and imbued it with a new sense of pride. 
This process was fundamentally similar to how many decolonizing 
nations in the second half of the 20
th
 century asserted their national 
self-efficacy and self-esteem via innovative socio-political concepts.
29
 
In Russian circumstances, political elites made ―stateness‖ the core 
marker of their difference from the West with the value of the strong 
state power (vlast‘, gosudarstvennost‘) at the core of the conception of 
common good. 
Second, social purpose has an economic dimension, which in 
the developing world is formulated often in response to organizational 
and normative models originating in the North. While the current 
antiglobalization movement is spearheaded against economic 
neoliberalism, the principles of marketization, deregulation, and 
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privatization seem to have gained momentum after the global collapse 
of administrative-planned economies.
30
 The strong emphasis placed on 
social redistribution of wealth, among other principles touted by the 
communist states, lost its legitimacy and was replaced by the so-called 
Washington Consensus in the 1990s. In various domestic contexts, 
however, the neoliberal policies had different fates. In South Africa the 
impetus of global economic neoliberalism as promoted by 
international financial institutions was intensified by negative 
memories of state-led economic disempowerment during the apartheid 
regime. Thus, not surprisingly, despite sharp domestic debate and 
much criticism, a new South African identity embraced neoliberal 
ideals, rather than social welfare principles.
31
  In Russian political 
context, the reliance on marketization and deregulation was overturned 
in favor of state-led economic development, after unpopular and not 
always fully implemented economic reforms of the 1990s. The 
problems in economic development were attributed to the negligence 
and unwillingness to use the state to exercise its power as an economic 
regulator. 
Third, building social purpose necessitates an 
international/global dimension as well. Elites are likely to formulate 
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their conception of common good in the context of the world system, 
which pressures states to define their own structural position in it. 
Elites pitch themselves as the ultimate champions of the state‘s 
desirable systemic position and imbue this position with a strong 
feeling of self-esteem. Advocates for any other position in the system 
are likely to get chastised as the promoters of the county‘s subordinate 
role, entailing the inevitable loss of sovereignty. After the exogenous 
shock of the late 1980—early 1990s, Russia‘s political elite 
downplayed the discourse of Russia as a great power at the 
international arena and instead talked about reentering the ―common 
European house.‖ When siloviki came to power in the early 2000s, 
they pledged to rectify the perceived loss of the nation‘s self-efficacy 
and revamped Russia as a great power (derzhava). This strongly 
implied that in any other international status Russia is likely to cease to 
exist as an autonomous political organization. In South Africa, Mbeki 
and his entourage also sought to boost the country‘s self-esteem as the 
primary and the sole expresser of a continental solidarity, and to a 
certain degree developed its image as a benevolent hegemon. In both 
cases, elites rejected Western values and asserted their own importance 
for the international system operating smoothly and for guaranteeing 
regional and global stability. 
129 
 
Table 3.1 National purpose in Russia and South Africa 
 
In sum, I assert that exploring elite‘s commitments is a good 
starting point to ascertain the presence or absence of elite-generated 
self-reflective and intentional effort to develop national purpose. To 
assert this emergence, in the following subsections I discuss how 
domestic articulated audiences exercise their influence on policy 
environment  and to what extend the elite-driven articulations find the 
support in the public culture. I would rank an extant elite‘s 
commitment to the conception of common good as follows: 
 Elites do not commit to any definite country-specific 
conception of common good (absent); 
 Contending elites strongly commit to  alternative conceptions 
of common good (fractured); 
 Elite strongly commits to a certain conception of common 
good, while its potential contenders chose not to (or simply 
cannot) challenge it overtly (restrained); 
 Elite is strongly consolidated around a certain conception of 
common good (consolidated). 
Yet from mere empirical description of domestic claims at the 
top political level about the search or emergence of national identity at 
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it is not always possible to arrive at a solid conclusion whether or not 
elite-driven articulations indicate the emergence of national purpose. 
 
Social purpose and its public legitimacy 
Social legitimacy of an elite-generated conception of common good 
depends on its public acceptance, as prompted by the so-called 
articulated audiences. Articulated audience labors to turn elite-
generated conception of common good into broadly resonating and 
recognizable, sometimes simplified, themes. In essence, articulated 
audiences connect elites to general public.     
Elites are likely to stimulate the emergence of articulated 
audiences, which justify why certain kinds of action are appropriate 
and why the others should be considered inappropriate. First, 
articulated audiences enable or constrain the production of certain 
resources shift the balance between previous discursive formations. 
Second, as elites relate providing common good to the desired image 
of the self as a primary or even sole carrier of its exact conception, 
articulated audiences ground a promoted conception of common good 
in particular self-Other dichotomies.  If their efforts prove to be 
successful, articulated audiences turn a specific conception of common 
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good into simplified, broadly resonating and recognizable, perhaps 
even undisputable, themes.  
In the absence of intentional efforts to credibly inject social 
purpose to the public intersubjective understanding, it is not likely to 
take roots.  Smith, for instance, convincingly demonstrated that 
Yeltsin‘s failure in embedding pro-liberal social purpose stemmed 
from his entourage‘s negligence towards the would-be highly 
important symbolic national events, such as the resistance to the 
August 1991 putsch.
 32
 In the 1990s‘ South Africa Archbishop 
Desmond Tutu promoted the notion of ubuntu (the universal bond of 
sharing that connects all humanity) and the idea of the Rainbow 
Nation as the country‘s social purpose. These concepts were seen as 
potentially accommodating all contending social values and thus 
ushering a broad social consensus as an ultimate political goal.
33
 In 
both cases it was the absence of decisive and consistent efforts to 
stimulate the wider awareness and public acceptance of these 
conceptions, rather than the unattractiveness of the proposals 
themselves. 
First, this thinking about the importance of providing 
discursive resources to the society draws on and refines the earlier 
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 Wilson 2001: 9—13  
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literatures on the ―invention of a tradition‖ as described in the previous 
sections.  Most commonly elite-friendly resources are carried out via 
national educational systems, specific commemoration practices, and 
museums. Other tools may include creating forests and parks, 
codifying literary language, implementing architectural styles, touting 
cultural heritage, establishing research institutes dedicated to a 
particular topic, as well as preserving archeological sites, tombs, 
monuments, and even mountains.
 34
  Although not exhaustive, this list 
aspires to show the most important discursive resources, which can 
become politically consequential in the context of contemporary 
politics. In different regional, national, and subnational contexts, the 
value of different discursive resources varies. One type of resource—
the past—deserves a special attention. 
Since the advent of modern nationalism, the role of historical 
narratives and the past was deemed to be especially effective in 
legitimizing elites‘ political goals and political proposals.35 Ernest 
Gellner, Terrence Ranger, and Eric Hobsbawm suggested the 
importance of developing binding historical narratives, supported by a 
single official language and spreading literacy as vehicles of providing 
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 For examples, see, respectively, Schwartz 2005;Laitin 2002; Dubin 2004; Austin 
2003, Nelson 2003; Riera 2006; Evans 2006; Smith et al 1998; Smith 2002; 
Zerubavel 1995; Callahan 2004; Shnirelman 2000; Groys 2003; Coombes 2003; 
Rosenberg 2005. On the role of media in sustaining national identities, see Price 
1996. 
35
 See Benson 1986, Reus-Smit 2004: 71; Wood 2008. 
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elite-oriented discursive resources. Later on, scholars specified this 
assertion by indicating that history was important inasmuch it allowed 
securing the political meaning of some ―big,‖ or ―liminal‖ events.36 
Historical education has been broadly suggested as one of the most 
common means get the political message ―outreached‖ to the society 
to build a national identity and legitimize elites‘ mission.37   
In Russia, for instance, national purpose has been embedded in 
the politics of the past, which aimed at reshaping the political memory 
of the XXth century and creating the discursive continuity among 
imperial past, communist regime, and Putin‘s increasingly autocratic 
rule. More specifically, Putin‘s entourage conducted intentional, 
systematic and almost decade-long activities to stigmatize the 
democratic politics of the 1990s, and glorify the Soviet role in the so-
called Great Patriotic War. In South Africa, past was used to generate 
an invented tradition too. Articulated audiences presented the past of 
the continent as an incredibly rich resource to be reappropriated for an 
intellectual and spiritual revival. They claimed that the continental past 
meant as much for South African Renaissance as the Greek antiquity 
meant for the Renaissance Europe.
38
 Building relevant discursive 
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 Campbel 1992: 21-23; on the notional of liminal events see Zerubavel 1995: pp  
37
 See, for instance, May 2008 issue of The Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science ―The Politics of History in Comparative Perspective‖. 
38
 See, for instance, Gueye 1999: 245 and Mzamane 1999: 173—183, both in 
Makgoba 1999 
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resources included the active role of the Human Sciences Research 
Council (HSRC) and a Council for the Development of Social Science 
Research in Africa (CODESRIA), which streamlined and valorized the 
African intellectual traditions. In fact, their publications were targeted 
to invent a tradition and generate a set of new canonic cultural 
landmarks for the contemporary South Africa.    
Yet stimulating discursive resources is not as trifle a task as it 
seems: deploying potentially very powerful symbols and collective 
images may be in vain. In Russia the new national holiday Day of 
National Unity, for instance plugged into the pre-revolutionary holiday 
of the Day of the Icon of the Kazan Mother of God and 
commemoration of the overturning the Polish occupation of the 
country in 1612.
39
 On the other hand, it was designed to move away 
from communist commemorations and replace by and large 
meaningless the Day of Accord and Reconciliation — Yeltsin‘s 
substitute to the October Revolution day. As many political observers 
explained, the true meaning of the day is was not really about history: 
it was supposed to seal symbolically the official rendition of the ―wild 
1990‖ by commemorating the ending of the protracted period of state 
weakness and the undermined national sovereignty. Yet this resource 
turned out not to be immediately successful, as during the first years of 
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 See Nazarov 2004; Gromov 2005a; Ivanov 2005; Nikonov 2006; Borodina 2008. 
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its celebrations the radical ethnic movements successfully highjacked 
it for their own purposes. Thus, simply tapping in what is readily 
available in the pre-existing collective discourses might not be enough 
for legitimizing social purpose: the discovery of and interest to some 
resources, as it happened with Russia discovering its pre-communist 
past, does not automatically convert these resources into politically 
salient and consequential topics.  
Second, elites do not exist in a political and social vacuum; 
they are likely to face domestic actors which embrace alternative 
conceptions of common good. Because the members of extant elite 
group strongly attach the conception of common good to its own 
identity and reputation, its opponents are most likely to be designated 
as the Other. Since they challenge the advocated conception of 
common good, the Other is cast as undermining the country‘s political 
sustainability and survivability. Articulated audiences create a strong 
national ―we‖ against sordid anti-national ―they.‖ The Other receives a 
spate of negative characteristics and is suspected to play the subversive 
role. In various circumstances, political Others may be pejoratively 
labeled as turncoats, fellow travelers, public enemies, pessimists, anti-
patriots, and so on.    
If the self-Other dichotomy is successfully deployed, a more 
embedded (intersubjectively shared) national purpose is more likely to 
136 
 
emerge. In different historical, cultural and temporal circumstances 
building this Self/Other imagery may start with already available and 
constraining perceptions of who the contending political actors are at 
the level of broader audiences. Alternatively, this imagery may be the 
result of a pure invention.  Putin‘s entourage conducted intentional, 
systematic and almost decade-long activities to embed his conception 
of common good by holding the democratic politics of the 1990s 
responsible for the collapse of the state, loss of national self-efficacy 
and self-esteem. The newly found Other was a domestic liberal, 
allegedly striving to ―dismember‖ the state, offer its ―juicy morsels‖ to 
Russia‘s foreign rivals, and certainly make Russia get down on her 
knees before the West. Similar dynamic can be traced in South Africa. 
In developing African Renaissance, its chief proponents successfully 
pitched it against Afro-pessimists, settlers and neo-colonialists, who 
schemed to keep South Africa subjugated to the West, denying her 
subjectivity, and treating the Native like a child. 
I would rank the extent to which a certain conception of 
common good is legitimized in domestic society as follows: 
 Conceptions of common good lack any definite legitimating 
discourses , self-Other dichotomies blurred (absent); 
 All contending conceptions of common good enjoy are 
supported by plurality of discourses (fractured); 
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 Only one conception of common good is explicitly supported 
and intentionally promulgated  (restrained); 
 Only one conception of common good is strongly legitimized 
with a single dominant self-Other dichotomy (consolidated). 
 
The caveat here is that the outcome of these legitimizing is not 
predetermined. In the contexts of deeply split societies, alleviating 
gulfs among diverse audiences is likely to be needed. Yet it is possible 
that building resources intended to traverse the divide between various 
separate identity formulations and discourses could make the appeal of 
the elite‘s conception of social purpose rather weak and eclectic. In the 
1990s‘ Russia, Yeltsin‘s task force in charge of formulating the 
concept of ―national idea for Russia‖ on the basis of taking stock of all 
discourses and ideas flowing in the society failed dramatically.
40
  At 
the same time, in some extraordinary cases, elites will try to constrain 
dangerous or undesirable discourses.
41
 This may lead to the outright 
criminalization of some political interpretations, or a variety of legal 
penalties for public usage of certain not desirable articulations.
42
  All 
this suggests that the successful production of new national rituals and 
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 Satarov 1997 
41
 An example is banned Russian TV show Kukly (The Puppets) for making fun of 
Putin. 
42
 Consider, for instance, the law against the display of the communist symbol of 
sickle and hammer in the Lithuania. 
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narratives should be attributed not to the forceful imposition from 
above, but rather to the collaborative efforts of wider audiences.
43
 The 
role of wider audiences is discussed in the subsection below. 
      
Social purpose and public culture    
Studying popular articulations is important inasmuch it is generally 
acknowledged that if the formulation of national identity/purpose (no 
matter how compelling inside an elite group) is not linked to the 
principal popular discourses, it remains either limited to a particular 
political group, or constricted to the elite. In other words, the emphasis 
on the popular culture captures the idea that it is a ―vessel‖ expressing 
and sustaining wider audiences‘ perceptions of a certain conception of 
common good and makes it self-explanatory and not contestable. In 
this subsection I address the ways to conceive popular culture as a 
[re]source shaping social purpose. As there is much debate and even 
confusion in the literature on how to employ popular culture without 
making unfalsifiable subjective interpretations, addressing this 
question is important.
44
  Detailed accounts showing how, why and 
what type of resources can be best used to characterize national 
purpose in two selected countries are provided in subsequent chapters. 
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 See also Zerubavel 1995: 232.  
44
 Nexon and Neumann (2006, Chapter 1) tentatively summarize the ways in which 
pop culture can be used in the study of politics. 
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Popular culture is a ―vessel‖ expressing and sustaining wider 
audiences‘ perceptions of what the nation is. It contains certain 
discursive streams—distinct, coherent and fairly elaborate narratives 
about national identity found at the level of collectivity, independent 
from what elites want to inculcate. Popular culture is studied here to 
tease out discernible overarching themes supporting or elite-driven 
articulations related to national identity and social purpose. When 
recovering identities from a collective level, scholars underscore that 
national identity is a cultural product, expressed in variegated textual 
sources and embedded at the level of collectivity. If national identity at 
the collective level can be retrieved from popular culture, looking at 
fictional works in principle can become useful.  As Hopf—perhaps 
one of the preeminent expressers of this approach—put it, ―popular 
fictional works are an especially important source of identity and its 
discursive practices‖.45   
In certain cases, a discursive formation could contain a single 
convincing elaboration of national imageries. On the other hand, there 
can be multiple discursive streams at the level of collectivity, 
embracing different understandings of the self. To make the study 
manageable, I am specifically interested to see whether popular 
                                                     
45
 Hopf 2002: 35. Besides Hopf, Olcot (2001) provides a very insightful analysis of 
the contemporary pulp-fiction. 
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articulations contain the self/Other dichotomies similar to what elites 
promote, whether popular articulations in general match the content of 
elite-generated conception of common good, which would strongly 
suggest the connection between elite and society and thus attest to the 
strength of the national purpose. The proposed way to address these 
questions culminates in my model of discursive activities shaping 
national purpose (Figure 3.1). It suggests that wider audiences 
generate these streams, while elites can tap into them to [re]generate 
the desired self/Other dichotomies and enhance their political 
proposals for the national existence. Thus, my approach requires 
evaluating whether there are prominent narratives in which elites can 
successfully tap into, rather than aspiring to cover all potential 
collective articulations in the sample of popular culture. 
In studying popular articulations, the first methodological 
obstacle comes from the very nature of popular fiction, which may 
either evade any straightforward interpretation, or offer even 
conflicting messages —the quality that makes fictional works so 
creative and interesting to consume and interpret.
46
 Thus, the clarity of 
the message could be considerably blurred. For the purposes of this 
study, it is necessary to explain how the multifaceted body of domestic 
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 For the particular examples of how malleable popular culture woks can be, see 
Chait 2000, Hozic 2003, Diala 2003. 
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popular culture can be used as a reliable indicator of a particular 
national identity and national purpose. Evoking popular culture for the 
analysis of the national identity can be suggestive if a scholar finds 
widely accepted interpretation of the textual or visual sources instead 
of deconstructing/interpreting them from scratch.  One way to address 
the issue is to examine secondary commentaries, which, of course, 
may miss some minor point of any given item, but nevertheless may 
signal certain societal sensibilities.  
Furthermore, another challenge in examining popular culture 
stems from its very nature, which is first and foremost about 
entertainment, rather than intentional conveying politically meaningful 
messages.
47
 In any case, an interpreter might be tempted to 
overestimate the significance of some random, single textual or visual 
quotes imbued with political points. Rather, I would try to retrieve 
some broader core themes, which stand out among the multiple 
artifacts of the popular culture, which may shape collective 
consciousness, and which could become politically suggestive. Public 
culture, thus, is studied here not only to tease out broad discernible 
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 In such cases, popular culture should be understood as dependent on articulated 
audiences and thus an integral part of intentional attempts to build public legitimacy. 
Popular culture should express and carry collective notions, while somehow 
reflecting on the broad socio-political events and themes used by elites and 
articulated audiences to substantiate their proposal for the nation. In this case, these 
resources are more likely to receive public commentaries, so that my interpretation 
can be supplementary reliable.   
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themes, but to stipulate what themes and presentations are missing at 
the level of collectivity (and thus presenting a challenge to providing 
discursive resources). In sum, the tasks pursued in studying 
articulation are quite modest. I am not trying to recover all the 
available formations, or explain them in intricate details (a-la Hopf), or 
precisely relate them to each other.      
The second methodological issue concerns sampling. An 
accurate sampling of domestic popular articulations is inevitably more 
difficult than finding the elite-formulated proposals to the nations. As 
the truly comprehensive survey of popular culture is hardly possible, 
theoretically-informed selection of particular type of information and 
kind of resources for national purpose is imperative.  As the usage of 
popular culture in political science remains debated and somewhat 
confused, the methodological comments are imperative. Scholars often 
make use of only the extremely popular and highly acclaimed cultural 
items. The more recent groundbreaking studies employ a variety of 
textual and visual sources, choosing them mostly on the basis of their 
overall popularity. Among key examples are Harry Potter series, Star 
Trek TV show, Big Brother, Hollywood war movies, and comic 
books.
48
  While I agree with the use of popular movies as a 
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 For the analysis of these sources see, respectively, Nexon and Neumann 2006; 
Weldes 2003; Dolby 2006, Gallager 2008, Hajdu 2008.    
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representation of what is conventional and broadly shared in a given 
collectivity, the implicit notion that popularity matters has to be 
explained further. Moreover, in order to understand the limits of public 
articulation of certain topics within the framework of discourse 
analysis (acceptance of variation or degree within a certain narrative), 
the sample of popular culture has to include both popularity and 
marginal items. While the generic notion of being popular stands for 
wider audience‘s cumulatively positive response to certain types of 
articulations, it is also helpful to know at what point they start 
responding negatively inside the same articulation/stream. The sample, 
therefore, has to make use of both canonic, highly praised as well as 
mainstream and even marginal or rejected resources.   
Below I propose several additional considerations guiding my 
sampling and interpreting collective articulations. First and foremost, 
these popular sources should be diverse (in their themes, numbers, 
producers, and targeted audiences) in order to contain, at least in 
principle, more than one self-Other dichotomy. If we look at fiction, 
the books we examine should not come out from the same publishing 
house; if we examine films, they should not be produced by the same 
studio, or directed by the same set of directors, screenwriters etc. The 
selected genre should not target only one segment of society. Besides, 
popular sources should not be dominated (censored) by domestic 
144 
 
political elite. This means, that the selected genre should be relatively 
free from intentional manipulation and thus should be analytically 
separate from elite-driven development of discursive resources.  
Finally, what type of popular culture is most relevant and 
insightful for the study of national identity? It is clear that the vast 
field of popular culture should not be trimmed down, say, only to 
books and films, even if assuming we can take stock of all relevant 
sources. Eric Helleiner pioneered studies of currency iconography to 
examine as a technique of ―nation-branding‖ and symbol of 
nationalism use.
49
 Comparing to fiction and even feature films, these 
artifacts may prove to be more important for expressing national 
identities, as they are used on the daily basis almost by everyone, and 
perhaps slowly but inadvertently percolating into the national 
consciousness. However, it is methodologically advisable to use the 
same genre of popular culture to have a stronger control, especially if 
we want to recover identities over a longer time span. Also, using the 
mixture of different genres and textual sources of popular culture can 
be very confusing to the reader.
50
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 Helleiner 1998; Helleiner 2002. For more specific examples see, for instance, 
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nationalist and colonial ideology; Fuller 2008 on Kwame Nkrumah‘s  image minted 
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The remainder of this subsection briefly discusses why have 
been selected feature films for the Russian Federation and fictional 
prose for South Africa. [South] African fiction historically remained 
very outward-oriented and speaks more directly to the Western 
readership, as JM Coetzee asserts in his description of a fictional 
Elizabeth Costello‘s pessimism about the quality and sensibilities of 
African writing.
51
 Most importantly, South African popular fiction has 
long operated in what can be described as a ―politically demanding 
milieu‖ and thus initially qualifies to be become the resource to forge 
the nation. It is well-suited to deal with the questions of morality, is 
conducive to the purposes of political mobilization and restructuring 
African identities, as Michael Chapman claims in his very important 
and multidimensional treatise of the contemporary state of popular 
culture in South Africa.
52
 Sam Durrant attributes to the postcolonial 
literatures both the healing, therapeutic, transformative role and thus 
capable of bringing the nation to the ―roots.‖ In general, because the 
contemporary South African literature is highly politicized and has 
stimulated a significant body of political commentaries it fits the 
purposes of my discussion.  
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 Chapman 2006: 43—46, 75, 87, see also Coetzee 2001:209.  
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In Russian case there is no shortage of pop culture resources to 
be used to study the country‘s identity. Since the early 1990s domestic 
interest to national identity was abundantly supplied by quasi-accurate 
novels of questionable literary merits, facsimile reprints of pre-
revolution historical narratives and grotesque historical pamphlets, 
which flooded the bookstores and street kiosks. Circa the early 1990s 
the sublime role of respected and influential historians, producing 
narratives about the past and reopening the forgotten and heavily 
censored histories was superseded by various segments of popular 
culture, which should be considered much better expresser of Russian 
identity. This dissertation makes use of domestic present-day feature 
films. The importance of the political role films and TV plays in 
contemporary Russia is widely acknowledged in literature.
53
 Indeed, in 
the 2000s the role of domestic movies became evermore important as 
evident by the increase of the number of filmed movies and their 
relative box-office success versus foreign ones. Studying film industry 
is warranted in the context of current semi-politicized claims of the 
significance of film industry for the national consciousness.
 54   
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I would rank the extent to which public culture supports a 
certain conception of common good as follows: 
 Absence of discernible and elaborate discursive streams as related 
to conceptions of common good (absent); 
 Public culture supports a plurality of contending articulations of 
common good (fractured); 
 Public culture partially supports a dominant articulation of 
common good, including  some of its substantive components 
(restrained); 
 Public culture strongly supports a dominant articulation of 
common good, including its all substantive components 
(consolidated). 
 
THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL PURPOSE ON PUBLIC POLICY   
This dissertation asserts that social purpose informs the kinds of 
actions the ruling elite considers appropriate, and helps ascertaining 
how domestic policy environment interacts with international 
recommendations flowing through it (including HIV/AIDS policy 
initiatives). In essence, when sorting through international policy 
recommendations, elites answer the fundamental questions how to 
define the guidelines of the provision of a particular public good 
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(treatment), which populations should benefit or be excluded from the 
consumption of public good (universality of access), and who gets to 
participate in shaping public health policy (partnership). On the other 
hand, as social purpose varies in its domestic acceptance, its various 
rankings might shape the intensity and nature of the domestic 
contestation around external policy prescriptions. Thus, this variance is 
likely to affect how exactly the external initiative are likely to be 
filtered through the domestic policy environment. While I am not 
claiming that social purpose should be treated as the single explanation 
of the variation in how governments and societies adopt external 
international policy recommendations, on balance it tells us an 
important and previously overlooked story about the political 
determinants of domestic policy responses.  
The biggest challenge is perhaps to provide a valid way to rank 
national purpose. Giving ranking is important and might help 
formulate and sharpen previously underspecified conjectures about the 
effects of identity policy formulation and implementation.  Scholars 
using elite-oriented approach use several indicators to classify the 
degree of elite consensus on national identity. These indicators include 
how many political parties commit to the similar conception of 
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common good.
55
 Another indicator is the endurance of a certain social 
purpose even after particular individuals or the elite group, which 
generated it, are no longer in power.  In this case, the strongest 
empirical evidence would be if multiple consecutive governments 
share the same identity.
56
 The downside is that these indicators are 
case-driven and have only limited validity. In this context, my 
framework of analysis provides more straightforward guidelines to 
rank social purpose and think about its effects of policy process (see 
Table 3.2): 
Table 3.2 Ranking social purpose 
 
Generally, this ranking is based on evaluating the extent to which elite-
generated conception of common good get to shape the domestic 
policy environment. These distinctions are important. Consider, for 
instance, situation when powerful elites carry out certain kinds of 
policy actions they consider legitimate, while society strongly 
embraces alternative conceptions of common good. This can trigger a 
profound societal contestation with different implications for policy 
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process. I delineate between absent, fractured, restrained, and 
consolidated rankings of social purpose. 
In case if elites demonstrate no strong commitment to a 
conception of common good, all alternative kinds of actions are 
legitimate; the policy environment is likely to be dominated by 
different bureaucratic agencies, which are expected to pursue their 
narrowly defined tasks. In the opposite case (social purpose 
consolidated), it prompts a relatively coherent and elaborate policy 
response, which brings together previous uncommitted domestic 
public policy initiatives approaches.   
At minimum, in case of fractured, restrained and consolidated 
social purposes elites possess an ability to influence the content of the 
external recommendations and policy initiatives, investing them with 
the clearly discernible local characteristics. Reus-Smit, for instance, 
offers an example from the contemporary American politics, where the 
neoconservative conception of common good did not become a 
national purpose, while nevertheless shaping American foreign policy 
agenda.
57
  Furthermore, elites can achieve a success in getting their 
particular iteration of common good to be supported by articulated 
audiences and embedded in collective articulations, expressed in the 
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means of popular culture. This strongly implies a public acceptance of 
a distinct social purpose and generally delegitimizes any alternative 
conceptions of common good, which might be considered only with 
serious reservations.  
At maximum, domestic policy environment—if significantly 
shaped by elite-friendly discourses—can simultaneously empower 
various groups if favor of governmental policies, and disempower 
various nongovernmental organizations, civil society groups, and 
social movements with the set of demands conflicting and inconsistent 
with the official policy responses. In this context, alternative 
behavioral choices might be advocated either moderately, or might not 
be consequential for the formulation and implementation of the public 
policy at all. Overall, the strength and limits of political mobilization 
in given societies is likely to be shaped by the extent to which 
alternative behavioral choices become either delegitimized, or simply 
not considered as viable in a given domestic policy environment. Thus, 
the degree of public contestation about the policy substance might be 
determined by the degree of societal agreement or disagreement on the 
conception of common good.  
As will be demonstrated in my empirical chapters, social 
purposes in two countries remained restrained (leaning consolidated in 
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Russia and leaning fractured in South Africa), yet combined with 
elite‘s strong commitment to their conception of common good it 
triggered certain policy responses (the kinds of actions) they 
considered legitimate.  This type of consensus emerges when one sub-
elite group strongly espouses a conception of common good and is 
able to act on and enforce it. At the same time, wider audiences might 
inherently disagree with the promoted conception of common good, 
but for a variety of reasons might conform to it and if chooses to 
dispute it publicly, does so in a very subdued manner. At the margins, 
other sub-elite groups and political parties keep advocating radically 
different set of political obligations, engrained in a different set of 
values. I roughly describe this as a power-based (restrained) consensus 
on social purpose. The power-based consensus might be expected to 
shape the policy environment, but in the long term remain inherently 
weak and unstable. In this context, my most general empirical 
argument is that the obsession with strong state and security in Russia 
created a policy environment, which delegitimized liberal approaches 
(with the strong focus on human rights and partnership with nonstate 
sector) to the looming health crisis. In South Africa, the obsession with 
local solutions and return to the roots delegitimized mainstream 
western biomedical approaches to curbing HIV/AIDS.  
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CONCLUSION 
Chapters 4 and 5 explore the national purpose in the Russian 
Federation and South Africa separately from the HIV/AIDS policy, 
using the model advanced in Chapter 3. I am interested in ascertaining 
whether or not social purpose provides a permissive environment for 
the emergence of specific policy responses as informed by country-
specific and contingent conception of common good. These chapter 
also examine the content of national identity in two selected countries 
with their historically contingent labels are ―Sovereign Democracy‖ in 
Russia and ―African Renaissance‖ in South Africa.  The dissertation 
strongly suggest that that in responding to the domestic epidemic of 
HIV/AIDS the key decision-makers in both countries have 
significantly transformed the internationally prescribed policy in 
accordance with the substantive components of the domestically 
accepted social purpose. In Chapters 6 and 7 I look at the HIV/AIDS 
policy with the presence of social purpose affecting it. I capture how 
national policy responses challenged and ―filtered‖ the internationally 
prescribed range of choices. In other words, I document and explain 
when, how and why the domestic policy choices became inconsistent 
with the mainstream international health consensus. Rather than 
treating the epidemic as a pressing public health issue, Russia‘s 
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―Sovereign Democracy‖ prompted the government to respond to the 
domestic epidemic as the issue of demographic survival and criminal 
drug abuse. This choice subsequently eroded the human rights 
component from the official policy, overstretched the public financial 
commitments, and frustrated the cooperation with private sector and 
civil society. The imperatives of ―African Renaissance‖ reframed the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic as a local developmental problem. As a result, the 
Cabinet supported substandard biomedical treatments and indigenous 
healing practices, consistently resisted the universal and free rollout of 
treatment in order to avoid the undesirable governmental expenditures 
and redistributive strategies. In both countries, these policy choices 
resulted in the adverse consequences for public health and prompted a 
protracted contestation among various state and non-state actors 
around the principles of the desired public health policies.  
  
After I discuss social purpose in details, I will evaluate how, 
why and to what extent Russia and South Africa responded to the 
global policy consensus as described in this chapter.  
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CHAPTER 4. SOCIAL PURPOSE IN RUSSIA (SOVEREIGN 
DEMOCRACY) 
 
Kathleen Smith has convincingly demonstrated that after the demise of 
the USSR the formulation of the national identity (and national 
purpose) in Russia was trapped in the mutually exclusive pro-liberal 
and pro-communist political mythologies.
1
 At the same time, neither 
proponents of the Western-style liberalism and democracy, nor the 
champions of the revamped communism infused with 
ethnonationalism, were able to outreach their respective vision of the 
national purpose for the broader audiences. Although anti-communist 
sentiment was broadly articulated in the popular culture, including 
movies and literature, a profound ideological confusion precluded the 
formation of a consolidated national purpose. At best, it remained 
fragmented.
2
  Not surprisingly, after Boris Yeltsin stepped down from 
the presidency, political elites in Russia began formulating a political 
proposal for the nation once again. 
The concept of Sovereign Democracy encapsulates three 
important themes: the ultimate political value of a strong state power 
                                                     
1
 See, for instance, Smith 2002 
2
 For general discussion of national identity in Russia, see Dunlop 1993; Tuminez 
1998; Brudny 2000. 
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(vlast) with a special stress on economic delivery in the context of 
state-led economy, and its leading role in reasserting and actively 
exercising Russia‘s great power status in global politics. Not only 
these particular themes (strong state, state-led economy, and great 
power complex) clearly stand out as three most important components 
in the Russian political discourse, but they were turned into 
prescriptions how to protect the country as an autonomous political 
organization. An integral part of the Sovereign democracy--the 
discourse of the ―wild 1990s‖--pulled together various collective 
articulations together, while sustaining the differentiated 
understanding of the Soviet past, transcending the boundaries of the 
blame so customary in the previous decade.
 3
 
In this chapter I ascertain whether or not social purpose truly 
emerges in Russia. In doing so, I follow the framework of analysis as 
laid out in Chapter 3. Throughout the whole chapter, I trace how elite 
formulated social purpose as pinned on their identity and clearly 
identified itself as the primary champion and embodiment of these new 
obligations. Self-Other dichotomy permeates discourses at all levels. 
This divide also shows the self/Other dynamic – Russian state-centric 
and sovereign self is pitched against the subversive liberals, allegedly 
                                                     
3
For the most important collections of essays and debates on Sovereign Democracy, 
see Remchukov 2007; Poljakov 2007; see also Migranjan, Andranik. 2007. O 
suverennoj demokratii. Rossijskaja gazeta, 03.10.2007. 
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striving to ―dismember‖ the state, offer its ―juicy morsels‖ to Russia‘s 
foreign rivals, and certainly put Russia on her knees.
4
 In Chapter 6 I 
demonstrate how all these efforts quickly politicized the responses to 
the epidemic of HIV/AIDS and subsequently had adverse effects on 
the adoption of global standards of the antiretroviral treatment.  
 
ELITE‘S COMMITMENT TO SOVEREIGN DEMOCRACY  
Elite‘s commitment to a certain conception of common good is the 
first step ascertaining whether or not social purpose truly emerges in a 
given country.  In this section I spell out the core components of 
Russian national purpose and ascertain the degree to which extant 
elites are consolidated around it. In Russian context, the core 
substantive components of the national purpose were tentatively 
articulated as early as in 2000—2001 and got elaborated on throughout 
the whole period of Vladimir Putin‘s presidency.   
At first, Putin made disparaging remarks about the national 
idea (read: national purpose) as the Russian pastime and thus was 
branded as a pragmatist.
5
 Later on, a seeming eclecticism of his 
                                                     
4
 See, for instance, Sergei Medvedev.  2004. ―Juicy Morsels: Putin‘s Beslan Address 
and the Construction of the New Russian Identity,‖ PONARS Policy Memo 334, 
November 2004. 
 
5
 R. Medvedev 2004: 93. 
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political statements made domestic political observers and journalists 
believe that Putin‘s political program was overcoming the previous 
ideological divisions.
6
 At the same time, many domestic political 
observers expected a new proposal for the nation to emerge.
7
  In this 
dissertation I use the term Sovereign Democracy to describe his 
conception of social purpose, even though sometimes Putin himself 
and several high-powered politicians (including future President 
Dmitry Medvedev) superficially disagreed with this descriptive tag.
8
 
Scholars have abundantly noted that since Putin came to power, many 
notable persons with military, security, and law enforcement 
background (siloviki) started dominating Russian political elite. 
According to some estimates, siloviki comprised up to 42% of the 
federal elite as compared to 13% in the 1990s. This data is tentative, 
since most of resumes of Russian bureaucrats are not readily available. 
Scholars still dispute whether siloviki is a meaningful way to 
aggregate individuals, given the abundance of internal conflicts, 
variance in organizational culture, and outlooks among those who had 
served in different agencies and ministries. These differences 
notwithstanding, scholars agree that an emphasis on siloviki is 
                                                     
6
See respectively Parland 2005: 191—197; Allensworth 1998: p. 288; Hopf 2002: 
157—158, 220, 223. 
7
 See, for instance, the roundtable in Literaturnaya Gazeta July11. 2001  
8
 On Putin‘s and Medvedev‘s reactions to the concept, see Evans 2008: 900; 
Morozov 2008: 154, 157.  
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instructive.
 
Brian Taylor argues that siloviki ―have been at the center 
of politics under Vladimir Putin. They have played a key role in 
Putin‘s central project of strengthening the state, which has in reality 
been more about establishing the dominance of the Kremlin than 
creating the administrative capacity to run a well-functioning 21st 
century government.‖9   
The well-informed Russian political observer Olga 
Kryshtanovskaia listed Sergei Ivanov, Viktor Ivanov, Igor Sechin, 
Nikolai Patrushev, and Viktor Cherkesov as members of Putin‘s inner 
circle and the true ideologues of the coming political changes.
10
 All 
these individuals shared the similar background and occupied various 
key positions in the state hierarchy under Putin. Siloviki spearheaded 
the formulation of the new conception of public good and linked it to 
their identity.  They excessively stressed the necessity to revive the 
strong state, eliminate any alternative spheres of authority, enforce 
law, and restore Russia‘s great power status. They also triggered the 
obsession with the threats to the territorial integrity of the country and 
its sovereignty. They attacked the liberal outlook and human rights as 
inconsistent with their core beliefs. Siloviki explicitly styled 
                                                     
9
 Taylor 2007: 41; For the detailed discussion of the concept, see Taylor 2007: 15--
24 
10
 Ol'ga Kryshtanovskaja, Possijskaja jelita na perehode, Publichnye lekcii Polit.ru, 
21 Avgusta 2008 
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themselves as the national saviours and the sole champions for the 
political existence of the country. The most noteworthy statement 
belongs to Victor Cherkesov‘s newspaper article ―Warriors Should 
Not Become Merchants,‖ where he argues that siloviki (chekisty) 
saved the country after a prolonged economic crisis and political chaos 
of the 1990s as inflicted on Russia by the liberal anti-statist forces.
11
 
Domestic observers tended to downplay the importance of this article 
as Cherkesov‘s attempt to get an upper hand in some nontransparent 
internal conflicts. Nevertheless the principal metaphor used in this 
public utterance was very clear. Cherkesov‘s portrayed the self as the 
state-building Warriors and contrasted it to the subversive Merchants 
(oligarchs), which had to be reined in. In a metaphorical form, this 
statement confirmed of role the law enforcement agencies as Russia‘s 
backbone, the primacy of state power over the free markets and 
laissez-faire. 
Throughout the 2000s this imagery percolated into the broader 
political elites and slowly became dominant. At first, the dominant 
party United Russia (Edinaya Rossiya, ER) pleaded not to inculcate 
any ―official state ideology‖ at the expense of solving ―real‖ 
                                                     
11
  Cherkesov, Viktor. 2007. Nel'zja dopustit', chtoby voiny prevratilis' v torgovcev. 
Kommersant-Daily, 09.10.2007. 
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problems.
12
  United Russia openly proclaimed itself the only 
champion of Russian national purpose, although its exact conception 
was yet to be formulated. Party‘s leaders denounced both the radical 
leftist ideology and the rightist liberal utopias as counterproductive 
and divisive. The Chairman of the High Council of United Russia 
Boris Gryzlov claimed that reiterating political mythologies was 
useless for the political and economic development and hence should 
be dismissed. He directly accused both ―so-called liberals‖ and ―so-
called derzhavniki‖ pursuing their narrow parochial interests instead 
of working for the betterment of the country.
13
 Simultaneously, 
Gryzlov described the Russian self as nationalist, evolutionary and 
conservative, and the Other as foreign-inspired, revolutionary and 
liberal.
14
  
Around 2003, United Russia explicitly committed to the goals 
of creating the strong state, state-led development and modernizations, 
as well as the necessity to restore the great power status. The 
commitment to the strong state laid down the basis for self—Other 
dichotomy. A number of political journalists built on this theme: they 
claimed that the subversive Other threatened the very existence of the 
                                                     
12
 Gryzlov, Boris. 2003. Politicheskij doklad Predsedatelja Vysshego Soveta 
Politicheskoj partii "Edinaja Rossija" B. V. Gryzlova pered delegatami III S"ezda 
partii "Edinaja Rossija," 22.09.2003.  
13
 Put' nacional'nogo uspeha.  Manifest Vserossijskoj politicheskoj partii Edinstvo i 
Otechestvo-- Edinaja Rossija.23.04.2003 
14
 Boris Gryzlov. 2005. Partija — ot latinskogo slova Chast‘, Tribuna, 20.09.2005. 
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strong state and thus should be excluded from the set of legitimate 
political actors.
15
 The liberal ideology and the promotion of human 
rights were presented as tools, purposefully used to undermine 
Russia‘s very existence as an autonomous political organization.  In 
practice, defending this conception of social purpose implied the need 
to eliminate any alternative center of authority, i.e., to limit domestic 
political competition, impose political unity, and keep liberals out of 
power.  
The consolidation of political elite around this version of social 
purpose became evident in 2003, when strictly Putin-oriented party 
Unity (Edinstvo) merged with its former rival Fartherland/All-Russia 
(Otechestvo-Vsya Rossia) into a mammoth ―United Russia‖ (ER).16 
The internal political discussion in 2005—2008 remained confined to 
State-Patriotic, Liberal-Conservative, and Social-Conservative (CSCP) 
clubs. There are very few meaningful ideological distinctions among 
these groups as demonstrated in their blurred titles. They all embrace 
the similar conception of common good.
17
 Furthermore, during his 
first terms as a president, Putin initiated a set of reforms, harshening 
                                                     
15
 See, for instance, Pavlovskij, Gleb. 2005. Vlast' i oppozicija: kriterii jeffektivnosti. 
Publichnye lekcii Polit.ru, 10.02.2005; Leont'ev, Mihail. 2004. "Sojuz mecha i 
orala:" Novaja ob"edinennaja oppozicija za "Rossiju bez Putina". Izvestija, 25.02.04 
16
 For the detail account, see Remington 2005: 35—44 in Herspring 2005; 
Remington 2008; For the overview of the formation of a new party system in the 
2000s, see Gel'man 2008 
17
 Detailed information about these clubs is available on their websites: 
http://cscp.ru/; http://gpclub.ru/; http://www.inop.ru 
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electoral laws. This pushed the parties embracing the alternative 
conception of common good, such as the Union of Right Forces, 
outside the federal politics. All this suggests the consolidation of elites 
around siloviki-generated conception of common good. In 2009, 
however, one opinion poll revealed some growing disagreements 
inside Russian political elite about what specific obligations they 
viewed as central for social purpose.
18
 
 
Strong state as an ultimate political value 
Scholars and political observers agree that the focal point of Putin‘s 
nation-building agenda was the value of the strong state power (vlast, 
gosudarstvennost).
19
 Putin expressed his personal commitment to the 
strong state in his early newspaper piece ―Russia at the Turn of the 
Millennium.‖20 In principle, the notion of a ―strong state‖ might imply 
preserving its territorial borders, increasing state capacity and 
                                                     
18
 See Mikhail Afanas‘ev 2009. These findings may signal the coming end of the 
consensus  about Sovereign Democracy. For the purposes of clarity I would bracket 
these minor intra-elite distinctions and preferences. For the broader overview of 
changes in Russian elites, see Gaman-Golutvina 2008. Hale and Colton 2010 
underscored that in 2008 the popular expectation for Medvedev to  challenge status-
quo. 
19
 See for instance, Nikonov, Vjacheslav. 2004. Strategija Putina: Stremlenie 
predotvratit' raspad gosudarstva lezhit v osnove federativnoj politiki. Rossijskaja 
gazeta, №3660, 22.12.2004; Surkov, Vladislav. 2004. Zamestitel' glavy administracii 
Prezidenta RF : Putin ukrepljaet gosudarstvo, a ne sebja. Komsomol'skaja pravda, 
28.09.2004; Chadaev 2005: 15; Klyamkin and Kutkovets 2006:32. 
20
 Godzimirski (2008) underscored Putin‘s personal role in developing Russian post-
soviet identity; see also Gevorkjan, Timakova, and Kolesnikov (2000) a book-length 
interview with Putin; Klyamkin and Kutkovets 2006: 11-12. 
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efficiency, and protecting the government against being highjacked by 
the special interests. For Putin personally and Russian political elite 
this notion had different connotation. The strong state implied the 
stress on the chain of command (edinonachalie) and the undesirability 
of the plurality of spheres of authority. The absence of the strong state 
threatened Russia‘s stability and survival as an autonomous political 
organization. In this context, the restoration of the strong state became 
a priority.  
In 1999 Putin described state in Russia as ―the source and the 
guarantor of the order, the initiator and the principal force behind any 
change.‖21  Commitment to the strong state also signalled the 
continuity between different domestic political regimes since the 
Principality of Moscow. Similarly, Surkov asserted that  
For 500 years Russians, since Ivan III time, have been 
the state-building people. We are the nation which has 
got used to statehood. And unlike our many friends 
across Soviet Union and many other countries we 
always have been the carriers of the statist idea.
22
 
                                                     
21
 Putin, Vladimir. 1999. Rossija na rubezhe tysjacheletij. Nezavisimaja gazeta, 
30.12.1999.  
22
 Surkov 2006. Surkov used both ethnic term Russkie, and more encompassing state 
term Rossijane. 
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The year of 2004 was a visible turning point in the 
contemporary Russian political discourse, when the value of the 
strong state became the dominant master-narrative. The terrorist 
highjacking of a school in Beslan and the wave of the ―Color 
Revolutions‖ across the soviet successor states were framed as 
immediate existential threats to Russia as an autonomous political 
organization.
23
 Political commentators abundantly exploited the scare 
of Russia falling apart to justify the incredible political strengthening 
of law enforcement agencies as the pinnacle of the strong state. Many 
public intellectuals and TV personalities echoed these themes and 
fleshed out the political necessity of the strong state for the decisive 
survival of the Russian nations by referring to various periods of 
Russian history. As the corollary, members of ER sometimes indicated 
that stressing the values of the state was a good way to prevent the 
politicization of the Russian ethnicity and the ethnic-based nation-
building projects.
24
 ER launched Russian Project, aimed not at 
                                                     
23
 See, for example, S. Medvedev on the link between Beslan and domestic identity, 
Malfliet and Laenen 2007 on the link between the institutional reforms and evolving 
Russian identity; on the specific cultural context of the Beslan event, see Ó Tuathail 
2009.  
24
Pavlovskij, Gleb. 2006. Russkij vopros v rossijskoj politike. Lekcija prezidenta 
Fonda jeffektivnoj politiki. Moskva: Gosudarstvennyj klub. 22.11.2006; Gromov, 
Andrej, and Ivan Davydov. 2007. Fantom nacionalizma. Expert, 15.01.2007; 
Osnovnye napravlenija dejatel'nosti Vserossijskoj politicheskoj partii "Edinaja 
Rossija" v sfere nacional'noj politiki i mezhkonfessional'nyh otnoshenij. 03.2007;  
Pligin, Vladimir. 2007. Russkij proekt. Strategija Rossii (№4); Sultygov, Abdul-
Hakim. 2007. Mnogonacional'nost' kachestvennaja harakteristika edinoj Rossii, 
10.07.2007. More generally, on the evolution of the Russian political debates about 
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politicization of the Russian ethnic identity, but rather as a tool against 
ethno-nationalists.
25
 
In domestic political discourse, the theme of restoring the 
strong state was embedded in the political imagery of the 1990s, as 
―wild,‖ tumultuous, erratic, crime-ridden period of Russian history. 
This imagery tapped into the popular disillusionment that the partial 
political and economic reforms did not quickly fix all the problems. 
However, instead of providing a careful balance sheet of the period, 
state-sponsored the Institute of Social Engineering (INOP) essentially 
branded it as lacking any conception of common good. Similarly, a 
famous political commentator Andranik Migranyan noted that 
democracy in the 1990s was just an illusion, a smokescreen protecting 
those political forces, whose interests were at odds with country‘s 
well-being.
26  
In his speeches Vladislav Surkov directly pointed at 
these forces. In his so-called ―secret report‖ to the General Council of 
ER on June 17, 2005 he asserted that liberals always failed to pull 
Russia out of the political turmoil and only exacerbated the social 
chaos (including the period directly preceding the Civil War and after 
                                                                                                                           
the role of ethnicity in domestic nation-building see Tishkov 1997: 138—175. On the 
problems of politicization of ethnicity in RF, see Warhola 1996; Tishkov 1997a; 
Ponarin 2005; Morozov 2008: 166—167. 
25
 See the minutes of the discussion in the Center of Social Conservative Politics, 03 
February 2007 (Formirovanie rossijskoj nacii Centr social'no-konservativnoj politiki: 
Stenogramma zasedanija Social'no-konservativnogo kluba,  03.02.2007) 
26
 Migranjan, Andranik. 2004. Chto takoe "putinizm"? Strategija Rossii v XXI veke 
(№3). 
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the collapse of the Soviet Union). Since the liberals were dubbed 
proponents of the weak state and historically incapable of governance, 
acknowledging them as legitimate political force was rendered 
dangerous and inappropriate.
27
  
The new president Dmitry Medvedev in his speeches stressed 
the necessity of modernization and innovations. This, not surprisingly, 
prompted a wide public discussion about the possibility of political 
liberalization in Russia. From the liberal side Aleksandr Auzan (a 
prominent member of the President‘s Council for Support of 
Development of the Civil Society Institutions and Human Rights), 
Evgeny Gontmakher and Igor Yurgens of Institute of Contemporary 
Development (INSOR) argued for the liberalization of the state.
28
 At 
the same time, from the conservative side Alexey Chesnakov, Vitaly 
Ivanov, and the members of INOP
 
argued that the liberalization and 
democratization were not only premature, but simply did not reflect 
the real need of state-building in the present-day circumstance.
29
 In the 
midst of this discussion, Medvedev reaffirmed the value of the strong 
state and did not dismantle Putin‘s political legacy. Thus, strong state 
retained its status as a component of national purpose.  
                                                     
27
 Surkov, Vladislav. 2005. My real'no schitaem, chto davat' vlast' liberal'nym 
"druz'jam" opasno i vredno dlja strany, Gensovet "Delovoj Rossii," 17.05.2005. 
28
 INSOR 2008; INSOR 2009; http://www.riocenter.ru/en 
29
 INOP 2008 
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State-led development 
Russian state officials staked the claim to promote the developmental 
state for the betterment of Russia as a whole.
30
 Leon Aron summarized 
this vision as follows: ― the reemergence of the state as the most 
powerful actor on the economic stage, serving as both the initiator and 
implementer of economic policy; <which causes> the slowing down or 
freezing of structural liberal reforms; <and> rapid expansion of the 
state sector of the economy.‖31  
This vision was articulated prior to siloviki‘s ascension to 
political power, and thus should not be viewed only as a vote-seeking 
propaganda. Consider, for instance, Vladimir Putin‘s dissertation 
thesis, which contained some key ideas regarding the use of minerals 
for the economic and social transformation.
32
 By the end of Putin‘s 
second presidential term, a bold political ambition to have a ―hard‖ 
developmental state came to its existence. Since the state sector 
                                                     
30
 While there is no a single definition of the term ―developmental state,‖ in this 
dissertation I refer to  the preponderance of state bureaucracy, intervening in and 
guiding the direction and pace of economic development, reallocating resources 
across industries, and protecting national economic interests in the context of 
capitalist political economy. See, for instance, Loriaux 1999: 235; Pérez Caldentey 
2008: 28. Similar, but not identical, terms are ―hard state,‖ ―state capitalism,‖ and so 
on. 
31
 Leon Aron , available at <http://www.aei.org/outlook/25022> 
32
 Putin‘s thesis was condensed for a stand-alone journal publication, see Putin 1999 
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swelled to about a half of the national economy, it fully reemerged as 
the most powerful economic actor.
33
  
In 2007 Surkov succinctly summarized this theme:  
Strong central authority for centuries collected, bonded, 
and developed a huge country, which was widely 
spread in space and time. < Strong central authority > 
implemented all the important reforms ... Today, as 
power shifted to the center, it stabilized the society, 
created the conditions for victory over terrorism, and 
sustained the economic growth.
 34
 
In general, Russian political elite claimed that economic 
development and growth during the 1990s delayed because of rather 
oversimplified grafting of the foreign policies and standards onto the 
Russian soil. In this discourse uncontrolled free markets and the 
laissez-faire ideology have invariably negative effects on economic 
development and prosperity. The previous problems in economic 
development were attributed to the negligence and unwillingness to 
use the state to exercise its power as an economic regulator. Putin 
stressed the role of government as ―the leader in creation and 
                                                     
33
 According to then Vice-Prime Minister Sergei Sobjanin, about a half of Russian 
labor workforce was employed by the state, which he deemed dangerous, cited in 
<http://www.polit.ru/news/2010/09/09/sobyanin.htm> 
34
 Surkov, Vladislav. 2007. Russkaja politicheskaja kul'tura. Strategija Rossii (№7). 
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application of high technologies, in providing a high standard of 
people‘s well-being, in ability to protect the safety and defend national 
interests on international scene.‖35 The core emphasis was strongly 
placed on the responsibility of the federal government to deliver while 
restricting the independence of the private sector in general. 
36
 Private 
sector was considered a minor partner: multiple the references to the 
social responsibility of business became mainstream. The stress on the 
crucial role of the state as the motor of economic growth and state‘s 
obligation to deliver permeated the domestic political discourse. In his 
political report to the United Russia‘s III Convention Boris Gryzlov 
stated that ―the major factor of keeping the nation united is social 
justice. The United Russia supports the creation not just a market 
economy, but a socially-oriented type of economy.‖37 Since 2005 this 
obligation becomes more salient in speeches of then first vice-Prime 
Minister Dmitry Medvedev,
38
 Moscow Mayor Yury Luzhkov, and 
Sergey Mironov (Speaker of the Federation Council and the leader of 
Spravedlivaya Rossiya).  By the end of Putin‘s presidency, this 
obligation was labeled ―Putin‘s plan,‖ or Plan 2020.  In the fall of 
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 Putin 1999. 
36
 Chadaev 2005: 95—137. 
37
 Gryzlov, Boris. Politicheskij doklad... 22.09.2003. 
38
 Medvedev, Dmitry. 2005. Sohranit' jeffektivnoe gosudarstvo v sushestvujushih 
granicah. Expert №13 (460). 
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2007 United Russia ran its parliamentary campaign on the promise to 
deliver, under the motto ―Putin‘s plan—Russia‘s victory.‖39  
Practical measures accompanied this evolving discourse. In 
2005 the Kremlin announced its decision to create a new governmental 
institution under the direct patronage of the President -- the Council 
for the Implementation of National Priority Projects and Demographic 
Politics (CNPPDP). In essence, National Priority Projects were created 
as a mechanism of an intense and ―smart‖ investment to prompt 
economic development in certain areas and improve certain social 
services. Putin formulated the core purpose of NPPs as follows: 
Concentration of budgetary and administrative 
resources on the improvement of quality of life of 
citizens of Russia is a necessary and logical 
development of our economic policy, which we have 
been implementing over the last five years and we shall 
be implementing in future. It is a guarantee from inert 
spending means without any palpable feedbacks. It is a 
policy of the investment into an individual, which 
means an investment in the future of Russia.
40
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 ER 2007a. 
40
 Putin, Vladimir. 2005b. Vystuplenie Prezidenta Rossijskoj Federacii V. Putina po 
povodu prioritetnyh nacional'nyh proektov, 05.09.2005.  
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In 2007, Dmitry Medvedev asserted that the decision to create 
NPP had been the most effective way to solve the most pressing 
economic and social problems.
41
 In 2008 President Putin, while 
summarizing the successes of the NPPDP, affirmed that all the 
national projects were designed and implemented to fulfill the social 
obligations of the state (or ―modern social politics‖ in his parlance).42 
Both politicians, as if anticipating liberal critique and incredulity to 
this initiative, determinedly noted that NPPDP was not a public 
relations exploit, but a genuine tool to uphold social justice and a 
vehicle of economic growth. They also juxtaposed NPPs to the 1990s, 
when the government allegedly shied away from any social 
obligations.  
Imagining the state as both the initiator and implementer of 
economic policy legitimized the creation at the end of 2007 several 
―state corporations.‖ Envisioned as another vehicle of economic 
modernization, they accumulate enormous amount of financial 
resources and various industrial enterprises. State corporations hold 
military-industrial sector, atomic and nuclear plants, shipbuilding and 
aircraft industries, and transportation. These corporations combine 
                                                     
41
 See, especially Medvedev‘s article Nacional'nye proekty: ot stabilizacii - k 
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private ownership with direct governmental and presidential control. It 
is instructive that the idea of state corporations to implement state 
economic policy belonged to Sergey Chemezov, yet another 
representative of siloviki. Chemezov was a KGB officer in the 1980s, 
Putin‘s subordinate in St-Petersburg, and currently is a Director-
General of Russian Technologies State Corporation (Rostechnologii).  
The development of medicines and biotechnologies fell under another 
corporation--the Russian Corporation of Nanotechnologies 
(RUSNANO) with Anatoly Chubais as its chief.
43
 On July 6 2010 
Russian news agency RIAN reported that Rosnano would invest about 
$40 million in biomedical projects, including developing treatment for 
AIDS, hepatitis and cancer of the pancreas.
44
 Vadim Volkov argues 
that in establishing state corporations  
Russian authorities have invented a new formula for the 
independent management of large state assets without 
fully privatizing them. Powerful industrial lobbies and 
Putin‘s cronies have now received formal rights to 
control several sectors of the economy, but in exchange 
they are expected to deliver tangible results and global 
                                                     
43
 Some projects for ―nanomedicines‖ are available at 
<http://www.rusnano.com/Section.aspx/Show/25831> 
44
 Russia to invest $40 million in developing AIDS, cancer treatment, RIAN, 
06/07/2010 
174 
 
competitiveness. The whole project, nonetheless, faces 
the risk of inefficient use of funds and depends upon 
personified mechanisms of control.
45
 
The majority of Putin‘s liberal opponents simply did not 
recognize the NPP as a meaningful vehicle of economic 
transformation. Many commentators thought that the sole purpose of 
NPPs was either to redistribute the revenues generated from the oil 
sector,
 to ensure the political survival of Putin‘s entourage after his 
second presidential term would expire in 2008, as well as the political 
springboard for Medvedev to secure his presidency, to which he 
allegedly had been previously shortlisted. Similarly, the creation of 
state corporations was not universally approved. However, the notion 
that state should act as initiator and implementer of economic policy 
remains resilient as a core component of national purpose. Despite 
palpable differences in presentation style from his predecessor, 
President Medvedev reaffirmed his commitment to economic 
modernization led by the state and threw his political weight behind 
new innovative projects. 
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Great power in the multipolar world 
In the 1990s political elite preferred to downplay the discourse of 
Russia as great power at the international arena and shied away from 
touting its military exploits. This distancing was prompted by the 
rapidly spreading popular awareness of the incompetence of the top 
political leadership, unjustified military interventions in Afghanistan, 
which tarnished the Soviet Union‘s image at the international arena 
and delegitimized its global ambitions. Yet in 1998 Astrid Tuminez 
insightfully expected a coming aggressive formulation of Russian 
foreign policy as a reaction to the national humiliation of the 1990s.
46
 
Consistent with this expectation, domestic elites claimed restoring 
sovereignty and great power status (derzhavnost‘) at the international 
arena as the third key element of common good. In 2000 the governor 
of Kemerovo Aman Tuleev redeemed a more assertive exercise of 
power instead of the repentance for the past sins.
47
 
Alexey Chadaev, the author of Putin: His Ideology, former 
member of the Public Chamber, and a chief ideologue at the United 
Russia‘s propaganda unit,  defined great power as a state‘s ability to 
uphold and exercise its sovereignty. He explained that having 
―absolute sovereignty‖ implied possessing an arsenal of nuclear 
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weapons, blocking any foreign influences on domestic political affairs, 
and behaving as a norm-giver on the international arena. The lack of 
great power status implied that other great powers can easily intervene 
to change domestic political regime and impose external governance 
(vneshnee upravlenie).
48
 Deliberately adopting any foreign practices 
meant to turn your sovereignty down.
49
  In terms of policy transfer, 
claiming great power status necessitated the resistance to any external 
influences, as well as devising and exporting domestic norms and 
standards.
50
   
Chadaev‘s book presented a relatively neutral way to think 
about sovereignty and great power as elements of common good. The 
domestic discourse was less impartial and at times considerably livid. 
On the aggressive side of the discourse, elite argued that in promoting 
democracy and human rights, Western countries often use double 
standards and undermine international law.
51
 The wave of the ―color 
revolutions,‖ sweeping across the Soviet successor states, promptly 
became one of the most discussed topics in the Russian media.  
Domestic political elites and spin-doctors interpreted it as having 
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serious ramifications for the national statehood. A prominent domestic 
political observer Vyacheslav Nikonov argued that the color 
revolutions were ―technologies, aimed towards weakening of the 
country and building the mechanisms of influence on Russia, not at 
democracy promotion.‖52 Similarly, the leader of the Liberal-
Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) Vladimir Zhirinovsky claimed 
that democracy promotion is a tool of dismembering the polity and 
prompting inter-ethnic conflicts.
53
  Such a misplaced emphasis 
allowed political elite to claim that democracy promotion was only a 
smokescreen to veil the US real geopolitical ambitions. As a corollary, 
reclaiming sovereignty rules out accepting a subordinate position in 
any international coalition, and on the contrary, embraces restoring its 
authority ―on the canonic territories of her historical presence and 
influence,‖ as Vitaly Tret‘yakov asserted.54 On this side of domestic 
discourse, Russian political life turned to be replete with subversive 
Others—enemies of the sovereignty. At the political rally to support 
United Russia at the Luzhniki stadium in Moscow in 2007, Putin 
lashed out as follows: 
They need the weak, sick state. To fix their affairs 
behind its back, to get gingerbreads at our expense they 
                                                     
52
 Nikonov, Vjacheslav. Chernaja magija. Izvestija, 30.05.2007. 
53
 Zhirinovsky 2007: 56 in Remchukov 2007. 
54
 Cited by Filippov et al 2007: 467. 
178 
 
need the disorganized, disoriented, and divided society. 
And, unfortunately, inside the country there still those 
who are ―jackaling‖ at foreign embassies, foreign 
diplomatic consulates, those who count on support of 
foreign funds and governments, instead of seeking 
support of their own people.
 55
 
At the other discursive boundary, reasserting Russia‘s great 
power status is consistent with a longer, historical trend of Russian in-
build ambivalence towards Europe.
56
 In the moderate, mainstream 
discourse Russia is typically viewed as a European state, which shares 
the common cultural and historical background, as well as the similar 
set of values and legal doctrines.
 57 
Several prominent ER members 
even lamented that the West does not fully understand Russia‘s 
position, does not appreciate Russia‘s affinity with the West.58 Then, 
the great power status implies neither political, nor economic isolation, 
nor the anti-European sentiment. Rather, it means participating in 
                                                     
55
 ―Nichego u nih ne vyjdet.‖ Vserossijskij forum storonnikov prezidenta Rossii 
Vladimira Putina vo dvorce sporta v ―Luzhnikah.‖ Rossijskaja gazeta, 21.11.2007; 
similar points were made in the so-called ―Munich speech,‖ Putin‘s speech at the 
43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy, 02/10/2007 in Munich, Germany. 
56
 For more detailed arguments about Russian ambivalence to the West, see see 
Kassianova 2001; Morozov 2002; Duncan 2005; Tsygankov 2005;  Prozorov 2007; 
Kratochvil 2008; Neumann 2008. 
57
 See for instance, Putin 1999; Surkov 2006; Tsipko 2007; D. Medvedev 2008.   
58
 See, for instance, Luzhkov, Yury. 2006. My i zapad. Strategija Rossii №6; 
Kosachev, Konstantin. 2006. Diktat nekompetentnosti. Rossija v global'noj politike 
№ 1; Kosachev, Konstantin. 2007. Rossija i Zapad: nashi raznoglasija. Rossija v 
global'noj politike № 4. For a scholarly summary of this argument, see Kratochvil 
2008: 410—411, 415—416.  
179 
 
international affairs on Russian terms and remain decisive in the 
context of inevitably confrontational (both politically and 
economically) power politics. Surkov, for instance, delineated Russian 
great power status as an assertive participation in the global economic 
and political competition. The economic comparative advantages 
should be used to advance Russia‘s international political goals and 
support her in geopolitical games (hence the additional concepts of the 
―energy superpower,‖ the ―liberal empire‖ which briefly surfaced in 
domestic political discourse).
59
 
 
SOVEREIGN DEMOCRACY AND ITS PUBLIC LEGITIMACY   
Public legitimacy of an elite-driven conception of common good is the 
second step ascertaining whether or not social purpose emerges in a 
given country.  In this section I spell out how articulated audiences 
legitimized the elite-generated conception of common good and 
ascertain the degree it got imbued into society. In the mid-2000s 
various explanatory journalists and public intellectuals converged 
around the conception of common good dubbed ―Sovereign 
Democracy.‖ Its originator, Vladislav Surkov, was a Deputy Chief of 
President‘s Administration in charge with internal politics and 
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relations with the State Duma. He concisely captured all three 
components of common good and gave the notion this eye-grabbing 
label. In 2004—2008 Surkov delivered a set of speeches on Russian 
national identity and national political culture, subsequently widely 
published in newspapers, journals and in the collection of essays.
60
 
Public discussion in Russia revolves around Surkov‘s writings: both 
the liberal critics and loyalists anchor their discussion to this canon of 
discourse.
 
 
In general I delineate among three broad groups of articulated 
audiences. The first once, following domestic liberal observers, can be 
dubbed ―the Kremlin school of political science.‖61 It includes 
representatives of the expert community, who catered to the 
ideological needs of the new political elite. Former dissident turned 
political analyst, Gleb Pavlovsky hosted the TV show Real Politics, 
edited highly salient internet-based Russian Journal, and headed the 
Foundation for Effective Politics (FEP). In 2000 Pavlovsky was 
instrumental in building Putin‘s positive public image. In 2004—2008 
his internet project served as the gathering place for many promising 
young illiberal commentators. Valery Fadeev was a chief editor of 
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analytical magazine Expert and the head of the Institute of Social 
Construction (INOP), affiliated with United Russia. Vitaly Tret‘yakov 
was a host of What is to be Done, an owner and editor of monthly 
journal Political Class, an owner of Independent Publishing Group. He 
frequently contributed to the governmental newspapers and authored 
several monographs. Vyacheslav Nikonov is the editor-in-chief of 
journal Strategy for Russia, head of foundation Politics, and a member 
of the Public Chamber.   
The second group of articulated audiences achieved high 
visibility in various political shows dominating the federal TV in the 
second half of the 2000s.
62
  Not by coincidence, many prominent 
members of the United Russia (and Putin‘s loyalists) turned into TV 
politicos, thus establishing a continuous flow of discursive resources to 
the general audiences. Here I will list only a few further emblematic 
examples. Political journalist Mikhail Leont‘ev hosted shows However 
and Freedom of Speech and produced mini-series The Big Game, 
describing Russia‘s geopolitical greatness. He‘s the editor in chief of 
the analytical magazine Profile. Alexey Pushkov hosted Post Scriptum 
show at TVC channel. Konstantin Zatulin hosted of Political Kitchen 
at TVC channel and simultaneously served as the first deputy of the 
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Committee on the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and 
relations with compatriots in the State Duma.  These persons were also 
frequent guests on Dmitry Kiselev‘s show National Interest and 
participated in Vladimir Soloviev‘s To the Barrier and later Poedinok.   
The third motley group of aggressive young journalists is 
typically referred to as ―okhraniteli‖ (―guardians‖), including Pavel 
Danilin, Alexey Chadaev, Vitaly Ivanov. The acolytes of Sovereign 
Democracy typically assert that any alternative conceptions of 
common good would inevitably cause adverse outcomes for Russian 
as an autonomous political organization. Okhraniteli commonly praise 
Putin‘s for saving Russia from collapse, portray the transformative 
politics of the 1990s as the intentional abrogation of sovereignty, and 
attack liberals ad hominem. Their contributions is typically scattered 
over various newspapers, internet resources, and blogosphere.  
All these groups were instrumental in projecting the official 
vision of common good. Their activity overshadowed both liberals and 
communists as generators of discursive resources.
63
 Their public 
utterances were permeated with a strong national ―we‖ against sordid 
anti-national ―they‖-- the subversive liberal Other, responsible for 
Russia‘s loss of national self-efficacy and self-esteem in the 1990s. By 
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the mid-2000s these political journalists invented a captivating image 
of ―the wild 1990s‖ to juxtapose it to the ―well-fed‖ and ―stable 
2000s.‖ The overarching idea of this discourse was that freedom, 
democracy—at least in the Russian context—had clearly visible 
negative effects on economic development and prosperity. As liberal-
minded Gontmakher summarized it:  
… in the early 2000s I suddenly realized that somebody 
on behalf of the state tried to brainwash me 
ideologically in an easy going, but very systematic, 
manner. TV masterfully created the image of the ―wild 
1990s‖ with such attributes as the lack of patriotism, 
kowtowing to the West, self-humiliation. It turns out 
that to love your Motherhood is impossible without 
hating her neighbors, the various antagonists from the 
overseas, who dream Russia being dismembered… It 
turns out that we were standing on our knees, while 
only the strong state could help us up; thus the strong 
state had to be served with an unflinching loyalty and 
without any criticism…64 
                                                     
64
 Evgeny Gontmakher, Perehod na lichnosti: Ideologija vs. politika, Vedomosti, 
№42 (2312),11.03.2009. 2008 
184 
 
These propaganda seeds fell on a fertile soil. By the late 1990s wider 
audiences expressed generally favorable popular attitudes to 
democratic ideals and simultaneous distrust in nearly all decision-
makers and political institutions.
65
 By the late 2000s public distrust in 
domestic political institutions and law enforcement agencies only 
increased. Recent polling data conducted by Russian Public Opinion 
Research Center (VCIOM) in 1992—2007, for instance, showed the 
persistently negative popular attitudes both to the notions of capitalism 
and communism. At the same time, market economy, private property 
and national sovereignty were perceived as positive values.
66
   
  
Strong state as an ultimate political value 
I have previously argued that elites relate providing common good to 
the positive imagery of the self, while articulated audiences ground 
this imagery in the full-bloodied self-Other dichotomy. In Russian 
context, the Other was created as early as in 2001. This sordid generic 
Other lumped together quite dissimilar political actors, whose political 
agenda was not truly compatible. The camp of Others included the 
prominent mainstream politicians (Boris Nemtsov, Vladimir Ryzhkov, 
Grigory Yavlinsky), Yeltsin‘s political advisers and human rights 
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watchers (Georgy Satarov, Sergey Kovalev), the former members of 
government (Mikhail Kasyanov, Evgeny Yasin, Andrey Illarionov), 
political activists of various persuasions (the world‘s chess champion 
Garri Kasparov, a mediocre narcissistic littérateur Eduard Limonov, 
among others). Not surprisingly, this diverse group of people 
promoted a different set of ideas, which engendered multiple internal 
conflicts. 
Since liberals were believed to subvert the Russian state, they 
had to be excluded from the pool of legitimate political actors.
67
 In the 
similar vein, Surkov and Chadaev argued that the liberals distorted the 
idea of democracy and undermined the genuine polity-building.
68 
Others claimed that ―limousine liberals‖ inspired the West to quarrel 
with Russia and slavishly followed the external agenda.
69
 A 
conservative commentator Aleksandr Tsipko pounded contemporary 
liberals as impostors, not being ensconced in the true Russian identity.  
In his view, liberals posed an ontological threat to the state as they 
…cannot consent for Russia to remain Russia, because 
their overall objective is directly opposite. It consists of 
creation of Russia in which there will be nothing 
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traditional, nothing Russian, except for the language. 
The whole meaning of the Russian liberals‘ ideological 
and political activity is to bury the remnants of the 
national self-identification from consciousness of the 
Russian Federation citizens, so that that Russia would 
never were Russia.
70
 
 
In Russia main political debates have been commonly riveted 
to the contending perceptions of the past. Not surprisingly, in the early 
2000s the Kremlin realized that teaching the elite-friendly version of 
the past can strongly endorse the foundational value of a strong 
developmental state and socialize youth into this perception.
71
 Another 
major focal point of writing the ―proper kind of history‖ was to 
buttress the thesis that liberal conception of common good had always 
been at odds with the appropriate kind of common good. The process 
of tailoring the past to certain political goals inevitably bowdlerized its 
nuances and intricacies.  
The Federal Minister of Education longed for a new mandatory 
textbook to countervail the former Soviet republics, which kept 
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blaming Russia for their historical misfortunes and generating 
Russophobe historical narratives.
72
  Aleksandr Filippov‘s A 
Contemporary History of Russia 1945-2006: A Book for the Teacher 
was an obvious candidate for this position. Its authors directly 
acknowledged that the textbook‘s  
…purpose is to generate a precise civic position of each 
graduate. As the citizen of the country he should 
represent values and ethical imperatives of culture of 
the state as the active participant of the open world 
processes it should possess values of a modern civil 
society and a sufficient set of representations for active 
intercultural interaction.
73
 
This book presented a very clear and comprehensible digest of 
the history since 1945, offered from an undiluted state-centric 
perspective.
74
 The book‘s beauty was in its simplicity: political 
stability and economic prosperity depend on the strong state, while 
state‘s weakness generates social hardships. This logic is easily 
extendable to all periods of Russian existence: strong state meant the 
end of Smuta in 1612 and the victory in the WWII; its weakness 
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entailed the power vacuum of 1917 and the collapse of the state in 
1991. Finally, the chapter entitled ―Sovereign Democracy‖ appeared in 
this manual to describe the period of Putin‘s presidency, thus sealing 
the doctrine‘s almost official status.75 The first draft of this textbook 
was complete in 2007 and was a subject of an enormous public 
attention and scrutiny. After some minimal editing, this manual was 
turned into a typical history textbook.
76
 Despite the liberal outcry, the 
State Duma made it illegal from September 2007 to teach history in 
schools using unapproved textbooks, making the described version of 
past almost mandatory.
77
   
Broader public debates also abused domestic history in order to 
legitimize the notion that only a full-bloodied strong state can be at the 
center of legitimate common good. For instance, at the seminar held at 
the Russian State University for the Humanities on the occasion of the 
90
th
 anniversary of the liberal-bourgeois February revolution, the chief 
ideologue Surkov claimed that it prompted social, economic, and 
political chaos. Ultimately, despite the false pretext of freedom this 
triggered the October coup d‘état. The former head of the pro-liberal 
party Yabloko Grigory Yavlinsky rejoined that liberals injected the 
ideals of freedom and democracy into Russian political life, yet failed 
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to institutionalize them because of the Bolsheviks. This interpretation 
did not find a positive response among political commentators.
78
 In 
further publications articulated audience laboured to convince their 
readers those self-styled liberals always failed in dealing with the 
major historical challenges.
79
 This aggressive historical politics was at 
variance with the practices of the 1990s. Pluralism of historical 
interpretations and the availability of multiple textbooks used to be a 
norm.  
 To countervail all this, some liberal politicians have tried to 
promote their conception of common good by setting off the pro-
democratic politics of the 1990s as a highly commendable political 
experience. Yet they failed to do so very effectively. Moscow-based 
foundation the Liberal Mission sponsors a range of conferences and 
publishes books written from the liberal perspective, many of which 
are available for free on-line. Another striking example is Andrey 
Zubov‘s edited book, which brought out histories of persons and 
collectivities in their pursuit of personal dignity, political and 
economic freedoms.  This is definitely a very notable attempt to write 
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a liberal history textbook, yet it has to be advertized and marketed 
more insistently. 
Recently Nikita Belykh, Russia‘s only liberal governor in the 
era of Sovereign Democracy, lamented that there was almost no 
cultural remembrance and recognition of the rich tradition of Russian 
XIX c liberalism at the level of wider audiences, which was an 
obvious obstacle to promote liberal outlook.
80
 Yet he had no one to 
blame but himself: Almost every Russian liberal thinker had been 
previously published, yet liberals failed to actively promote and 
interpret their writings for the general audience.  
 
State-led development 
In fleshing out the notion of state-led development, Putin and his 
entourage hounded oligarchs and liberal economists as the regime‘s 
Other. In the 1990s there was a lot of hostility towards all economic 
reformers (most notably Yegor Gaidar and Anatoly Chubais) and their 
foreign advisers (neoliberal economists such as Anders Åslund and 
Jeffrey Sachs). Aggressive claims were abound. Communists, for 
instance, asserted that the reformers were intentionally pushing the 
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contemptible and ruinous economic reforms forwards to subjugate 
Russia to the Western economic powerhouses.  
In the 2000s political elites switched their attention to domestic 
oligarchs as economically irresponsible and socially dangerous 
actors.
81
   In 2003 a think-tank the National Strategy Council (SNS) 
published a report usually referred to as ―The Oligarchic Revolution is 
being Brewed in Russia.‖ Its authors, more than 20 well-known 
political experts, claimed that liberals and oligarchs conspired to grab 
political power in their own parochial interests. According to the SNS, 
Mikhail Khodorkovsky inspired the alleged attempt of coup.
82
 In the 
new public discourse, the main tycoons of the 1990s, including Boris 
Berezovsky, Vladimir Gusinsky, and Mikhail Khodorkovsky, were 
chastised as socially irresponsible. Most importantly, this report 
directly Othered liberals and oligarchs as an elite group, which 
allegiance is not with Russia:  
Families of the majority of oligarchs permanently live 
outside Russia; their heirs are educated abroad. Much 
evidence indicates that the majority of oligarchs do not 
connect their individual and family strategic interests 
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with Russia as a geopolitical and ethno-cultural 
essence.
83
 
Surkov‘s short pamphlet ostentatiously titled The Main 
Tendencies and Perspectives of the Development of Contemporary 
Russia is another important document of the period. In this text, he 
described an oligarch as a parasite exploiting the backbone of the 
economy—the oil-based export. Instead of making the state stronger 
and people wealthier, oligarchs refused much needed wealth 
redistribution. Nor did the liberal-oligarch economic policies rectify 
the problems inherited from the Soviet economy.  
In 2004 Khodorkovsky was able to sneak a piece of his 
thinking entitled The Crisis of Liberalism in Russia out of the prison 
and publish it in a prestigious newspaper. In this open letter he tried to 
redeem liberalism and offer a public repentance. He lamented that 
liberals ignored, ―first, some important national-historical features of 
development of Russia, and secondly, the vital interests of the 
overwhelming majority of Russian people.‖84 Khodorkovsky also 
lamented that in the 1990s the values of self-gratification and quick 
enrichment replaced any sense of social responsibility. In his manner 
of speaking, liberals focused on ―sturgeon under horseradish‖ instead 
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of Constitution. One can only speculate about the reasons behind this 
open letter, yet Khodorkovsky definitely played into Putin‘s hands. In 
essence, he confirmed Putin‘s evaluation of liberals as subversive and 
irresponsible Others.
85
                            
  The discourse of state as the indispensable economic regulator 
builds on the widespread disappointment with the painful economic 
reforms of the 1990s. To a certain degree, articulated audiences 
intentionally misrepresented the course and outcomes of the economic 
reforms.  First, clearly overextended the relatively short period of 
complete lawlessness and bandit capitalism of 1992—1994 to the 
whole decade, and low-balled the economic costs of keeping the state 
enterprises in business. Second, they blamed the young reformers‘ 
incompetence for the near economic collapse of the early 1990s, 
conveniently forgetting that soviet administrative economy had failed 
prior to the shock therapy.
86
 Third, they offered a rather superficial 
explanation of the underlying reason of the soviet economic 
malfunctioning. Instead of focusing on the inherent problems of the 
Soviet commanding heights, they blamed incompetent party leaders 
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dominating smart technocrats. Finally, more complex weighing out the 
state as an economic actor got silenced.    
Legitimizing the reemergence of the state as the only 
appropriate initiator and implementer of economic policy had to be 
exercised with extra caution to avoid traps of rolling back to glorifying 
the communist regime. Anchoring the new social purpose only in the 
Soviet past means to be praise socialism with the mainstream 
communists (Communist Party of the Russian Federation, CPRF). Yet 
the wholesale Othering of the Soviet past would bring the collective 
articulations of national purpose too close to its liberal rendition. This 
challenge made Putin and political elite move towards a differentiated 
rendition of the soviet past.  The communist past was rendered 
negative inasmuch as it created an economically ineffective society 
and was not able to deliver. The Filippov‘s history textbook, which I 
introduced in the previous subsection, also used economic 
performance as a secondary indicator to keep the Soviet past distinct 
from Russia‘s historical self. (The authors note the lack of economic 
freedom and private property, stagnation and lagging behind the 
technological breakthroughs). Many other documents similarly 
attributed the collapse of the Soviet regime to its poor economic 
performance, failure to make people prosperous, and inability develop 
decent standards of living. As Surkov explained, the Soviet system 
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collapsed due to inability of the state to perform and deliver as an 
economic actor: 
It also obviously lagged behind in satisfying the needs 
of people in new quality of a life the Western countries 
[enjoyed]. Well, who would want [to live in] such an 
empire which could provide the citizens neither bread, 
nor shows? Refusal to live in such society was 
inevitable. It is not necessary to explain the wreck of 
the Soviet Union as a result of CIA intrigues or the 
party leadership conspiracy. This is an escape from 
reality.
87
 
 
Great power in the multipolar world 
Articulated audience sought to embed the imagery of Russia as a great 
power via two discursive streams. First, they mobilized the popular 
support by warning that external meddling in country‘s affairs 
unacceptable.  Second, articulated audiences skilfully played public 
emotions by applying the pain of severe human losses in World War II 
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and appropriated the victory in it as the indisputable evidence of 
Russian great power status. 
   Several famous politicians and experts warned that 
―orangists‖ aspired simply to grab power and abrogate national 
sovereignty. The so-called color revolutions (Orange in the Ukraine, 
Rose in Georgia, and Tulip in Kyrgyzstan) triggered the scare of being 
under a purposeful attack. According to this logic, the main 
consequence of the color revolutions in all these countries was not the 
success of popular resistance to the rigged elections, but simply a 
lasting political turmoil.
 
For instance,
 
domestic political observers 
projected the belief that the Ukrainian society was at the brink of 
collapse, government was not governing but squabbling, and the 
country‘ Russian-speaking regions in the East were on the verge of 
secession. The flurry of these commentaries simply ignored the 
staggering fact that the rate of economic development in the Ukraine 
remained higher than in Russia.  
Conservative commentators imagined that ―orangist 
ideologies‖ were percolating into Russia.88 They surmised the strong 
likelihood that the color revolutions would destabilize Russian 
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statehood and undermine the country‘s territorial integrity.89  Arkady 
Mamontov‘s film Velvet, aired on the state-controlled TV channel, is a 
case in point.  Mamontov‘s narrative ―exposed‖ the liberals‘ secret 
plot to subvert Russian political system and disintegrate it in 2012, as 
well as attacked young Russian liberals as foreign spies.
90
  This 
response to the color revolutions was not just discursive. It had 
immediate political ramifications as well. Western-sponsored NGOs 
are the ideal promoters of the foreign interests.
91
 It also led to the new 
legislation, significantly restricting the NGOs in Russia.
92
 Extending 
this logic, loyalists accused orangists of acting at the whim of the 
US.
93
 In this picture, the cynical West was more interested in subduing 
developing countries, rather than establishing a genuine democracy 
there. Staunch communist Sergey Kara-Murza and his co-authors put 
the ―color revolutions‖ into the broader historical context of uprisings 
in former socialist camp (1956, 1968 and 1980), the velvet revolutions 
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in the Eastern Europe (1989) as direct challenge to USSR‘s 
geopolitical ambitions.   
At the same time, those Western countries, which remain 
uninvolved, are likely to remain partners and ―friends‖ (such as 
Germany and Italy). Although ―Russia will not become soon, if at all, 
the second edition of, say, either the USA or England, where liberal 
values have deep historical traditions,‖ not all Western countries 
automatically become Russia‘s others. As there is wide variation in 
approaches to individual countries, I am skeptical of the viewpoint that 
Russian political elite defines ―the West as unified democratizing 
actor.‖  
 Another blanket theme of great power discourse was 
glorifying Russia‘s role in the World War II, locally referred to as the 
Great Patriotic War.
 Articulated audiences labored to restore Russia‘s 
worth and honor as related to the victory over Nazism. More 
specifically, this was intended to build the benign image of Russia as a 
great power in historical dimension. Putin‘s administration widely 
used the imageries of the WWII to connect to the broader public 
sentiment. For instance, the Kremlin reclaimed the Soviet tradition of 
pompous and costly military parades on the Red Square. Teddy 
Uldricks correctly asserts that the myth of this war ―continues to be a 
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key element in the national identity of the Russian people.‖94 In a 
similar vein, a famous political pugilist Mikhail Leont‘ev claimed that 
the Victory upheld the continuity of statehood and national unity.
95
 
Thus, since the remembrance of WWII remained deeply enrooted in 
the domestic popular culture, reviving the great power imagery proved 
to be relatively undemanding.   
By producing and constraining discursive resources, such as 
historical documentaries, articulated audiences tried to narrow the 
socially acceptable public presentations of WWII. Some movies and 
documentaries tarnishing the benign image of the great power were 
banned from being aired on TV, or had only limited distribution in 
theaters and DVD shops.
96
  Since 2005, various politicians and 
journalists warned that in-depth critical scrutiny of the WWII will 
challenge Russia‘s worth and honor as a sovereign power.97  The 
prominent members of ER in the State Duma (including Sergey 
Shoygu) went as far as considering criminalization of questioning 
Russia‘s benevolent role in the WWII.  This restrictive approach 
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justified the Soviet occupation of the Baltic States in the 1940,
98
 
deliberately obscured the discussion about political repressions, 
glossed over the phenomenon of the Soviet collaborationism, and 
scrapped any critical outlooks on the Soviet military preparedness and 
effectiveness. Predictably, several Russian youth movements picked 
the sentiment up and fuelled international scandals around the politics 
of commemoration and war monuments in the former Soviet bloc.  
Celebrating Victory Day is divested of any decisive communist 
connotations, and yet communicates the nostalgic image of Russia as a 
great power at the international arena.
99
 Generally, since Putin publicly 
contended that the demise of the USSR was a great geopolitical 
catastrophe, a flurry of commentaries incorrectly inferred that 
communism to be re-envisioned as the historical self. The common 
rendition (both from domestic liberals and scholars) is that Putin 
embedded the proposal for the nation on the idealized presentation of 
the Soviet period. Indeed, elites definitely toyed with the public 
display of various stalinesque symbols, and even returned the old 
soviet tune for the anthem. Yet accusations of the communist bend 
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seem to be too far-stretched.
100
  Rather, it evoked the Soviet Union as 
an undiluted ideal of the great power and reappropriated the image of 
its external strength.
101
  It is true, however, that the official unqualified 
glorification of the former military glory played into the hands of those 
who were twisting the official discourse to support the communist-like 
conceptions of social purpose. Among those, an amateurish stage 
director turned political thespian Sergey Kurginyan claims attention. 
In his frenzied political debates and unhinged political commentaries 
he justified Stalinist atrocities, delved into multiple global conspiracies 
against modernity and common sense, assailed postmodernism, and 
claimed that rejecting the communist past altogether undermined 
Russian proper place in the world.
102
 
 
SOVEREIGN DEMOCRACY IN COLLECTIVE ARTICULATIONS    
Examining collective articulation is the third step in ascertaining 
whether or not a certain conception of common good becomes truly 
legitimate and embedded in among the wider audiences.  In this 
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section I spell out how public culture discursively supported the core 
components of Russian national purpose.   
In order to sample identity at the level of collectivity I will use 
domestic movies. Several methodological considerations are in order. 
First, some scholars have already suggested the importance of movies 
and film industry for studying national identity and nationalism.
 103
 
What is beamed into big screens in movie theaters and into TV may 
not only complement current belletristic textual sources (in a way that 
the commemoration system, or architecture can), but in certain cases 
can be viewed the better expresser of the intersubjective articulations. 
Recently film industry became the symbol of national pride, perhaps 
even more so than literature [had been]. The number of the films 
soared, especially compared to the 1990s.  Movies definitely generated 
comparable amount of core themes and protagonists than any textual 
sources did, which gives me a better and more diverse sample.  
Generally, all the titles, plot descriptions, casting and box-office sales 
are widely available on the industry-related websites and in the special 
sections on culture in journals.
104
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Second, my sampling of 150 movies was stipulated by the 
consideration that picking only few emblematic exemplars can be 
misleading. In order to aggregate movies into discursive formations 
with clear and elaborate meanings, the sample should be large, but 
manageable.
105
 To show the dynamic of collective articulations, it 
includes movies produced both in 2000—2008, as well as refers to 
some prominent examples to illustrate the popular articulations 
throughout the 1990s. Unfortunately, unless the sample to be trimmed 
down to a mere dozen, it is impossible to cover different periods 
proportionately, primarily because the mass production of domestic 
films and TV series in the 1990s decreased dramatically.
  
 
Third, I collected movies of all genres, excluding 
documentaries. I treated documentaries as conscious political 
statements. Empirically, in Russia the documentary-producing TV is 
dominated by articulated audiences and thus excluded documentaries 
from an unbiased sample of collective articulations. These 
considerations made me using documentaries as a significant part of 
the official discourse, explaining elite‘s obligations and proposal for 
the nation (linkage).  If the film industry in the USSR was totally 
controlled during the communist regime, it became by and large free in 
the 1990s.   
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 Fourth, talking about collective articulations we are talking 
about popularity of certain singular cultural units. The commercial 
success positively attests to the wider audience‘s acceptance of the 
themes, characters and, perhaps, even messages conveyed in films. In 
Russian case, however, financial hit it is not a valid indicator, as the 
box office sales for the top movies of the year range dramatically, 
while only very few movies enjoyed an undisputable financial 
success.
106
 Movies almost immediately are aired on the federal TV 
channels, sold on DVDs and get downloaded through multiple illegal 
file-sharing websites and peer-to-peer networks (such as 
www.scteam.ru). Thus my sample is based on a mixture of 
commercial success, official ratings, responses from various sources, 
as well as my own following film production trends since mid-1990s. 
Although I deliberately concentrate on the new collective 
articulations, produced in the 2000s, domestic discursive streams are 
not fully confined to what was written, directed, and acted specifically 
in the analyzed period. In Russian context, thus, a careful observer 
should also comment on the unequivocal building on soviet resources 
(in terms of remakes of and sequels to the iconic movies), as well as 
continuous beaming of the older soviet movies on the TV screens. At 
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the first glance, this indicates an increasing nostalgia about the Soviet 
past. The seeming abundance of the soviet resources would entail the 
continuing popularity and intersubjective sharing of the soviet 
discursive resources, but for several considerations. Most importantly, 
any direct glorifications of the soviet achievements are almost absent, 
exemplars of do not contain politically meaningful pro-soviet 
articulations, and thus do not attest to the strength pro-soviet 
discursive stream. In fact many soviet films of the late 1970s—erly 
1980s still praised today were tongue-in-cheek critique of the 
deficiencies of the regime.  
Symptomatically, in the era of Sovereign Democracy, many 
observers, movie critics, and general public dismissed the fact that 
popular articulations were shaped by the plurality of permissible 
approaches how to envision and represent the Russian self. 
Importantly, they lamented the low quality of the cinematographic 
products, tagging the films of the 1990s under the rubric of 
chernukha.
107
 In the Russian cultural context, this term could be quite 
broad and imply not only the sense of being doomed, general 
gloominess, negativity and depression permeating the movies, but also 
trashiness and inferiority as the major characteristic of the Russian 
film industry in the 1990s. New collective articulations seem to be 
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intentionally avoiding chernukha, while the detectable discursive 
streams were fleshed out and cemented in terms of consistency of the 
themes and messages contained in these movies. In the 2000s three 
overarching themes at the level of collectivity undoubtedly 
predominated. 
By the end of Putin‘s presidency, however, many prominent 
cinematographers warned about the looming crisis in the industry. 
Among them, several iconic and near-iconic directors, including 
internationally acclaimed Nikita Mikhalkov and Fedor Bondarchuk, 
made a public plea for more governmental money to produce more 
patriotic films. They seemed to be willing to film what the government 
would deem important for its own purposes (goszakaz, state order).
 
This demonstrates not only the filmmaking industry‘s recognition of 
importance of movies for shaping political representations at the 
collective level, but even directors‘ and producers‘ acceptance to be 
engaged in intentional outreach as articulated audiences. Would this 
trend fully gain its momentum, the films will no longer be true 
collective articulations, but rather elements in intentional strategy of 
deploying politically meaningful discursive resources. 
 
Strong state as an ultimate political value 
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The first broad discursive stream affirmed the commitment to the 
strong state as a core component of common good. Film directors used 
a broad range of historical material spanning the whole Russian 
history, as if to reaffirm Putin‘s statement that stateness provides the 
continuity of the national history.   
At the more extreme side of popular articulations, the produced 
films convey a clear message that any revolution, or abrupt political 
change, or weakness of power could not only trigger an avalanche of 
criminal activity, but also could endanger the very existence of Russia 
as a coherent political unit. The bluntest exemplars of the themes 
negatively portray characters, who intentionally promote ―liberal‖ 
ideology at the expense of Russia‘s strength. The historical truth and 
justice is always embodied by the state servants, while liberal impulses 
lead to the conspiratorial activity to destroy the very existence of 
Russian polity. Notable examples include Tsar‘s Servant (in which 
only freedom-seeking Polish peasants are represented as the bandits, 
preventing Russia‘s rise), Alexander: The Neva Battle (in which the 
faction of old Russian nobility seeks not freedom, as declared, but 
rather to prevent consolidation and strengthening of the state), 1612 (in 
which state-defending militia of the early XVIIth c., as well as 
ordinary Muscovites, voluntary chose to protect the state as the their 
solemn duty). 
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Protagonists are always striving to make the state stronger (and 
stronger here equals better), while its opponents pursue the opposite 
goals under different disguises. The mini-series Demise of Empire and 
The Empire under Strike offer a rich gallery of soulless monsters, 
conspiring against the very existence of the state for no apparent 
reason. Personal feelings and dislike of separate state officials have to 
be sacrificed for the greater good of Russia. In State Councilor, for 
instance, the principal character Erast Fandorin  decides to accept the 
position of the Moscow police head, despite his deep distaste for the 
repressive practices of the state and intense personal dislike of his 
immediate superior—Moscow general-governor. The last example is 
actually very telling as the protagonists‘ choice (also the logical 
dénouement of the film) was the opposite in the novel on which the 
film was based on.  The director‘s choice clearly meant to 
accommodate the tastes of the film spectators.  Boris Akunin, the 
author of the novel, was not thrilled with such an ending, yet he 
essentially agreed to have it. This positive imagery of serving the state 
stands in the stark contrast of the overwhelming popular ridiculing of 
domestic authorities (Soldier Ivan Chonkin), Russian international 
affairs (Afghan Fissure) and mockery over the Russian way of life, 
comparing to the West (White King—Red Queen). In the 1990s, being 
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Russian was denounced as being indisputably inferior to foreigners, 
especially Europeans.
108
  
In developing the theme of the strong state, majority of the 
films present state service which equals loyalty to the current political 
regime as a high moral obligation to be carried out by every Russian. 
In this context, even working for the communist regime is an 
honorable choice, unless marred by the personal involvement in 
political repressions. Thus, outright portrayal of communist and 
socialist revolutionaries is blurred by these distinctions. Isaev, for 
instance, demonstrates that the considerations of protection of the state 
from its internal and external enemies are (and should be) superior to 
the personal attitudes to the political regime.  This by and large 
exonerates the protagonists‘ doubtful choice of working for the 
communists, whose overall image (both on personal and political 
level) is far from idealized. The opposite choice, although allowing a 
protagonist to retain high moral grounds and the sense of personal 
dignity, inevitably incurs broader tragedies (Admiral, Demise of 
Empire). This message that commitment to the strong state should 
transcend ideological divisions could be easily applied to Putin‘s 
Russia.  
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Another striking example is the highly acclaimed film Pushkin: 
The Last Duel (2006), featuring the first-rate Russian movie stars. The 
film topples the traditional vision of Aleksandr Pushkin as an anti-state 
and proto-liberal ―freedom-loving‖ poet, which was deeply inculcated 
during the communist period. This XIXth c. famous man of letters is 
portrayed as a victim of an international intrigue, aspiring to rob 
Nicholas I off the intellectual resources of the emerging Russian 
nationalism. The general message of the movie implies that the 
subsequent economic and political stagnation in the mid-XIXth should 
be blamed on the subversive outsiders, rather than any internal 
problems. The film also shows that harmful forces often evade the 
proper punishment by the skewed international norms. Pushkin‘s 
killer, being a foreign subject, is exempt from hanging by the 
international regulations.  
 
 
 
State-led development 
The second discursive stream exposed the ubiquitous violence and 
lawlessness, the helplessness of the state, entangled with organized 
crime and shady businesses practices in the 1990s. The stream in 
general supports the notion of the ―wild 1990s‖ as the centerpiece of 
Sovereign Democracy.
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In recreating the human experience of the period, many movies 
pictured the protagonists‘ deep personal crisis and inability to realize 
their potential in embarking on the service to the state as highly 
rewarding career. In the films about the 1990s, main characters are 
inevitably sucked into the organized crime and violence. (Consider 
ubiquitous bloodshed and sadism in Dead Man‘s Bluff, which in 
Russia was released under the title Squints, implying the shut eyes of 
the dead). In a canonic movie Beemer, for instance, four small-time 
crooks, strive to own a Beemer, which is presented as an ultimate 
object of their desire, an affliction, which brings them only misery. 
The mere task of surviving in the ―wild 1990s‖ presented 
characters with harsh choices. In many cases personal survival in the 
state of nature (as well as protecting their families and their significant 
others) meant turning to violence.  Multiple films explore an array of 
possible repercussions of this harsh choice (Sisters, Angel on the 
Sidewalk).  Often even seeking seclusion and atonement would not 
bring peace of the protagonist. Such is the story of an ex-killer, who 
pursued an escape in a secluded and frosty Russian town only to get 
hunted by an aspiring hit-woman (Garbageman).  This theme was also 
explored in the film Sisters, where the 13 year old girl dreams about 
become a sniper in the Russian military and fight in Chechnya to 
escape from the brutality and crime surrounding her family. 
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The connections between the politicians of the 1990s and the 
organized crime are best explored in a canonic mini-series Brigada. It 
traces the epic history of four friends, who started their own business 
at the end of perestroika. In this very popular mini-series the main 
protagonist Sasha Belyi is able to succeed in business because he helps 
the corrupt federal agents to transport narcotics to the West. Yet, once 
asked to smuggle arms into Chechnya, Belyi declines the offer. Not 
surprisingly the corrupt siloviki fight back killing his friends, family 
and taking away his hard-earned prosperity. Quite a similar story is 
told in Oligarch. Smart and innovative businessman, who knows how 
to play the inefficient and corrupt system, is hunted by the corrupt 
politicians, envying his financial success.
109
 In these movies, corrupted 
state officials internalize the criminal rules to pursue personal wealth.     
The mini-series Time of the Cruel shows even more saliently 
how the dissolution of the state in the early 1990s pitched former 
military officers against each other.  First they fight against each other 
in various local conflicts in the Soviet successor states. Later, some of 
them become involved into the weaponry smuggling scheme, under 
president‘s advisors and a vice prime minister. Others become 
consigliore to the well-connected gangsters, while still serving in the 
                                                     
109
 In Oligarch the protagonist is allegedly modeled on Boris Berezovsky, a former 
Russian media tycoon living in exile in London. 
213 
 
power ministries. Similarly, in Hunting the Elk (2005) most of 
presented banks owner, entertainers, and journalists have strong 
connections with organized crime. Their goal is to acquire a highly 
successful and profitable metallurgical plant for a fraction of a price, 
using illegal means. Their long-term plans, obviously, have nothing to 
do with the plants‘ and workers prosperity. At the same time pervasive 
corruption, permeating all strata of Russian state and 
commercialization of law-enforcing agencies is filmed very 
infrequently (Flint, Oligarkh, Time of the Cruel). 
According to Swaffar, in the major Russian films of the 1990s 
characters unsuccessfully struggle to find a coherent identity.
110
 In 
sharp contrast, in the late 1990s a weak, erratic, and confused 
protagonist turns into a decisive hero. In 1997 Russian TV aired the 
first season of the phenomenally popular show The Streets of the 
Broken Lanterns, portraying police officers, whose deep character 
flaws and less than glamorous personal lifestyles, and sometimes not 
irreproachable professional conduct were absolved by their service for 
the greater societal good. Airing The Streets signaled the appearance 
of the whole spate of TV shows dedicated to good ―cops‖ (menty), and 
later to the heroic intelligence and especially counterintelligence 
community. In the context of siloviki rise to power, such an emphasis 
                                                     
110
 See Swaffar 2000: 101. 
214 
 
on law enforcement seemed to imply that only service to the state 
helps overcome deep personal and professional crisis. 
Since the late 1990s, protagonists‘ behavior is shaped by their 
Russianness and deep commitment to the Russian moral imperatives. 
Even direct violence gets justified as an instrument of defending the 
truth, national values, and reasserting Russia‘s greatness. This message 
is best captured in tremendously popular Brother and Brother 2. In the 
first movie Danila Bogrov, a youth with a shady past, is fully 
committed to help and then protect his brother, even at great personal 
expenses.  In the second one, he is portrayed like a true national 
protagonist, a hero of the Chechen war, bringing justice to his wronged 
friends and punishing the immoral Westerners.
111
  According to 
Larsen, the first decisive filmographic attempts to reassert Russian 
unique and commendable values could be attributed to Nikita 
Mikhalkov‘s Burnt by the Sun, Barber of Siberia and Alexei 
Balabanov‘s Brat, Brat 2.  
 In Mikhalkov‘s attempt to reestablish a historical 
connection to unjustly condemned military fathers and 
Balabanov‘s reassertion of brother‘s obligations to one 
another, both filmmakers invoke the metaphor of a 
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―great family‖ united by shared moral certainties, 
cultural values, and unconditional loyalties... Yet the 
craving for the community remains, as does the 
yearning for a heroic national image capable of defying 
foreign threats and alien cultural influences (italics 
added—V.K.).112 
These newer themes break up with the previous 
cinematographic trend of the 1990s, which put on screen ―useless‖ 
characters living in permanent personal crisis with no chance of 
achieving anything positive in life (Genius, Sagittarius Lost, The Time 
of Sorrow Hasn‘t Come Yet). Characters clearly did not have purpose 
in life and had no firm and positive sense of belonging, many of them 
wanted to escape the contemporary Russia, which itself suffered from 
a deep identity crisis. The most acclaimed movies of the period 
directed by Vladimir Khotinenko presented ordinary men crushed by 
identity crisis and alienated from their communities. The main 
character of Musulmanin converted to Islam and thus renounced his 
Russianness, and later was rejected by his community. A not so 
successful poet Makarov tries to build his identity around a newly 
found affinity with a handgun, while being at odds with surrounding 
society. Russian everyman were openly ridiculed as an alcoholic with 
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no other positive interests in life: Fishing, hunting, travelling, and 
politicking experiences were shaped by and subjugated to the drinking 
purpose (Peculiarities of National Fishing). This gloomy uselessness, 
attributed to being Russian stands in contrast with later articulations.  
 
Great power in the multipolar world 
The third broad discursive stream affirmed the commitment to 
Russia‘s great power status in both military and moral dimensions.  
After a long break, films directors returned to the war imageries of the 
Great Patriotic War—the name clearly underscoring Russia‘s special 
role in the World War II, as well as distancing from the pre-1941 
military occupation of the Baltic States, and the Winter War with 
Finland. The cinematographic theme dominated the industry, yet by 
2010 is seemingly losing its emotional appeal and financial success. 
Throughout the 1990s the filmmakers by and large ignored this 
theme (the rare examples include Victory Day, General), in the 2000s 
the war imageries swoosh the spectators. In general, WWII is an 
excellent and abundant resource for pure entertainment and action-
packed films. The stress on the entertainment and avoiding any really 
tough and potentially traumatic questions about the past often pushes 
overt political arguments out of these films.  Most importantly, 
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however, the typical movie puts in the center of its narrative a story of 
a heroic everyman‘s adventures, underscoring protagonists‘ superior 
moral and physical characteristics.
113
   
Even for the victims of regime, defending the state (Fatherland) 
and working for its glory is presented as a moral obligation. The 
conflict between protagonists and his oppressors is never glossed over, 
but often used as an obstacle to prevail over in order to show the 
strength of the will and character (Apostle, the Saboteur).  Movies and 
mini-series which explore the themes of repressions and inhumane 
treatment of its own people are smaller in numbers and often become a 
subject of public debate, rather than unquestionably accepted as a 
shared articulation of the past (Penal Battalion, The Last Battle of 
Major Pugachev, Bastards). Highly debated Penal Battalion, for 
instance, meticulously exposed soldiers‘ lives under the repressive 
military mechanisms.  Equally, an ultra-realistic presentation of the 
everyday hardships of the wartime is often ignored and rarely becomes 
popular.
114
  Mikhalkov attributed the victory in WWII to the 
Russianness and the Russian exclusive and highly rewarding 
connection to the orthodox celestial spheres (Burnt by the Sun-2, see 
                                                     
113
 August 44; Star, Stand, Transfer, Leningrad; June 1941, Stronger than Fire, The 
Last Armored Train, Time to Collect Stones,  
114
See, for instance, Constellation of Taurus, Red Sky, Black Snow, Half-Mist, Battle 
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also earlier I am Russian Soldier), rather than specific and limiting 
Sovietness. The focus on Russian uniqueness and great power status 
seems to be devoid from communist undertones.  
 
CONCLUSION: RANKING NATIONAL PURPOSE 
Russian political elite expressed strongly commitment to Sovereign 
Democracy as the conception of common good, while domestic 
articulated audiences were very active in outreaching its components 
to wider audiences. On balance, throughout Putin‘s presidency, this 
conception of common good got strongly embedded/legitimized in 
domestic policy environment. At the same time, public culture 
strongly supports a dominant articulation of common good, including 
all of its three substantive components. At the margins, other sub-elite 
groups and political parties keep advocating radically different set of 
political obligations, engrained in a different set of values. The 
summary characteristics of Russian national purpose are provided 
below: 
Table 4.1 Indicators of national purpose 
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CHAPTER 5. SOCIAL PURPOSE IN SOUTH AFRICA (AFRICAN 
RENAISSANCE) 
 
In the post-apartheid South Africa political elites discussed several 
alternative programs for the South African national identity. During 
the time of political transition to the majority rule in 1990-1994, there 
were a lot of credible nation- and identity-building proposals, each 
with its own specific focus. Solving the so-called national question 
was intended to rebuild, reunite and heal the nation in the context of 
profound ethnic, racial, gender, and class gulfs.
1
 
The prominent members of the African Nation Congress and 
the participants of the liberation movement simultaneously engaged 
the ideas of Pan-Africanism, Africanism, nonracialism, as well as 
class- and ethnic-based conceptions of common good. The Pan-
African national identity coalesced into the core imagery of Africa for 
the Africans from Cape to Cairo and was articulated by the Pan-
African Congress, based on the political writings of Steve Bantu Biko 
and Black Consciousness Movement. Africanism envisioned the 
common supra-ethnic nationhood of all black South Africans, and was 
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 For the collection of earlier discourse on South African identity-building see, for 
instance, van Diepen 1989. 
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espoused by certain members inside both the African National 
Congress (ANC) and Pan-African Congress (PAC). South African 
non-racialism (South Africanism, ―the Rainbow Nation‖) was 
promoted in Nelson Mandela‘s and Desmond Tutu‘s proposals for a 
multi-racial, multi-cultural South African nation. Other proposals 
included less politically feasible ethnic-tribal nationalism (Inkatha‘s 
Mangosuthu Buthelezi). Last, but not least, the members of South 
African Communist Party (SACP), including Jabulani Nxumalo 
(Comrade Mzala), Joe Slovo, and charismatic Chris Hani promoted the 
radical class-based nationalism.
2
 Among all those, the popular imagery 
of the Rainbow Nation briefly peaked in popularity during the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), soon to be perceived as a less 
attractive option.
3
   
African Renaissance is a veritable salmagundi of themes, 
meanings, and sensibilities. The three themes clearly jump out as the 
most important.
4
 First, indigenousness is an outgrowth of Africanism 
as the ideology of returning to the roots in the ANC. Second, 
marketization is the strategy of economic empowerment, Third, ubuntu 
is the notion of South African exceptionalism in the context of 
globalization. Vale and Maseko drew attention the African 
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 See, for instance, Neuberger 1990, pp. 54—77 
3
 See Nattrass and Seekings 2001 
4
 Vale and Maseko 2002; Ajulu 2001, Maloka 2002. 
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Renaissance aiming at constructing a new African history, identity and 
culture (culturalist interpretation which I will define as 
indigenousness, or ―nativism‖) and the second one aiming at South 
Africa‘s special role in the continental revival in the context of 
globalization (globalist interpretation, which I define as ubuntu). To 
these two I add the third component, marketization, which according 
to WM Gumede was a single defining event in the battle for the ―soul‖ 
of the ANC in the late 1990—early 2000s.5  There is a seeming 
inconsistence among all these components: indigenousness and 
marketization seem to underpin different kinds of action. However, in 
South African political context, both components are deployed to 
countervail the global power structure. Indigenousness promotes local 
solutions for local problems, while marketization economically 
empowers certain subset of domestic political elite.  
I have previously suggested that building public legitimacy 
entails bonding with wider audiences and creating a strong national 
―we‖ against sordid anti-national ―they‖--the Other--which is 
presented as undermining the nation and therefore should be struggled 
with. In sum, South African political elites created particular three 
Others: the settler other, a disempowering deliverer, and the neo-
colonial Other, embedded in the European Renaissance. Over time, 
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however, these set of others remained somewhat compounded in the 
theme of two contending identities, Afro-optimist vs. Afro-pessimist, 
embracing incompatible and contending political projects was the most 
important trait of the loyalist discourse throughout Mbeki‘s 
presidential terms.an innovative set of identities across racial, ethnic, 
and cultural divides.  
In this chapter I explore how the formation of a new 
conception of common good and ascertain to what degree it got 
embedded among wider audiences. In doing so, I follow the 
framework of analysis as laid out in Chapter 3. In Chapter 7 I will 
demonstrate how the pursued conception of common good politicized 
the responses to the epidemic of HIV/AIDS and subsequently had 
adverse effects on the adoption of global standards of the antiretroviral 
treatment.  
 
ELITE‘S COMMITMENT TO AFRICAN RENAISSANCE  
Elite‘s strong commitment to a certain conception of common good is 
the first signal that social purpose truly emerges in a given country. It 
demonstrates what kind of action elite perceives as appropriate to 
solve policy problems. In this section I spell out the core components 
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of South African national purpose and ascertain the degree to which 
extant elites are consolidated around it.  
Mbeki‘s speech ―I am an African‖ signaled the desire to 
generate a common social purpose.
6
  This speech is often quoted to 
show what is meant by the notion African Renaissance in South 
African political discourse. This is not entirely accurate: the content 
and message of this highly poetic and emotional speech was closer to 
the Rainbow Nation rhetoric than to what Pretoria would promote 
under the heading of the African Renaissance. Nevertheless, 
throughout his upcoming presidency in a series of speeches, addresses 
and letters, President Mbeki elaborated his vision further, thus creating 
a corpus of canonical texts, to which domestic elites and articulated 
audiences anchored their discussion of social purpose. In general, for 
Mbeki African Renaissance was the core marker of [South] African 
identity: ―This is because to speak of an African Renaissance is to 
speak of the coming into being of a new African identity, a new 
resolve to take our future into our own hands and determine our own 
destiny.‖7 
                                                     
6
 ―I am an African‖ speech delivered on behalf of the African National Congress, on 
the occasion of the adoption by the constitutional assembly of "The Republic of 
South Africa Constitution Bill 1996," in Africa: The Time Has Come: Selected 
Speeches, pp. 31—36  
7
Thabo Mbeki,  Address to the National house of Traditional Leaders, Ulundi, 3 
August 2001 
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When elected to the presidency of the republic, Mbeki started 
consolidating political elites around him by expanding and 
strengthening the role of the presidency in particular and the executive 
power in general. If under Nelson Mandela the presidential office was 
rather small, Mbeki created additional internal bodies such as the 
Coordination and Implementation Unit (CIU), the Policy Coordination 
and Advisory Service (PCAS), the Presidential Support Unit (PSU).
8
 
Beyond their instrumental role in helping formulating and coordinating 
domestic policies, these units also promoted presidential vision of a 
new conception of common good among the domestic elite.
9
 Essop 
Pahad, for instance, openly asserted that the office of the presidency 
was the ministry of African Renaissance. According to Frank Chikane, 
a team of senior advisors turned then Deputy President‘s vision of the 
African Renaissance into an operational plan how to achieve this 
objective.
10
 
Informally, the strengthening of the presidency relied on the 
growing role and power of President Mbeki‘s inner circle of advisors. 
South African political columnist Richard Calland‘s list of the core 
important individuals features Joel Netshitenzhe (the member of the 
                                                     
8
 On the political role and functions of these policy units, see Calland 2006: 35—41; 
on the expansion of the presidency see Calland 2006: 22—28. 
9Some of them after Mbeki‘s ousting from power created a new party Congress of 
People (COPE) with surprising electoral success. 
10
 Chicane, Frank. 2006. A new type of partnership. The African Renaissance and the 
development of NEPAD. Umrabulo 27 (3). 
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ANC National Executive Committee, NEC, and allegedly the chief 
political strategist), Trevor Manuel (Minister of Finance, 1996—
2009), Mojanku Gumbi (legal advisor to the President‘s Office), 
Phumzile Mlambo-Ngucka (Deputy President in 2005—2008), Essop 
Pahad (the Minister in the Presidency, 1999-2008), Aziz Pahad, 
(Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1999—2008, and allegedly 
Mbeki‘s best personal friend), Smuts Ngonyama (a head of 
communications for the ANC), Titus Mafolo (Mbeki‘s political 
adviser in the presidency), Cunningham Ngcukana (Deputy Executive 
Director, NEPAD),and  Bheki Khumalo (presidential spokesman), 
among others.
11
 These individuals constituted ―president‘s inner 
circle‖ and sometimes were described as the powerful cohort of 
loyalists.  
Until 2008, Mbeki was quite successful in having a broad 
power-based consensus on the major political goals inside the ANC. 
Mbeki‘s loyalists attained this internal power-based consensus most of 
the times through intricate apparat games and through firing the 
―dissidents‖ from the executive positions, often through bitter personal 
attacks in the media, and sometimes through direct persecution and 
allegations of political conspiracy to overthrow the presidency. With 
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 On the background of these individuals, their political views and positions, see 
Calland 2006: 27—35, 49—53, 61. 
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less internal democracy inside the ANC, the core Mbeki supporters 
were able to make African Renaissance a dominant proposal in the 
party.
12
 ―African Renaissance‖ features prominently in the outlook of 
the African National Congress (ANC). The 50th National Conference 
in Mafikeng, the ANC adopted the ―African Renaissance‖ as a key 
component of its ideological outlook, especially as related to economy 
and international relations.
 13
 The language of the following statements 
was also heavily imbued with references to the African Renaissance as 
one of the core strategic tasks of the ANC.
14
 The concept of African 
Renaissance also was fundamental for the documents discussing the 
continent‘s future at the 51st National Conference in Stellenbosch 
(December 2002).
15
  
The ANC remains the unchallenged political party of power, 
crowding and even marginalizing the rest of the smaller political 
parties. In this context, the ANC‘s vision of national identity would 
constitute at least a power-based (restrained) consensus. Indeed, the 
role of potential challengers, such as South African Communist Party, 
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 See, for instance, Lotshwao 2009; on the ANC as the dominant party system, see 
Lanegran 2001, for the growing role of NEC, see Calland 2006: 122—124.  
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 Lodge 2003: 227—228; Also see the policy document Strategy and Tactics—
Mafikeng. As amended at the 50th National Conference, December 1997. 
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 See, for instance, Statement of the National Executive Committee on the occasion 
of the 88th Anniversary of the ANC, January 8, 2000, available at 
<http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?include=docs/jan8/2000/jan8-2000.html> 
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 See, for instance, The ANC and Challenges facing the African continent, 
Unrambulo 16 (3): Special 51st National Conference Edition (2002). This discussion 
document initially appeared on 30 August 2002 in preparation for the December 
conference. 
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the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) remained 
relatively minor. One indicator that the notion of African Renaissance 
became accepted in domestic political elite beyonf Mbeki‘s circle of 
supporters is that the leftist-oriented Vusi Maviembela (a current 
leader of Congress of South African Trade Unions, COSATU) fully 
endorsed and promoted this version of social purpose, especially 
pertains to the country‘s role in continental leadership, continental 
solidarity and common African heritage.  
 
Indigenousness: return to the roots   
Indigenousness pinpoints using local solutions and genetic resources 
as a kind of action appropriate for addressing pressing policy 
problems. ―A return to the roots‖ is a formula capturing major 
interrelated themes, including the rediscovery of Africa‘s creative past, 
taking the indigenous peoples‘ wisdom seriously, preserving and 
promoting various indigenous customs transcending the present-day 
political borders.
16
 Returning to the roots also aimed at the moral 
regeneration to curb the present-day violence and stop the decline of 
the moral standards.  
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 See, for instance, The African cultural milieu and our common humanity, ANC 
Today, Volume 7, No. 40 (12—18 October 2007) 
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Among all those themes, South African political elite placed a 
special emphasis on the necessity to establish an African interpretation 
of things, that is, producing and advancing indigenous science, 
technology, and education. In his speech The African Renaissance, 
South Africa and the World, Mbeki envisioned that indigenousness 
would generate ―modern products of human economic activity, 
significant contributions to the world of knowledge, in the arts, science 
and technology, new images of an Africa of peace and prosperity.‖17 
During African Renaissance conference in 1999, Githae Mugo called 
for African education as a ―system of knowledge, theory and practice, 
informed and shaped by a content  and form that are definitive of 
African space as well as the indigenous experiences of Africa‘s people 
and diversity.‖18 Importantly, in 2002 one discussion document 
defined indigenous knowledge as central for a new African identity: 
―Citizens are not made by Acts of Parliament, but by a growing 
common awareness emerging through politics, education, working 
together, sport, entertainment, and religion. A new Indigenous 
                                                     
17
 In 1998 Mbeki purposefully reappropriated the Latin proverb ―Ex Africa semper 
aliquid novi! (Something new always comes out of Africa!) with can have a negative 
meaning as well. See Thabo Mbeki, The African Renaissance, South Africa and the 
World, in Africa: The Time Has Come: Selected Speeches, pp 239--251 
18
 Githae Mugo, African Culture in Education for Sustainable Development, in 
Makgoba 1999: 225  
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Knowledge System (IKS) is arising which is not western, American, 
European, but African.‖19  
 All this rhetoric signified something more profound than a 
mere propaganda, or public relations exploit. Pretoria encouraged a 
variety of institutions embodying the indigenous values and promoting 
the contextualized systems of knowledge. The Cabinet supported 
traditional leaders financially and logistically and recognized the role 
of traditional governance in rural reconstruction and development, as 
well as in sustaining cultural, linguistic and religious communities.
20
 
Early in his presidency, Mbeki and the President‘s Office helped 
create National House of Traditional Leaders, Programme of Support 
for the Institution of Traditional Leadership, the Traditional Leaders 
Conference, and the African Renaissance Festival. Another, more 
specific manifestation of indigenousness was the creation of the 
National Research Foundation (NRF) to manage the governmental 
funds directed to the study of indigenous knowledge and traditional 
                                                     
19
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nd
 National Conference Discussion Documents, The RDP of the Soul, 30 
March 2007, available at 
<http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?include=docs/discus/2007/rdp.html> 
20
See the White Paper on Traditional Leadership and Governance and the Traditional 
Leadership and Governance, Staatskoerant, 10 September 2003, No. 25438 3 
General Notice 2336 of 2003; Speaking notes for Deputy President Phumzile 
Mlambo-Ngcuka at the House of Traditional Leaders during Social Development 
Day, 19 October 2007; for the broader academic analysis of the traditional leadership 
institutions in the context of democratic South Africa, see  Williams 2010. 
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healing practices.
21
 Throughout his tenure, Mbeki publicly extolled 
traditional institutions and their leaders for their determining role in 
the African Renaissance by developing communities and stimulating 
the new common ground.
22
 
In South African context the commitment to indigenous 
knowledge systems and traditional institutions went beyond standard 
declarative purposes. One practical implication directly relevant for 
the subsequent chapters is related to African Traditional Medicines 
(ATMs). The South African Health Ministry defined IKS as ―scientific 
methodologies that stretch back thousands of years,‖ being ―essential 
and irreplaceable component of the comprehensive care.‖23  From the 
international vantage point, promoting TMs implies standardization 
and commercialization of knowledge about plants, as well as 
institutionalizing relationship between traditional healers, plant 
gatherers, governments, biomedical researchers, and the private 
sector.
24
 The global consensus on genetic resources is to make 
ethnomedicines applicable for public health and to promote the 
sustainable management of resources. This consensus does not imply 
any of the far-reaching aspirations, as pursued by South African 
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Important role for traditional leaders in development and nation-building, ANC 
Today, Volume 3, No. 28 (18—24 July 2003).  
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 Thabo Mbeki, Address to the National house of Traditional Leaders, Ulundi, 3 
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24
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political leaders. While the World Health Organization (WHO) had a 
particular interest in traditional medicine, it was very careful in its 
evaluation of safety and efficacy of local knowledge about genetic 
resources.  
Generally indigenousness entails that the local innovations and 
local solutions as policy action should be preferred to the Western 
models, as employing the former only creates the negative image of 
South Africa‘s backwardness and helplessness. At the more radical 
side of the discourse, the participants of the African Renaissance 
conference, the Foundation for the Global Dialogue, claimed that the 
majority of Western institutions and structures on the African soil were 
―promiscuously copied from the West,‖ proved themselves culturally 
ineffective and irrelevant and thus should be boldly discouraged and 
abolished.
25
  
 
Marketization as the economic empowerment 
Marketization prescribes the economic empowerment of South 
Africans based on boosting the private sector and relying on market 
economy strategies as a kind of action appropriate for addressing 
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pressing policy problems, as opposed to the governmental delivery and 
redistribution.
26
  
 In the late 1980s the ANC briefly planned to rebuild the 
country‘s economy using soviet-style economic prescriptions. Some 
powerful figures in the organization studied the Soviet, Chinese, 
Cuban experiences and purportedly decided on nationalization as the 
main economic strategy.  In the early 1990s, however, Madela publicly 
distanced himself from the ideas of nationalization so that the ANC‘s 
economic policies could remain rather flexible.
 27
 The sharp 
turnaround in the party‘s economic outlook got cemented in 1992—
1993, when socialist-inspired redistribution was categorically excluded 
from the ANC policy documents. The agreement on the new economic 
outlook superceded the strong contestation inside the future South 
African elite. It had been fractured along the leftist and pro-
distribution (SACP, COSATU) and more centrist and pro-
marketization proponents (the ANC, Trevor Manuel, Tito Mboweni, 
and later Alec Erwin). WM Gumede implied that the strong consensus 
about marketization at the level of political elite was borne out of the 
successful transfer of assets and economic power to newly generated 
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class of wealthy black entrepreneurs.
28
 Most importantly, for both 
camps the choice of the path to growth was intricately connected to 
their political identities and ideological outlooks.  
Scholars still dispute the specific reasons why marketization 
was embraced. Hein Marais, the author of perhaps most authoritative 
account of the south African politics of economic reform, drew 
attention to both structural and institutional factors, including global 
communist collapse, learning from the overspending in Chile and 
Peru, and the ANC‘s historical unpreparedness to debate economic 
policy professionally. Zimbabwe‘s economic problems were attributed 
to the lack of to the marketization principles the dedication to the land 
redistribution and overspending.
29
 According to Gumede, the ANC 
was simply seduced by the International Financial Institutions, most 
notably the World Bank, whose representatives courted the ANC 
members and in a course of a few years fully socialized them in the 
neo-liberal orthodoxy. It could be also argued that these pro-market 
policies were chosen simply out of overpowering fiscal constraints.   
In any case, Mbeki‘s speech at the University of Transkei‘s 
fundraising dinner on April 30, 1998 made abundantly clear that the 
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 Tokyo Sexwale was one of the success stories of the Black Economic 
Empowerment. 
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 As  in 2002 the ANC‘s Secretary-General Kgalema Motlanthe and Mbeki himself 
argued. 
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stress on delivery was undesirable, since it overpowered the 
government and disempowered the people: 
What remains is for us all to invest the government with 
the heavenly powers… Is it correct that we preach such a 
message of disempowerment of the people, predicated on 
the notion of a deliverer and a recipient? When we who, for 
now anyway, occupy positions of political leadership speak 
only of a record of achievement illustrated by statistics of 
delivery, and do not address with the same vigour and 
consistency the issues of what each of our citizens is doing 
themselves to deliver to themselves and to society - are we 
not thereby also contributing to the demobilisation and 
disempowerment of the people and the inculcation among 
them of a frame of mind of dependence on.
30
 
The elevation of marketization as strong political obligation 
was accompanied with the slow erosion of the socialist inspired 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). Simultaneously, 
the ANC started underscoring economic growth through deficit 
reduction, tight monetary policy, and trade liberalization, according 
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the Washington Consensus.
31
 The final break away from the 
redistribution to the neo-liberalism was sealed with the Growth, 
Employment, and Redistribution (GEAR), the Accelerated and Shared 
Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA).
32
   
   
Ubuntu in the context of globalization 
Ubuntu emphasizes the continental solidarity, self-reliance, and 
resistance the Western neo-colonial imperialism as the kind of action 
appropriate to solve pressing policy problems. The more politicized 
rendition of this concept strongly implied South Africa‘s role as the 
primary and perhaps the sole expresser of a continental solidarity, 
which also entails South African status as a benevolent hegemon.
33
  
Ubuntu is roughly defined as a universal bond of sharing that 
connects all humanity, an intrinsic African outlook that places a strong 
value on communal interests, underscores that human existence, gives 
meaning to one‘s life through interactions with others, fosters spiritual 
collectiveness, and promotes the ethos of reciprocity and mutual aid. 
The Zulu saying ―umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu‖ is commonly 
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translated as the person becoming self through interaction with the 
Other. In this context, the political meaning of ubuntu implies that 
South Africa can realize itself as a successful political project only if 
shaping the future of the continent and playing an important global 
role. 
 
The Minister of Foreign Affairs Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma 
fleshed out the notion of continental solidarity as follows:  
Our foreign policy is not only anchored in our domestic 
policy, but on the responsibility that South Africa offers 
hope for all humanity. We have to contribute to the 
ongoing struggle for a better world. Internationally, we 
continue struggle for a world with the following values: 
democracy, good governance, people-centered 
development, peace, stability and security, promotion of 
cooperation, partnership and good neighbourliness.
34
 
Some observers claimed that South African elites strategically 
deployed the notion of continental solidarity in order to maximize 
South Africa‘s foreign policy options in Africa—including the 
country‘s quest to occupy Africa‘s permanent seat in the United 
Nations Security Council.
35
 Yet political commitment to the social 
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purpose captured in ubuntu goes beyond strategic considerations. In a 
1997 discussion document prepared for the 50
th
 national Conference in 
Mafikeng ―African Renaissance‖ was mentioned 17 times in relation 
to the South African foreign policy strategy.
36
 In 2007 political elites 
continued extolling a strong and decisive leadership of South Africa in 
ushering moral-political regeneration, economic revival, self-reliance, 
and continental solidarity. In this context, ubuntu should be seen as a 
politically meaningful program of action: many practical steps ensued 
from this discourse.  
The resolution of the 50
th
 National Conference in Mafikeng 
called for ―developing a theoretical framework and strategy to give 
content to our vision of the African renaissance.‖37 The documents 
flowing from the discussion indicated that the New Economic 
Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) will be such an 
instrument.
38
 
 
 Heavy-weight members of the South African political 
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elite Jacob Zuma, Essop Pahad, and Frank Chikane claimed the crucial 
role of NEPAD in implementing the conception of common good.
39
  
Minister of Provincial and Local Government Sydney Mafumadi 
asserted that NEPAD presented ―a framework for a break with the 
unequal and exploitative economic and political relations that manifest 
itself in the causal connection between development in the North and 
underdevelopment in the South, of which our continent is an intimate 
part.‖ 40 Frank Chikane, a member of the ANC National Executive 
Committee and Director-General in the Presidency, claimed that the 
deployment of NEPAD would put Africa on equal terms with the 
West: 
…is about restoring the dignity, respect, pride and ubuntu 
of the African people... From a South African perspective, 
NEPAD is seen within the context of the development of 
the vision of the African Renaissance… NEPAD has 
changed the nature of the relationship between the donor 
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and the recipient, the developed and the developing 
countries. It has contributed to a partnership of mutual 
trust, respect and responsibility.
41
 
Very similar, but more recent, initiative demonstrating the 
commitment to self-reliance was the South African financial 
contribution to the newly created the Pan-African Infrastructure 
Investment Fund (PAIID). This fund combined exclusively African-
generated $625 million in order to address the continental 
developmental challenges.
42
 More generally, being a benevolent 
hegemon implied that South Africa is likely to act as a norm-giver, 
than a norm-taker. Next logical step was an attack on the global 
pharmaceutical sector as undermining continental self-reliance and 
solidarity.
43
 
 
AFRICAN RENAISSANCE AND ITS PUBLIC LEGITIMACY   
Public legitimacy of an elite-driven conception of common good is the 
second step ascertaining whether or not social purpose takes root in a 
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given country. Domestic articulated audiences select, enable, and 
constrain the production of various discursive resources and thus 
shape policy environment and constitute what kind of policy action is 
likely to be perceived as legitimate. This means that the notions of 
indigenousness, marketization, and ubuntu should be intentionally 
disseminated and turned into the broader societal resources. In this 
section I spell out how articulated audiences legitimized the elite-
generated conception of common good and ascertain the degree it got 
imbued into society.  
Given Thabo Mbeki‘s penchant for political writing, both his 
critics and supporters anchor their discussion to this canon of 
discourse. A large portion of the legitimation efforts revolve around 
his letters, speeches, and addresses. In 2003—2007 Mbeki actively 
contributed to the on-line ANC resource ANC Today with his almost 
weekly section ―Letters from the President.‖ In these lengthy and 
sometimes not very coherent contributions, he touched upon various 
issues pertinent to history of slavery and liberation movement, national 
identity, African solidarity, as well as aggressively engaged his 
political opponents. Concurrently, a set of highly visible domestic 
intellectuals and political leaders fleshed out Mbeki‘s vision of social 
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purpose both in ANC Today and Umrabulo.
44
 The head of the 
Government Communication and Information Service (GCIS) Joel 
Netshitenzhe and the Minister of Arts and Culture Z. Pallo Jordan—
Mbeki‘s key supporters—headed Umrabulo‘s editorial board. The 
journal also frequently gave the tribune to the Health Minister Manto 
Tshabalala-Msimang to defend her controversial health policies. Eddy 
Maloka, the Executive Director of Africa Institute of South Africa and 
the President of the African Association of Political Science (AAPS) 
also published frequently in Umrabulo. The journal‘s notable rubric 
―Celebrating our heritage‖ recurrently explained what political actions 
reflect the notion of indigenousness best and thus have to be nurtured. 
The ANC‘s first attempt to publicly promoting the rhetoric of 
African Renaissance was the discussion at the Foundation for Global 
Dialogue (FGD). Although many notable and influential public figures 
(including Moeletsi Mbeki) presented very engaging occasional 
papers, this discussion was a false start. The ensuing large-scale 
―African Renaissance‖ conference in Johannesburg turned out to be 
way more decisive initiative in influencing the national political 
environment. This conference was promoted by the President‘s Office 
and gave a forum for more than 400 participants to formulate what it 
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meant to apply the principles of African Renaissance to culture, 
education, science, technology, media and telecommunications, 
territorial divisions inside the continent. A year later, in 1999, the 
thirty best contributions made it to a book entitled African 
Renaissance: The New Struggle.
45
 Beyond the scholastic discussion, 
the conference allegedly provided an intellectual foundation for the 
broad social movement to ―reawaken‖ the continent. Simultaneously, 
the President‘s Office launched the African Renaissance Institute 
(ARI) to coordinate the South African Chapter of the African 
Renaissance (SACAR), one of many across the continent.  
 The launch of the Native Club in May 2006 was another 
attempt to promote African Renaissance and bring together its major 
acolytes. Although initially the Club tried to be elitist and operate 
without much press coverage, South African newspapers came to view 
the Native Club as an ANC project.
46
 This view seems to be 
warranted: the Club was in part sponsored by the Department of Arts 
and Culture (DAC) and lead by Mbeki‘s senior political advisor Titus 
Mafolo as its Founding Chairperson and RS Roberts as its media spin-
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doctor. The tasks of the Club were rather extensive: it was supposed to 
develop a progressive force to sustain the African Renaissance, 
countervail the multiplying domestic critics, shape and define South 
African nation and African identity, revive indigenous African cultural 
values and spirituality. Mafolo directly asserted that the Club‘s goal 
was to stimulate those discursive resources, which would reflect the 
notion of indigenousness and embed it among wider audiences: 
 [The Club] …aims to mobilise South Africans to ensure 
that the ideas, philosophies, values and knowledge that 
propel society in a particular direction reflect the 
indigenous (italics added.—VK) identity of our people. We 
seek to strengthen our democratic order by interrogating 
the philosophical framework within which we produce 
knowledge and within which certain ideas have become 
entrenched and dominant in our society. This is particularly 
critical because today, blacks in South Africa are 
responsible for around only 15% of knowledge 
production.
47
 
Predictably, the ANC-sponsored journal Umrabulo favorably 
covered the Club‘s mission and agenda for action. Yet the mainstream 
post-colonial intellectuals and mass media brutally clobbered it as 
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divisive and shallow.
48
 Overall, by the late 1990s and early 2000s 
talking and writing about the African Renaissance became an industry 
in itself,
 
as it included numerous conferences, publications, and special 
journals [most notably African Renaissance, Rootz].
49
 The Cabinet 
also used the services of some domestic spin-doctors: most notoriously 
Ronald Suresh Roberts with his Fit to Govern: The Native Intelligence 
of Thabo Mbeki.
 
Similarly, the Office of the President helped create 
the Moral Regeneration Movement (MRM) to mobilize a broad mass 
movement on order, propagate the spirit of ubuntu, restore the moral 
fiber of the society, and preserve South African national heritage.
50
   
In as much as they tapped into very broad and malleable principles, 
these initiatives signal that the process of embedding was successfully 
triggered. On balance, however, Mbeki and his supporters failed to 
dominate domestic media and turn them into the effective propagators 
of their vision of common good. The elite‘s bitterness toward the non-
supportive media is best captured in the 2007 ANC discussion 
document entitled ―The RDP of the Soul:‖ ―The transformation of our 
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country can be inhibited by the negative attitudes, news items, editing, 
illustrations and advertisements in the media. The media can be 
subjugated to portraying western oppressive values, instead of the 
liberating values of ubuntu thinking.‖51  As a result, despite the fact 
that articulated audience turned the African Renaissance into a 
noticeable and well-received notion in general, they failed to explain 
the ensuing political benefits.   
 
Indigenousness: return to the roots   
The 2002 National Conference in Stellenbosch specified various 
aspects of indigenousness and promoted it for the further political 
development. It resolved to develop indigenous sports as part of nation 
building and the African Renaissance, protect cultural heritage  as part 
of a major contribution to the South African national identity, develop 
heritage sites to enroot historical memory at local level, promote the 
Indigenous Knowledge Systems as a part of the national 
transformation process and as an integral part of continental 
solidarity.
52
 September 2007 was named the Heritage Month.
53
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Another way to stress indigenousness as a core component of 
social purpose was in the creation of national parks as natural wonders, 
cradles of the humankind, representing a deep connection to nature 
that Europeans have lost long time ago.
54
  Newly created collective 
spaces of memory stood for South African indigenousness and visibly 
represented its inherent values for every inhabitant of the country. 
Promoting education and business tourism was envisioned as yet 
another way to reach out to wider audiences and popularize African 
traditional culture. Among all these activities, Moral Regeneration 
Movement (MRM), first led by Deputy President Zuma and then by 
his successor Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, overtly aimed to create ―a 
national consciousness‖ and national identity compatible with the 
value of indigenousness.
55
     
While there is a strong identity connotation inbuilt in all three 
components of national purpose, indigenousness is of special 
importance. This component of common good is pinned on the 
worthiness of creative and unique self, and stands in opposition to the 
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Settler Other, who does not believe that [South] Africa can offer 
anything of significance and value to the world.  The common theme 
revolves around the thesis of two irreconcilable nations, each 
embodying the opposite values.  In this context, indigenousness got 
treated as the core marker of South African ingenuity, a major defining 
characteristic of [South] Africans, and a corner stone of their 
identity.
56
 The general sense of the Other as an Afro-pessimist is 
captured in Mbeki‘s diatribe against distant, aloof and cynical 
observers, ―laughing‖ at the prospects of an African Renewal.57 
Presidential spokesperson Mukoni Ratshitanga in 2007 argued that 
despite the efforts of successive colonial and apartheid regimes to 
obliterate the African cultural milieu, the values of traditional culture 
―served both as a shield and weapon of struggle.‖58 Yet the Other is 
constantly on the offensive. According to Pitika Ntuli, the Director of 
the African Renaissance Institute at the University of Durban-
Westville, the Eurocentric knowledge not only continues to dominate 
in the African sciences, culture and education, but also keeps 
suggesting that African is incapable of formulating its own knowledge 
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systems.
59
 Importantly, indigenousness is cast not in ethnic or racial 
terms, but rather as a conscious cultural choice based on learning and 
commitment: 
...Africanness in neither a pure matter of pigmentation, nor 
a question of geographical or ethnic belonging. ...it is a 
cultural choice and commitment, something which is 
acquired, gained, a matter of deep feeling and concrete 
behaviour ...everybody who feels our continent in the depth 
of her or his soul and in each beat of her or his heart, can 
legitimately be considered an African.
60
 
Yet, at least until 2003 the official rendition of self/other 
dynamic remained rather ambivalent in terms of who can be 
included/excluded. Obviously, not everybody was convinced with this, 
yet the major themes were articulated and promoted in a very clear 
manner.
61
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Marketization as the economic empowerment 
There were a lot of intentional activities to make marketization 
publicly legitimate and popular. According to Maloka, various talks 
and discussions revolving around the notion occurred very regularly 
on the radio stations, television, newspapers and magazines. The high-
ranked Professional Managing Review (PMR) bestows an ―African 
Renaissance Award‖ to businesses supposedly successful in 
contributing to the black economic empowerment.
62
 More generally, 
the corporate sector widely uses the notions of African Renaissance 
and ubuntu in order to make products more attractive and to embed 
marketization strategies as the way of doing business.
 
Two astute 
observers of South African economy Hein Marais and David 
McDonald provide crucial evidence that academics and business 
leaders in South Africa have been aggressively promoting ubuntu as a 
home-grown management philosophy since the early 1990s, arguing 
that it leads to better corporate governance and social responsibility 
while at the same time safeguarding market economy.
 
Marais noted 
―[m]otivational speakers and consultants, corporate human resource 
planners and advertising agencies eagerly assimilate[d]‖ the 
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authentically African concept of ubuntu and African Renaissance to 
talk about South African capitalism.
63
 
There is a strong identity connotation inbuilt in marketization 
as well. As a core component of national purpose, marketization is 
pinned on self, who can provide for himself/herself, and rejects both 
exploitation and redistribution as practices, which deny a South 
African the well-deserved subjectivity and autonomy.
64
 The Other 
claims that a South African is hostile to market principles and is 
unable to sustain himself/herself economically.
65
 The Afro-pessimists 
want the government to deliver, thus implying that African people 
themselves are incapable of dealing with the pressing local problems. 
Mbeki mocked the proponents of these ideas as follows: 
…they join the chorus which reinforces that notion that 
government has legitimacy only to the extent that it 
delivers. We have a place in society only because we have 
the miraculous power to deliver. … I am the Deliverer and 
none exists but I. Cursed are those who worship at the feet 
of idols, because it is I and only I, the democratic state, that 
will deliver you from your misery! And so you and I can 
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see these masses at the feet of the Deliverer, hands held out 
in supplication, incarnating in unison - Deliverer, deliver! 
…magnanimous Deliverer who has an exclusive obligation 
to see to the improvement of the conditions of life of the 
passive recipient whose only task is to say - give me more! 
Give me more!
66
 
Recently Pretoria continued its efforts to embed marketization 
among wider audiences and pitched itself as an inventor of the unusual 
and morally superior business practices. Most notably, many high-
powered politicians such as Mlambo-Ngcuka and Jordan explicitly 
claimed that South Africa became fully committed to stable and 
market-friendly values.
 67
 This type of embedding marketization was 
also used by the lower-level bureaucrats as well. The Minister of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism Marthinus van Schalkwyk pushed 
this line of argumentation further, asserting that South Africa ―fused 
African wisdom with Western business, to offer Business Unusual to 
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the world.‖68 The link between ubuntu and marketization allegedly had 
an impact on the ways South African corporations and private sector in 
general conducted business in the country.
69
 
In sum, with Mbeki‘s ascension to the presidency, promoting 
marketization in the context of traditional African values became a 
clear political trend and overall contributed to the growth of neoliberal 
thinking in South Africa.
70
 After some of these aggressive and visible 
leftist forces were sidelined and some of them actually converted to 
marketization, the resistance to marketization significantly 
weakened.
71
 However, there are a lot of the leftist academics and 
journalists, who continue a heated attack on the public commitment to 
marketization. They keep predicting economic collapse and broad 
social distress, caused by the commitment to economic orthodoxy and 
economic globalization for South Africa.
72
 Although the government 
chose to play serious attention to this critique, in the long-term period 
this may undermine the degree to which marketization is imbued in 
South African policy environment. 
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Ubuntu in the context of globalization 
Publications streamlining and valorizing the African intellectual 
traditions contributed to the popularity of ubuntu as a legitimate 
notion. Notably, these publications treated any authentic tradition, 
produced in other African countries and historical periods as an 
equally important, of not integral, part of South African heritage. This 
way of embedding included newly produced discourses about the 
canonic cultural landmarks for African Renaissance, including The 
Subtle Power of Intangible Heritage (2204), The Meaning of Timbuktu 
by Jeppie and Diagne (2008), The African Intellectuals in the 19 and 
20
th
 centuries, as presented by Mcebisi Ndletyana (2008), and The 
Deaths of Hintsa by Premesh Lalu (2009), among others. The Human 
Sciences Research Council (HSRC) and the Council for the 
Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) were 
the most important centers propagating continental solidarity and 
common intellectual tradition as part of African Renaissance. Their 
publications can be seen as inventing the tradition and reappropriating 
history--creating the image of incredibly rich and resourceful yet 
untapped past, similarly to what the Renaissance Europe did to the its 
Greek antiquity.   
254 
 
In all this, one common theme contrasted European and 
African programs of Renaissance. In Europe the development of the 
Renaissance knowledge and technology was employed as means of 
subjugation and allowed Europeans to conquer Africa. Moreover, 
today‘s continuing Western superiority in technology and economic 
development perpetuates the new Global apartheid. In contrast, 
African Renaissance is based ubuntu and embraced human solidarity. 
In his September 2007 lecture delivered on the occasion of the 30th 
anniversary of the death of Steve Bantu Biko, Mbeki actively built on 
Biko‘s anti-western Pan-Africanism and extensively quoted him. 
Mbeki borrowed Biko‘s core point about the irreconcilable differences 
with the West: 
We reject the power-based society of the Westerner that 
seems to be ever concerned with perfecting their 
technological know-how while losing out on their spiritual 
dimension. We believe that in the long run the special 
contribution to the world by Africa will be in this field of 
human relationships. The great powers of the world may 
have done wonders in giving the world an industrial and 
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military look, but the great gift still has to come from 
Africa – giving the world a more human face.73 
This theme essentially revealed the self-other dynamic. In this 
context, ubuntu was pinned on mentally and spiritually liberated self, 
whose Other crusaded for the ―mental colonization‖ and acted on the 
inherent racism. The external Other have perpetuated the negative 
construction of a South African and denies him/her a human dignity 
and subjectivity.  According to Mbeki, ―frightening images of 
savagery that attend the continent of Africa‖ span over millennia and 
had to be confronted head on.
74
  Pretoria presented political turmoil in 
the continent, its violent conflicts, and even the scourge of HIV/AIDS 
and various natural disasters as obstacles to be overcome, much like 
European Renaissance rose above political fragmentation, armies of 
mercenaries, Black Death and climatic instabilities.
75
  
The more assertive formulation of acting on ubuntu in the 
context of globalization implies South Africa‘s role in fighting western 
neocolonialism (liberal imperialism) as its principal Other. The new 
South Africa has to be protected by exposing the legacies of racialism, 
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oppression and domination, continuing to thrive in the global arena. 
One particular policy implication, which damaged Mbeki‘s 
international reputation, was Pretoria‘s support and regional solidarity 
with Robert Mugabe‘s Zimbabwe. His disastrous land reforms were 
interpreted as a bold opposition to the new global apartheid 
unwelcomed by the former colonial powers.
 
 The most warranted 
argument indicates that the South Africa support of Mugabe was 
prompted by falling for Harare‘s duplicitous discursive resistance 
against the legacy of colonialism, in which context the Western 
critique was no more than a typical imperialist double-faced 
opprobrium for daring to confront the enduring inequalities of the 
colonial era and the continuing Western presence in Africa.
76 
   
The sense of historical proportions and the value attached 
to the continental solidarity is best demonstrated in Mbeki‘s then 
political adviser Vusi Maviembela‘s article, which described the 
―African Renaissance‖ as a defining ―third moment‖ in Africa‘s 
post-colonial history comparable with decolonization and the 
democratic transitions as the first and the second moments, 
respectively.
77
  As Mavimbela explained: 
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The raison d‘être for a renaissance in the African continent 
is the need to empower African peoples to deliver 
themselves from the legacy of colonialism and neo-
colonialism and to situate themselves on the global stage as 
equal and respected contributors to as well as beneficiaries 
of all the achievements of human civilization. Just as the 
continent was once a cradle of humanity and an important 
contributor to civilization, this renaissance should 
empower it to help the world rediscover the oneness of the 
human race.
78
  
 
 
AFRICAN RENAISSANCE IN COLLECTIVE ARTICULATIONS    
Examining collective articulations is the third step in ascertaining 
whether or not a certain conception of common good becomes truly 
legitimate and embedded among the wider domestic audiences.  For 
the strong and consolidated social purpose it is essential that the elite-
driven notions of indigenousness, marketization, and ubuntu are 
congruent (or compatible) with the imageries spread in popular 
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culture. In this section I spell out how public culture discursively 
supported the core components of South African social purpose. 
I have selected fiction as the source of recovering the collective 
level of articulation. First and foremost, South African popular fiction 
has long operated in what can be described as a ―politically demanding 
milieu‖ and thus is well-suited to deal with restructuring of African 
identities, as Michael Chapman claims in his very important and 
multidimensional treatise of the contemporary state of popular culture 
in South Africa.
79
 Historically, the importance of South African 
literature for politics is based on a strong and acclaimed tradition of 
JM Coetzee, Nadine Gordimer, André Brink, Breyten Breytenbach and 
others, who purposefully concentrated on exposing the inhumanities of 
apartheid. With the end of apartheid, the literature of South Africa 
became more diverse and is not organized around a single overarching 
narrative and one explicit set of political goals. The lack of a single 
political focus in the post-apartheid fiction justifies treating the South 
African writing as a good expresser of independent public culture, 
rather than a set of conscious attempts of influencing the policy 
environment.  The new wave of politically concerned prose billowed 
with an abundance of the post-apartheid communal, autobiographical, 
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and confessional writing.
80
 The authors came from all walks of life, 
ranging from the former victims Nelson Mandela (Long Walk to 
Freedom) and Mamphela Ramphele (A Life, 1995) to the former 
―oppressors‖, including a prison warden James Gregory (Goodbye 
Bafana: Nelson Mandela, My Prisoner, My Friend) and a security 
police spy Mark Behr (The Smell of Apples, 1995).
81
 Memoir as a 
genre in often said to have both the healing, therapeutic, 
transformative role and the one capable of bringing the nation to the 
roots, grappling with legacies of oppression and imagining new 
political and cultural identities.
82
 Memoires, however, are outside the 
scope of my inquiry here. 
The biggest objection for using South African literature as a 
truly collective articulation of social purpose and identity can be 
leveled by those literary critics, who argue that only the original 
writing styles and indigenous languages—yet not codified and 
developed for the desired scientific and cultural revival—can be true 
expressers of the indigenousness and Africanness.
83
 The most rigorous 
proponents of African Renaissance infallibly claim that ―by default 
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privileged English‖ should be abolished as Africa‘s lingua franca as it 
sneaks in the colonial consciousness, heritage of imperialism and 
domination, and  thus fosters ‗parrot culture,‘ not genuine creativity.84 
Yet iconic Ngugi wa Thiongo, Chinua Achebe, Zakes Mda and others 
write in English. Ironically, literatures written not in the indigenous 
languages can transcend the artificially imposed divisions among 
ethnic groups and languages, thus truly contributing to the African 
renewal.
85
  
Others might extol the rich oral tradition, the indigenous 
African theatre, and celebration and festivities customs to suggest the 
pathways for the African post-colonial reconstruction and indigenous 
revival.
86
 Githae Mugo approvingly recalls Kenyan experiment in 
removing the English (British colonial) literature from the curriculum 
and replacing it with studying African orature.
 87
  These two genres, 
however, are typically best operating inside smaller local communities, 
rather than imagined ones.   
In general, because the contemporary South African literature 
is highly politicized and has stimulated a significant body of political 
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commentaries it fits the purposes of my discussion. The way literary 
masters portray politically sensitive themes attracts a lot of attention in 
the South African literary commentary. Thus, South African fiction 
has stimulated a significant body of public interpretations, often 
spilling over to the academic journals (Cultural Critique, Modern 
Fiction Studies, Research in African Literatures, Journal of Southern 
African Studies, Journal of Modern Literature, African Studies, and 
Third World Quarterly, to name the main ones). This dissertation 
judiciously uses secondary commentaries as evidence of how wider 
audiences reflect major political themes, as opposed to relying solely 
on my own rendition.  
  
Indigenousness: return to the roots   
The stress on indigenousness is perhaps best captured in the revival of 
the previously subjugated literary forms, including praise poetry, and 
incorporating some forms and themes from African oral traditions of 
fairy tale-telling —purportedly standing in a stark contrast to what the 
Western fiction writers consider appropriate. The second stress is to 
give voice to the previously silenced people. 
First, the academic literary criticism often claims that the 
resurgent genre of fairy tale-telling (under the more common title 
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―magical realism‖) and its growing popularity are crucial 
characteristics of contemporary South African writing. The rise of 
magical realism in the present-day literature ostensibly returns the 
country‘s westernized (and hence colonialist) fiction to the authentic 
oral tradition of African story-telling practices and also compensates 
for the lack of fiction in the native languages. (This perhaps alleviates 
concerns of the wide-spread use of colonial English as lamented by the 
African Renaissance purists).
88
  The South African fantastic tales are 
decidedly unique and by no means simply emulate of the western-style 
fantasy a-la JRR Tolkien, Poul Anderson, Robert Howard, or George 
Martin—with their highly stylized European pre-Renaissance setting. 
On the contrary, the genre is imbued with very distinct African values 
and sensibilities, including the resistance to colonialist assertions of 
possessing the ultimate truth and knowledge. Among many authors 
writing in this genre, the work of Brink is viewed especially 
favorably.
89
 While Brink used the elements of the genre in the 1980s 
(consider for instance his The Chain of Voices and On the Contrary), 
he fully committed to the magic realism in his post-apartheid writings.  
Second, Andre Brink defined the purpose of post-apartheid 
fiction as to imagine and represent those private historical experiences 
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and public ―regions of the past,‖ which had been silenced before and 
yet remain pivotal to the future of the nation.
90
 Establishing the 
continuity with the pre-apartheid past and giving the voice to the 
previously silenced people (natives) helps restoring the worthiness of 
creative and unique indigenous self. The metaphor of being silenced 
previously was best expressed in Coetzee‘s Foe—the postmodern 
remake of Robinson Crusoe—in which the white settler cuts out 
Friday‘s tongue to keep his subjugated native mute. On a side note, 
mutilation is a common trope of subjugation in Brink‘s The Other Side 
of Silence.  
In the post-apartheid writing, characters tend to act on the 
notion of going back to the roots in order to heal themselves, as well as 
immerse into the recollection of history -- along very personal lines. 
Often the focus is placed not the nation on the whole, but rather on a 
particular community or individuals (KhoiKhoi in Brink‘s case, Xhosa 
and Zulu in Mda‘s writings).  Most whites, males or females, young or 
elderly, are doomed without this return. The list of ―doomed‖ 
characters includes Reuben Olivier in The Rights of Desire, Ouma 
Kristina in Imaginings of Sand, semi-fictional Coetzee in Boyhood, 
delusional David Lurie of Disgrace, and depressed Adam Napier of 
The Impostor. Even if the characters are not ―doomed,‖ they retreat in 
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self-absorption, soul-searching, and gloomy reflexivity. Disgrace‘s 
protagonist David Lurie escapes realities of everyday by writing about 
Lord Byron‘s life on an Italian villa, Ouma Kristina is tracing their 
Afrikaner family‘s genealogical lineage through the centuries and 
totally immersed in remembering, Galgut‘s Dr. Frank Eloff retreats to 
the rural South Africa, while disillusioned about the purpose of life.   
It underscores those personal experiences which transcend the 
divisions of defined by any rigid political, cultural and social 
boundaries.
91
 Brink‘s Imaginings of Sand and The Other Side of 
Silence (2002) offer a rich and multidimensional view of settlers‘ story 
plentiful of hardships and injustices. In his novels, settlers do not 
travel the mythologized Boers‘ Great Trek to glory, prosperity and 
political power. Instead, subjugated women in South-West Africa tread 
a miserable passage to more hard labor, aggravated by cruelties 
inflicted on them by other settlers. Once truly transplanted into the 
local ways of life, the settlers obtain psychological strength to counter 
the injustices inflicted on them. Africa gives prospects of liberation 
and finding a new home to all oppressed. In this word, indigenous 
medicine generates miracles and heals the impossible terminal 
wounds, brings back to life a mutilated protagonist and gives her 
powers to fight back.  
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This rendition support the idea that it is not the race, or place of 
birth that defines who is native and who is settler. The principal theme 
asserts a clear articulation of deep human solidarity and the profound 
sense of belonging that transcends the rigid political boundaries. Many 
popular novels register the uneasiness of relationship between different 
races and ethnicities, both in historical and contemporary perspective. 
According to Rastogi, this pessimism stands in a stark contrast with 
the writer‘s apartheid-era anticipation for racial harmony and cultural 
reconciliation to be achieved after the successful liberation struggle.
92
 
At the same time, many commentators contended that the central 
question of the white writing concerned the role that whites must play 
in the new nation, suggesting the mutual responsibility for the national 
destiny and the mutual responsibility for its past.
93
 Thus, on balance, 
the literature eschews direct politicization of race, class or ethnicity 
and instead enables more creative and subtle ―refashioning of 
identities.‖ 94 South African fiction seems not to base true nativism 
simply on the pigmentation of the skin, but rather link it to the distinct 
sensibilities and the ability to reflect on the meaning of the past. No 
person can be automatically considered a native as perhaps the idea of 
the Rainbow Nation for the inclusive national identity did.  
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The vices of marketization in South African writing 
In The Heart of Redness Zakes Mda uses the image of Casino as a 
symbol of marketization, global capitalism and a threat to the 
traditional way of life. This is one of the commanding illustrations that 
popular culture reflected the notion of marketization in a very 
unfavorable manner.
95
 
In the previous subsection I mentioned that Mda represented 
historical breakdown of the Xhosa community in relation to their 
attitudes to Nongqawuse‘s prophesy. In today‘s context, the challenges 
to the Xhosa survival, unity and distinctiveness are embodied by the 
spread of global capitalism and its adoption in the form of an 
international casino and resorts in South Africa. Schatteman explains 
that ―the opposing camps are resurrected in the conflict between those 
who see the casino as a threat to traditional life and culture and those 
who welcome the move towards progress and western capitalism.‖96 
This, this disagreement and conflict about marketization is essentially 
a marker of new identity conflicts, which potentially can undermine a 
building of a new South Africa. Contrary to the official rendition of 
ubuntu-inspired marketization in the post-apartheid setting, their 
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dismissal of native customs disempowers the local community and 
may revive neo-colonialism.
97 
  
 In Slaves, Rings and Rubbish (1995), Martin Hall bluntly 
thickens the negative representation of capitalism. His plot contrasts 
two characters, whose clash demonstrates the profound gulf between 
the value of nativism and marketization, and even the overt danger 
marketization presents to indigenousness. One main character (John 
Berg) is interested in historical artifacts and historical sites both for 
their own artistic sake and as the way they reconnect him to his 
family‘ past in particular and the country‘s heritage in general. To him, 
valuable artifacts become a source of pride, emotion and stimulate a 
strong sense of belonging. Another character (Sterling Wolff) simply 
treats historical artifacts as commodities to acquire a personal wealth 
and status—all this ―decontextualizes these artifacts and strips them of 
their connections to individual family histories.‖98 His unscrupulous 
decorum and obsessive profit-seeking end him up in jail.   
The author, no doubt, implies a very negative attitude to the 
principle of marketization. Of course, it would be warranted to like 
Berg and dislike Wolff as particular individuals with particular set of 
personal characteristics, just as the author intended. Yet the broader 
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message gives no clues how to delineate between successful, hard-
working entrepreneurs and dishonest businesspeople, while blending 
these two distinctive images together. Perhaps, the author shows that 
the profit-seeking behavior always results in the predatory, neo-
colonial disrespect for the native customs and heritage. 
More generally, probing the place of the wealthy in South 
African writing is often imbued with the suspicion and revile towards 
those who had achieved personal financial success of major 
proportion. The work of Ahmed Essop, for instance, reveals the 
popular suspicion against the wealthy entrepreneurs, especially of 
Indian origin. Commentaries of Essop‘s stories contend that Indian 
success and wealth is portrayed as being built on the exploitation of 
black people.
 99
 The financial success of the fictional Mr. Khamsin is 
perpetuating both the class-based structure of society and the 
apartheid-era stereotypes of what it means to be an African (indolent) 
and an Indian (hard-working).  
The goals of personal enrichment have strong negative 
repercussions to the democratic of the new South Africa. Essop‘s 
protagonist courts democratic leaders only to rip greater profits from 
this connection, just as he had done under the apartheid rule.  The 
imperative of economic success at any cost implies that the wealthy 
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elude any strong circles of allegiances, even loyalties to their own 
(Indian Muslim friends in Mr. Khamsin‘s case). More alarmingly, in 
The Third Prophesy Mr. Khamsin is anticipated to become the next 
President as opposed to his more likeable friend, Mr. Khan, who was 
demoted from being in charge of the Ministry of Education to be in 
charge of prisons.  
On balance, contemporary South African literature writing 
develops the notion that the political stress on marketization empowers 
wrong people and is not conducive to the empowerment of all South 
Africans as officially intended.  In the popular literature marketization 
is used as marker not of economic empowerment, but rather as one of 
the most profound factors, stimulating the further rifts among South 
Africa‘s multiple ethnic groups, between privileged few and alienated 
many. Thus, the commitment to marketization may endanger the 
national future. 
  
Ubuntu in the context of globalization 
As I have argued in the first section, the South African political elite 
considered ubuntu —the third component of the African 
Renaissance—in two particular segments. First, the contemporary 
South African writing directly exposes the incompatibility of the 
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Western and Native ways of life and strongly implies the necessity of 
rejecting the western values for the personal liberation. Second, the 
South African commitment and openness to the human solidarity is 
also expressed in the detailed and highly emotional accounts of the 
moral regeneration achieved against the backdrop of the untamed 
wave of crime. Authors demonstrate the strong human potential to 
emphasize and combat the profound moral decay. 
The general theme demonstrating the incompatibility of South 
Africa and the west has abundant coverage in the contemporary South 
African literature. In Brink‘s novels the encounters between the native 
(Khoi) self and the Other (alien Portuguese, English, German travelers 
and settlers) generate linguistic, religious, and physical conflicts. In his 
Cape of Storm: The First Life of Adamastor (1993), it is not only the 
different languages that drive the native and the settlers apart, but the 
physical differences as well. The whole story revolves around the 
African chief T‘Kama‘s lust towards a Portuguese shipwoman, which 
he is not able to consummate. None of the traditional healing practices 
and medicines proved even remotely helpful; they inflicted more 
physical pain. Thus, this incommensurable relationship remained more 
of a notion than actuality, as the physical contact was facilitated by an 
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artificial organ.
100
  From the plot it is not even clear whether the 
Portuguese woman was remotely interested in connecting with the 
African protagonist, while the native chief definitely tried to make an 
effort throughout the whole narrative. This suggests indigenous 
openness to universal human solidarity, as well as its undesirability 
and impossibility for West. 
 The difference in destinies of the western invaders/settlers and 
the natives is demonstrated by their involvement in religion. 
Religiosity is the focal point of the life of Cupido Cockroach, the main 
protagonist of Praying Mantis (2004), a fictional KhoiKhoin of the 
XIXth century with some real historical prototype.
101
 Once his luck in 
hunting the elephants wanes, he abandons the local god Heitsi-Eibib 
and becomes an ardent follower and aggressive proselyte of the 
Christian faith. He sees the Western God as compatible with and even 
superior to the gods of his own. For a considerable portion of Cupido‘s 
life, his religious conversion reconciles him with settlers and makes 
him a respected member of Christian community. Yet, despite his 
extended self-sacrificing service in the harshest desert, he got relieved 
of his ministerial duties immediately after the traveling inspector had 
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realized Cupido‘s useless in his narrow instrumental function in 
converting other natives. As he belongs to a different race, white 
preachers suspect that Cupido has not fully abandoned the gods of his 
past and reject him. In the end he switches back to Tsui-Goab, 
Gaunab, and Heitsi-Eibib and spiritually reconnects to the native way 
of life. Just like Adamastor, this story suggests the possibility of the 
utilitarian and transient coexistence between natives and settlers, rather 
than productive Western impact on the South Africa.    
It appears that the penetration of the West not only imposes the 
injustices, but also brings the worst out of the local individuals, and 
profoundly splits South African communities along various lines.  
Karen Press‘s Hidden Histories and Zakes Mda‘s The Heart of 
Redness both center on the major traumatic event in Xhosa history. In 
the XIXth century, Nongqawuse gave a prophesy that the massive 
cattle-killing as an offer for the Xhosa ancestral spirits would be an 
appropriate way to defeat the British colonial order.  Hidden Histories 
implied that while prophesies were normal and authentic, British were 
able to abuse it as a war trick, causing major famine among the Xhosa.
  
As many Xhosa today share this explanation, this account of the events 
is more congruent to the official stress on the role of the Western 
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influence.
102
 In The Heart of Redness, the prophesy generates a deep 
gulf between the Xhosa who believed in the traditional practices (the 
Believers) and those who rejected them outright (the Unbelievers). As 
the story goes, the split between the two factions would remain 
unabated through the present day, reinforcing the conflicts and 
misunderstanding in the community.
103
  The Unbelievers become 
ultimately a brooding and negative faction:  
Unbelievers are reputed to be such somber people that they 
do not believe in those things that can bring happiness to 
their lives. They spend most of their time moaning about 
past injustices and bleeding for the world would have 
been…104  
Another broad discursive formation of the South Africa‘s 
fiction explores the untamed wave of crime and post-apartheid 
violence, overwhelming the country. Damon Galgut‘s The Quarry 
(1995), Zakes Mda‘s Ways of Dying (1995), Mike Nicol‘s Horseman 
(1996), Sindiwe Magona‘s Mother to Mother (1998), and Mandla 
Langa‘s The Memory of Stones (2000), are the prime examples of this 
discursive stream.  The Memory of Stones described the emergence of 
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new solidarity in response to violence among black South Africans in 
KwaZulu-Natal, gangster crime, and political terrorism (from all sides) 
during and immediately after the apartheid.
105
 Similarly, Mother to 
Mother explores how to survive the violence and abuse during the 
transition years.
106
    Some literary critics still accuse the white writing 
of racial stereotyping and depicting violence in such a way that 
relieves whites of responsibility for their apartheid crimes. Disgrace 
and Horseman are often cited as prime examples of this stream. Chait 
asserts that Nicol suggests the universality of evil and thus ―the very 
banality of South Africa‘s particular white brand of horror.‖107 The 
apartheid ―apocalypse‖ is predetermined and reflects the will of God 
and is not so different from other historically recorded genocides.   
  Acknowledging these specific claims about the pessimist 
politics of white writing, and the fact that this topic warrants a very 
pessimistic rendition of the role of ubuntu in contemporary 
circumstances, writers‘ strong emphasis is on the mourning, which is 
depicted as a unique method of demonstrating the humanness, 
compassion and therefore a fundamental commonality of all people. 
Ways of Dying is a case in point. The book received a sharp 
politicized critique for making intra-ethnic violence and the crime 
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wave a focal point of critical scrutiny, as opposed to showing how 
local white and multinational capital created the black bourgeoisie and 
perpetuated the subaltern black underclass.
 108
 Yet Mda‘s central point 
is about the healing function of mourning as a form of showing 
empathy, a form of practicing ubuntu. According to Durrant,  
…the kind of communion produced by death might bind us 
together not by the operation of ideology, not by an 
exclusionary appeal to sameness of race, nationality or 
class, but by an appeal to our own otherness, to our own 
difference from ourselves. One might say that we are 
bound together by our recognition of our own death in the 
death of others: their death performs, enacts or even mimes 
our own death. At a basic level, funerals perform a mimetic 
function: the body to be buried or burnt or left to rot mimes 
what will eventually happen to our own bodies.
109
 
There are also some stand alone examples of ubuntu in South 
African fiction. Coetzee occupies a special place in this context, as his 
writings often defy an easy interpretation and provide a difficult read. 
Elizabeth Costello—a character appearing in his several novels— is a 
chief protagonist in The Life of Animals. She takes the notion of 
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ubuntu one step further as she asserts very primal sense of belonging 
and extends the notion of humanness to animals. In her fictional 
lectures she critiques our innate feeling of human superiority over 
animals and even the notion of ecology as the science of domination 
over the non-human life.
110
 Coetzee depicts Costello as always 
travelling, always trying to disseminate her sensibilities across the 
globe, which shows the universal appeal and moral fiber of ubuntu.  
 
CONCLUSION: RANKING NATIONAL PURPOSE 
South African political elite strongly expressed its commitment to 
African Renaissance as the conception of common good, while 
domestic articulated audience was very active in outreaching its 
components to wider audiences. At the same time, public culture 
strongly supported a dominant articulation of common good, including 
two out of three substantive components (excluding marketization). 
On balance, throughout Mbeki‘s presidency, at the very least, one-
party dominance suggests a power-based consensus, which may be 
more temporary in nature, but nevertheless very informative for the 
study how the domestic policy environment underpins certain kinds of 
policy choices. This type of consensus emerges when one sub-elite 
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group strongly espouses a conception of common good and is able to 
act on and enforce it. At the same time, wider audiences might 
inherently disagree with the promoted conception of common good, 
but for a variety of reasons might conform to it and if chooses to 
dispute it publicly, does so in a very subdued manner. At the margins, 
other sub-elite groups and political parties keep advocating radically 
different set of political obligations, engrained in a different set of 
values. The summary characteristics of South African national 
purpose are provided below:  
Table 5.1 Indicators of national purpose 
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CHAPTER 6. HIV/AIDS POLICY IN RUSSIA 
 
In the early 2000s in Russia the rates of the HIV infection grew 
exponentially, exacerbating the perceived demographic crisis. At the 
same time, an incredible success in curbing the pandemic across the 
globe proved that the international take on the HIV/AIDS treatment 
policy was indeed effective. In 2006 President Vladimir Putin 
discussed the issue of HIV/AIDS at the State Council.
1
 Subsequently, 
Russian political elite actively responded to the challenge.  Many 
domestic and international observers publicly lauded Putin‘s 
acknowledgment of HIV/AIDS as a serious threat to the country. Yet, 
in spending significant amount of efforts and resources to mitigate 
HIV/AIDS, the Kremlin chose to follow the international 
recommendations only selectively. In general, governmental actions 
were marred by only partial, or inefficient, implementation, and 
sometimes by open resistance to critical elements of international 
guidelines and recommendations.    
This chapter argues that Russian HIV/AIDS policies were 
shaped by the deployment of the Sovereign Democracy--the 
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historically contingent and country-specific content of social purpose. 
The most important outcomes of this impact include three broad 
clusters of effects. First, in accordance with the strong state component 
of national purpose, it affected the general political understanding and 
framing of the domestic epidemic and linked it to the highly desired 
demographic security as the major tool in having a strong state; it 
impinged on the human rights principles in providing ARVs to the key 
vulnerable populations as these principles were seen as undermining 
the strong Russian state; politicized and filtered the desirable pool of 
partners, as well as shaped the permissible role of civil society in their 
combat against HIV/AIDS. Second, in accordance with the social 
responsibility component of national purpose, it led to the significant 
increase in public spending for healthcare and infectious diseases and 
efforts at universal and free medical coverage, and shunning the 
private sector as a potential partner.  Third, in accordance with the 
great power component of national purpose, it stimulated the Kremlin 
to act like a donor/leader on the international arena, fend off the 
expertise and resources of well-established international health 
organizations, and attempting to revamp the country‘s position in the 
pharmaceutical markets. 
While there some compelling accounts of Russian HIV/AIDS 
policies, the emphasis on the politically contingent conception of 
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common good as the intervening variable helps providing a more 
encompassing account of adopting international health 
recommendations. The effects of deploying social purpose on the 
domestic HIV/AIDS policies are summarized in the Table 6.1 below.  
 Table 6.1: Summary of the HIV/AIDS policy in Russia 
 
TREATMENT  
Indicator 1a: Epidemic in the context of state weakness 
Russian government did not emphasize the need to respond to the 
epidemic as a serious public health crisis in its own right, instead 
viewing the epidemic in the context of two broader socio-political 
issues. First, HIV/AIDS was linked to the looming demographic 
decline, which was perceived as threatening the power and survival of 
the state.
2
 Second, the Russian government linked the spread of 
HIV/AIDS as a secondary factor almost exclusively to the intravenous 
drug users (IDUs), which legitimized ruling out the human rights 
component of the governmental response.  
The spread of HIV/AIDS was framed in this context as the 
issue of demographic decline and state weakness, rather than an 
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alarming public health crisis in its own right. In the 2003 address to the 
Federal Assembly Putin directly linked the impending consequences of 
the epidemic to the challenges to achieve the strong state. Following 
this address, several high-ranking members of the government, 
including Igor Ivanov (then the Minister of Foreign Affairs) and 
Aleksandr Zhukov (then First Deputy Prime Minister), warned about 
the negative effects of   HIV/AIDS on national security and survival.  
On March 30, 2005, Zhukov indicated that ―[t]he HIV epidemic is far 
more than just a health issue: in the light of [Russia‘s] on-going 
demographic decrease, it presents a serious threat to Russia‘s strategic, 
social, and economic security.‖3  
The notion of the strong state required a strong state solutions. 
In 2005 the Kremlin announced its decision to create a new 
governmental institution under the direct patronage of the President -- 
the Council for the Implementation of National Priority Projects and 
Demographic Politics (CNPPDP). The Council was supposed to 
reverse the adverse demographic tendencies and smartly invest money 
in several critical areas, including health. 
By 2006 Russia got obsessed with pending demographic 
collapse. Even Mikhail Khodorkovsky, writing to the popular 
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newspaper Kommersant-Daily from jail, imagined strong Russian state 
inhabited by 220-230 million people, which meant an increase by 90 
million.
4
 A notable demographer Anatoly Vishnevsky indicated that 
Russian political elite did not perceive the unfolding demographic 
crisis as a long-term consequence of the socialist-era economic 
disproportions. Instead, the mainstream political elite, in accordance 
with the formula of the ―wild 1990s,‖ viewed the demographic decline 
either as the outcome the neoliberal ideology and the state weakness, 
or even as a consequence of purposeful subversive strategies, aiming 
at the reduction of the ―indigenous‖ populations across the globe.5  
More radical politicians and activists made claims that the diminishing 
population of ethnic Russians and the increasing influx of various 
immigrants would undermine the unity of the country and signal its 
end as an autonomous political organization.
6
  
Mikhail Grishankov was one of the most highly visible 
political leaders involved in the fight against HIV/AIDS and publicly 
tying the extant views on national purpose with HIV/AIDS policy. He 
had a KGB background, served as a Deputy of the State Duma, Fist 
Deputy of the State Duma Committee on Security, and later he became 
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Fist Deputy of the Committee on Corruption. In one of his interviews, 
he claimed that AIDS was not only threatening the strength of the 
state, but could have been prevented by maintaining the great power 
status. He offered an instructive phrase that 
…had we foreseen the advent of HIV/AIDS, somebody 
would have thought <about its future repercussions>, 
would not have destroyed the USSR, would have 
maintained the Iron Curtain, and <then> we would have 
had neither narcotic abuse, not AIDS.
7
   
The official statistical data always downplays the rate of HIV 
infection in the country. According to the official estimates, the most 
recent number of people registered as HIV positive reached 370, 000.
8
  
The majority of the estimates provided by the independent from the 
state bureaucracy organizations and experts strongly suggested that the 
actual number of HIV infected population could be as much as 1 
million people or even approaching 1.5 million.
 9
 This discrepancy has 
been always duly noted in the relevant literature, even though not 
given an adequate interpretation.
10
 In essence defending these low 
numbers feeds the unwarranted conviction that the epidemic would 
                                                     
7
 Mikhail Grishankov, Rasprostranenie SPIDa v Rossii: sposobno li gosudarstvo ego 
sderzhivat'. Interview for radio station ―Ekho Moskvy,‖ 12.01.2005. 
8
 Gennady Onishchenko, VICh-politizirovannyj, Rossijskaja gazeta, №3719; 
03.15.2005. 
9
 UNAIDS 2004 : 4 (UNAIDS/04.18E). 
10
 Twigg 2007: 2—4, CIRA 2004. 
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remain limited to some marginalized groups, which in turn gives the 
necessary justification to deploy harsh and repressive measures in 
treating the IDUs. 
As late as in 2009 the majority of state officials, 
acknowledging the unprecedented growth in reported HIV infection, 
failed to learn that it was very likely that the epidemic would soon 
become generalized. Once reaching more than 1% of the general 
population, the epidemic affects a variety of groups.  The references to 
the feminization of the epidemic—as the first signal that it traveled 
beyond the marginal and negatively constructed populations—were 
made only once by the President, and once by the junior member of 
the Federation Council, responsible for health education. In essence, 
Russian policy-makers remained entrenched in old perceptions of the 
pandemic, which associated the disease with the IV drug-users and 
prostitutes as the only vulnerable group. It is not by coincidence that 
Grishankov explained his original motivation behind an aggressive 
bringing of the disease to the fore as follows: 
Working in the commission in my own region, Chelyabinsk 
oblast, I really saw that the problem of drug abuse is very 
closely linked to the problem of HIV/AIDS. And we have to 
acknowledge that today the majority of HIV/AIDS positive 
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people in the country are heroin addicts. Thus, dealing with the 
problems of narcotics, we cannot but deal with the problems of 
HIV/AIDS.
11
  
This dominant theme was extended in the series of official 
assertions that the domestic epidemic was mostly a result of the 
increasing domestic abuse of narcotic substances related to the 
increased harvest of opiates in Afghanistan since the US invasion. 
During the State Duma‘s hearings ―On the causes and consequences of 
the Afghan narco-traffic for the Russian Federation‖ its Speaker Boris 
Gryzlov claimed that Russia entered in the state of war with those who 
spread opiates from Afghanistan as a deliberate strategy to destroy the 
Russian gene pool.
12
 As I will discuss shortly, the top political 
leadership delegated the rights to formulate and implement AIDS 
policy to the law enforcement agencies, most notably to the Federal 
Drug Control Service of the Russian Federation (FSKN).   
In general, sorting the meaning of epidemic through the narrow 
state-centric lenses inhibited the political urgency to combat 
HIV/AIDS as a public health crisis. Russian president Dmitry 
Medvedev, for instance, failed to mention HIV/AIDS as a national 
health crisis even once in all his multiple newspaper and on-line 
                                                     
11
 Mikhail Grishankov,  VICh/SPID: Uroven' Opasnosti, Interview  for radio station 
«RADIO ROSSII», 14.04.2006 
12
Information available at <http://russianews.ru/second/21815/> 
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interviews, as well as speeches addressed to the members of the NPP 
Council. This seems especially strange since in his capacity as First 
Vice Prime-Minister Dmitry Medvedev was de facto in charge of the 
National Priority Projects, including Health. 
 
Indicator 1b: Standardized protocol in treatment 
The Russian government never rejected the life-saving role of ARV in 
fighting HIV/AIDS and in this context its response did not deviate 
from the international consensus on the antiretrovirals. In the early 
2000s Russia used monotherapy (AZT), yet after 2006 the Russian 
government switched to the triple therapy and started its universal 
disbursement.  
Standardized protocol also means the strict adherence to the 
medically prescribed regimen.
13
 The best way to guarantee it is to 
institutionalize orderly and uninterrupted purchase of the appropriate 
line and combination of pharmaceuticals. On the one hand, Russian 
officials tried to enforce a more centralized and transparent mechanism 
of procuring the necessary pharmaceutical products. The centralized 
system of drug procurements and disbursement is consistent both with 
                                                     
13
 Breaching the standardized protocol is dangerous for both HIV-positive patients 
and the general population, as it may lead to the wide-spread resistance to the older 
medicines and the virus mutation. 
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the kind of political environment the social purpose underpins and 
with the international policy consensus. On the other hand, the 
government failed to enforce it. Purchasing the insufficient number of 
therapy components, delays in the drug tenders, intergovernmental 
coordination, and institutional reshuffles endangered the enforcement 
of the standardized protocol.  
 In 2005 the Ministry of Health and Social Development (often 
referred to in an abbreviated form as Rosminzdrav, or 
Minzdravsocrazvitija) and its head Mikhail Zurabov became the 
―favorite‖ target of public scrutiny and criticism. The inefficiency of 
his Ministry was so pervasive and evident that many newspapers 
imbued the reporting on domestic health issues with profuse 
reflections on Zurabov‘s prospective sacking.14 Since in 2006 the state 
became more proactive in public health, all these problems became 
obvious. These and other scandals attested to the state‘s low efficiency 
in procuring the lifesaving medications and perhaps some elements of 
corruption, even though the criminal charges were not pressed.   
The biggest political scandal erupted in late November 2006, 
when Rosminzdrav single-handedly ordered to replace the less 
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Anastasija Makrjashina, Umirat' ot SPIDa stanet deshevle, Gazeta.ru, 30.03.05; 
Andrej Stenin, Jelja Vermisheva, Minzdrav podvergsja VICh-atake, Gazeta.ru, 
14.05.05; Ada Gorbacheva, Poluchilos', kak vsegda: V regionah zhdut lekarstvennyh 
buntov, Nezavisimaja Gazeta, 11.02.2005; Marija Bondarenko, Zurabov pokinul 
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expensive first and second-line drugs with a very costly newer 
pharmaceutical product. The executive order № 785, which excluded 
first-line Combivir, as well as Trisivir, Teataz and Fusion (all second-
line), and replaced with the third-line Darunavir. Subsequently, the 
Deputy Minister Vladimir Starodubov signed an executive order № 
786, amending the medical standard of HIV treatment. It prescribed to 
treat 50% of adult patients and children with this new medication, even 
though the benefits and adverse effects of darunavir on children had 
not yet been studied (some still argued it should have been considered 
as an experimental drug). As the outburst of the Russian epidemic 
stated in the late 1990s and the majority of patients began receiving the 
ARV treatment only recently, the resistance to the prescribed 
combination of drugs was not widespread. Thus, darunavir should not 
be included in all treatment plans, which made prescribing any 
individual appropriate ARV combination (―cocktail‖) of drugs very 
difficult.  One of the leading Russian epidemiologists Vadim 
Pokrovsky estimated that that among 30,000 patients receiving 
treatment only 300 could have really benefited from the new 
pharmaceutical, while not more than 3,000 could be treated with it 
overall. This decision did not make sense from the financial standpoint 
either, as the cost of treatment was projected to increase by 30 percent 
(in absolute numbers the cost of darunavir was about $14, 000 a year).
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15
 In the context, the decision was highly inadequate both from 
medical and financial standpoints. Moreover, according to the new 
standard, the new drug had to be administered in hospitals rather than 
disbursed for individual treatment at home. These orders were signed 
without any consultation with other AIDS bodies, which traditionally 
were in charge of developing standards of HIV treatment.
16
 
After an outburst of public criticism, Zurabov called the 
decision ―a statistical error.‖ His deputy Starodubov retorted that this 
decision was supposed to diminish the price on the medicines though 
the support of those foreign companies, including Janssen-Cilag and 
Makiz-Farma, which were willing to manufacture pharmaceutical 
drugs on the Russian soil.
17
 These justifications sounded like an 
intentional cover-up of inefficiency, furtiveness, and corruption. 
Grishankov raised the issue about the incompetence and corruption in 
the Ministry:  
The standard has been developed for the particular company 
and for the particular winner of the request for tender. This can 
destroy the whole presidential campaign for HIV treatment. 
We addressed to the presidential administration and Dmitry 
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 Ibid  
16
 Elena Gorlanova, Zurabov oshibsja na $37 mln, Gazeta.ru; 18.01.07 
17
 Vladimir Starodubov, VICh-inficirovannye pacienty ne ostanutsja bez lekarstv, 
Ria-Novosti; 21.12.2006 
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Medvedev with the request to sort out the secret tendering of 
Minzdravsocrazvitija. Additionally, the group of State Duma 
deputies, including myself, sent an address to President 
Vladimir Putin, retelling all the ―achievements‖ of 
Minzdravsocrazvitija, machinations with financial assets, 
including the executive order on the new standard of HIV 
treatment.
18
 
This incident of purchasing quite expensive and relatively 
inefficient drugs was not single.  Seven month later, in June 2007, the 
WHO informed about the global recall of a protease inhibitor 
―Viracept,‖ some batches of which contained a high level of cancer-
causing substance.
19
 This recall brought on the spotlight yet another 
staggering case. In essence, the government purchased enough of this 
drug to treat as much as 15 percent of patients. For some unclear 
reason, Viracept cost a lot more for the Russian government than to 
others. Furthermore, from the same recall statement it turned out that 
the WHO had already recommended using different protease 
inhibitors, especially in post-exposure prophylaxis packs. As the 
representative of the Russian PLWA community put it: 
                                                     
18
 Julija Taratuta, Dmitrij Krjazhev, Minzdrav ne nashel u sebja simptomov 
korrupcii, Kommersant-Daily  № 240 (3571); 22.12.2006   
19
 WHO statement on ROCHES‘s Viracept recall, 14 June 2007, available at 
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The bureaucrats follow a strange logic, purchasing the least 
effective pharmaceuticals for the most expensive price. This 
logic undercuts patients‘ interests, as opposed to the 
commercial interests of <trading> parties.
20
 
Another endemic problem was in recurring flaws in 
streamlining the procuring and disbursing the necessary 
pharmaceutical products, causing unintended interruption of HIV 
treatment.  In June—July 2006, for instance, the AIDS-centers 
disbursing the antiretrovirals on the ground in Moscow oblast, Rostov-
on-Don, Bashkortostan, Voronezh and Khabarovsk had to interrupt the 
standardized treatment protocol for many patients as the governors 
decided to cut the regional health care budgets and rely on the federal 
government to supply their regions with the necessary 
antriretrovirals.
21
  
At the same time, in March 2006 the Ministry of Health, while 
having spent more than $13 million on the ARVs in general, failed to 
procure 10 out of 15 essential pharmaceuticals to be used in the 
combination treatment. The regional disbursement was delayed by two 
month (from March to May), and in the meanwhile the only regions 
covered by the nongovernmental sector (GFATM‘s Globus program) 
                                                     
20
 Anastasija Makrjashina, VICh ostalsja bez lekarstva, Gazeta.ru; 16.06.07  
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had enough supplies to cover the gap of disbursement. High powered 
health officials acknowledged the ―difficulties‖ and lamented about 
their consequences.
22
 Similarly, in 2007 the government committed 
more than $25 million (the sum almost doubled since the previous 
year), yet both the tender to procure the treatment and its disbursement 
was delayed by six month.
23  
In effect, the HIV treatment had either to 
be reduced to two drugs instead of three, or to be postponed for those 
who already had started it. This meant a complete failure of enforcing 
the standardized protocol in treatment by the federal government.
 
  
To deal institutional inefficiency, Medvedev initiated moderate 
organizational reshuffling. The Federal Agency on Health and Social 
Development (Roszdrav) was no longer in charge of purchasing the 
ARVs, while these function were transferred to Rospotrebnadzor, the 
agency primarily responsible the surveillance of health safety and 
consumer rights.
24
  While Aleksandr Goliusov they key official in 
HIV/AIDS surveillance at Rospotrebnadzor was pleased with this 
change, many observers and journalists remained confused what 
agency exactly would be in charge of public procurement of the 
ARVs. In fact, the functional distinctions between these two 
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 According to the other data provided by NPP, in 2006 the government failed to 
procure 13 out of 26 necessary; see < 
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surveillance agencies remained overlapping and their mandates 
excessive.    
   
Indicator 1c: Check on prices and the availability of generics 
Prior to 2006 the government did not propose any specific and 
coherent policies how to ensure the continuous flow of cheaper 
pharmaceutical products into the country. After 2006 the situation 
turned around. The government increasingly resorted to protectionism, 
mandatory state purchases of the domestically produced drugs, and 
even developed an ambitious plan to build a strong and innovative 
domestic pharmaceutical industry almost from scratch. This kind of 
policy choices was clearly underpinned by perceived role of state as 
the initiator and implementer of economic policy and is consistent with 
the second core element of Russian social purpose.   
In 2000-2004 many developing countries negotiated ARV 
treatment at significantly reduced prices.
25
 While costs of ARV 
therapies in Russia remained very high (about $12,000 per year per 
patient), Russian government did not formulate any coherent policy 
towards the pharmaceutical companies in order to decrease prices. 
                                                     
25
 Using or threatening to use the compulsory licensing, and emphasizing the 
domestic development of generic version of brand-name drugs. These three 
components are the principal ways of ensuring appropriate access to treatment are 
discussed at length in Chapter 2. 
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Moreover, antiretroviral generic drugs were simply not registered in 
the country, despite massive civil society and PLWA campaigns.
26
  
Things soon changed. In Mach 2005 the Ministry of Health and 
Social Development for the first time negotiated the reduced prices on 
ARVs, which slashed the cost of treatment to about $3,000 a year. In 
2005 Zurabov announced the further decreases in prices.
27
 Since 
December 2008, according to the executive director of the Association 
of Clinical Trials Organizations (АOKI) Svetlana Zavidova, Russian 
health agencies pressed the Western pharmaceutical companies to 
reduce prices by additional 15 percent as a precondition for signing 
trade contracts.  At the same time, Russian pharmaceutical companies 
got preferential treatment and got the governmental discounts.
28
 Today 
this strategy might no longer work since Russia became a ―donor‖ 
country and is no longer qualified for getting antiretroviral drugs at 
reduced prices.  
The new grand strategy was proposed in October 2008, when 
the Kremlin chose import substitution as its principal pharmaceutical 
strategy (sometimes referred to as ―pharmaceutical security,‖ or 
―pharmaceutical sovereignty‖). The Kremlin set up the Council for the 
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Development of Pharmaceutical and Medical Industry. The principal 
objective of the Council was to devise measures to spur the domestic 
biomedical industry and help other governmental agencies to achieve 
partial import substitution by 2020.  Roszdravnadzor, for instance, 
recommended substituting as much as 5351 foreign drugs with 
domestic ones in the first half of 2009 alone.  Also, the objective was 
to increase the capital volume of domestic pharmaceutical market from 
306 billion rubles in 2008 to 1.5 trillion rubles in 2020. Not by 
coincidence, the Vice Prime-Minister Igor Sechin, believed to be the 
informal leader of siloviki clan, became the Council‘s supervisor. He 
called for stricter law enforcement measures 
 
in controlling the 
pharmaceutical procurement in the regions.
29
 
To lay down more specific stages in achieving the 
―pharmaceutical sovereignty,‖ the Ministry of Industry and Trade 
(Minpromtorg) developed a long-term doctrine and specified five 
ambitious goals to be achieved by 2020. They included  
1. to increase the overall domestic drugs price share in the internal 
market by 50% (comparing to 19% in 2009);  
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2. to increase the number/variety of the available domestic brand-
name (―innovative‖) drugs and their percentage in the 
manufacturers‘ portfolios;  
3. to increase exports 8 times compared to 2008 levels; 4) to 
achieve the pharmaceutical security of the country; and  
4. to stimulate the domestic production of the pharmaceutical 
substances.
30  
 
In general, it is difficult to ascertain whether or not this strategy 
was oriented towards the decreasing the prices of pharmaceutical 
products for domestic consumers. The doctrine did not directly discuss 
the necessity of the decreasing the prices as a strategic objective, 
perhaps it was assumed that domestic medicines would be cheaper by 
definition, especially in the context of a massive replacement of the 
foreign brand name drugs. Yet the doctrine formulated its objectives in 
terms of price-share, rather than total increase of domestic vs foreign 
drugs.  The major point that bears emphasis is that this state-led 
strategy intended to check the power of the foreign industry and 
trigger domestic production.   
Besides ―pharmaceutical sovereignty‖ the government 
remained a generous spender and supported a whole range of research 
and development activities. In 2008 the federal budget allocated about 
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$5.7 million to the State Centre of Virology and Biotechnology, about 
$614,000 -- to the Ivanovsky Institute of Virology, about $1.2 million 
to the St. Petersburg State University, and about $8.7 million to the 
Federal Medico-Biological Agency (FMBA).
31
 More generally, the 
2008-2010 federal budgets allocated $41 million for HIV/AIDS 
vaccine research and for the improvements of the HIV/AIDS 
monitoring and control centers.  
 
UNIVERSALITY 
Indicator 2a: Providing the ARVs to key vulnerable groups 
Treating the key vulnerable populations is imperative as it helps 
preventing the spillover of the epidemic to the generalized population. 
In Russia the main bridge population consisted primarily of the 
intravenous drug users (IDUs). At the same time, since treating the 
bridge population was in large part based on observing of human 
rights, which was at odds with Russian version of national purpose. As 
a result, Russian government pursued policy initiatives inconsistent 
with the mainstream international recommendations and practices.  
In Russia key vulnerable populations include (1) 0.5 to 3.5 
million injection drug users and 9 million sex partners of IDUs; (2) 
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500,000 to 700,000 commercial sex workers;
32
 (3) 1.3 to 2.5 million 
their clients; and (4) about 1 million prison inmates, often injecting 
drugs intravenously. The other groups include 2.7 million men who 
have sex with men (MSM) and migrant workers from Central Asia [no 
official estimates found]. From the public health perspective, these 
seemingly isolated, but often overlapping groups in the later stages of 
the epidemic typically transmit the disease to the generalized 
population. In Russia, this trend becomes evident with the rapidly 
recently increasing numbers of HIV incidence among women and 
heterosexual population. Many Russian health care professionals, as 
well as domestic and international civil society clearly saw the value 
of harm reduction and tried to promote it as part of the international 
medical consensus.
33
  
Domestic arguments against harm reduction programs reflected 
national purpose‘s state-centrism. The head of FSKN Victor 
Cherkesov rejected decriminalizing HIV/AIDS policy as 
inappropriate. In his view, promoting OST was strongly tied to 
domestic criminal and international lobby‘s purposeful activity to 
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undermine the strength and sovereignty of the Russian state.
34
 A 
Deputy Head of FSKN Aleksandr Mikhailov in his 2005 interview on 
the pro-liberal radio ―Ekho Mosvy‖ offensively argued against harm 
reduction measures because they were enrooted in the 
―incomprehensible reflections related to human rights.‖ 35 Similarly, 
Victor Ivanov (the head of the State Anti-Narcotic Committee (GAK) 
and the new director of FSKN) rejected human rights aspects of 
treating the IDUs as it was associated with liberal ideology and was 
incompatible with conception of common good.
36
  Siloviki argued that 
the spread of HIV/AIDS was not curbed because the government had 
been way too liberal in prosecuting the IV drug users and dealers, as 
well as being unable to stop the production of opiates in Afghanistan.
37
    
Since the FSKN and siloviki in general perceived themselves 
as the major champions of common good, they acted as domestic 
policy entrepreneurs. Besides multiple interviews, they spread 
brochures and information compatible with the official views of 
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FSKN. For instance, in 2007 FSKN distributed to all of its regional 
branches Hegumen Anatoly Berestov‘s a book-length diatribe against 
the western approaches to treating the IDUs.
38
   
Siloviki spearheaded punitive rather than rehabilitative 
measures in dealing with the vulnerable groups.
39
 Domestic policy 
environment also rejected harm reduction and human rights as the 
kinds of action inappropriate for public policy. Moscow mayor Yuri 
Luzhkov, for instance, claimed that Russian approach to IDUs and 
MSMs should not be borrowed from the western democratic 
standards.
40
 Some health care professionals and medical doctors 
surmised that harm reduction programs aggravated the contemporary 
demographic problems in the Russian Federation. In this 
interpretation, the GFATM‘s and the World Bank‘s humanitarian 
rhetoric disguised their furtive subversive agenda.
41
  
In any case, the proponents of the harm reduction programs 
and human rights watchers (pravozashitniki)—since they were 
associated with the liberal ideology and the dissident movement-- were 
rendered more dangerous than HIV/AIDS itself. Andrey Leonov of a 
Moscow network TV station accused them of building societal 
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tolerance to these sins and sneaking destructive ideas into the Russian 
laws. Also, he referred to the repressive Soviet policies as a highly 
commendable practice:  
In the USSR there were 2-3 human right watchers and no 
more than two hundred thousand narcotic addicts. Today in 
one Russia by different assessments there are several 
hundred human right watchers and from 4 up to 10 million 
addicts… They carry out the same function, as goats which 
were held at slaughterhouses to lead the whole herd to 
death. One such animal was enough to kill hundreds of 
thousands without any problems.
42
  
Similarly, Alexei Nadezhdin (in 2005 the chief of the division of 
adolescent narcology of the National Scientific Center at Ministry of 
Health) lashed out against the foreign-sponsored actors as follows:   
… ―human rights observers‖ (pravozashitniki) and ―humanists‖ 
shift the vector of public perception from the interest of the 
majority… to the pathological minority. And, supporting this 
minority, crudely impinge on the interests of the healthy 
majority, threatening the security of the state.
43
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As a result, the Russian government systematically 
underpromoted the necessary health services for the IDUs as a main 
vulnerable population.
  
First, IDUs were given a low priority on the 
treatment waiting list. Judith Twigg noted that the regional AIDS 
centers treated IDUs without proper guidelines to support treatment 
adherence.
44
  
Second, the official position on the long-term sustainable 
HIV/AIDS policy for the generalized population was dissociated from 
the harm-reduction strategies and treating the IDUs.
45
 Sometimes the 
harm reduction therapy was opposed to and rejected on the purely 
technical grounds. Russian chief public health official Gennady 
Onishchenko, the long-time director of Rospotrebnadzor for instance 
went on record against opiate substitute treatment (OST) and needle 
and syringe exchange programs (NSP) as ineffective.
46
 In 2009 
Onishchenko defended the view that IDUs simply walked away from 
treatment, thus making the provision of treatment irrelevant and even 
harmful in terms of drug resistance. Clearly, the blame was placed not 
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on the inefficient and punitive withdrawal programs at governmentally 
funded narcological institutes, but on the victim.
47
   
Third, the government often relegated the funding of harm 
reduction services to the international and domestic non-governmental 
organizations, rather than providing the necessary services with the 
state health care infrastructure. As a result, the number of NSPs 
increased very slowly up to only 75 SEPs programs by 2003, which 
was absolutely inadequate to the scope of the epidemic. The modest 
progress in harm reduction programs was almost always associated 
with the civil society‘s initiatives, rather than governmental programs. 
According to numerous newspaper and advocacy reports, states 
officials continuously harassed the nongovernmental programs, using 
substitute treatment and harm reduction techniques.
48
 Today the 
majority of the IDU-related programs are in danger, as Russia may no 
longer qualify for the international assistance and thus will fully 
depend on the governmental funding.  
Fourth, the 1998 Federal Law on Narcotic and Psychoactive 
Substances was amended in 2003 in order to allow some flexibility in 
the policy towards the IDUs. The 2003 amendments to the Criminal 
Code were relatively liberal and seen as a major step in 
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decriminalizing key vulnerable populations. However, the moderate 
liberal changes were quickly repealed in 2006. The 2005–2009 federal 
anti-drug programs stressed the primacy of the law enforcement 
agencies in carrying out a series of comprehensive measures, including 
projects aimed at prevention, treatment, and rehabilitation.
49
 
According to Alexandra V. Orlova, ―most of the federal funds for anti-
drug efforts still go to law-enforcement agencies rather than to 
financing preventative measures.
‖50
 Yet in certain respects the law 
remained vague and was not universally enforced.  Thus regional 
governments and civil society, despite regional freeze of these 
services, can develop more or less adequate treatment programs for 
IDUs and sex workers.
51
   
 
Indicator 2b: Scaling up as a proxy for universality 
The federal government continuously advocated the universal 
treatment coverage. This commitment fully matched the international 
best practice, and reflected the governmental imperative of attaining 
social obligations, as expressed in national purpose. Providing the 
universal coverage, especially in the context of the generalized 
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HIV/AIDS epidemic is very costly for the public sector, as it demands 
funding treatment, education and care programs, as well as 
maintaining and improving the health care infrastructure.  Despite 
these complications, the Russian government embraced the political 
obligation to be a provider of resources and social services and placed 
a strong priority on the rapid increase of funding allocated to treatment 
among other important components of HIV/AIDS response.   
In principle, the federal laws guarantee the free and universal 
access to ARV therapy. Russia‘s first comprehensive legislation 
concerning HIV/AIDS directly called for universal access to HIV 
medication and comprehensive public education.
52
  Subsequently, in 
November 2001 the federal government approved program 
―Preventing and combating the socially significant diseases (2002–
2006),‖ including the HIV/AIDS, which included a specific provision 
for purchasing and disbursing the ―most effective‖ ARVs.53 The so-
called Moscow Declaration, which that was adopted in April 1
st
, 2005 
at the ministerial meeting of governmental officials, representatives of 
                                                     
52
 Federal Law 38-03 of 1995 
53
 For the detailed discussion of the law and its historical context, see TPAA 2004: 
1—11  
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the civil society, and health care practitioners, also called for scaling 
up responses to the HIV/AIDS.
54
  
In September 2005 Vladimir Starodubov, the Deputy Minister 
of Health and Social Development, claimed that the budget would 
cover all mothers to prevent transmission of the virus to children 
(MTCPT, 6253 people), as well as all those who need treatment (up to 
15000 people).
55
 By 2008 most regions covered more than 70% of 
people who needed treatment. By 2007 more than 30,000 patients 
received therapy. To put these numbers in comparison to 2002, when 
the ARVs were available for fewer than 2,000 patients, the progress is 
truly staggering.
 56
 The official statements gave a strong impression 
that the universal treatment was fully achieved. However, the official 
data sometimes become the source of controversy and public 
discussion.  
Many independent observers noted, however, that the near-
triumphant governmental declarations fell short of the meaningful 
targets, even though the general spending on HIV/AIDS became quite 
sumptuous. According to Michel D. Kazatchkine, Executive Director 
of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, by the end of 2009 only 23% of 
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HIV-infected population received treatment. Other independent 
experts and observers estimated that ARV treatment is available and 
accessible to only 6 to 15 percent of people who need to even as low 
as  2% to 4% of the infected population, according to more pessimistic 
numbers.
57
 Comparing to the average of 40% among other nations, this 
was definitely an underachievement. Moreover, the treatment is 
received only by a small fraction of the populations. 
The ambiguity might arise from the fact that the number of 
HIV-positive population in Russia might be significantly higher than 
the official statistical data recognizes. Also, the Russian government 
accepted the model of treatment, which recommends providing 
treatment after the specific viral load, and not since the infection is 
detected. The WHO recommends that treatment should be started if 
the CD4 count goes below the certain threshold, which estimated by 
the availability of CD4 and viral load testing.
58
 In any case, despite 
some ambiguity and discussion revolving around numbers, it would 
not be warranted to accuse the Russian government of an intentional 
policy to resist scaling-up treatment. The figures in the Table 6.2 
demonstrate that NPP Health funded not only treatment, but also 
diagnosis which included the viral load testing.   
                                                     
57
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Indicator 2c: Treatment as an integral part of prevention 
In general, the evidence whether or not government accepted the 
international consensus on treatment is dubious.  
There is a significant variation in regional responses to 
HIV/AIDS, in which the Moscow government continuously advocated 
prevention as more important than treatment. In 2003 the Moscow 
government openly argued that money should be spent on prevention, 
understood as the war against consumption of narcotics and 
prostitution, rather than on treatment of the HIV-positive persons.
59
 
Even when HIV/AIDS was framed as a matter of national emergency, 
Liudmila Stebenkova (the chair of the Moscow Duma committee on 
the protection of medical and social health) insisted that the epidemic 
could be curbed by promoting healthy lifestyles, enforcing the moral 
sexual behavior, and restricting the outreach of the nonstate 
educational campaigns on sexual education.
60
  These choices reflect 
personal views of Moscow Mayor Yury Luzhkov‘s and his 
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entourage‘s idiosyncrasies, rather than intervening effects of social 
purpose. 
At the same time, contrasting treatment to prevention did not 
evolve into cancelling or downshifting of the money allocated to 
treatment. In terms of financial commitments, often the financial data 
is rather imprecise and the figures of how much money was allocated 
and for what exact purposes remain contradictory. Twigg demonstrates 
that the Kremlin in 2007 allocated significantly more resources to 
prevention than treatment: 4,600.0 million rubles on prevention vs. 
3,200.0 million allocated for treatment.
61  Twigg‘s figures for NPP for 
2007 are very different from the official numbers. 
 
In any case, as the 
post-2006 evidence demonstrates, the spending on treatment was 
significant and undeniably important in curbing the epidemic in Russia 
(see the Table 6.2).  
Table 6.2:  Summary of the HIV/AIDS budget 
 
A) Source of financing: National Health Project, National Priority 
Projects, Millions of rubles, $1 = 27 RUB
62
 
 
Diagnosis Prevention Treatment Research Construction Total 
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 Twigg 2007: 12--13. 
62
 Data available at <http://hivpolicy.ru/publications/index.php?id=469> 
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2006 1,200.00 200.00 1,700.00 0.00 0.00 3,100.00 
2007 2,277.50 200.00 5,322.50 0.00 0.00 7,800.00 
2008 2,799.32 200.00 4,800.00 0.00 0.00 7,799.32 
2009 3,400.00 400.00 5,500.00 0.00 0.00 9,300.00 
2010 3,404.74 400.00 8,143.30 0.00 0.00 11,948.04 
Total  13,081.56 1,400.00 25,465.80 0.00 0.00 39,947.36 
% of 
NPP 32.75% 3.50% 63.75% 0.00% 0.00% 
  
B) Source of financing: Federal Targeted Program, Subprogram 
HIV, Millions of rubles, $1 = 27 RUB
63
 
(Department of State Targeted Programs and Capital 
Investments, Ministry of Economic Development of the 
Russian Federation (Mineconomrazvitija) 
 
 
 
Construction Research Various Prevention Treatment  Total 
2006 107.90 16.10 0.00 56.80 13.70 194.50 
2007 249.40 25.59 95.20 
  
370.19 
                                                     
63
 Federal target program ―Prevention and Treatment of the Socially Important 
Diseases,‖ subprogram HIV, data available at <http://fcp.vpk.ru/cgi-
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2008 372.29 27.50 63.73 
  
463.52 
2009 221.76 0.00 75.28 
  
297.04 
2010 415.34 3.62 8.86 
  
427.82 
Total 1,366.68 72.82 243.07 56.80 13.70 1,753.07 
% of 
FTP 77.96% 4.15% 13.87% 3.24% 0.78% 
  
PARTNERSHIPS  
Indicator 3a: Public-private partnerships 
The intentional efforts to implement public-private interaction 
mechanisms and contract from private sector for the public needs 
(PPP) are pivotal to increase the capacity of the public health care 
sector.  
Evidence strongly suggests that the Kremlin overcommitted to 
act as the sole provider of finance for health sector, while shying away 
from meaningful engagement of the private sector. Rapid expansion of 
the state sector of health care was prompted by not only newly 
available money from the hydrocarbons, but also by an intentional 
commitment to state-led development (the government as an economic 
deliverer).  It is debatable whether or not NPPs had adverse 
implications for public health. At most, the overextended economic 
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obligations exacerbated by the weak state capacity, inefficiency, and 
corruption lead to the inefficient allocation of resources. Throughout 
all the described period the government remained willing to cover the 
costs of treatment exclusively from its budget.
64
 Not surprisingly, even 
the dramatic increase of the budget surplus based on the high prices of 
the hydrocarbon products, might not be sustainable in the longer term. 
Since the state came to control all the spending, the government was 
able to dictate priorities in spending and inhibit alternative 
recommendations from civil society. 
In Chapter 4 I discussed how the National Priority Projects 
(NPPs) related to the national purpose. NPPs were created as the state-
centric tool in initiating and implementing national economic 
improvement. More specifically, National Priority Projects were 
created as a mechanism of an intense and ―smart‖ investment to 
prompt economic development in certain areas and improve certain 
social services.
65
 In essence, NPPs provided funding to upgrade the 
public health sector. By the Russian standards, the spending turned out 
to be truly colossal and historically unprecedented, especially as 
compared to the 1990s. In general the state funding for HIV/AIDS-
related programs grew exponentially from 2005. In 2007 alone the 
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government spent $444.8 million to fight HIV and additional $105 
million went to GFATM.  In 2009 Russia has pledged about $392 
million for various HIV/AIDS initiatives.  
The total funding through NPPs in 2006—2010 amassed to 
more than $1 billion. The funding for HIV/AIDS went primarily 
through NPPs and by far surpassed other sources of governmental 
funding of AIDS, including the Federal Targeted Program, World 
Bank project, Globus project, Global Fund disbursements, as well as 
regional budgets. In 2006—2010 the overall health-related spending in 
the framework of NPPs reached 400 billion rubles (which was 
approximately $13.5 billion). In April 2010 Putin, now Prime-
Minister, announced additional 460 billion rubles to be invested to 
modernize the health care infrastructure and increase its capacity 
inside next several years (approximately $15.5 billion).
66
 The Council 
primarily oriented NPP Health to rebuild the public health care 
infrastructure, to raise the salaries of doctors and nurses; to increase 
the number of broadly trained health care practitioners, as opposed to 
the narrow specialists, among others. According TPAA/GBC analysis, 
as much as 86% of the committed resources were channeled to 
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building the physical infrastructure, while the provision of treatment 
and palliative care received only 14% of resources.
67
 
 The 2006 collective report, compiled by the well-known 
domestic liberal economists and health care practitioners, by and large 
evaluated the general NPP approach to the reforms in health sector 
positively.
68
 At the same time, this report indicated that the Kremlin‘s 
picked up too many social obligations.
 
However, many liberal 
economists did not recognize the NPP as a meaningful vehicle of 
economic transformation.
69
 The lack of state efficiency and capacity 
plagued this massive spending, significantly undermining the whole 
purpose of upgrading public health care. Judith Twigg noted that 
―even in a resource-rich environment, Russia‘s capacity to spend 
money effectively and without unintended negative consequences 
remains uncertain.‖70 Putin himself acknowledged that despite the 
overall increase of invested resources, only 33% of patients were 
satisfied with the provided health care services.
71
  
While the government rapidly expanded public sector, its 
partnerships with the private sector stalled, if not overtly deteriorated. 
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In March 2003 the representatives of high-powered business circles 
including Arkady Volsky and Fedor Prokopov of the Russian Union of 
Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RSPP) lamented that they cannot 
meaningfully participate in the fight against HIV/AIDS as long as the 
government did not formulate a clear strategy how private sector could 
fit in the governance of HIV/AIDS.
72
 Furthermore, the government 
chose to increase taxes: In spring 2010 Prime-Minister Putin 
announced that in 2011—2012 the private sector would be taxed an 
additional 2% to cover the governmental failures of the public health 
care sector reform.
73
 The money--460 billion rubles-- was to be 
allocated to reconstructing the hospital buildings and clinics, 
increasing the quality of the health care services, and some unspecified 
additional help for pensioners.
74
 This decision effectively disregarded 
the multiple pleas of the RSPP members, as well as the representatives 
of general business circles.  
Thus, while the Kremlin poured more and more money to 
upgrade the public sector, its partnership with private sector remained 
far from productive. At the same time, the government was not able to 
increase the capacity and efficiency of its public sector. From the 
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liberal standpoint, building the universal free public health care 
without private sector was criticized as harmful to the health care 
services and perpetuating endemic and increasing inefficiency.    
 
Indicator 3b: Partnerships with international health organizations  
Russia collaborated with various international health organizations, 
living up to best international practices. At the same time, the Kremlin 
used partnerships with international health organizations to play a 
great-power role.  
First, Russian government decided to act like a donor rather 
than like a recipient of international health organizations, despite the 
fact that its domestic federal and regional disbursements never reached 
satisfactory levels. In 2003, after two years of protracted negotiations 
and resistance, Russia signed the $48 million loan with the World 
Bank to improve the regional HIV/AIDS services, including treatment. 
In 2004, for instance, the international funding for Russian HIV/AIDS 
prevention was more than $13 million, comparing to approximately $4 
million domestic funding coming from the federal budget. In 2003—
2008 the EU committed more that €16 million for various transborder 
and internal projects to combat HIV/AIDS. The United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID) budgeted $106 million in 
317 
 
2004 and $61 million in 2007. Yet later, after the GFATM‘s grants in 
aggregate reached over $250 million, Russia has promised to 
reimburse the Fund for all $270 million of its grant funding, and even 
pledged to contribute additional up to $100 million to the Fund.
75
 To 
put Russia in comparison: Brazil, for instance, preferred to use 
international resources to build strong domestic programs and achieve 
the universality of treatment, rather than overextended commitments 
and overstretched much needed resources.  
Even the federal revenues from the steeply increased prices on 
the hydrocarbon products, could not be turned entirely to cover all the 
domestic ARV expenses. On several occasions Medvedev proudly 
stated that Russia became ―a creditor, not a debtor,‖ like it was in the 
1990s. To a large degree, Russia remained dependent on the 
international resources, expertise and logistical help. More realistic 
and cautious practitioners revealed their concern for the scenario when 
Russia would not be able to qualify for the international grants. In 
2008, however, GFATM‘s Executive Director Michel 
Kazatchkine proposed to continue the funding of ―increasingly 
wealthy countries that do not yet have the infrastructure to effectively 
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fight HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria‖ and perhaps including loans in the 
Fund‘s work.76  
Second, Russia pursued a more assertive international role by 
sponsoring and organizing several regional HIV/AIDS initiatives, 
reinventing its role as a leader in the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS). In 2005, for instance, the Russian government hosted a 
ministerial meeting, attended by CIS governmental officials, 
representatives of civil society, health care practitioners from the 
public and private sectors, as well as the officials from the UN 
specialized agencies.
77
   
Starting from 2006 Russia hosted three regional Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia AIDS Conferences (EECAACs) on 
HIV/AIDS, organized by Rospotrebnadzor. According to its declared 
objectives, the First conference was ―gathered to strengthen and 
consolidate a large-scale response to HIV in the region through high 
level political commitment and leadership and create partnerships with 
civil society and people living with HIV/AIDS.‖78 The Second 
conference was intended to accelerate access to HIV prevention, 
treatment and care. The self-evaluation reports claimed strong success, 
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but this conclusion does not seem fully warranted.
79
 The stated grand 
objectives were clearly not achieved.   
The evaluation paper proudly claimed that 2,056 participants 
from 52 countries attended the conference, while the overwhelming 
majority of participants came from Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan.  
Many participants were only loosely related to the issue area, and 
some of those had questionable expertise credentials. These gatherings 
most definitely were not designed to serve as policy arenas for 
fostering international cooperation. Different civil society actors were 
not able to voice their concerns and could not articulate their 
organizational positions on the national policies. Less sedately put, 
especially if compared to such gatherings as International AIDS 
conferences, these regional initiatives did not perform any meaningful 
political or technical function.  
 
Indicator 3c: Partnership with civil society sector    
For the Russian government fostering partnerships with civil society is 
not just a technical necessity in diversifying the ways of providing 
treatment, but also a political choice whether to help civil society 
sector bringing changes in public health policies and implementing 
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new practices according to the internationally prescribed standards. 
However, the Russian government was reluctant to engage civil 
society as the independent advocacy and political actor, even though 
the Kremlin was willing to accept the civil society as a subordinate 
―technical‖ provider of some AIDS-related services. This policy 
towards nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) became possible 
since Sovereign Democracy implied that acting on the alternative 
conception of common good and proliferating alternative spheres of 
authority was absolutely subversive and inappropriate. According to 
this, the independent civil sector and especially externally funded non-
state actors involved in politics and advocacy were not perceived as 
fully legitimate. 
In his May 2004 address to the Federal Assembly, President 
Putin belligerently accused non-profit sector in receiving money from 
abroad, while not taking part in solving any pressing domestic 
problems.
80
 In 2005—2006 Putin suggested the infamous law 
significantly increasing bureaucratic control over civil society in 
Russia as a part of the sweeping changes in domestic political 
system.
81
 All the NGOs working in Russia were forced to undergo 
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additional complicated registration procedures, submit very frequent 
reports, and so on. According to the report of the Moscow Helsinki 
Group, while some NGOs were specifically chosen for public closure 
and even televised harassment; as a direct result of this legislation 
2300 NGOs were simply shut down by the end of 2007.
82
   
In 2008 Putin extended this legislation to the remaining non-
governmental organizations receiving grants and funding by the 
foreign sponsors. This legislation burdened the majority of NGOs with 
an excessively heavy taxation. According to some calculations, the 
number of tax-free NGOs was cut by 90 per cent.
 
The Global Fund 
was among one of the internationally funded NGOs which were 
included on the heavy tax list (25%).
 
  Heavy taxation and arcane red 
tape effectively constrained the role of NGOs in Russia.
83
 The trend to 
develop additional restrictive measures against civil society sector 
peaked by January 2007, when the draft legislation proposed to shut 
any NGO down if it ―creates a threat to the sovereignty, political 
independence, territorial integrity, national unity and originality 
(samobytnost‘) cultural heritage and national interests.‖ However, in 
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July 2009 Medvedev proposed some cosmetic amendments to the law 
and slightly relieved the bureaucratic pressure on civil society.
84
   
The public reaction to this legislation neatly reflected the split 
between the Kremlin-sponsored articulated audiences and their liberal 
opponents. For liberal observers and commentators, these legislative 
restrictions were an example of the autocratic turn. The proponents of 
the sovereign democracy praised these restrictions and regurgitated the 
core arguments about the necessity to curb the western involvement in 
the domestic affairs and the general uselessness of many civil society 
organizations. In essence, international organizations were perceived 
as a potential threat for the state‘s strength and agents of pernicious 
ideological influences at the broader levels of collectivity as well. 
Some public figures spoke of transnational civil society sector with 
unqualified and unconcealed suspicion. 
 Right before the issue of HIV/AIDS was discussed at the State 
Council in 2006, Liudmila Stebenkova, the Deputy of the Moscow 
City Duma, claimed that ―Under the guise of prophylaxis (prevention) 
the Western Foundations advertise pedophilia, prostitution and 
immoral behavior.‖85 She petitioned President Putin to further restrict 
the Western NGOs‘ activity in Russia. Some commentators went as far 
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as claiming that transnational HIV/AIDS programs, including 
GFATM, Open Health Institute (OHI), Soros Foundations, AIDS 
Foundation East-West (AFEW), and Population Services International 
(PSI) aim to ―create and consolidate the socially harmful and 
dangerous for the rest of the population elements—homosexuals, 
prostitutes, narcotics users.‖86 Nikolay Kakliugin also claimed that the 
US government covertly supported these organizations‘ subversive 
activities to turn Russia into the liberal democracy.
87
  
James Richter described the way Kremlin interacted with the 
civil society in conjunction with the discussion about the Public 
Chamber, purposefully designed to to organize and supervise the 
―messy‖ civil society sector. Richter captured the conditions under 
which President Putin personally viewed civil society as benign:  
 The Kremlin even tolerated organizations dependent on 
foreign funding so long as they pursued projects that did 
not contradict state interests: organizations that helped 
educate society on domestic violence or prevent the 
trafficking of women for prostitution, for example, or 
environmental organizations that sought to preserve and 
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protect existing natural areas. By contrast, those 
organizations that actively challenged the state‘s position, 
that criticized the construction of oil pipelines, the 
dumping of chemical or radioactive waste by defense 
industries, or human rights violations in Chechnya were 
portrayed as alien and even harmful to the interests of 
society.
88
 
On the other hand, the Kremlin pledged to fund the charity and 
socially important organizations. In other words, while not ruling out 
the need to collaborate with the civil society sector as a subcontractor 
in social service delivery, the Russian government detested the idea of 
civil society as policy advocates and norm entrepreneurs. For instance, 
in 2006 and 2009 the government included a number of civil society 
representatives in the Governmental Committee on HIV/AIDS, which, 
at least in theory, was supposed to formulate the consolidated national 
health strategy.  Unfortunately, this special multisectoral Committee 
remained by and large defunct since its inception.  
To be fair, many elected politicians demonstrated willingness 
to work closely with the civil society sector. In addition to the State‘s 
Duma Health Committee, Artur Chilingarov, Tatiana Yakovleva, Olga 
Borzova, Nadezhda Gerasimova, and Aleksandr Chuhrajov among 
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others, were active participants in the newly organized the State Duma 
Commission on the prevention of HIV/AIDS and other socially 
important diseases.  In 2004—2008 their cooperation and commitment 
empowered the most prominent organization in Russia--Transatlantic 
Partners against AIDS/Global Business Coalition (TPAA/GBC), 
despite its external sources of funding.  The Chairwoman of the Duma 
Health Committee Tatiana Yakovleva, for instance, defended NGOs 
underscoring their important role in educating wider audiences on 
prevention and increasing trust to the domestic health care sector.  
Even this modest level of partnerships is under suspicion. According 
to Judith Twigg, the mentioned partnerships were strategically 
initiated by HIV/AIDS-related organizations to secure themselves 
politically, rather than state officials out of the genuine commitment to 
the cause of curbing the pandemic.
89
 Despite of increasing the level of 
individual-level partnerships between the governmental and non-
governmental sectors, the overall governmental strategy was to 
exercise surveillance and control over independent NGOs.
90
 As only 
few Russian NGOs have true financial security, are experienced in the 
competent advocacy, and possess requisite capacity to implement 
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health services independently from the state, the civil remains very 
vulnerable.
91
   
Despite these tensions and uncertainties, civil society continues 
playing an important part in curbing the Russian governance of 
HIV/AIDS. According to different estimates, there are between 100 
and 300 smaller non-governmental AIDS service organizations, 
working as subcontractors for the bigger NGOs and the regional 
governments. Among the most active NGOs working in the country 
are Family Health International (FHI), International HIV/AIDS 
Alliance (IHAA), Partners in Health (PIH), AIDS Foundation East-
West (AFEW), and the American International Health Alliance 
(AIHA). Five transnational organizations formed a NGOs consortium 
to curb AIDS in Russia. This consortium included the Open Health 
Institute (OHI) as the principal recipient of international funding and 
the leading force in the GLOBUS Project, funded by the Global Fund.  
Transatlantic Partners Against AIDS (TPAA), the AIDS 
Foundation East-West (AFEW), and the Global Business Coalition 
against AIDS (GBC) formed a very strong inter-organizational 
alliance, which quickly became prominent in the country. TPAA 
which was able to forge closer connections with the regional 
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governments and public health care officials in Tatarstan, Orenburg, 
Samara, Krasnoyarsk, St-Petersburg, and Tomsk. In 2007, TPAA 
expanded their activities by implementing ―an educational course for 
the regional governmental officials on effective strategies to develop 
and implement regional HIV/AIDS programs.‖92 TPAA was especially 
active in raising awareness, engaging in advocacy, providing treatment 
and various services both for PLWA and general public in Russia. It 
has the broader public outreach though Online Policy Resource Center 
on HIV/AIDS (OPRC) and high-level policy conferences. TPAA‘s 
policy annual reports, policy briefs, analysis of regional health 
programs, and advocacy of certain health issues remains the principal 
(if not only) nation-wide alternative source of information on the 
epidemic and governmental policies.   
 
CONCLUSION 
Russian consensus about the new conception of common good shaped 
the general response to HIV/AIDS crisis as an existential threat to the 
polity and made possible certain policies not devised before. 
Generally, political elite elevated the issues of HIV/AIDS high on the 
national policy agenda, as it understood the growing rates of infection 
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to become an additional factor contributing to the declining 
population, thus impinging on the much desired strong state.  
On balance, I do not claim to explain all nine indicators of the 
global consensus, yet the provided analysis both contributes to the 
existing explanations and covers important elements of the domestic 
HIV/AIDS politics not covered before. For instance, the continuous 
problems with treatment procurement and delays in tenders should not 
be attributed to the impact of national purpose, but rather to 
corruption, lack of state capacity and efficiency (indicators 1b and 2c 
in the table below). For other components of the policy (indicators 1c 
and 2b), Russian national purpose can be used as a partial explanation.   
In regard to the first core component of HIV/AIDS policy, 
Russia subsumed the issues of HIV/AIDS under the looming 
demographic crisis and generally linked it to the growing consumption 
of narcotic substances, rather than addressing the epidemic as a public 
health crisis in its own right (Indicator 1a). The standardized protocol 
(in terms of what line of products should be purchased reflecting 
Russian state of epidemic) was often breached, despite the broad 
acknowledgement of the life-saving role of the ARVs. The consistent 
supply of the pharmaceuticals to the patients almost every year was 
punctuated by month-long delays (Indicator 1b). Although neither the 
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Kremlin, nor the public health officials overtly questioned the 
importance of generic medicines for the check on prices and increase 
of coverage, the whole issue was downplayed in favor of developing 
and import-substitution pharmaceutical industry (Indicator 1c).  
In the context of the Russian epidemic the most vulnerable 
group was the intravenous drug users (IDUs), which in the 2000s 
became the principal driver of spreading the epidemic into the 
generalized population. The vulnerable populations definitely were 
disadvantaged, as the federal legal provisions stimulated 
criminalization of IDUs and put this group at the mercy of the lower-
level bureaucrats and officials from the so-called power ministries 
(Indicator 2a). The government accepted the necessity of the 
universality of access to treatment and consistently worked to scale up 
the treatment access as evident in massive financial commitments to 
procure these medicines (Indicator 2b). At the same time, many highly 
visible representatives of Russian political elite and public health 
officials aggressively advocated very narrow prevention strategies, 
confined to abstinence, family values, and health lifestyle. 
Simultaneously, such legitimate prevention strategies as the substitute 
treatment and syringe exchange was by and large excluded from the 
preferred measures in protecting population‘s health (Indicator 2c). 
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The Kremlin generally overemphasized the role of the 
government in curbing HIV/AIDS and intentionally downplayed the 
significance and desirability of partnership with other sectors. There is 
strong evidence to suggest that the National Priority Projects—
framework of disbursing resources and transforming the health care 
sector—was designed to fend off the potential role civil society and 
private sector could have played in domestic health policies. In the 
context of the expansion of the public sector and massive financial 
inflows into health care projects, it shied away from any meaningful 
engagement of the private sector (Indicator 3a), and forcefully 
imposed strict legal boundaries under what conditions non-
governmental organizations can participate in curbing the epidemic 
(Indicator 3b). At the same time, Russia embarked on and even 
initiated a number of international AIDS initiatives, which are 
typically seen as commendable from the vantage point of international 
health community (Indicator 3c). 
Table 6.3:  Summary of the impact of national purpose on HIV/AIDS 
policy  
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CHAPTER 7. HIV/AIDS POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
By the beginning of Thabo Mbeki‘s presidency, the global consensus 
on ARVs became not only fully articulated as a broad political 
commitment, but also was supported by the undeniable practical 
success as evident in multiple national HIV/AIDS health care 
interventions around the globe. Despite all this, Mbeki immersed 
himself in the public discussion on the HIV/AIDS-related issues, 
eventually making himself an easy target for the global opprobrium 
and the wide-spread domestic animosity. The Cabinet devised the 
gamut of governmental policies and initiatives to respond to the 
epidemic, which not only went against the global consensus on 
HIV/AIDS, but sometimes were very unique. In general, the 
governmental approach to the HIV/AIDS issue-area and its resulting 
policies were more complex than a simple denial and rejection, as 
typically claimed by the infuriated domestic health activists. 
This chapter argues that South African HIV/AIDS policies 
were shaped by the deployment of the African Renaissance--the 
politically contingent and country-specific content of national purpose. 
The most important outcomes of this impact include three broad 
clusters of effects. First, pursuing indigenousness (nativism, 
332 
 
Africanism) impinged on the standardized protocol in treatment, 
stimulated the production of traditional medicines, and subsequently 
institutionalized their national governance. It also contributed to the 
politicization and filtering the desirable pool of partners, as well as 
shaped their permissible role in curbing HIV/AIDS. Second, the stress 
on marketization (economic neo-liberalism) undermined the universal 
rollout of the antiretrovirals in public health sector, and protected the 
private sector from sharing the burden of health response. Third, the 
commitment to exceptionalism (ubuntu) politicized the domestic 
epidemic and put it in the global context of colonialism; contributed to 
the pursuit of the national pharmaceutical product at the expense of 
procuring generics; and empowered the counter-epistemic community 
of AIDS dissidents.  
The aim of attaining the specific conception of common good 
as captured in the notion of African Renaissance points up to the 
profound effects on the general content of the domestic ARV policies 
in comparison to the global ARV consensus. These effects are 
summarized in the Table 1 below.  The more nuanced arguments are 
provided in relation to each component and indicator of the ARV 
policy in the appropriate subsections.  
Table 7.1: Summary of the ARV policy in RSA, 2000—2008  
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TREATMENT  
Indicator 1a: Common epidemiology in understanding the pandemic 
The South African government claimed that the nature of the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic in the country was very different and unique from 
the pandemic in the rest of the world, including other African countries 
and especially the West. This claim was consistent with the notion of 
exceptionalism as the one of the core components of social purpose 
and was the first step in staking a claim about the inapplicability of the 
Western solutions to the South African epidemic.  
According to Pieter Fourie, the Mbeki administration‘s 
response to HIV/AIDS epidemic was an ongoing attempt to reappraise 
the structural variables that drove the epidemic.
1
 There are several 
general themes, variations of which the Cabinet, Mbeki, and his 
supporters articulated throughout his presidency. First, Pretoria 
claimed that the majority of the diagnoses made in rural areas was 
inaccurate, unreliable, and led to overestimating the number of the 
HIV-positive in South Africa. This formulation went against the global 
consensus that the estimates from the pre-natal clinics and mortality 
data in South Africa were by and large accurate.  
                                                     
1
 Fourie 2006: 141.  
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Second, the outbreak of the disease in the West was often 
attributed to the overuse of prescription drugs, abuse of narcotic 
substances, as well as to the alternative lifestyle issues (the HI virus 
then was simply a carrier of the Western drug-related diseases). In 
Africa, it was extreme poverty and malnutrition triggered the outbreak 
of HIV/AIDS. According to Feinstein, in his address to the ANC 
parliamentary caucus in 2000 Mbeki claimed that 90% of death 
attributed to AIDS was the result of poverty.
2
  Others emphasized the 
poverty alleviation as a precondition for disease eradication (Prof. Sam 
Mhlongo, Head of the Department of Family Health and Primary 
Health).
3
 While such bodies as the World health Organization (WHO), 
Southern African Regional Poverty Network (SAPRN) and other 
international and domestic health organizations name poverty and 
malnutrition as factors exacerbating the effects of the epidemic and 
even making the ARV treatment less effective, yet they hardly 
pinpoint these factors as the root causes of the spread of the HI virus in 
South Africa.
4
 
Third, the neo-colonial and racially skewed Western science in 
general used an African as an object of negative construction, denied 
                                                     
2
 Feinstein 2009: 112.  
3
 An interview with Samson Mhlongo available at < 
http://www.virusmyth.com/aids/hiv/jsinterviewsm.htm> 
4
 See, for instance, Butler 2005; Schneider and Stein 2001 
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him/her a human dignity, and treated him/her like a child. The 
outbreak of HIV/AIDS gave an ideal opportunity to represent an 
African as the Other, ―natural born promiscuous carrier of germs,‖ 
thus reinforcing the Western imaginings of Africa.
5
 Mbeki argued 
against pointing fingers at the sexual immorality of African people, 
who were ―prone to rape and abuse of women‖ and upheld ―a value 
system that belongs to the world of wild animals.‖6 Nkululeko Nxesi, 
in 1999—2004 the National Director of National Association of 
People Living with AIDS (NAPWA) echoed this theme. He claimed 
that the nature of the epidemic in South Africa was different even from 
the rest of the continent because of the very specific legacies of the 
apartheid, forced labor migrations, and the stifled discussions of 
sexuality.
7
 NAPWA, along with the government, sought to resist the 
derogatory and disempowering stigmatization African people living 
with AIDS as ―sufferers‖ and ―victims.‖8 
The last theme fell on a rich soil of more radical and 
conspiratorial formulations, which in the 1990s-early 2000s were in 
broad circulation. These collective articulations ranged from beliefs 
that the HI virus was created artificially to undermine African 
                                                     
5
  See also Wertheimer 2007: 29, 31, 33 in Falola and Heaton 2007. 
6
 Cite taken from Castro Hlongwane.  
7
 See Helen Epstein‘s interview with Nxesi in Epstein 2007: 170-171. 
8
 For NAPWA‘s official website, see http://www.napwa.org.za. 
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population growth
9
  to popular perceptions of AIDS as an American, 
or sometimes Afrikaner, Invention to Discourage Sex (hence the 
acronym). Other perceptions ranged from conspiratorial notions that 
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) propagated the belief that HIV 
causes AIDS to the imageries of witchcraft with white doctors, 
treatment activists and representatives of Western pharmaceutical 
sector as reinvented ―sorcerers.‖10   
Mbeki set in motion a broad campaign to substantiate more 
specific assertions of racialism and neo-colonialism dominating the 
research on HIV/AIDS. The important ―Castro Hlongwane‖ report 
(most likely co-written by Mbeki and Peter Mokaba) heavily borrowed 
from the early literature on the impact of racism and prejudices in 
collecting the evidence on AIDS in Africa in the 1980s. By and large it 
repeated the accusations of Zimbabwean scholars Richard and 
Rosalind Chirimuuta, the authors of Africa, AIDS and Racism 
(1987).
11
 Later on, Robert Suresh Roberts tried to locate Mbeki in the 
tradition of ―pro-native‖ and anti-colonialist thinking of Frantz 
Fannon. He linked Mbeki‘s views to Harriet A. Washington‘s Medical 
Apartheid: the Dark History of Medical Experimentation on Black 
                                                     
9
 van der Vliet 2004: 73, 85. 
10
 Ashforth 2002: 124; Ashford 2005; also van der Vliet 2001 
11
  For the detailed analysis of this document as an anti-colonial statement, see Wang 
2008 
337 
 
Americans from Colonial Times to the Present (2006) and Celia 
Farber‘s Serious Adverse Events: An Uncensored History of AIDS 
(2006).
 
Roberts insisted that global science was ridiculing the native 
quest for African solutions and thus was skewed by racial politics. In 
essence, these books over-exaggerated certain policy blunders of the 
1980s out of proportion. 
Mbeki‘s April 2000 letter to world leaders on AIDS in Africa 
is a well-known and often-cited document. It illustrated the deep 
distrust in the Western science.
12
 This important letter provided direct 
evidence that placing a strong emphasis on the indigenous, native 
medicines was an intentional commitment, rather than a mere policy 
blunder. The letter stated that,  
… as Africans, we have to deal with this uniquely African 
catastrophe... It is obvious that whatever lessons we have to 
and may draw from the West about the grave issue of HIV-
AIDS, a simple superimposition of Western experience on 
African reality would be absurd and illogical. Such 
                                                     
12
 For the detailed analysis of the content and context of the letter, see Eboko2005:  
40—45 in Patterson 2005. For the international response, see Milan Vesely, Thabo 
Mbeki ignites AIDS inferno, African Business, 06.01.2000 
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proceeding would constitute a criminal betrayal of our 
responsibility to our own people.
13
 
This letter was helpful in neither justifying, nor explaining the 
South African position at least for international audiences. Soon, the 
South African government became more defensive about their policies 
and started talking about the pandemic in the regular terms. Although 
questioning the epidemiology of the disease and the uniqueness of 
epidemic in the country by and large disappeared from the official 
discourse, the government stayed committed to the kinds of actions 
underpinned by African Renaissance.   
At the same time, domestic spin-doctors tried to gloss over 
Mbeki‘s prior record, claiming that he had never been an AIDS 
dissident, never questioned the value of ARV treatment, and even was 
able to point out the shortcomings of the global biomedical science 
before they became apparent to the Western scientists.
14
 Unwilling to 
discuss his biomedical views openly, in a private letter to a member of 
his politico-intellectual entourage, Mbeki still clung to the view that 
the Western neo-colonial science dictated its will to the champions of 
native (traditional) knowledge: 
                                                     
13
 Thabo Mbeki, Letter to the World Leaders, April 03, 2000. The full text available 
at < http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/aids/docs/mbeki.html> 
14
 Roberts 2007: 186-191 
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Not surprisingly, the most virulent of the debates, about 
knowledge, has been the contest concerning the science 
that informs the global and our own programmes on HIV 
and AIDS. It is most interesting that the most vocal in this 
contest centered their argument… on the demand that all 
the discussion must be terminated, and that all that had to 
be done was to implement what directly and indirectly, the 
pharmaceutical companies said should be done to dispense 
the drugs they produce as widely and as quickly as 
possible.
15
  
 
Indicator 1b: Standardized protocol in treatment 
In 2004—2008, the Cabinet placed the strong emphasis to promote 
native medicines, which was
 
consistent with indigenousness as the 
core component of national purpose.
16
 At first, Pretoria briefly 
emphasized the use of complementary and alternative medicine 
(CAMs) and later promoted the value of various African traditional 
                                                     
15
 Roberts 2007: 181 (letter dated 1 January, 2006). 
16
 On the distinctions among different types of traditional healers, see Gumede 1990; 
Ashforth 2005: 52—57; on the place of indigenous medicine practitioners in select 
African states, see Marlise Richter, Traditional Medicines and Traditional Healers in 
South Africa; Discussion paper prepared for the Treatment Action Campaign and 
AIDS Law Project, 27 November 2003; Kibuka-Sebitosi 2008; on relationship 
between ―traditional authorities‖ and the ANC, see Koenane 2008.  For the overview 
of traditional healing of sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) and AIDS in the 
country prior to Mbeki, see Green 1994: 135—178.  
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medicines (ATM, muthi) for the treatment of both HIV and the 
number opportunistic diseases. While the notions of the ARVs‘ 
toxicity and inefficiency were only briefly entertained, this 
commitment to indigenous solutions proved to be more robust and 
resilient to both internal and external criticism.  
  According to Anthony Brink of the Treatment Information 
Group (TIG), his 1999 book draft ―Debating the AZT: Questions of 
Safety and Utility‖ led Mbeki to begin inquiry into the safety of 
AZT.
17
 Whether or not this book was the exact trigger, Mbeki accused 
multiple international actors of concealing the scientific evidence 
about AZT inefficacy.
18
 The semi-official position stated that the 
human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) could not solely cause the 
whole syndrome of opportunistic diseases (AIDS), thus the links 
between the human immunodeficiency and AIDS-associated diseases 
to be discarded. Moderate voices in the Cabinet insisted that AZT 
treatment was simply not helpful in curbing the pandemic, because it 
treated people who are already sick (Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, 
Minister of Health 1994—1999, Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1999—
2009). Because the ARVs would neither cure a set of opportunistic 
                                                     
17
 http://www.tig.org.za; Brink 2000. 
18
 Mbeki letter to Leon, published in Sunday Times, 07.09.2000. Such a statement 
dismissed the results of the domestic SA trials of AZT and nevirapine treatments in 
Chris Hani Hospital during 1996-2000, see d‘Adesky 2004: 183. 
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diseases, nor alleviate the root causes of poverty and malnutrition, the 
antiretroviral treatment was at best useless. The most radical anti-
colonialist position surmised the Western conspiracy in cramming the 
toxic drugs into African nations.
 
This discourse revealed the desire to 
suspend the domestic distribution of the internationally approved 
medicines and replace it with something else.   
The above sentiments culminated in the unprecedented interest 
to integrate indigenous herbal medicines and potentially commercially 
valuable genetic resources into national healthcare systems.
19
 The 
point of the revival of indigenous knowledge systems was to de-
monopolize neo-colonial science and refute the Afro-pessimists‘ 
claims that natives are unfit to produce original knowledge.
20
 
According to Mbeki, one of the primary objectives was to ―defend, 
uphold and promote our culture in the face of strong encroachments of 
alien cultures some of which seek deliberately to destroy our 
indigenous cultures.‖21 Similarly, in 2006 during the Toronto 
International AIDS Conference Dr. Mantombazana Edmie Tshabalala-
Msimang (MTM, Health Minister in 1999—2008) attacked the 
Western cultural imperialism, criticizing its negligent attitude towards 
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 Reihling 2008 
20
 See, for instance, Roberts 2007: 215-222. 
21
 Cite taken from Response of the President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, to the 
debate of the National House of Traditional Leaders, Tshwane Municipal Chambers, 
04.02.2008 
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the traditional medicine. The Health Ministry infused these views with 
additional value: native ―scientific methodologies that stretch back 
thousands of years‖ are ―essential and irreplaceable component of the 
comprehensive care.‖22   
Although these formulations may seem very similar to the ones 
formulated at the international arena, no international guideline 
actually prescribes preserving and fostering indigenous knowledge as a 
core substitution for the standard biomedical products. Thus, Pretoria 
came dangerously close to rejecting the standardized protocol of the 
anti-retroviral treatment. 
 The South African leadership undertook a massive set of 
practical measures to promote native medicines and institutionalize 
their governance. The Cabinet invested resources in researching the 
efficacy of ATM, elevated the status of traditional healers under the 
Traditional Health Practitioners Bill (2004), reserved the right to 
define the standards of traditional healing, drafted National Policy on 
African Traditional Medicine to provide a legal framework to rollout 
native medicines in the public healthcare system (2008).
23
  
More specifically, to throw some institutional support behind 
these initiatives, in 2006 the Cabinet established the Presidential Task 
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 MBewu and Simelela 2003: 86 
23
 The draft is available at <http://www.doh.gov.za/docs/policy/atm.pdf> 
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Team on African Traditional Medicine in South Africa and the 
Directorate of Traditional Medicine within the DOH.
24
 These bodies 
were supposed to alleviate the differences among traditional healers‘ 
group and to offer policy recommendations for the government. They 
had to decide 1) whether to incorporate traditional healers into the 
dominant health care system or to make the indigenous system of 
health care fully separate and grant it an exclusive status; 2) whether 
the ARVs were toxic and should be replaced by traditional medicines; 
3) whether alternative treatment should be offered as complementary, 
or even as a full substitute to the Western biomedicines.
25
   
Other organizations involved in the promotion of native 
science included the South African Traditional Medicines Research 
Unit in Medical Research Council (MRC), National Reference Centre 
for African Traditional Medicines (NRCATM), and African Health 
Care Systems Research Network (AHCS). The National Research 
Foundation (NRF) managed the governmental funds directed to the 
study of indigenous knowledge and traditional healing practices.
26
 In 
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 Department of Health,  Government Gazette, 25 July 2005, No 31271, General 
Notice No 906 
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 For the overview of different views on the epidemiology and ARVs among various 
traditional healing organizations, see Richter 2003, Working Papers of the Centre for 
Social Science (CSSR) Nos. 153, 170, 209, 210. On the official position on the 
traditional medicines and healing practices see WHO 2002; WHO 2004a; WHO 
2005. 
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2006 the Department of Science and Technology (DST) sponsored the 
study of the local knowledge as an alternative (and better) foundation 
for the local decision-making as opposed to the international 
knowledge.
27
 DST‘s Indigenous Knowledge Unit linked the 
development of indigenous knowledge to the resistance to the Western 
neo-colonial domination in devising the health care models and called 
for the protection of native science as intellectual property collectively 
owned at the local level.
28
 In 2009 DST and NRF made a research call 
for The South African Research Chairs Initiative (SARChI) pursuing 
to demonopolize the Western knowledge and making South Africa a 
strong contender to the global knowledge as formulated by the 
North.
29
 
The evidence suggests that ATMs became deeply enrooted at 
the   local (provincial) level as well. In KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) 
traditional healers were integrated into HIV treatment and care in 
2005. In 2006—2008 Member of Executive Council (MEC) Peggy 
Nkonyeni forged strong connections with the already established 
native organizations and she hosted an information workshop featuring 
thirty prominent anti-treatment advocates, who condemned the use of 
ARVs. She also courted such outspoken opponents of ARVs as Dr 
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 DST 2006 
28
 Mosimege 2005 
29
 http://www.nrf.ac.za/sarchi/call_sarchi_reschairs_082008.pdf 
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Cyril Khanyile (Medunsa University) and Nhlavana Maseko (the 
president of THO), who were vocal against the rollout of ARVs and 
spending money on the biomedical research. Simultaneously, 
Nkonyeni tried to roll out herbal remedies for treating HIV/AIDS 
patients at public hospitals.
30
  Similarly, Mpumalanga Health MEC 
Sibongile Manana, frequently ordered doctors not to prescribe the 
ARVs.
31
 
Besides intentional efforts to promote traditional medicines, the 
Cabinet allowed people of different walks of life (but with highly 
questionable medical qualifications) to sell a variety of herbal mixtures 
as genuine alternatives to ARVs. Medical reports and the media 
typically described their product as brown liquids of suspicious origin, 
having no benefits for the health of the patients. Consider some telling 
examples.  
In 2000 a local inyanga (healer) Lulu Ngubane claimed to treat 
and/or reverse the HIV virus with the recipe which came to him in a 
dream. In 2001 Phyto Nova produced immune-boosting Sutherlandia, 
potentially useful for the people with HIV. In 2001 Siphiwe Hadebe 
amassed a fortune by treating about 600 patients with ―umbimbi.‖ 
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 Kerry Cullinan, KZN Health minister mimics Manto and punts herbal remedies for 
Aids, Health-e News Service, 11. 23, 2006; Kerry Cullinan, MEC keeps up pressure 
on Manguzi, Health-e News Service, 24.06.2008 
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 Anso Thom ‗Tyrant‘ Manana made to pay doctor, Health-e News Service, 
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Among his high-powered patients was Mbekis‘ loyalist Peter Mokaba, 
who soon died from the lung infection, most likely AIDS-related. In 
2003 the Health Minister gave permission to the former nurse Tine van 
der Maas to conduct trials of her ―African solution‖ in public hospitals 
and clinics.
32
 In 2005 another traditional healer and a former truck 
driver Zeblon Gwala offered a mixture of 89 herbs ―uBhejane‖ to be 
taken simultaneously with ARVs. Gwala‘s product have been 
marketed and sold extensively over the years with an active support of 
various provincial and national health officials.
33
 In 2007 lawyer 
Christine Qunta of Comforter‘s Healing Gift produced the extract of 
sonneblom —yet another untested nutritional supplement to cure 
AIDS.
 34
  These and other healers often persuaded patients to stop 
taking ARVs, while asserting that their treatment reversed the course 
of the disease or killed AIDS. Yet the government intentionally kept 
the window of opportunity open for them.  
 
Indicator 1c: Check on prices and availability of generics 
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 Deane 2005 in Karim: 540; Kerry Cullinan , Health Minister promotes nutritional 
alternative to ARV roll-out, Health-e News Service, 30.05.2005 
33
 Ndaki in Cullinan and Thom 2009: 149—153. 
34
 For the best account of traditional healers‘ backgrounds and marketing strategies,  
see an excellent collection of essays The Virus, Vitamins & Vegetables: The South 
African HIV/AIDS Mystery, edited by Kerry Cullinan and Anso Thom, especially 
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The universality of treatment crucially depends on securing the 
uninterrupted supply of medicines at the cheaper price. One realistic 
option is to negotiate discounts with the international pharmaceutical 
companies and use generics. Yet Pretoria refused either negotiating the 
discounted prices, or using generics as a leverage tool. 
Purchasing ARVs from the pharmaceutical giants even at the 
reduced price was nailed as reinforcing the predatory power of 
―pharmaceutical colonialism‖, bringing by far more problems to South 
Africans than solutions. The member of government argued that ―price 
reductions negotiated with manufacturers were neither substantive not 
a permanent solution.‖35 Pretoria turned down the pharmaceutical 
companies‘ offer to enter talks on price reduction to the poorest 
African nations, refused to accept the Boehringer Indelheim‘s offer of 
free Nevirapine for the pregnant women in the mid-2001, and refused 
Glaxo‘s offer to buy AZT at a 70% slashed price.36  In 2000 the 
presidential spokesperson Parks Mankahlana asserted that 
pharmaceutical companies and their propagandists were profiteering 
from the epidemic being uncurbed.
 
In his presentation, the 
pharmaceutical sector was misusing the information about the 
pandemic and exaggerating the positive effects of their medicines: 
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 Gumede 2007: 196. In 2000, the UN announced the negotiated deal with five 
major pharmaceutical companies. 
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 See, for instance, Youde 2007: 82 
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HIV/AIDS is not going to succumb to the machinations 
of the profiteering pharmaceuticals and their 
propagandists. Like the marauders of the military 
industrial complex, the profit takers who are benefiting 
from the scourge of HIV/AIDS will disappear to the 
affluent beaches of the world to enjoy the wealth 
accumulated from humankind ravaged by a dreaded 
disease. And we shall continue to die from AIDS.
37
  
All this was very surprising as, in 1997—1999 South African 
government seemingly followed the global consensus by challenging 
big transnational pharmaceutical corporations. The South African 
Medicines Act of 1997 allowed the domestic production of the generic 
drugs, parallel import and compulsory licensing. In defending the Act, 
the government resisted Vice President Al Gore‘s and the United 
States Trade Representative‘s (USTR) pressures to accept the rules for 
pharmaceutical production as formulated by the international 
pharmaceutical sector.
38
 Despite the media portrayed this resistance as 
a big success of pro-treatment and anti-globalization forces, the 
relevant literatures soon noted the furtiveness of the Medicines Act. As 
it turned out, the hidden purpose was to manufacture local 
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 Mankahlana, 23 March 2000.  
38
 For the details see Behrman 2004: 142—148. 
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pharmaceutical alternatives to ARVs, independently from the 
international pharmaceutical sector.
39
 Neither acquiring the cheaper 
ARVs, nor pressing for the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property (TRIPS) safeguards, was on the real agenda. 
Most strikingly, believing in the inevitable success of the domestic 
medicine, the South African government lost an interest in legal action 
against foreign pharmaceutical sector. As a result, the government at 
some point decided to accommodate pressures of the pharmaceutical 
companies, neglecting to enact the compulsory licensing safeguard.    
The Cabinet‘s put all its bets on the development of Virodene® 
PO58 (1997—2002).40 This controversial, but genuine, passion for the 
local drug stared in 1997, when three physicians from the University 
of Pretoria announced the invention of a cheap and effective anti-
AIDS drug on the basis of an industrial solvent used in 
cryopreservation. From the outset this discovery was under suspicion 
as it had been neither peer reviewed, nor published in respected 
scientific journals, while its inventors hardly possessed relevant 
medical qualifications. Not surprisingly, in February the MCC banned 
                                                     
39
For the further discussion see Barnard 2002: 159-174. 
40
 For the detailed accounts of the Virodene affair, see Van der Vliet 2001: 164; 
Deane 2005: 539—540; Fassin 2007: 41—49; Mybugh 2007; Youde 2007: 81—87. 
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the drug and stopped its testing.
41
 However, the inventors skilfully 
deployed an argument against the Western pharmaceutical neo-
colonialism, which in turn generated a firm political and financial 
backing.
42
 Despite the alleged continuous support and financial 
involvement of some senior members of the ANC, this attempt to 
produce a local pharmaceutical product failed.   
The failure of the original domestic pharmaceutical product did 
not abate the specious drug-colonization rant. As Rath vitriolled, 
At their 2007 conference in Heiligendamm, Germany, the 
G8 heads authorized the largest genocide program in 
modern history - the promotion of toxic ARV drugs across 
Africa and the developing world. …this plan provides the 
blueprint for the economic and political subversion and 
control of the African continent by the former colonial 
empires…Under the terms of implementing human rights, 
fundamental freedoms, peace and democracy, this plan is 
an outline for the recolonialisation of the African continent 
on behalf of the pharmaceutical drug cartel. Under the term 
of universal access to ARV drugs and improving the health 
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of African people, the $60 Billion attack plan with 
―chemical weapons‖ called ARV drugs is specified in 
detail.
43
 
In this context, advocating generics was pinned down as a part 
of a plot to undermine President Mbeki‘s and the ANC‘s authority, 
threaten the black lives and turn the country into a banana republic. 
Roberts, for instance, politicized the treatment activism as the AIDS-
drug promotion conspiracy. Using defamatory language, he lashed out 
against ―the elite media and its anti-ANC AIDS-drug agitation,‖ as 
well as ―the AIDS-drug lobby lore‖ of David Cameron, Tony Leon, 
Zackie Achmat, Mark Heywood, Kerry Cullinan, Nicoli Natrass, and 
even ―celebrity colonialism‖ of Nadine Gordimer.44  Rath-sponsored 
End AIDS: Break the Chains of Pharmaceutical Colonialism was a 
book-long accusation of multinational pharmaceutical industries of re-
colonizing the continent. In this diatribe, the global pharmaceutical 
neo-colonialism was infiltrating the county via civil society, which 
castigated Mbeki‘s take on the multinationals only to promote the 
multi-billion dollar ARV business in South Africa.
45
 In this 
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presentation, civil society simply detracted Mbeki from opposing the 
mass import of toxic ARV drugs.
 46
  
In 2002/2003 the SA government responded very negatively to 
the domestic activist groups‘ efforts in smuggling generics to the 
country. The local production of generics begun as late as in 2003, 
when its role as a tool in cutting deals with the pharmaceutical sector 
decreased.
47
 Some policy analysts noted that advocates of the generics, 
such as The Clinton Foundation, were quietly pushed aside.
48
 
According to one report, ―[M]any generic companies complained of 
being shut out of the process — which mostly seemed tailored to 
favour the Western pharmaceutical industry and/or possibly, the 
development of South African sources.‖49 By 2006, the South African 
government failed to secure licenses for the generic manufacture and 
production of second-line drugs.
50
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Indicator 2a:  Providing ARVs to key vulnerable groups 
The international policy consensus underscored the critical importance 
of treating key vulnerable groups, which might become bridge 
populations. The provision of the ARVs to mothers is viewed as a high 
priority, as mothers constitute the key target vulnerable population, in 
which the transmission of HIV is highly preventable. In South African 
case, despite the decreasing prices and increasing efficiency and safety 
of the drugs, the Cabinet was reluctant to offer mother to child 
prevention transmission (MTCTP) programs. However, once 
international funding became available, the Cabinet reversed its 
decision. This evidence is consistent with the strategy of marketization 
as the core component of African Renaissance.  
The following policy choices attracted most attention in the 
South African mass media. In October 1998 the Health Minister Dr. 
Dlamini-Zuma, along with the various provincial Members of 
Executive Council for Health (MECs), decided not to make AZT 
available to MTCTP and discontinue the pilot projects.
51
 In 2000 
Phakamile ―Parks‖ Mankahlana indicated that the MTCPT policy, if 
fully implemented, will result in dramatic increase of orphans and 
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vulnerable children (OVC), which would deplete the state resources.
52
 
Dr. Nono Simelela (Chief Director for HIV, AIDS and STDs in the 
National Department of Health) argued that implementing MTCPT 
would imperil the other vital health needs of all South Africans. This 
argument continually translated into attempts to stop and then delay 
the universal rollout of drugs as related to the most vulnerable 
population. 
Calculations made by the prominent domestic health 
economists had no impact on the DOH‘s position, ―despite medical 
and economic research showing that the costs of MTCTP were more 
than offset by the cost-savings associated with reduced numbers of 
HIV-related paediatric cases.‖53 According to James Myberg, the 
funds were diverted to other way less critical goals ―The R80m it 
would have cost to roll out this programme was to be spent instead on 
an anti-AIDS advertising campaign. This was launched on October 9 
1998 by Mbeki in a nationally televised address.‖54 While the 
provinces of Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape were 
able to start more or less decent MTCTP, the national officials 
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obstructed the logistical support and planning of the rollout in the rest 
of the provinces.
55
   
This policy was promoted against the backdrop of strong 
public criticism and pressure from the ANC‘s traditional allies.56 
Prominent political figures, including Nelson Mandela, Desmond 
Tutu, and Mbhazima Shilowa joined the set of ―traditional‖ critics of 
the cabinet and Ministry of Health. According to Patrick Furlong and 
Karen Ball, ―state response to criticism from traditional supporters was 
the cabinet‘s dramatic recommitment on 17 April 2002 to fighting 
AIDS…the cabinet also asserted that universal rollout of PMTCT 
drugs and supportive programs for rape survivors were on track.‖57   
Yet the real change in the policy did not come until generous 
financial aid from international sources became available. According 
to Theo Smart, ―given South Africa‘s history on the issue, without 
pressure from PEPFAR, it is not clear how far those efforts would 
have favoured the roll-out of ART.‖58 Since the beginning of PEPFAR 
disbursements: 
 3,045,400 pregnant women  began receiving HIV counseling and 
testing services for PMTCT ; 
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 462,400 HIV-positive pregnant women receiving antiretroviral 
prophylaxis for PMTCT ;  
 528,100 orphans and vulnerable children (OVCs) were served by 
the program in FY 2008 alone.
59
 
 
Indicator 2b: Scaling up as a proxy for universality 
The rapid improvement of biomedical technology, the fast-growing 
generics industry in the developing world (India, Brazil, and 
Thailand), and subsequently steadily decreasing prices on 
pharmaceutical products at least in principle made ARVs affordable 
for the national rollout. Yet the South Africa put forth unaffordability 
argument, which stemmed from marketization as the core component 
of African Renaissance. In essence, it prescribed to curb the spending 
in the public sector. However, once international funding became 
available, the Cabinet was willing to comply with the global consensus 
of scaling up.   
The extant elite‘s commitment to marketization prompted the 
Cabinet to keep the HIV treatment programs down or discontinuing 
the modest AZT treatment programs, which were available at that 
juncture in time.  Pretoria stayed committed to the argument of 
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unaffordability in the context of continuous public outcry against these 
policies headed by the strengthening pro-treatment coalition in 
particular and the leftist critics of neo-liberal economic principles in 
general. Scholars and practitioners describe a variety of high-profile 
activities, including meetings and conferences, civil disobedience 
campaigns, litigation campaigns, as well as negotiations and talks at 
key ―consensus-seeking institutions.‖ The special attention is paid for 
the Durban Declaration (2000), Framework Agreement on a National 
Prevention and Treatment Plan for Combating HIV/AIDS (the 
National Economic Development and Labour Council, NEDLAC 
2002), and ―Dying for Treatment‖ campaign (2003).60 As a result of 
this pro-treatment mobilization, the Cabinet gave in to the scale-up 
demands and announced the new Operational Plan for Comprehensive 
HIV and Aids Care, Management and Treatment for South Africa (19 
November 2003). This plan officially stipulated the universal 
antiretroviral treatment provision in the framework of the public health 
care system. This plan also arranged for a significant increase of 
AIDS-related funding and set up numbers of a steady raise of the 
patients to be covered by the ARVs.
61
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However, according to the more cautious assessments, the 
victory of the pro-treatment coalition over the absenteeism of the 
South African government was marred by the palpable governmental 
reluctance to scale-up the ARV roll-out as required. Although the 
number of treated patients in the public sector constantly rose almost 
to the targets set in the Operational Plan, further reports suggested the 
inherent problems with the government‘s commitment to the 
universality of treatment. Generally, after November 2003 Pretoria 
continued to stall the scale-up efforts.
 62
  In 2003—2005 such 
prominent think tanks as the South African Health System Trust 
(HST), International Treatment Preparedness Coalition (ITPC) and 
Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) expressed some 
concerns with the implementation of the Operational Plan.
63
 Their 
reports indicated, first, that the government designated much less 
money for the full implementation of the announced targets than 
required. Second, the national and provincial health departments 
delayed the procurement of drugs, for a variety of reasons not able to 
use the significant portion of resources allocated by the Treasury for 
the comprehensive rollout. Most importantly, by 2005 there was only 
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23% ARV rollout countrywide, comparing to 85% in Botswana.
64
  In 
the province of KwaZulu-Natal the problems with ARV provision 
persisted until 2009; in the Free State the department of health 
imposed a moratorium to stop initiating ARV treatment for new 
patients, which was not lifted after a as four-month period as first 
planned.
65
 All this, of course, can be viewed as simply logistical 
challenges, related to the state‘s low capacity and efficiency.   
These logistical difficulties plague the country‘s anti-AIDS 
battle today as well. Yet in 2000s the lack of any extensive or 
elaborate plan for ARVs disbursement aggravated these problems.
66
 It 
mentioned treatment in a very generic way (not even antiretrovirals, 
but treatment of opportunistic diseases, along with care and support), 
while limiting the use of ARVs only to the post-exposure situations 
(such as sexual assault and occupational exposure in public health 
facilities). It was recommended that the research on the use of ARVs 
to be reviewed and re-evaluated.
67
  Thus, to a certain extent the 
Cabinet turned logistical difficulties into an excuse not to scale up the 
treatment. 
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In all this, Pretoria pitched itself against the WHO‘s 3X5 
initiative by the target year of 2005. The Health Minister directly 
challenged the initiative, saying that she did not ―…want to be pushed 
or pressurised by a target of three million people on antiretrovirals 
(ARVs) by 2005. WHO set that target themselves; they didn't consult 
us. I don‘t see why South Africa today must be the scapegoat for not 
reaching the target.‖68  
Finally, since the South African government received a 
generous PEPFAR funding, it changed its strategy and decided to 
scale-up the ARVs. This funding significantly mitigated the resource 
scarcity to achieve the universality of treatment. According to 
Nattrass, inflow of the external funding and support provided by 
PEPAFR and GFATM was fundamental to the increase of the 
universal ARV coverage in South Africa and quicken the rollout 
speed. Thus, the PEPFAR funding significantly contributed to the 
scale-up as indicated in the following Table 2. 
Table 7.2: PEPFAR‘s funding for treatment in RSA69 
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In 2006—2007 the volume of general criticisms against the 
domestic health policy and specific calls to dismiss Tshabalala-
Msimang peaked, along with the more general process of crumbling 
support for Mbeki as a national leader. Subsequently, NSP 2007—
2011 shows a remarkable breakthrough: it sets forth expanding access 
to appropriate treatment as a key priority area, while downgrading the 
research on the efficacy of traditional and complementary medicines 
for HIV treatment and OI prophylaxis as a secondary concern. This 
NSP for the first time clearly set the targets for scaling up care and 
support (80% of all HIV-positive people and their families by 2011).
70   
 
Indicator 2c: Treatment as an integral part of prevention 
The South African government chose not to use treatment for the 
purposes of prevention. First, the Cabinet resisted the policy of 
providing nevirapine as a central component of vertical prevention 
from mother to child.
71
  Until 2007 it continued to obstruct particular 
plan for mother to child transmission prevention (MTCTP) protocols. 
Second, until 2004 the government was resolute to use complementary 
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micronutrients and nutritional supplements as products preventing the 
development of AIDS. 
The central component of vertical prevention is to roll out 
nevirapine—the essential drug for mother to child prevention 
transmission (MTCPT). Nevirapine significantly reduces the chances 
of HIV transmission to infants and significantly alleviates the burden 
of the palliative/paediatric care to be carried out in the public health 
sector. The South African government, however, resisted this policy 
component by referring both to the drug safety issues and broader 
economic reasons of the treatment rollout.  Pretoria even tried to 
―debunk‖ the results of Uganda-based study (HIVNET012) and 
deregister nevirapine.
72
 Later on, after nevirapine was made available 
to South Africa free of charge, the official position stated that ―the 
costs of testing all pregnant women for HIV, of introducing necessary 
counselling service, and of providing infant formula (to prevent 
transmission of HIV through breast milk) were too high.‖73 
The argument against separation of prevention and treatment 
became very important in the advocacy efforts of the pro-treatment 
groups. Over the period of several years, Treatment Action Campaign 
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(TAC) activists argued that treatment was an indispensable part of the 
prevention strategies and it should be universally provided within the 
public health care system and that the separation of the two policy 
components was unacceptable. At the XV International AIDS 
Conference, TAC decisively brought the issue of the role of treatment 
in prevention at the international arena (Thailand, 2004). Backed by 
Dr. Jim Yong Kim (WHO director for HIV/AIDS) TAC chairperson 
Zackie Achmat exposed the SA health department‘s position on the 
resistance to the use of nevirapine for MTCPT as a ―vertical 
prevention‖ measure.  
Even after the Constitutional Court ruled to administer 
nevirapine in the public health sector, the resistance continued. In 2002 
Mpumalanga‘s MEC Dr. Sibongile Manana did not comply with the 
order.
74
 In August 2003 Medicines Control Council (MCC) withdrew 
the license for the use of nevirapine, ignoring both the domestic 
studies and trials, as well broad international practice of administering 
the drug.
75
  In essence, the pro-active vertical prevention measures 
were announced as late as in November 2007, only when the 
governmental resolve to resist the pro-treatment coalition significantly 
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weakened. In 2007 Deputy President Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka 
chaired a meeting with South African National AIDS Council 
(SANAC) and announced a new PMTCT protocol consistent with the 
global prescriptions.
76
  
While stalling the vertical prevention, the government actively 
promoted the idea of prevention through nutrition. In 2000-2004, the 
Cabinet actively promoted the ―immune-boosting‖ concoctions and 
various nutritional supplements as the major alternative to the 
internationally sanctioned medicines. In 2003 Dr. Manto Tshabalala-
Msimang publicly suggested several variations of the so-called 
nutritious recovery regimen and the ―Mediterranean diet,‖ consisting 
of garlic, ginger, beetroots, and olive oil. There is no doubt that an 
adequate nutrition is a part of generic healthiness, yet from the 
standard medical viewpoint should not be adopted as the primary and 
exclusive preventive measure against AIDS.  Roberto Giraldo, the 
Health Minister‘s official nutritional advisor was a strong advocate of 
complementary and alternative treatment programs, notorious for 
making some outlandish claims to about the near miraculous results 
associated with alternative medicines: 
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The use of food, micronutrient/antioxidant 
supplements, and herbal remedies can reverse the 
effects of AIDS and can prevent the progression of 
HIV-positive individuals to AIDS. Their use can avoid 
the ―transmission‖ of what is known as HIV from 
person to person and from mother to child during 
pregnancy, delivery, and breastfeeding. Their use can 
arrest ―HIV viral loads‖ and can reverse AIDS 
dementia… Food, nutritional/antioxidant supplements 
and indigenous herbs are an effective and inexpensive 
alternative for the prevention and treatment of AIDS. 
Testimonies explained that it could cost as little as US 
$7 per month.
77
  
 
PARTNERSHIPS  
Indicator 3a: Public-private partnerships 
The intentional efforts to implement public-private interaction 
mechanisms and contract private sector for the public needs (PPP) are 
pivotal to increase the capacity of the public health care sector, where 
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the ARVs are rollout to anybody who needs them. The critical 
evidence suggests that the South African government opted to protect 
private sector, while keeping the expenditures in the public sector as 
minimal as possible to prevent the undesired overspending. This 
evidence is consistent with the strategy of marketization as the core 
component of African Renaissance.  
Prior to 2001 90% of the seropositive patients were treated in 
the private sector (yet overall it was just a fraction of people who 
needed treatment at heat time). In 2004 only 11,000 HIV-positive 
people received treatment from the public health system, which was 1 
out of every 50 AIDS patients who were medically ready for ARVs.
78
 
After 2004, however, the government did not resist to PPP overtly, but 
avoided decisive policies in transferring risks to the private sector in 
achieving the universality of treatment. More specifically, in 2005—
2008 the annual editions of the South African Health Reviews 
emphasized the continuing accumulation of resources and expertise in 
the private sector, the absence of public-private interaction 
mechanisms, and, with a few exceptions, the governmental reluctance 
to contracting private sector for the public needs.
79
 As one chapter 
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from the 2005 Health System Trust (HST)‘s South African Health 
Review (SAHR) report put it,  
The financial disparity in health spending between 
the two sectors has widened, with the private sector 
spending approximately seven times more per capita 
than the public sector, on less than 20% of the 
population. The public sector serves 84% of the 
population (mainly the uninsured and poor), spending 
approximately 41% of total health funding.
80
 
Once again, the missed targets indicated Pretoria did not 
consider the possibility of sacrificing the empowerment of 
marketization in order to implement more redistributive, social-
oriented programs. In the most outspoken form, the claim that the 
universal access in the public sector was not sustainable in the long run 
lasted from 1998 to 2003.
81
  In 2001 Dr. Ayanda Ntsaluba (in 1998—
2003 Director-General for Policy and Planning in the National 
Department of Health) underscored the logistical challenges behind the 
universal rollout in the public sector, which would hamper its 
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implementation.
82
 In 2003 Dr. Tshabalala-Msimang argued that the 
provision of treatment would be sustainable only if the government 
adequately tackled the problem of improving the domestic health care 
system infrastructure.
83
 While a large-scale AIDS intervention with 
HAART was estimated between 1 and 3%, these arguments were but 
exceeding rationalization of why the universal rollout in public sector 
was undesirable.  
The budgetary financial constraints got alleviated at the 
moment when external donor assistance programs amassed to the half 
of the money for the universal antiretroviral rollout. The availability of 
resources, however, did not change the domestic stress on 
marketization. According to several domestic reports, the South 
African government continued to view the provision of ARVs in 
public sector as an ―additional to, and not a replacement for, existing 
ARV access through managed private sector care schemes.‖84 Nicoli 
Nattrass argued that the external finial inflows to South Africa had an 
adverse effect on public sector, as they essentially had taken all the 
pressure off the national Department of Health to use available 
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domestic resources.
85
 This means that the Cabinet government used 
the influx of foreign resources not to strengthen its public sector, but 
rather to protect its private sector. Subsequently, the Cabinet critics 
became concerned about the potential effects of donor dependency, 
locking in the weakness of the public sector, as it happened in some 
other African countries as well. The Cabinet chose not to be engaged 
in this discussion.
 
 
The second part of the story is the Cabinet‘s strategy to 
decrease the policy-making capacity of the public sector, including 
health agencies, medical research units, health regulatory bodies, and 
prominent individuals, while putting them under the direct control of 
Manto Tshabalala-Msimang.  In the late 1990s the SA government 
undermined the authority of the MCC by reversing its decision on 
Virodene as toxic and unsafe (see the previous subsection), and 
disputed the safety of nevirapine. MMC, however, reaffirmed its 
independence as it kept refusing to sanction its clinical trails.
86
 The 
Cabinet went as far as firing Peter Folb, then director of the MCC and 
the ANC member.
 
 In 2004 the government-backed Dr. Rath 
Foundation published a petition to disband the MCC, calling it ―an 
agency whose members are directly or indirectly dependent on the 
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international pharmaceutical industry, and whose decisions have 
consistently served these foreign interests at the cost of the health and 
lives of the people of South Africa.‖87 In 2008 Tshabalala-Msimang 
promoted the legislation to replace ―the ineffective and slow‖ MCC 
with Regulatory Authority for Health Products (RAHP), which was 
intended to ―close loopholes by covering traditional and 
complementary medicines‖ and command more staff and resources.88   
Other examples include the governmental restrains on the 
Medical Research Council (MRC), as well as its president Malegapuru 
Makgoba, the prominent epidemiologists from the University of 
Witwatersrand, once Mbeki‘s supporter. Makgoba‘s objections to the 
governmental stance on the ARV policy were dismissed by Mbeki 
himself, which in effect ended their partnership. The Cabinet put 
constraints on MRC‘s mandate, censured the body‘s research findings, 
and accused it of being hostile to the government.
89
  The apparat 
games permeated the Department of Health as well. In 2007 Deputy 
Minister Nozizwe Madlala-Routledge was fired after having 
participated in the International AIDS Conference in Barcelona. While 
the official reason was her failure to secure a direct presidential 
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approval, the media attributed the firing to her mainstream beliefs 
about the role of ARV treatment. 
 
Indicator 3b: Aid and expertise of international health organizations  
Today international recommendations have become almost universally 
recognized as important tools in improving domestic policies, 
including public health. This implies that following the guidelines and 
recommendations provided by international health organizations, such 
as the WHO, UNAIDS, and others is indispensable in developing 
adequate domestic health policies. In 1994—1996, the government 
explicitly embraced partnerships with international governmental 
organizations, private sector and civil society.
90
 In the late 1990s, the 
stress on exceptionalism and continental leadership as elements of 
common good prompted the Cabinet to establish an alternative forum 
of the HIV/AIDS-related biomedical expertise and later claim that the 
international health organizations‘ prescription and guidelines are 
misinformed and ill-suited for South African realities.   
Instead of pursuing closer partnership with international health 
organizations, in the early 2000s Pretoria turned to the AIDS 
dissidents as chief partners in formulating the appropriate policies in 
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response to the epidemic. This decision went against the grain of the 
common biomedical expertise. Most importantly, first, the AIDS 
denialist movement was hardly a recognizable and legitimate 
international force since 1996, when many dissidents refused to take 
the newly available ARV medications and passed away. Second, the 
Cabinet valued the dissidents‘ approach as it was believed to be open 
to the African knowledge and not committed to the Western science 
methodologically. The irony of this commitment was that the dissident 
theory had been formulated by the Westerns scientists, as many 
political observers snidely remarked. In essence, sponsoring select 
biomedical pariahs from across the globe was intended to challenge 
the expertise of mainstream international health organizations, as well 
as to the medical and pharmaceutical establishment of the Global 
North. The public criticism of the dissidents was interpreted as an 
orchestrated campaign, using racially skewed science to suppress 
Africa‘s independent quest for unique solutions.91 
More specifically, South African government and President 
Mbeki personally commissioned the Presidential AIDS Advisory 
Panel (PAAP, or the Pretoria Panel), of which the dissidents comprised 
at least a half. PAAP brought together notable dissidents Prof. Peter 
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Duesberg, Prof. Sam Mhlongo, Dr. Valendar Turner, and Dr. David 
Rasnik. Their recommendations for South Africa were based on the 
claims that AIDS was not contagious, although many of the 
opportunistic infections were; AIDS was not sexually transmitted; 
AIDS was not caused by HIV; the admittedly toxic anti-HIV drugs 
were killing people; the drug-induced toxic effects caused AIDS-
defining conditions that cannot be distinguished from AIDS.
 92
 
This counter-epistemic community gave President Mbeki and 
his supporters a quasi-scientific vocabulary to refute the conventional 
epidemiological wisdom that HIV was the cause of AIDS, and reject 
the cost-efficient and safe drugs. As a result, Mbeki created a self-
deceptive possibility to select among a large number of legitimate 
health policy options how to deal with the epidemic domestically. In 
the summary policy document, PAAP fused two contradictory sets of 
recommendations. AIDS denialists recommended suspending all HIV 
testing in the country, using no ARVs to treat patients, while 
eradicating other infectious diseases, and improving nutrition and 
sanitation.
 
 
Under the strong pressures applied by international-domestic 
pro-treatment coalition, the PAAP was disbanded and never 
reconvened again in the same format. The disbanding PAAP, however, 
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converted neither into the acceptance of the expertise of the 
international health organizations, nor in straightforward endorsement 
of the mainstream science. After an enormous international and 
domestic outcry Mbeki distanced himself from AIDS activists by 
asking AIDS dissidents not to use his name for the fundraising 
purposes. Yet this distancing remained somewhat duplicitous.
93
 In 
2007 Roberts politicized the public criticism of bringing the dissidents 
on the panel. He charged critics being informed by colonial 
scholarship, racial stereotypes, and the beliefs in black incompetence 
and native unfitness for governance:    
But why, upon mature reflection, would anybody be 
surprised that a responsible elected official wants to 
acquaint himself ―with all sides‖ of a science that 
everybody says is central to a massive health crisis under 
his watch? It is an elementary intellectual procedure, unless 
of course the leader is implicitly denied the right to or 
faculty of intellect. He must just shut up. He must just 
obey… Mbeki‘s sin was to reject a drug-based intellectual 
protectionism in favour of a free exchange of ideas on the 
proper solution to the AIDS pandemic…Mbeki‘s 
methodical inquiry was recast as native 
                                                     
93
 Business Day, November 07, 2007 
375 
 
stubbornness…Mbeki is cast as a heathen, a non-
believer—indeed as the proverbial Kaffir in that rich and 
resonant word‘s original sense.94 
After the whole dissident debacle was over, the Cabinet turned 
to more subtle ways not to forge partnerships with the international 
health organizations. The Department of Health resisted the adoption 
of an adequate monitoring and evaluation system, which would have 
enabled comparison between the domestic progress and international 
guidelines and objectives. In general, the crucial evidence is that the 
overwhelming majority of the domestic policy documents either did 
not follow these prescriptions, or attempted to reframe them.
95
  
For instance, the first official update report ―Progress Report 
on the Declaration of Commitment on HIV and AIDS‖ submitted by 
DOH in 2006 was widely criticized in eluding the discussion and 
presentation of any tangible data that would allow to compare the 
domestic progress with the international guidelines and objectives.  
Evading the monitoring and evaluation mechanism was also pervasive 
on the provincial level as well. According to the Joint Civil Society 
Monitoring Forum (JCSMF) by 2006 the provincial health 
departments provided neither disaggregated data on HIV/AIDS 
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expenditures, nor the information about rollout for the domestic 
monitoring agencies.
96
 Only in 2007, the National Strategic Plan for 
2007—2011 making provisions for the large national ARV rollout, 
soon to be praised internationally, recommended to follow 
international prescriptions in establishing the monitoring and 
evaluation framework.
97
 
 
Indicator 3c: Partnership with civil society sector    
In this subsection I argue that Pretoria pursued selective partnerships 
with domestic civil society organizations. It refused to cooperate with 
those organizations, which the Cabinet perceived as disloyal to the 
South African common good, sided with the neo-colonial global 
pharmaceutical sector, and used international arena to discredit the 
country.  The Cabinet preferred to forge connection with organizations 
advocating local solutions for the country‘s exceptional problems, 
which is consistent with the core components of social purpose. 
Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) remained the most visible 
and internationally supported AIDS treatment advocacy group. TAC 
fully embraced the international consensus on the nature of the 
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pandemic (and therefore the norm of ARVs as a biomedical solution. 
Because of its strong resolve and consistence with the global 
consensus on ARVs, by 2004 TAC received an international 
recognition and was broadly praised for its efforts to promote the use 
of antiretrovirals in the country. Moreover, to a great extent, it was 
able to frame the global academic discussion about HIV/AIDS politics 
in South Africa and advertised its cause via the eye-grabbing 
campaigns of civil protests.   
TAC effectively became a linking pin between domestic and 
international civil society organizations since its active participation at 
the international AIDS conferences, which brought TAC international 
supporters. At the XII International AIDS Conference (Durban, SA 
July 2000) TAC and Doctors without Borders (MSF) organized a joint 
satellite conference ―Improving Access to HIV/AIDS Drugs in 
Developing Countries.‖ In 2002, following the Barcelona Conference, 
TAC tried to bring together most visible civil society organizations 
across Africa to create a unified pro-treatment advocacy network 
under the name of Pan-African HIV/AIDS Treatment Access 
Movement (PHATAM).
98
 In 2006 At the XVI International AIDS 
Conference TAC co-organized the march for the Global Day of 
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Action in Brazil, Canada, China, and South Africa.  Thus, the early 
2000s the domestic pro-treatment coalition was able to forge the strong 
international links.
99
 
As TAC gained more international recognition and credibility, 
the members of Mbeki‘s administration became evermore hostile and 
unwilling to collaborate with it. According to the ANC member 
Andrew Feinstein, who took notes during Mbeki‘s speech at the ANC 
caucus meeting in 2000, Mbeki blamed TAC for lobbying the special 
interests of the pharmaceutical sector (and thus acting as an agent of 
foreign influence).
100
 According to TAC‘s Secretary-General Sipho 
Mthathi, in 2004 the governmental representatives charged the 
organization with ―using international podiums to embarrass the South 
African government and of not being patriotic.‖101  In 2006, Pretoria 
attempted to exclude TAC (as well as Friends of TAC, and the AIDS 
Law Project, ALP) from participating in the Review Meeting on the 
UNGASS Declaration of Commitment, taking place at the United 
Nations in New York in 2006.  Ultimately, the Cabinet strongly 
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disapproved of the domestic civil society‘s participation in 
international health conferences and their appeal to the international 
arena. This animosity notwithstanding, TAC was gaining political 
momentum and domestic prominence.  
The Cabinet chose to support organizations, which were hostile 
to ―AIDS-drug lobby‖ and backed up the governmental call for the 
African solutions for African problems.
 102
  For instance, the Dr. Rath 
Foundation, the SA National Civic Organisation (SANCO), and the 
Treatment Information Group (TIG)—for a long time were favored in 
the DOH. The official Operational Plan for Comprehensive HIV and 
AIDS Care, Management and Treatment for South Africa went as far 
as incorporating Robert Giraldo‘s alternative nutrition-related 
interventions in its policy recommendations.
103
 The governmental 
links with these organizations remained quite strong as long as the 
Cabinet‘s strategy to promote complementary and alternative solutions 
for African epidemic endured. Tshabalala-Msimang maintained 
personal relations with Dr. Matthias Rath and Robert Giraldo. The 
former proposed treating HIV/AIDS with his multivitamin supplement 
VitaCell and claimed that G8 was involved in the genocide and 
recolonization conspiracy against Africa; while the latter was the 
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Minister‘s personal nutritionist.104 The governmental partnership with 
persons and groups promoting nutritional treatment flourished until 
2008, when the Cape High Court ruled multivitamin trials illegal and 
instructed to investigate Rath‘s activities.  
Besides these intentional partnerships with these unhinged 
nutritionists, the Cabinet was generally supportive of those 
organizations and groups, which concentrated on poverty and 
malnutrition as deep structural variables driving the epidemic, while 
not rejecting the life-saving role of the ARVs. At one point, the 
Department of Health became the major donor of the South Africa‘s 
National Association of People Living with HIV/AIDS (NAPWA), an 
organization boasting 90 branches with estimated 300,000 members, 
yet suffering from the lack of funding and the crisis of legitimacy.
105
   
Not surprisingly, domestic AIDS dissidents sought to support 
Mbeki‘s AIDS policies and attack his ―drug-lore‖ opponents as well. 
In 2007 Treatment Information Group (TIG) drafted a 59-page bill of 
indictment for the prosecution of Zackie Achmat at the International 
Criminal Court at the Hague on a charge of genocide for his direct 
criminal role in the deaths of thousands of South Africans from ARV 
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poisoning.
106
  By that time Mbeki‘s be supporters still were actively 
seeking a personal access to the President, since the speculation about 
his dissident views had never ceased to circulate in the country. Yet 
Mbeki cautiously avoided any public association with these 
individuals, and tried to revamp himself as a decision-maker in search 
of a specific and sensible policy. 
The government became willing to cooperate with the pro-
treatment activist movement only when Mbeki and Tshabalala-
Msimang lost their expressiveness in the public debate about AIDS 
and subsequently loosened their grip in controlling the health-related 
agencies.
107
 In 2005—2006 new Deputy President Phumzile Mlambo-
Ngcuka tried to restructure the organizational governance of 
HIV/AIDS in the country. The new National Strategic HIV/AIDS Plan 
(NSP 2007—2011) intended to return to the South African National 
AIDS Council (SANAC) the status of a linking-pin between the 
government and the civil society.
108
 To fulfill these objectives, 
Mlambo-Ngcuka brought on board a number of civil society 
representatives, including Mark Heywood of TAC as the deputy chair. 
Under her brief leadership, SANAC organized the 3rd National AIDS 
Conference in order to resolve the key contentious issues regarding the 
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HIV/AIDS.
 109
 Despite these efforts received an international 
recognition, they were effectively countered when the Health Minister 
returned from a sick leave in 2007. Quickly after her recovery, 
Tshabalala-Msimang once more tried to restructure SANAC in order 
to counterbalance the growing influence of the civil society 
representatives.
110
  Although her plan to keep only functionaries and 
loyalists ultimately failed, SANAC remained stuck between being an 
integrative and coordinating body, representative of South African 
AIDS community, and a rubber-stamp institution.  
Yet these modest elements of cooperation came out of 
necessity, and were never accepted as a principled policy. According 
to the report of International Treatment Prevention Coalition (ITPC) 
one 2006 report, the Cabinet continued ―efforts to inhibit full 
participation of civil society.‖111  Roberts, accordingly, once again 
accused AIDS activists and pro-treatment movement of generating the 
AIDS debate in order to discredit the South African democracy and 
gloss over the consequences of the apartheid rule, and perhaps even to 
rehabilitate it: 
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In the South African political context, it has been easier 
and more politically convenient... to blame black 
incompetence and even callousness for the AIDS epidemic 
that manifested itself immediately after 
 
1994, than to 
acknowledge the obvious momentum of history in creating 
it. The AIDS debate marks the most notable success of 
those who seek to erase apartheid and colonial history from 
South Africa‘s present-day self-understanding.112  
 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter asserts that in South Africa domestic responses to the 
global consensus on HIV/AIDS and the antiretroviral treatment were 
based on the deployment of an African Renaissance, the historically 
contingent and country-specific content of national purpose. In other 
words, the national purpose significantly impinged on the transfer of 
the global policy consensus on ARVs, prompting the Cabinet and its 
high-power members to challenge this consensus in public. On 
balance, I do not claim to be able to explain all nine indicators of the 
global consensus, yet the provided analysis both contributes to the 
existing explanations and covers important elements of the domestic 
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HIV/AIDS politics not spotlighted before(see the indicators 1a, 1b, 2b, 
3a, 3b, and 3c in the table below).  
South African elites questioned the sameness of 
epidemiological trajectory of the disease in South Africa and the rest 
of the world. Elite framed the domestic epidemic as a local 
developmental problem in opposition to the lifestyle issues and the 
massive consumption of various toxic drugs, including the 
antiretroviral medications, in the West (Indicator 1a). As an extension 
of this reasoning, political elites worked to revive and institutionalize 
the alternative/indigenous medicines as either a full substitute to the 
―toxic AZT,‖ or an addition to the Western biomedical products in 
general (Indicator 1b).  In this context, Pretoria for a while was not 
quite concerned about the rapid importation and domestic 
disbursement of generic pharmaceutical products; in certain cases even 
attempting to prosecute the smugglers of generics (Indicator 1c).  
In South African epidemiological conditions the most 
vulnerable group was mothers carrying the virus giving birth to 
children. Despite the decreasing prices and increasing efficiency and 
safety of the available drugs, for a while the Cabinet was reluctant to 
offer mother to child prevention transmission program as too 
expensive and pharmaceutically unsafe (Indicator 2a). To keep the 
385 
 
expenditures in the public sector as minimal as possible to prevent the 
undesired overspending, both Pretoria and provincial health officials 
consistently stalled the national roll-out programs on the ground and 
tried to block the universality of access to treatment in principle 
(Indicator 2b). The South African government was resolute to use 
complementary micronutrients and nutritional supplements for 
prevention of the development of opportunistic diseases (Indicator 2c). 
The critical evidence suggests that Pretoria chose to protect the 
relatively successful private sector and did not employ it to improve 
the dismal health care conditions in the public sector (Indicator 3a). 
The prospects of partnership with civil society sector were tainted by 
the latter‘s support of the Western biomedical products. As a result, 
the Cabinet preferred to forge connection with organizations 
advocating alternative and complementary treatment (Indicator 3b).  
Finally, Pretoria legitimized a counter-epistemic community of health 
dissidents and worked to make traditional healers to be recognized 
internationally. The government seemed to accept partnership with the 
international organizations, only when their financial assistance 
alleviated the burden of the public sector, which was consistent with 
the emphasis on slashing the spending (Indicator 3c). 
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Table 7.3:  Summary of the impact of national purpose on HIV/AIDS 
policy  
 
The consequences of deploying national purpose to HIV/AIDS issue-
area as a particularly South African problem were self-defeating 
inasmuch as doing so it thwarted adequate, quick and appropriate 
response to the country‘s looming health crisis. Pretoria missed the 
international targets of curbing HIV/AIDS and failed to acknowledge 
how grave the epidemiological situation was.  
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CHAPTER 8. PLACING SOCIAL PURPOSE IN THE CONTEXT 
OF RELEVANT LITERATURE  
 
Chapters 4 and 5 traced how Russian and South African political elites 
constructed and legitimized their new social purposes, which were 
respectively labeled ―Sovereign Democracy‖ and ―African 
Renaissance.‖ In these chapters, I examined how country-specific and 
politically contingent conceptions of common good legitimized certain 
kinds of policy actions and inhibited others.  
In both countries the advent of new social purpose occurred 
simultaneously with the spread of the epidemic of HIV/AIDS. Because 
the spread of the pandemic threatens the existence of the state and 
hinders the physical survival of population, providing the antiretroviral 
treatment becomes a fundamental common good. Chapters 6 and 7 
demonstrated how, why and to what extent social purpose politicized 
domestic policy responses to HIV/AIDS and prompted the kinds of 
actions considered legitimate and appropriate. In this context, the key 
decision-makers from these two countries have significantly filtered 
the standardized policy prescriptions to the pandemic through the 
pursued conceptions of common good.  
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The question remains whether or not my emphasis on social 
purpose as an intervening variable is robust to major alternative 
explanations, which might explain the cross-national deviations from 
the international best-cases practices.  This chapter places social 
purpose in three primary policy transfer explanations, including peer 
learning, coalition-building, and external pressures. This move 
sharpens my analytical focus and confirms social purpose as a 
plausible explanatory variable. 
 
In many cases, norm diffusion explanations provide very 
credible models demonstrating the adoption of or resistance to 
international, or foreign policies in the domestic arenas. Locating 
national purpose within broader explanations of norm diffusion will 
help me not only to test my findings from the previous chapters, but 
also facilitate thinking about how identity factors into in norm 
diffusion processes more generally.   
Wade Jacoby‘s classification is a good starting point, as it 
delineates among combination of foreign and domestic influences in 
the process of transfer, ranging from the uttermost involvement of the 
powerful outsiders to their exclusion, and is agnostic about the 
underlying normative logic of norm diffusion processes. According to 
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Jacoby‘s classification, the menu of policy transfer includes external 
influences, coalition-building and learning.
1
 One caveat here is that 
other scholars might use a different list of diffusion mechanisms, 
sometimes including regional competition, normative imitation, 
socialization, and so on.
2
  In this chapter I will not consider those 
mechanisms which either employ very specific scope conditions, or 
may not be relevant for the regions other than the European Union 
(EU), or can be subsumed under the broader norm diffusion models.
3
  
Table 8.1: Summary of the relationship between variables & 
explanations 
 
 
It is conjectured here that to the extent to which learning, 
coalition-building, and external pressures cannot explain the filtering 
of international policy initiatives in regard to HIV/AIDS, the focus on 
social purpose an explanatory variable becomes analytically 
warranted. I assert that the strength of domestic commitments to the 
formulated social purpose (both among elites and wider audience) may 
alter the theoretical predictions of policy transfer, otherwise having a 
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strong explanatory logic of how external prescriptions of change and 
innovation are adopted domestically. While I am not claiming that 
social purpose is the single explanation of the variation in national 
responses to the emerging infectious diseases, on balance it helps us 
explain how the deep-seated political commitments shape public 
policies. 
 
EXPLANATION 1: LEARNING 
A standard account of learning 
How does national purpose factor into learning as an explanation of 
policy transfer processes? It is hypothesized here that if social purpose 
has no impact on learning, than norm-taking elites should consider all 
available information and select the best case practices for domestic 
adoption. If the benefits of international policy are indeed tangible, 
selecting and implementing a ―rival‖ policy is the most straightforward 
indicator of the failure of learning. If social purpose does impact 
learning, then only a particular subset of the available practices will be 
considered and implemented. This, however, does not mean that we 
should strongly expect to see an observable deviation from the global 
policy consensus. Rather, we should expect to trace how certain 
components of common good filter what is available internationally. 
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For instance, international policy prescriptions might conform to the 
content of the social purpose and even amplify it.   
In the learning explanation (sometimes called ―inspiration‖) 
policy adoption occurs as a direct result of domestic elite buying into 
the foreign norm simply by being exposed to it at the global arena, and 
then realizing that an outside norm has significant benefits to improve 
domestic public health. More specifically, domestic decision-makers 
purposefully initiate the change in domestic policy inspired by a 
measurable policy success in other countries, anticipated benefits in its 
own country. These choices sometimes get mediated via the existing 
epistemic/medical networks, providing and interpreting the necessary 
technical (biomedical) information.
4
 In other words, domestic policy-
makers are ―inspired‖ by the outside-generated policies, prescription, 
and norms and then proceed to implement this policy domestically.  In 
the best-case scenario, domestic elites screen and evaluate all the 
available information.  
This model is by and large should have been applicable to 
Russia and South Africa—since the availability of more effective, 
relatively non-toxic, fixed-dose combination of triple therapy proved 
its effectiveness as a policy solution in many other countries. Neither 
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Russia, nor South Africa have been isolated from the international area 
and international health organizations during the time of the pandemic, 
which rules out any major domestically-generated political roadblocks 
to the policy transfer. In most cases, the technological expertise and 
help, especially since the early 2000s, was readily available. There is 
plenty of transnational communication about the appropriate 
HIV/AIDS policies at various conferences, international organizations, 
medical exchange civil society networking, and diplomatic venues, to 
name a few. If necessary, argument, reasoning, persuasion, 
information access, or even some material incentives may be 
employed at these venues to convince leaders to move faster and more 
decisively on the issue. Obviously, various social movements, non-
governmental organizations, representatives of the private sector and 
several epistemic communities may purposefully facilitate the learning 
about the global consensus on the HIV/AIDS policy and the 
subsequent adoption of antiretrovirals.   
In the learning model the adoption of an innovative foreign 
norm is most of the time an advantage. Indeed, quickly adopting the 
HIV/AIDS treatment can protecting countries from the potentially 
devastating consequences of the pandemic, such as the demographic 
collapse, spreading the disease among civil servants, teachers, 
increasing number of orphans and so on. However, this model implies 
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that the prospective technological success and biomedical information 
should be difficult to misinterpret and perceive as irrelevant for 
domestic circumstances. Thus, learning model does not account for the 
possibilities of the competing interpretations of and contestation 
around a given policy. On the contrary, it predicts relatively fast, 
smooth, and almost ―natural‖ adoption of ARVs across the globe, 
provided some basic level of state capacity.
5
 In essence, the learning 
model described here is very similar to the ―classical‘ definition of 
policy diffusion, used by Everett Rogers‘ followers in sociology: 
…policy innovations are communicated in the 
international system and adopted voluntary by an 
increasing number of countries over time. Diffusion 
refers to an international spread of policy innovation 
driven by information flows rather than hierarchical of 
collective decision making within international 
institutions… Diffusion becomes manifest only through 
the accumulation of individual cases of imitation or 
learning with respect to one and the same policy item.
6
 
In this context, an important qualification for the learning 
model is that it links various deviations from the standard spreading 
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policy to the particular timing when certain countries are up for 
adopting the norm. As HIV/AIDS is an acute health care crisis, it can 
be asserted that the sense of urgency prompts governments to act 
decisively and adopt the international recommendations when the 
infection rates skyrocket.  In the context of the generalized epidemic a 
country is more likely to adopt the international policy prescriptions as 
there is no time to develop radically different health intervention 
measures, while the policy solutions to combat HIV/AIDS are readily 
available for decision-makers. In the context of contained epidemic 
international guidelines can be discussed, debated, or simply ignored 
for the time being.
 
 Some broader observations point out that quite 
often the sense of emergency and the need to respond to pending 
health crisis is associated with neither certain epidemiological 
threshold, nor international projections of the global spread of 
HIV/AIDS. Brazil and Uganda, for instance, took the decisive steps in 
the late 1980s—early 1990s, when the very nature and implications of 
the disease were hotly debated. Other countries have been rejecting the 
state of national emergency, with infection rates estimated to come 
close to 20 percent of population.  In other words, adopting, 
challenging, or ignoring international consensus is likely to be a 
function of purposeful governmental choices, and not a function of 
seroprevalence. 
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As this dissertation was in progress, the HIV prevalence in 
South Africa rapidly increased to 20—25% of population, while in 
Russia even the most pessimistic estimates hardly exceeded 2 or 3% of 
the country‘s citizens. If this conjecture were accurate, Pretoria should 
have adopted and strictly observed the international consensus, while 
the Kremlin still had time to mull over the set of appropriate 
responses. Contrary to this expectation, South African Cabinet did not 
follow international recommendations even though the entire country‘s 
health collapse was looming large. Russian leaders pursued quite an 
aggressive government intervention, even though they believed that 
the epidemic would remain contained to vulnerable subpopulations.  
Yet qualifying my cases as or simply being laggards will completely 
overlook the political component in policy transfer.  
Generally, one may argue that cross-national variations in 
health policies, as well as ―deviation‖ from the global consensus grow 
from the differences in the epidemiological conditions, the HIV-
infection prevalence, and the quality of health care sector (structural 
variables), rather than domestic policy environments, shaped by 
particular conceptions of public good.  In both countries the epidemic 
of HIV/AIDS impacts different populations (mothers and orphans in 
South Africa, drug users in Russia), and while growing in the 
magnitude of its impact, contributes to the dissimilarity of 
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epidemiologic situation. From the health policy standpoint, individual 
countries should adjust their policies to the specific epidemiological 
trajectories and characteristics. Policy variations might emerge, for 
instance, in relation to at what point antiretroviral treatment should be 
provided regarding the decrease of to the specific number of T-cells. 
Thus the health crisis will be to be addressed somewhat differently. All 
this does not mean, however, that the epidemic should be addressed in 
terms other than public health crisis. 
 
Learning in South Africa 
While various elements of the global consensus on the HIV/AIDS 
treatment were spreading rapidly among African countries, the 
opportunities for learning were ample.
7
  As several policy experts 
indicate, prior to 1998 Pretoria was following the international 
prescriptions. More specifically, in the 1994 National AIDS Plan 
(NAP) was dubbed the ideal policy drafting process and reflected the 
majority (if not all) international prescriptions how to curb the 
pandemic. Russel noted that in the early to mid-1990s Mbeki publicly 
demonstrated a strong interest in spearheading the fight against AIDS, 
proactively filling in Mandela‘s lack of leadership on the issue. His 
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vision was compatible with UNAIDS program,‖ which impressed both 
Peter Piot of the UNAIDS and AIDS activists.
8
 In other words, the 
preconditions for learning about the global consensus to emerge after 
1996 were all in place. There is no solid way to claim that the country 
was simply a laggard case in norm diffusion as an alternative 
explanation of learning failure.  
In Chapter 6 I argued that South African understanding and 
responding to the epidemic was shaped by elite‘s conception of 
common good, known as African Renaissance. It made an entry in the 
policy environment circa 1998, when the positive achievements of the 
previous years in following the global consensus were reversed and the 
process of ―unlearning‖ was triggered. The stress of the Mbeki‘s 
presidency was placed on medicines developed in Africa for Africa, 
which would both strongly reaffirm the capacity of the former 
liberation movement to govern, and disprove the Western neo-colonial 
stereotypes about the native incapacity to solve their local problems 
using indigenous tools. In the early stage of his presidency it the 
priority was given to domestic Virodene, in 2004—2006—to 
alternative and nutritional medicines of various sorts, and after that the 
focus was placed exclusively on the institutionalization of native 
medicines. At the same time, the additional opportunities for learning 
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remained ample: several domestic health agencies, mainstream 
scientists, and many concerned members of the ANC fed enough 
information to the country‘s political leadership through both formal 
institutional channels and informal sources of personal and electronic 
communication.
9
 The general approach to treatment simply dismissed 
the results of domestic trials, which proved the efficiency of 
antiretrovirals
10
 and confirmed the adverse effects of abusing 
nutritional and vitamin supplements. 
Having whipped up these attitudes, Mbeki officially yet 
unwillingly withdrew from the HIV/AIDS debate. Pro-treatment 
activists attributed this to their protest and litigation campaign; 
Richard Calland attributed Mbeki‘s silence to the influence of his spin-
doctors and aids, more specifically Bheki Khumalo and Joel 
Netshitenzhe 2006.
11
 This silence was prompted by anything but 
genuine learning, as since 2002 Mbeki and his entourage tried to 
promote the same views, this time in a more secretive manner. The 
anonymous report ―Castro Hlongwane,‖ controversially regurgitating 
the substandard views on the pandemic and drugs, was attributed to 
Mbeki and Peter Mokaba and was traced to a computer in the 
presidency. It challenged the very assertion of learning from the 
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biomedical experts: ―that only scientists and medical doctors are 
capable of understanding this medical condition‖ and epidemiology of 
HIV and AIDS.
12
 Later on, Mbeki remained wishy-washy about his 
biomedical views when his biographer Mark Gevisser confronted him 
with more tough questions while preparing the President‘s biography.  
Even after 2007, when the country launched the globally approved 
large-scale national ARV program, Mbeki shied away from speaking 
in public about the benefits of this treatment.
13
  
More broadly, South African policy environment got primed to 
overemphasize the importance of genetic medicinal resources and 
traditional healing practices. In this context, the Cabinet and many 
provincial health departments did not internalize the global consensus 
either. In accordance with prescription to find African (indigenous) 
solutions to the specific incidence of AIDS in Africa, in 2004—2008 
Pretoria shifted focus to emphasize the indigenous knowledge and 
traditional medical practices.
14
 According to the Health Minister, 
African Traditional Medicines (ATMs), apart from their medicinal 
values defined South Africans as people, values which some 
mysterious forces attack:  ―it is this heritage amongst others that we 
are simply not going to give away purely because of the humiliation 
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we get subjected to for the things we believe in.‖ 15  In general, both 
public intellectuals and governmental agencies claimed that the 
emphasis on the indigenous knowledge was counter-hegemonic and 
anti-colonial in nature and thus affirming the values of African 
Renaissance.
16
 Alternative treatments were pursued not as some nice 
niche thing to show off the respect for the local cultural heritage, but 
rather as a serious replacement of the ARVs. This downplayed the 
gravity of the problem of epidemic and demedicalized it by putting it 
in the context of poverty. As the solution to the epidemic, it fit in the 
African Renaissance as an integral part of the resistance to the 
(neo)colonial attitudes to undermine traditional medicine.
17
   
Furthermore, in pursuing this policy, the Cabinet actively 
looked for the alternative international health guidelines compatible 
with the domestic policy choices on traditional healing. Despite the 
WHO‘s and the World Banks‘s international guidelines concerning 
preservation of traditional knowledge were by and large vague and 
cautious, the South African government tried to elevate these 
international guidelines to the prescriptive status, thus trying to justify 
the switch from ARVs to ATMs and challenging the Western 
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medicines with alternative treatment agenda. Pretoria also promoted 
ATMs at the international arena. For instance, in 2007 the government 
hosted the 3
rd
 Ordinary Session of the Conference of African Ministers 
of Health (CAMH3) in the framework of the African Union (AU) 
decade on African traditional medicine.
18
 The Cabinet invented and 
began observing African Traditional Medicine Day. The consequences 
of not learning about the HIV and ARVs and obscuring the 
connections between treatment and prevention were self-defeating in 
as much as they made possible the rejection of the safe, efficient and 
cost-effective mainstream measures to curb the epidemic. This 
rejection resulted in a grim toll with attributable loss of 334,300 lives 
with more than 2.2 million life-yeast lost according to the Journal of 
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome.
19
    
 
Learning in Russia 
Unlike many other states, Russian government was never in overt 
denial of the disease, even in the 1990s, when other numerous pressing 
social and economic problems overwhelmed Russian politicians.
20
 As 
early as in 1990 Boris Yeltsin‘s pledged to donate a part of his 
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autobiography‘s honorarium to combat HIV/AIDS.21 The federal 
legislature enacted the stream of AIDS-related laws and programs, 
including the provision for the free access to treatment, even when the 
official number of HIV-infected population was about 1000 people. At 
the same time, the constantly growing epidemic (number of the 
infected population was at least doubling each year starting the late 
1990s) and the rapid increase of IV drug users did not translate in an 
acute epidemiological awareness, let alone understanding HIV/AIDS 
as the looming public health crisis. In general, prior to 2006 the 
government has significantly underfunded the response, spending only 
about five million dollars per year, had no streamlined national policy 
how to respond to HIV/AIDS, and was vague on acknowledgement 
what  the spread of the disease actually meant for Russia‘s 
development etc. Despite overwhelming financial shortcomings and 
perhaps meager state capacities, the preconditions for learning were all 
in place. There is no solid way to claim that the country was simply a 
laggard case in norm diffusion as an alternative explanation of learning 
failure.  
In Chapter 6 I argued that Russian understanding and 
responding to the epidemic was shaped by national purpose, a genuine 
concern for the demographic future of the polity, and a public relation 
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exploit. The stress on demographic decline was not random. Russian 
political elite viewed it as the consequence of the state weakness in the 
1990s, thus being at odds with the imperative of attaining the strong 
state as the principal component of national purpose. While the 
observers correctly praised Putin‘s acknowledgment of HIV/AIDS as a 
serious threat to the country, the kind of actions Russian government 
pursued was not based on the meticulous screening all the available 
technical information, success stories and best cases, On the contrary, 
the Kremlin‘s integrated those elements from the global consensus, 
which seemed to be appropriate inasmuch as they were consistent with 
Sovereign Democracy. As a result, Russia failed to learn in two crucial 
respects.  
First, technological efficiency and humanity of harm reduction 
programs were unambiguously ruled out of the national policy 
response as highly inappropriate and illegitimate. For instance, the 
western recommendations about human rights standards and efficiency 
in treating the vulnerable populations went against the grain of 
Sovereign Democracy‘s anti-liberalism. In some radical formulations, 
the harm reduction programs were rendered more dangerous than 
HIV/AIDS itself, whose spread was attributed to the ―aggressive alien 
ideology of the western origin.‖ Human rights advocates, with the 
notable exception of the ―domesticated‖ ombudsman Vladimir Lukin, 
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were seen as regimes‘ Other. The more repressive policy choices, 
characteristic of China and some South-East Asian countries, on the 
other hand, were presented—without much hard evidence or even 
appropriate discussion—as great examples of a successful fight against 
narcotics and the epidemic.
22
 In the narrow sense, stigmatization can 
generically explain the difficulties of reaching out to the key risk 
groups [from below] and having them to come forward to discuss the 
desired ARV policies. Yet the national strategy should definitely 
become more pro-active in providing treatment and legal framework, 
as the focal point of public health prevention practices. This filtering 
went against various international and domestic biomedical and 
epidemiological experts‘ policy recommendations for the government 
how to follow the global policy consensus on ARV.   
Second, the Kremlin understood the looming epidemic of 
HIV/AIDS as a secondary factor, rather than a public health crisis in 
its own right—despite the mounting attention and expressive political 
urgency attached to the topic globally. Dmitry Medvev in both of his 
capacities as the President and previously the person responsible for 
the improvement of Russians‘ well-being and health, never mentioned 
HIV/AIDS as a national health crisis even once in all his multiple 
newspaper interviews, on-line appearances and blogging, of which he 
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proved to be so fond of. The special multisectoral Governmental 
Committee, which in theory was put together to be in charge of 
formulating the consolidated national strategy to respond to HIV/AIDS 
as a broad public health crisis remained by and large defunct since its 
inception. After several year of the initial recognition of AIDS as a 
potential threat, it became obvious the Russian government did not 
formulate an adequate strategy in accordance to the international 
consensus on AIDS.   
In general, the overemphasized stress on the law enforcement 
agencies and return to very harsh, some would say truly repressive 
measures, in many aspects of domestic political and economic affairs, 
should be seen as a distinct contribution of Putin‘s administration, 
legitimized and propagated by the Sovereign Democracy and 
engrained in the newly found passion of the Russian political elite--its 
disdain for liberalism and human rights. Scholars tend to explain the 
resistance to decriminalization of IDU treatment strategies in general 
and SNPs in particular in terms of the deeply enrooted legacies of the 
soviet repressive policies.
23
 Indeed, in the late 1980s the legislation 
adopted several severely restrictive and criminalizing measures, which 
violated the principle of human rights (including resource-demanding 
and ineffective mass involuntary testing, deportation of the foreigners 
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with HIV, and so on). Yet the overemphasized stress on the law 
enforcement was significantly punctured in the 1990s (for instance, by 
Yeltsin‘s multiple reorganizations of the state security and intelligence 
community). The Yeltsin-era ―quiet‖ on the epidemic, it can be 
conjectured here, in case of the ability to dispose the requisite 
resources was less likely to imply ignoring the human rights issues in 
addressing the pandemic (there are some evidence of pro-active 
legislation on this count, including voluntary testing, illegality to fire 
infected workforce, etc). 
 
EXPLANATION 2: COALITION-BUILDING 
A standard account of coalition-building 
How does national purpose factor into coalition-building as an 
explanation of policy transfer processes? If social purpose does not 
matter, then national elites are likely to utilize international norm in 
order to broaden their support, or reach out to additional would-be 
supporters, and cement the prospective support groups together. In 
case if elite can capitalize on the constituents‘ negative attitude of the 
norm, we should expect a consistent effort of providing various 
resources (financial, logistical etc) to mobilize them into broader anti-
norm coalition. In case if the strong coalitions with a ―positive‖ take 
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on the international norm are already formed, domestic elites are 
expected to bandwagon them. If social purpose does matters, we 
should expect domestic elites to stick to the localized interpretation of 
the policy, and pursue the selective policy promotions even with the 
danger of losing some political support. In other words, the value of 
pursuing coalitions and partnerships is likely to be determined on the 
basis whether or not sub-national groups share elite‘s commitment to a 
certain conception of common good, rather than their generic utility in 
reaching out to those constituents that do not support the contents of 
social purpose in principle.  
According to Jacoby, coalition-building is the most common 
way how foreign norms and practices achieve domestic prominence. In 
general, more or less powerful outside norm-givers achieve domestic 
change by empowering, sponsoring, or simply encouraging existing 
minority traditions, which become their allies in injecting international 
norms in domestic contexts and building their general attractiveness. 
Minority traditions are defined as ―domestic movements, parties, or 
sub-sets of state officials who have pursued, but never achieved a 
particular institutional solution to an important political problem.‖ 
This account focuses on how minority entrepreneurs can sway 
otherwise recalcitrant governments in changing their policies. Even if 
the government strongly opposes the proposed international policy for 
408 
 
domestic adoption, if the minority tradition is gaining a momentum, 
especially if backed up the powerful foreign actors, it is more likely to 
give in to it. 
Similarly, a number of constructivist scholars—especially 
under the rubric of ―boomerang model‖—have discussed this kind of 
international interactions, including a wide range of relationship 
between norm-takers and norm-givers in terms of networks, social 
movements, and transnational coalitions.
24
 Even if there are many 
domestic norm entrepreneurs, the one with stronger international 
endorsement, more effective organizational capacities and broader 
popular appeal, is likely to get an advantage in the contestation.
25
 In 
the context of multiple contending norm entrepreneurs, the 
internationals become a factor helping minority traditions to get an 
upper hand in the contestation around the principles of policy change. 
Indeed, a potent transnational network is very important, as it can 
significantly empower the domestic agents of change and put 
significant pressures on state governments.
26
 Here the process of norm 
diffusion commences with tactical concessions norm-takers 
(governments) being made to entrepreneurs, which slowly turns into 
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adopting a new norm. In this case, even if governments strongly reject 
the instrumental utility and principled value of the incoming norm, 
they still might adopt a policy in question for a number of any strategic 
reasons. In reverse, the governments might side with domestic forces 
opposing the global consensus, especially if society is split in its 
reaction to the incoming policy. Ultimately, this explanation 
underscores that it is the calculation of specific political gains, rather 
than a technical value of the policy, that drives the policy transfer. 
The caveat is that in examining some empirical cases of 
coalition-building, the power of individual leaders is often deemed 
pivotal, if not incredibly exceptional. Particular coalition-building 
instances in the process of policy transfer may reflect leader‘s 
principled beliefs, his/hers personal political tastes, ideological likes 
and even some deeply engrained idiosyncratic convictions. Political 
leaders might empower some marginal and radical domestic and 
international actors to express, promote, and apply their substandard 
[in my case biomedical] convictions in the country. Thus, some 
deviations in anticipated course of how the process of coalition-
building occurs may be attributed to the leadership factor, making the 
partnership choice seemingly contingent and singular. In the context of 
this project, political leaders do not stand alone: they belong or even 
spearhead domestic elites, which generate and propagate a certain 
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conceptions of common good. Thus, political leaders as individuals are 
expected to act on this conception to promote their self-efficacy and 
self-esteem. In other words, powerful leaders should be analyzed in 
conjunction with domestic level of analysis. 
 
Coalition-building in South Africa 
The relevant literatures suggested that instrumental coalition-building 
around HIV/AIDS policies in South Africa was hardly possible. In the 
context of post-apartheid state the conflict around AIDS was ―a battle 
between certain state and non-state actors to define who has the right 
to speak about AIDS, to determine the response to AIDS, and even to 
define the problem itself.‖27   In other words, the governmental 
strategy of coalition-building clearly was not driven by the anticipated 
value of political gain.  
Prior to Mbeki administration, the government purposefully 
cooperated with major domestic health-related actors to formulate and 
implement the appropriate responses to the epidemic. In the early 
1990s, the National AIDS Coordinating Committee of South Africa 
(NACOSA) developed a national AIDS strategy, bringing on board a 
diverse group of consisting of NGOs, AIDS-service organizations 
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(ASOs), government officials, business representatives, private sector, 
political parties, individual AIDS activists, and trade unions. They all 
played a major role in drafting the 1994 National AIDS Plan.
28
 During 
the Mbeki presidency, the broad pro-treatment coalition included 
increasingly influential and diverse groups, such as the Treatment 
Action Campaign (TAC, founded in 1998),
 
The South African 
National NGO Coalition (SANGOCO, an umbrella body of South 
African NGOs consisting of provincial and sectoral affiliates, 
operating since 1995), the Nelson Mandela Foundation, the Congress 
of South African Trade Unions (COSATU, operating since 1985), the 
National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC, the 
peak-level representative and consensus-seeking body, providing 
negotiation arena for business, labor, government and domestic 
community-level organizations). 
In Chapter 6 I argued that South African understanding and 
responding to the epidemic was shaped by the conception of common 
good known as African Renaissance, while TAC spearheaded the 
movement to bring Pretoria to compliance with the global consensus. 
It is really puzzling that despite long-standing and increasingly 
powerful and angry ―pro-treatment‖ coalition in South Africa 
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combined with an obvious governmental oversensitivity to the 
criticism of their HIV/AIDS policies, South African elites were 
reticent of any links and relationships with TAC. The TAC‘s domestic 
and international popularity, prominence, and   legitimacy strongly 
suggested the rapidly decreasing instrumentality of using the resistance 
to the norm of ARVs in order to seek broader domestic coalition. By 
2004 not building coalitions with AIDS activism was counterintuitive 
given that such an alliance could have been instrumental in building up 
[or at some later point restoring] governmental credibility in the 
international arena.
29
   
In essence, TAC was a domestic minority tradition, which in 
the end was able to achieve its own programmatic goals.  The newly 
made international icon Zachie Achmat and other TAC‘s leaders 
toured the United States to celebrate their victory and appeared in the 
glamour magazines. Although the government made significant 
tactical concessions, they signalled changes in neither what kind of 
actions Pretoria considered appropriate, nor how government 
evaluated the benefits of various domestic groups to ally with. Pretoria 
remained very hostile to health activists pushing for the universal 
access to ARVs, accusing them with disloyalty to South African 
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transformation process.
30
 The independent AIDS dissident Andre 
Brink (not to be confused with a prominent writer!), at some point 
being on the payroll of the Rath Foundation, claimed that the 
presidency secretly put him in charge of building an organizations 
counterweight to TAC, which was supposed to express the dissident 
viewpoint.
31  
Thus, Pretoria did not adopt the global consensus on the 
ARV treatment politically as a resource to broaden its own support and 
win its increasingly influential opposition. 
Second, Pretoria directly supported domestic and international 
health-related organizations, which revised or resisted the international 
definition of epidemiology, despite their relative organizational 
weakness in garnering popular support and financial liability. The 
Cabinet empowered multiple domestic and international actors to 
express their radicalized political views, as well as promote and apply 
their substandard biomedical convictions in the country. The Cabinet-
sponsored strange alliance of the dissident Treatment Information 
Group (TIG, Andre Brink), the vitamin-peddling Rath Foundation, the 
Traditional Healers Organisation of South Africa (THO, Nhlavana 
Maseko) with its stress on the  native medicines, the South African 
National Civic Organisation (SANCO, Mlungisi Hlongwane), the 
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South Africa‘s National Association of People Living with HIV/AIDS 
(NAPWA), and soon to become  universally reviled Mbeki‘s 
biographer and spin-doctor Robert Suresh Roberts, whom media 
scorned as the permanently pouting Caribbean clown, aka Ron the 
Con.
32
 This type of coalition-building lacked any obvious political 
benefits and was by and large counterintuitive, as most of the 
organizations named above either had been marginalized 
internationally, or were simply very weak and needed the strong 
support and sponsorship themselves. Giving these organizations both 
direct and indirect support looked counterproductive and did not 
conform to the political calculations to win uncommitted or broaden its 
political base.  
The government began to support alternatives to ARV 
treatment, despite its decreasing benefits for garnering domestic and 
international political support and the apparent lack of instrumentality 
in coalition-building with traditional healers. Although the estimated 
number of on the ground healers fell somewhere in 200,000 to 
350,000, they had neither a strong organizational structure, nor 
international support, nor consistent (permanent) and active clientele.
33
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Although the official statistics claimed that up to 70 or 80% of South 
Africans used the services of traditional healers, independent studies 
projected the majority of South Africans to have a good understanding 
of ARVs by 2005.
34
 On the other hand, it is true that even skeptically-
minded reporters, which were highly uncomfortable with unscrupulous 
people profiteering from the desperate people‘s hope to get cured from 
AIDS, often were not ready to question muthi.  Genetic medicinal 
resources and healing practices were described as a legitimate part of 
their culture, ―something that always been there, a familiar belief,‖ not 
to be simply discarded.
35
 Wider audiences viewed ATMs and ARVs as 
equal, and kept purchasing the expensive native medicines even after 
the ARVs had been made free in the public sector.  
While the tangible political benefits of resisting the norm of 
treatment were far from obvious, the Cabinet kept sending mixed and 
confusing messages to its constituents.
36
  Government decision to 
allow the partial rollout of the ARVs in November 2003 it by and large 
undermined the value of pursuing the closer alliance with traditional 
healers. At the same time, traditional health organizations did not 
overcome the differences in outlook on the value and appropriate 
regulation of traditional medicines, bringing on organizational 
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rivalries, personal skirmishes, and conflicting biomedical views. At 
one point, the Department of Health became the major donor of 
NAPWA, an organization boasting 90 branches with estimated 
300,000 members (the numbers are highly questionable).
 37
  The 
Cabinet remained NAPWA‘s donor, despite their lack of legitimacy 
and coherent and inconsistent outlook on traditional versus western 
biomedicines.
 38 
 
Third, South Africa reinvented itself as a global champion of 
anti-colonialism. In this context, an optimal option would have been to 
forge coalition with Brazil, India, and Thailand as they were rising as 
the principal challengers to the pharmaceutical sector. These countries 
would have been the natural ally for the South African government in 
widening its international coalition legitimacy and prestige in the 
Third World. At the same time, the government chose to play no active 
role in the creation of the new generation of AIDS organizations. 
Although the relevant literature acknowledges the South African 
contribution to the foundation of UNGASS and GFATM, this 
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contribution was very modest, especially comparing to the support 
provided by other countries.
39
 The choice of not building any 
international coalitions proactively was counterintuitive, as the 
members of this coalition widely used the anti-colonialist discourse 
and wished to curb the power of the Global North.
40
  However, joining 
any of these global coalitions also implied to promote generics at the 
expense of traditional medicines and to give full backing to the free 
delivery of the antiretroviral in the public sector at the expense of 
marketization. Obviously, Pretoria was not ready to makes these 
choices. 
 
Coalition-building in Russia 
Russian government pursued two types of coalitions. The first one 
with transnational nongovernmental actors, and the second one with 
various Eastern European and Eurasian states. In both coalitions 
Russia wanted to play a position of a leader, principal, rather than a 
follower. In neither case, coalitions were pursued to widen the 
Kremlin‘s support base or win the uncommitted.  Rather, joining 
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coalitions to combat HIV/AIDS helped the Kremlin to deploy its 
vision of great power on a very practical level. 
In 2003 the experts from the Center of Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS) and the Brookings Institute specified the 
desired components of partnership between the Kremlin and the civil 
society. They called the Russian government to promote policies that 
not just tolerate the existence of the non-governmental organizations, 
but rather encourage its growth and robustness via giving generous tax 
incentives, setting up training programs for NGOs‘ leaders, increasing 
financial resources available to them, and, last but not least, creating 
trust and predictability in the working relationships between state 
officials and NGOs.
41
 These goals were extensive and ambitious, but 
reasonably attainable given the palpable, but brittle, presence of the 
civil society in Russia.   
At the domestic arena, Russian approach to the coalition-
building with the nonstate actors was highly selective: the Kremlin 
was willing to accept the civil society‘s role as a ―technical‖ provider 
of AIDS-related services, while it was reluctant to engage civil society 
as the independent advocacy and political actor. On the one hand, 
Putin particularly endorsed a whole range of health NGOs, 
strengthened their resolve and even contributed to the building of a 
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large informal coalition, uniting European NGOs, the EU-sponsored 
programs and domestic ―non-human rights‖ organizations. 
Transatlantic Partners against AIDS (TPAA), one of the leading 
transnational health advocacy organizations, boasted its connections 
with the government and the Duma‘s deputies. This evidence is to a 
certain degree consistent with the null hypothesis that elites may use 
the global norm as a resource to widen a coalition for their political 
support and win uncommitted.  On the other hand, the Russian 
government during Putin‘s presidency purposefully legislated to 
obliterate the political and financial independence of many NGOs 
through both severe bureaucratic restrictions and making 
governmental sponsorship available to the approved domestic 
recipients. In general, both sharp liberal critics of the Kremlin and its 
conservative supporters acknowledge that the Kremlin‘s approach to 
NGOs was definitely connected to the central tenets of Sovereign 
Democracy The doctrine prescribed keeping the direct governmental 
control over non-state actors involved in politics and advocacy, 
preventing the foreign meddling in the domestic politics by curtaining 
the foreign funding and sponsorship available to the domestic 
recipients. 
The Kremlin used the epidemic as a public relation exploit in 
an attempt to aggrandize its efforts in response to the epidemic. The 
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coverage of the issue-area was meant to be truly impressive The 
informational company ―Be in touch with your health‖ was aired on 
the national TV in all Russian regions, and supplemented with special 
shows and ads, discussing the nature of the domestic epidemic. By 
2009, the federal and regional TV channels televised the nine 
educational videoclips more than 50 thousand times, while private 
channel REN-TV aired 9 films about people living with HIV/AIDS 
based on real characters.
42
 According to Ellen Mickiewicz, the state-
controlled TV channels to a large extent tended to characterize the 
epidemic as an outside problem, which has been successfully dealt 
with. In her study of the ordinary citizens‘ perception of the official 
coverage of AIDS, ―Russians spoke of the state channels as reducing 
real and necessary news about HIV/AIDS in Russia by blending it in 
with HIV/AIDS as a global problem,‖ and ―alter what they know to be 
true to give a false impression of security.‖43  Furthermore, 
Mickiewicz‘s focus groups felt that the private coverage of the 
epidemic was perceived as far more accurate and grave.  Not 
surprisingly, the compliance to the foreign norm, or even underscoring 
the role of international organizations and nonstate sector was not part 
of the domestic informational campaign. 
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Thus, the Kremlin wanted to convey an image of successful 
and unique struggle against AIDS among the global failure to deal 
with the pandemic, which is consistent with its imagery of the great 
power. At the global arena, the Kremlin tried to establish an extensive 
and credible reputation as one of the key norm entrepreneurs in global 
health and sought to be a leader in certain coalitions. As Judith Twigg 
put it, ―A newly assertive Russia has been determined to reclaim its 
position as both regional hegemon and global power. To this end, 
Russia has been anxious to cast itself as part of the solution—rather 
than part of the problem—when it comes to key issues of global social 
and economic development.‖44   
Since the early 2000, the Russian government maintained 
normal connections with various international organizations, including 
the World Bank, the Global Fund, UNAIDS, and the United Nations 
specialized agencies. While the increase in cooperation with these 
organizations was generally expected in the context of the growing 
incidence of HIV infection, certain political choices looked somewhat 
less conventional. The imagery of the restored great power status 
required Russia to be a donor, not a recipient. Russia was willing to 
part with much needed financial resources to buy its way into the 
global club. In 2003 Russia rejected $150 million offered by the World 
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Bank while recognizing that even Brazil—which was viewed as a 
model response by the key medical professionals and bureaucrats—
was using its loans. Several years later, in February 2007 President 
Putin committed $270 million to the Global Fund. Given the dismal 
state of Russian health care in public sector, the quality of its response 
to the health crisis, and the capacity to lead at the international arenas, 
all these choice look counter-intuitive from the vantage point of 
benefits.  
There was definitely a strong agenda for the leadership and 
coalition-building in the Central and Easter Europe and Central Asia. 
Russia pursued a more assertive international role by sponsoring and 
organizing several regional HIV/AIDS initiatives, reinventing its role 
as a leader in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Starting 
from 2006 Russia hosted three regional Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia AIDS Conferences (EECAACs) on HIV/AIDS. These gatherings 
most definitely were not designed to serve as policy arenas for 
fostering international cooperation. Less sedately put, especially if 
compared to such gatherings as International AIDS conferences, these 
regional initiatives did not perform any meaningful political or 
technical function.  Russian action in the context of the G-8 Summit in 
St. Petersburg attracted most international attention and received a 
high approval. President Putin used Russia‘s presidency to elevate 
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infectious diseases and global health as one the core priorities of the 
summit. Beyond the G-8, Russia tried to take the position of the global 
leader for the Health Leadership Forum (G-8 health ministerial 
meetings), reaching out to China, India, Brazil, South Africa, and 
Mexico.
45
   
In contrast to this described gamut of activities, any 
international action was avoided, when the Kremlin felt it would play 
the role of the international follower. For instance, Russian 
government could have chosen to embark on the global movement to 
keep the pharmaceutical sector accountable and pursue closer alliances 
with the developing world. Such a form of international action was 
important for the strategic coalition-building to pursuing the parallel 
importation from Brazil or India, and for the closer alliance with 
transnational civil society to keep the issue visible on the global 
agenda. Yet doing so would have implied that the status of great power 
and domestic sustainability had not been achieved.  
 
EXPLANATION 3: EXTERNAL PRESSURES 
A standard account of external pressures 
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How does social purpose factor in external influences as an 
explanation of policy transfer processes? If national purpose does not 
matter, then we should expect national elites to interact strategically 
with external entrepreneurs of a certain international norm/policy 
based on the calculation of costs and benefits. If the costs associated 
with the resistance to the international policy are high, we should 
expect domestic elites to comply with the international norm. If the 
costs of non-compliance are low, we should expect the domestic elites 
to resist international policy initiatives. In case if national purpose 
does matter, we should expect a selective adaptation of external 
demands filtered through national purpose, and selective resistance 
even when external pressures are high and the costs of non-compliance 
can be potentially detrimental for domestic elites.  
The external pressures mechanism of norm diffusion portrays 
policy transfers in terms of powerful external norm-givers being able 
to displace domestic norms and policies by the international ones, even 
against the strong domestic opposition to it. There is no doubt that in 
some cases the outsiders become, to borrow a phrase, ―causal 
behemoths,‖ unquestionably dominating what happens in the domestic 
policy landscape and determine the process and outcomes of policy 
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transfer.
46
  In this line of reasoning, the mounting external pressures 
and incentives from outsiders lead to the substitution of previous 
domestic practices.  
Observers tend to attribute primacy in norm diffusion to the 
powerful outside norm-givers, such as the World Bank, the United 
States, and others as they provide much needed financial and logistical 
support. Circa 2003 new generation of AIDS health organizations 
started providing direct material incentives to comply with the 
international consensus on antiretroviral policy by allocating generous 
grants both to the governments and local ASOs to curb HIV/AIDS. In 
countries, where domestic capacities are lacking altogether, we can 
expect that the suppliers of the pharmaceutical products and the 
international technical expertise to play an overwhelming role in 
domestic HIV/AIDS politics. Recipient states are expected to be 
invariably interested in financial influx and not particularly concerned 
about challenging the external arrangements for the domestic 
governance of HIV/AIDS. This proposition may be empirically correct 
for some individual cases such as Zambia and Mozambique, whose 
compliance with the global norms depended on the strong external 
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presence and support, while implementation depended on some 
domestic material factors. 
The analytical power of this explanation, however, raises many 
questions. First, it is unlikely that external pressures alone displace 
local policies, especially in the absence of credible domestic norm 
promoters, among others. Scholars constantly remind us that ―external 
influences can almost never have any real purchase unless they are 
joined together with domestic influences,‖47 or that assigning too much 
value to the power of external pressures will bracket the domestic 
politics altogether.
48
 For instance, some smaller countries like 
Turkmenistan, Malawi, Swaziland, and Cuba were able to enact 
domestic policies at odds with the rising global consensus (even 
though it significantly exacerbated the epidemiological gravity of the 
epidemic).
49
  
Second, for the nations with relatively meager financial 
capacities and infrastructure policy displacement is a function of 
foreign pressures mediated by the resource exchange patterns. In this 
context, the donor dependency might diminish domestic incentives to 
muster a strong HIV/AIDS health care response in the public sector. In 
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these cases we might expect to observe the compliance with the 
external prescriptions, but actually not see it. In this light, it is not 
surprising that many pro-treatment health activists start arguing against 
the overreliance on the external financial and logistical help.  
 
External pressures in South Africa 
In essence, the South African Cabinet did not experience any real 
external pressures—separate from the transnational pro-treatment 
coalition‘s—as there are really no strong material sanctions for non-
compliance with the international donors and health organizations. 
Thus, the costs of non-compliance remained low (vague opprobrium, 
bad image in mass media, and so on). In Chapter 6 I showed that South 
African response to the epidemic was shaped by African Renaissance. 
Following the African Renaissance‘s prescriptions, South 
Africa showed variation to the externally prescribed models of curbing 
HIV/AIDS. While the government picked up a fight against the WHO, 
MDGs and UNGASS and tried to put GFATM under its own control 
as it could have empower the Cabinet‘s ―AIDS-drug lobby‖ rivals, it 
was more willing to accommodate the model of policy approach as 
promoted PEPFAR. The simple explanation for this is that using 
PEPFAR was able to alleviate governmental concern about 
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disempowering the economy for the sake of delivery (marketization), 
while the other models had some conditionality inbuilt in their 
prescriptions, which went against the grain of the African Renaissance.  
In 2000 the presidential spokesperson Mankahlana asserted 
that the pharmaceutical sector misused information about the 
pandemic, exaggerated the positive effects of antiretroviral medicines, 
and benefited from the unmitigated scourge of AIDS.
50
 Pretoria 
intentionally pitched itself against not only against the international 
and domestic ―AIDS-drug lobby,‖ but also against the WHO‘s and 
UNGASS‘s recommendations and guidelines.51 According the reports 
the country made no progress regarding various international 
guidelines regarding the universality of treatment as a part of global 
consensus on the HIV/AIDS. The Health Minister was either trying to 
downplay the role of Millennium Development Goals reports, thus 
clearly shying away from the globally articulated responsibilities.  
According to the Resident Coordinator of UN SA country team, ―[t]he 
first South African MDG Report was released in September [2005], 
but the Government chose to make this a very low-key event.‖52 
Second, Pretoria intentionally tried to resist the pressures of the 
Global Fund in empowering the local AIDS Service Organizations 
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essentially circumventing the government. Instead of simply 
disbursing the money to the domestic AIDS service organizations on 
the basis of their merit and prior performance, the Cabinet tried to 
either control who gets international health-related grants, or seize 
them to redistribute as it saw fit.
53
 In 2002, Mbeki attacked the Global 
Fund for ―flouting its own rules by funding AIDS programs without 
proper government approval.‖54 The biggest controversy arose when 
Mbeki announced that the government would seize a grant targeted 
specifically to the province of KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) and add it to the 
general South African grant. For more than a year, the government 
stalled the influx of international resources, refused to sign the 
agreements with GFATM in order to finalize the funds transfers.
55
 In 
result, the South African grant portfolio went almost exclusively to the 
country‘s Cabinet-level departments.56  The Cabinet‘s governing of 
GFATM‘s Country Coordinating Mechanism (CCM), led by Jacob 
Zuma and Health Minister Dr. Manto Tshabalala-Msimang (MTM) 
was entirely dedicated to this goal. 
57
 The Country Coordinating 
Mechanism (CCM) was not supposed to be another controlling and 
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distributive body, a layer between these levels.  As late as in 2006 The 
International Treatment Preparedness Coalition (ITPC) reported that 
the GFATM CCM was not yet functioning [appropriately].
58
 
On the other hand, in South Africa both governmental and 
nongovernmental programs funded by PEPFAR were running quite 
smoothly. PEPFAR worked with South African National Defence 
Forces (SANDF), Department of Correctional Services (DCS), and 
Department of Social Development (DSD), as well as 
nongovernmental organizations, such as Nurturing Orphans and AIDS 
for Humanity (NOAH), Hope Worldwide (HW), Society of Family 
Health (SPH), Centre for the AIDS Program of Research in South 
Africa (CAPRISA).
59
  Once the government received a generous 
PEPFAR funding, it changed its strategy and decided to scale-up the 
ARVs, seemingly giving in to the international pressures. This 
funding, however, significantly mitigated the resource scarcity to 
achieve the universality of treatment. Nicoli Nattrass argued that the 
external finial inflows to South Africa had an adverse effect on public 
sector, as they essentially had taken all the pressure off the national 
Department of Health to use available domestic resources, to protect 
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its private sector, and keep its public sector weak. In other words, the 
availability of these resources alleviated neoliberal concerns of 
diverting too much domestic resources predominantly to ARVs, which 
is compatible with the marketization as the core component of the 
national purpose. This means that the Cabinet government continued 
and gave in to the international pressures very selectively as it saw fit. 
 
External pressures in Russia 
In a way similar to South Africa, Russia did not experience any 
definitive external pressures as there were really no strong material 
sanctions for non-compliance with the global consensus on ARVs. Yet 
in Russia we would not expect external pressures to play a significant 
part of norm transplantation in a broader sense. While external 
pressures definitely occur, they might have played a limited role in 
pushing the Kremlin into the partnership with the transnational AIDS 
actors. According to Judith Twigg, ―the international community has 
played a significant role in shaping the dynamic of Russia‘s response, 
and its continued involvement—including a strong bilateral U.S. 
presence—will remain an important determinant of Russia‘s 
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success.‖60 Yet the role of international community had to be highly 
qualified. 
There is only some scant evidence concerning international 
prescriptions and perhaps very limited pressures, regarding the 
domestic distribution of international grant. the Ministry of Health 
created the Country Coordinating Mechanism (CMM) to procure the 
fourth round of grants from the GFATM. The CCM was not supposed 
to be another controlling and distributive body on behalf of the 
national governments, but rather a layer between these levels—directly 
empowering domestic civil society sector on the grounds of the merit 
of their proposals and prior performance on the ground. As the typical 
critique goes, the Russian government did not grant the country‘s 
CMM an independent political authority, but instead chose to control 
the procurement of international resources to combat to HIV/AIDS, 
and even highjacked some programs as it saw fit.
61
  More specifically, 
the Global Fund-sponsored harm reduction programs were 
geographically limited to 10 out of 86 Russia‘s regions, while the 
consequences even in the covered regions became uncertain.
62
 
Highjacking the Country Coordinating Mechanism (CMM) was 
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stipulated by the sovereign democracy‘s clearly articulated imperative 
not to allow the foreign control of the domestic civil society 
implemented through the generous and unaccounted foreign financial 
influx not controlled by the state authorities. 
On the other hand, pursuing highly unique health policies can 
be explained referring to the profound institutional legacies of the 
communism, which under certain conditions could have been re-
entrenched again.
63
  Ambrosio argued that dealing with looming AIDS 
crisis for Russia is a precondition to play a great-power role, which its 
political elite started craving—as expressed in its national program for 
the country.
 64
 However, before Russia started tackling the issue of 
HIV/AIDS more assertively the soviet legacy of the country‘s self-
perception as a great power had been notably uprooted. Thus, by no 
means it should have over-determined the following ARV policies, 
while keeping open a range of potential options and strategies for the 
decision-makers in the 2000s. Russia‘s self-image as a great-power--
one of the most notable and palpable components of the soviet legacy-
- did not fully disappear from the national policy environment after the 
end of the Cold War. However, it did not manifest itself a relevant 
factor in prompting Russian politicians to deal with looming AIDS 
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crisis until it was re-legitimized as a component of a new national 
purpose. In sum, it can be said that it was the new conception of 
common good--Sovereign Democracy –which reintroduced these 
legacies rather than mitigated them. 
 
CONCLUSION  
In this Chapter, I located social purpose as a potential intervening 
variable in the context of relevant literatures. It also examines whether 
or not social purpose as an intervening (and explanatory) variable is 
robust to country-specific and individual-level explanations. The 
principal caveat to any overarching cross-national argument about 
policy transfer is that in the overwhelming majority of the developing 
countries the state capacity and state efficiency is extremely limited.
65
 
This project focuses mostly on political choices that affect AIDS 
policies even prior to the implementation stage. On the other hand, 
problems that seem to be purely implementational might be inherently 
linked with these prior political choices.  
Indeed, in any country which lacks the requisite amount of 
resources, is plagued with corruption, possesses insufficient technical 
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expertise and suffers from the shortages of professional doctors and 
nurses, a deviation from the global consensus may simply be an 
inability to implement the policy appropriately due to the weakness 
and inefficiency of the available state institutions.
66
 Amy Patterson 
summarizes these challenges. The state capacity might be undermined 
by the interlocking phenomena of the incapacitating role of traditional 
patriarchy in Africa, the dependence on international financial 
resources, the lack of consistency in political and economic 
commitments, the inability to design and implement long-term 
treatment and prevention programs, and even the civil society 
challenging states‘ authority.67 This list can be easily expanded to 
include regional and national factors. At the same time, state capacity 
and efficiency are important, but not over-determining factors. Just 
how simply having enough money to throw at a problem may not 
mitigate its adverse impacts, strong political commitments in certain 
cases may overpower the institutional deficiencies of the state, and 
reallocate scare resources.
68
 In Russian case, for instance, the yearly 
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delays in procuring and disbursing the antiretroviral treatment were 
clearly a result of endemic corruption, lack of state capacity and 
coordination among various segments of bureaucracy. Yet elite‘s 
choice to uptake more social responsibilities in providing public 
services (as a part of its conception of common good) definitely 
contributed to the unintentional failure in the timely procurement and 
disbursement of pharmaceutical products. In the following final 
Chapter—Conclusion--I summarize my empirical and theoretical 
results, focusing on the effects of social purpose on public policy. The 
final note here concerns material capacities as an additional alternative 
explanation. 
                                                                                                                           
country in the absence any direct military threat, while choosing to spend next to 
nothing on the looming domestic pandemic (in 1999). 
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CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSION 
 
Empirical analysis of data and evidence regarding the content of 
national responses to HIV/AIDS crisis in Russia and South Africa 
reveals the strong impact of social purpose. Social purpose becomes 
causally relevant to the extent it underpins certain kinds of policy 
actions and responses, which were not entailed to the same extent in 
the absence of social purpose or prior to its emergence. Studying social 
purpose is relevant not only to spell out the kinds of actions the ruling 
elite considers appropriate, but also to ascertain the kinds of actions 
domestic policy environment is likely to stimulate and sustain.  
To examine the analytical purchase of social purpose this work 
gauges its impact on the externally introduced policy 
recommendations, guidelines, and advice. This move also helps to 
keep social purpose as the explanatory variable separate from the 
subsequent policy choices (dependent variable). Today 
intergovernmental organizations and transnational professional 
community play increasingly important roles in formulating 
sophisticated policies, providing expertise, and assisting in service 
delivery. In this context, international prescriptions become almost 
universally recognized as instrumental to improve domestic policies, 
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including public health. Yet under certain circumstances a strong 
societal commitment to the particular conceptions of common good 
might politicize international public policy, or even become hostile to 
it. I am not claiming, of course, that social purpose can solely explain 
the processes of policy transfer and the reasons why some issues get 
politicized. Instead this dissertation maps out the empirical ways in 
which social purpose does make a difference and summarizes its 
effects theoretically.  
My findings resonate with prior scholarship on HIV/AIDS 
politics. For instance, they speak to Michael Bosia‘s analysis on the 
neoliberal reform in France and its impact on the contestation around 
the HIV/AIDS policies.
1
 In a series of academic articles, Bosia 
documented how the change in the conception of common good (or, 
―moral ambition‖ in his parlance) had an adverse impact on the spread 
of AIDS through the blood supply, which resulted in the bitter 
contention around the principles of public health. The framework 
adopted in this dissertation conceptualizes French transition from an 
exceeding government presence to neoliberalism and austerity as a 
clear case of the elite‘s attempt to redefine, or alter the public accepted 
conception of common good. Cutting social spending, looking out for 
the profitable blood products ensued. Activists understood an adverse 
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impact on the blood supply and thus the spread of AIDS in connection 
with the ethical mission of the Republic. Since the domestic policy 
environment was not shaped or significantly influenced by neoliberal 
concerns, social contestation among the participants in public health 
followed. Thus, the analysis of socially accepted conceptions of 
common good might help find and explain patterns in contestation 
around AIDS politics well beyond Russia and South Africa. 
At the same time, this dissertation advances the current study 
of deep-seated political determinants of public policy, that is, what 
guides the politics of policymaking. Using social purpose I can explain 
specific types of policy actions governments pursue in order to curb 
AIDS. If racial/ethnic boundaries, according to Evan Lieberman, help 
explain the aggressiveness and quickness of the response to the 
epidemic, the attention to social purpose help us explain governmental 
politics of policymaking and the nature of societal contention around it 
well beyond this initial timeframe. More generally, bringing social 
purpose to the analysis of AIDS complements the abundant 
anthropological and sociological approaches to the pandemic.
2
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BRINGING SOCIAL PURPOSE INTO EFFECT 
How does social purpose emerge and how does it become socially 
acceptable? In the previous chapters I traced in details how Russian 
and South African political elites constructed and legitimized their 
conceptions of common good, which were respectively labeled 
―Sovereign Democracy‖ and ―African Renaissance.‖ In this part, my 
dissertation expanded traditional academic focus placed on 
subnational, smaller identity entrepreneurs and social movements as 
the agents of change to the exploration of elite‘s commitment to a 
certain conception of common good, which is legitimized via the 
perception that country‘s political sustainability depends on providing 
it. When successful, intentional and systematic efforts to present 
national identities as vital for the existence and survival of the state as 
an autonomous political organization in the context of one-party 
dominance implied their public acceptance. Thus, both counties met 
criteria under which the role of national purpose was expected to 
matter most.  
This dissertation examined the empirical content of the social 
purposes in relation to its political distinctiveness, economic 
empowerment, and the imagery of its desired systemic position. This 
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dissertation also ranked social purpose in two countries, delineating 
between: 
1) commitments (more narrow examination of domestic elites linking 
their self-efficacy and self-esteem to some specific conceptions of 
common good);  
2) the extent to which the influence on policy environment (a broader 
examination of the kinds of action embedded by elites in a given 
political context and considered appropriate and legitimate); and 
3) the extent to which the articulated substantive components of a 
given social purpose are reflected at the broader level of collective 
articulations, mostly popular culture.  
The concept of Sovereign Democracy encapsulates three 
important themes: the ultimate political value of a strong state power 
(vlast, gosudarstvennost) with a special stress on its social 
responsibility and economic delivery in the context of state-led 
economy, and the necessity to reassert and actively exercise Russia‘s 
great power status in global politics. Not only these particular themes 
(strong state, state-led economy, and great power complex) clearly 
stand out as three most important components in the Russian political 
discourse, but they were turned into prescriptions how to protect the 
country as an autonomous political organization. An integral part of 
442 
 
Sovereign Democracy--the discourse of the ―wild 1990s‖--pulled 
together various collective articulations together in order to appeal to 
broad audiences. The chief proponents of the Sovereign Democracy 
pitched themselves against the liberals (the Other), who allegedly 
strove to dismember the state, absolve it from any economic 
obligations for its citizens, and ―put Russia back on her knees.‖ Except 
for its liberal critics, Sovereign Democracy received by and large 
positive response in Russian society. 
In South Africa, ―African Renaissance‖ at first was received 
with criticism and confusion. Some outside observers not involved into 
its conceptual development, beset African Renaissance as ―the new 
ideology of self-deception, the refusal to acknowledge the current 
realities that parameter even our own political space.‖3 This 
assessment is too tough and does not give African Renaissance a full 
justice.  Yet similarly critical or pessimistic kinds of responses for a 
while seemed to be pervasive in South Africa. It implied that many in 
the country were simply not buying into the notion.  Combined with 
the limited ability of Mbekiites to influence policy environment, 
including press, it implied a significant limitation in deploying the 
African Renaissance in society.  However, from reading the canonic 
texts and supporting publications, three themes stand out very clearly. 
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African Renaissance prescribed to find and utilize only the local 
solutions for local problems (indigenousness), to promote the 
economic empowerment of South Africans based on boosting the 
private sector and relying on market economy strategies rather than 
governmental delivery and redistribution (marketization), and to claim 
a moral continental—and perhaps global—leadership (ubuntu). Chief 
proponents of African Renaissance pitched themselves against Afro-
pessimists and neo-colonialists, all scheming to keep South Africa 
subjugated to the West and denying the country its subjectivity. 
Besides some casual interest in tracing domestic debates about 
elite, nation, and their purposes, the analytical value of social purpose 
might be challenged. To keep separate social purpose as the 
explanatory variable with the subsequent policy choices (dependent 
variable) I examined the impact of social purpose on external policy 
initiatives. In the previous chapters, I broke down the broad notion of 
social purpose into several distinct graspable components. 
Subsequently, I demonstrated how and why each specific component 
of social purpose affected certain indicators of health policy response 
(See also Table 1.4 in Introduction).  In the following two sections I 
briefly summarize the causal impact of social purpose on public 
policies. 
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THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL PURPOSE ON PUBLIC POLICY   
What kind of effects does social purpose have on public policy? The 
provision of the antiretroviral treatment is a fundamental obligation 
domestic elites should carry out in order to ensure the physical 
survival of their polities. Very few politicians would deny that having 
a healthy domestic population underpins economic development, 
human and national security. As the HIV/AIDS policy hinges on the 
technological solution (the availability of treatment) it is reasonable to 
expect its relatively smooth and comprehensive diffusion. Yet even 
purely technical choices that unconditionally follow international 
prescriptions may challenge domestic legitimacy and sovereignty, 
accountability and influence, thus might become unacceptable for 
domestic policy-makers.
4
  Thus, in some circumstances adopting 
international prescriptions could trigger a highly politicized reaction. I 
argue that such a reaction is linked to the deployment of social 
purpose. This dissertation asserts that social purpose informs the kinds 
of actions the ruling elite considers appropriate, and helps ascertaining 
how domestic policy environment interacts with international AIDS 
initiatives.  
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In other words, national purpose made possible a range of potential 
policy responses, which otherwise would have been either less viable, 
or not pursued as a core components of national responses to 
HIV/AIDS. For instance, the indigenous turn in South African policy 
environment as a part of elite-driven conception of common good 
(African Renaissance) legitimized their wider use and aimed to 
institutionalize governance of native medicines, or African traditional 
healing practices. Otherwise, this kind of actions would have been on 
the margins of the national policy response, rather than in its center. 
Similarly, in Russia the harsh restrictions of the harm-reduction 
approach, syringe and needle exchange programs (SNP) and medically 
assisted therapy (MAT), as well as persecution of its promoters, 
became possible as a result of as inhibiting liberal values in the context 
of domestic policy environment dominated by the value of strong state 
(Sovereign Democracy).  
My findings indicate that the effects of deploying social 
purpose are observable in all three dimensions of HIV/AIDS policy 
(dependent variable). Policy-makers evaluate the benefits of 
international policy initiatives from the vantage point of their 
commitment to a certain conception of common good. This ―sorting 
through‖ impacts on defining the guidelines of the provision of a 
particular public good (treatment), which populations should benefit or 
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be excluded from the consumption of public good (universality of 
access), and who gets to participate in shaping public health policy 
(partnership). All this does not mean that governments either stop 
providing at least some rudimentary services in regard to HIV/AIDS, 
or fully reject and deviate from the global consensus. While some 
observable variations are very exotic and eye-grabbing, others are 
more subtle, the impact of social purpose is quite palpable. I delineate 
between five main effects of social purpose in public health policy. 
The first effect of social purpose stems from the fact that the 
uncurbed epidemic is a direct challenge to the ontological security of a 
state a functioning political organization. This implies that elites are 
likely to frame and respond to the epidemic as a threat to their 
conception of common good. The nature of HIV/AIDS threat in the 
global arena is defined as a massive public health crisis. Of course, 
Russia responded to AIDS as a health crisis. Yet this response was in 
large part a reaction to the perceived weakening of the state. For 
Russia the threat of HIV/AIDS implied the weakening of the state 
mediated by the looming demographic crisis and the growing 
consumption of narcotic substances. For South Africa the threat of 
HIV/AIDS implied a challenge to its elite commitment to 
distinctiveness. Since South African elites wanted to uphold the 
uniqueness of the country, they became less willing to use multiple 
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international recommendations and more willing to give support to the 
alternative and traditional medicines as either a full substitute, or an 
addition to the western biomedical products.   
 The second effect of social purpose is related to the developed 
conceptions of how much (if any) common good should be provided. 
Thus the ideally non-exclusive and non-rivalrous provision of public 
goods might be challenged by the considerations which populations 
should be protected in the first hand, who should benefit or be 
excluded from the consumption of public good and why. 
In general, Russian government did not question the necessity 
of the universality of access and consistently worked to scale up the 
treatment access among general populations. Once the nature of threat 
was formulated, Russian government committed to a massive domestic 
procurement and disbursement of the life-saving medicines. At the 
same time, the shortages and yearly scandals about the effective and 
uninterrupted provision of the antiretroviral treatment was better 
explained by other factor, including state efficiency, pervasive 
corruption, lack of coordination etc. In South Africa, the Cabinet clung 
to the idea that spending should be limited and thus was reluctant to 
provide it as too expensive. The alleged toxicity and unsafeness of the 
international pharmaceutically products added to the reluctance to 
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ensure the universal access to treatment. The South African 
government was resolute to use complementary micronutrients and 
nutritional supplements for prevention of the development of 
opportunistic diseases. As a result, both Pretoria and provincial health 
officials consistently stalled the national roll-out programs on the 
ground and tried to block the universality of access to treatment in 
principle.  
The third effect of social purpose stems from the fact that 
conception of common good is pinned on the understanding of who 
the contending political actors are. Thus, it helps define which actors 
and on what terms get to participate in shaping the policy as 
governmental partners. Elites are likely either to exclude those actors 
which embrace an alternative conception of common good, or enter 
only highly contingent and unstable partnership relations with them.  
The Kremlin generally overemphasized the role of the 
government in providing services to the population single-handedly, 
without any help of private sector or nonstate organizations. 
Government shied away from any meaningful engagement of the 
private sector, and forcefully imposed strict legal boundaries under 
what conditions non-governmental organizations can participate in 
curbing the epidemic. In Russian political imagery neither private 
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sector, nor nonstate sector were perceived as trustworthy allies: the 
former was at odds with the goals of economic development and the 
latter was susceptible to embrace the liberal conception human rights. 
In South Africa, the Cabinet believed that civil society sector was 
tainted by the latter‘s role in an unconditional support of international 
(read Western) policy initiatives as related to treatment. The tacit 
partnership of November 2003 was soon broken by the government. 
As a result, the Cabinet preferred to forge connection with 
organizations advocating alternative and complementary treatment, 
including a counter-epistemic community of health dissidents, strongly 
questioning connections between HIV and AIDS. The government 
seemed to use selectively partnership with the ―mainstream‖ 
international organizations only when they were instrumental in 
alleviating the burden of the public sector and thus did not impinge on 
the conception of common good.  
The fourth effect of social purpose is related to the extent to 
which elites are successful in making their conception of common 
good legitimate among wider audiences, or the whole nation. If social 
purpose becomes truly nationally legitimate, it is likely make policy 
choices intersubjectively shared, or simply undoubted. On the other 
hand, disagreements about the legitimacy or content of common good 
450 
 
are likely to prompt societal clashes around the desired principles of 
public policy.   
At minimum, elite‘s commitment to act on a particular iteration 
of social purpose might be supported by pure enforcement. Their 
success, especially if matched by the broader level of public 
articulation as expressed in the means of popular culture, strongly 
implies a public acceptance of the proposed policy responses how to 
deal with health crises. At maximum, domestic policy environment 
significantly shaped by social purpose can simultaneously empower 
various elite-friendly groups, and disempower various 
nongovernmental organizations, civil society groups, and social 
movements with the set of demands conflicting and inconsistent with 
the official policy responses. In this context, alternative behavioral 
choices might be advocated either moderately, or not observable all. 
Overall, the strength and limits of political mobilization in given 
societies is likely to be shaped by the extent to which alternative 
behavioral choices become either delegitimized, or simply not 
considered as viable in a given domestic policy environment. Societal 
disagreements might stem from elites‘ failure to influence domestic 
policy environment.  
451 
 
Since Mbeki was never fully able to dominate domestic policy 
environment, civil society sector was able to advocate and convince 
many that alternative policy choices were not only practical, but more 
humane and morally superior. Putin and his entourage were much 
more successful in influencing domestic policy environment.  As a 
result, the official policy responses in regard to HIV/AIDS received 
much less criticism and precluded a broad mobilization of the groups 
with conflicting demands in regard to its health policy. Thus, many 
observers from the non-governmental sector, including the 
representatives of Transnational Alliance against AIDS (TPAA), 
repeatedly gave an overall positive evaluation of the Russian response 
to the pandemic. In stark contrast, the majority of South African AIDS 
initiative continuously received very bad press.  
The fifth effect of social purpose is that it prompts a relatively 
coherent and elaborate policy response, which pulls together previous 
uncommitted domestic health policy initiatives and approaches. 
Because HIV/AIDS has many implications, in general it is likely that 
domestic policy responses will not have a common denominator in the 
absence of strong commitment to a single conception of public good.  
As many policy experts indicate, for the most part of the period 
following the democratic transitions, Pretoria was following the 
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mainstream international policy initiatives. This portrayal glosses over 
the fact that the HIV/AIDS policy in the 1990s was far from coherent 
and contained somewhat conflicting trends. For instance, the 1994 
National AIDS Plan (NAP) reflected the majority of international 
prescriptions how to curb the pandemic, the drafting process included 
all the relevant stakeholders and was dubbed ―ideal.‖ At the same 
time, this period was punctuated by series of grave setbacks: the first 
democratically elected President Nelson Mandela did not exercise any 
leadership on the issue, the scarce funds were allocated towards very 
dubious projects (infamous play Sarafina II, or developing a domestic 
substitute to AZT), and so on. Since Mbeki took power, the 
government not only publicly demonstrated a strong interest in 
spearheading the fight against AIDS, but also began to tackle the issue 
exclusively in terms of local socioeconomic problem requiring a set of 
unique solutions.  
Somewhat similar dynamic characterized the situation with 
HIV/AIDS policy in Russia. Not only in the 1990s, when the rate of 
the epidemic was low, but even during the years when the infection 
rates grew almost exponentially (1999—2006), Russian awareness of 
the pandemic and seeming willingness to deal with it remained low. 
Yet this inaction did not mean that the government did not learn or 
adopt some international recommendations. For instance, the notion of 
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the universality of treatment was reflected in several federal laws. In 
2006 President Vladimir Putin quickly put the issue of HIV/AIDS high 
on the federal political agenda and demonstrated his government‘s 
undeniable commitment to deal with the epidemic. Thus, in the 
absence of the coherent and consolidated social purpose, different 
bureaucratic agencies are expected to pursue their narrowly defined 
tasks, not implying any wider social goals.  
 
THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL PURPOSE ON POLICY TRANSFER 
What kind of effects does social purpose have on policy transfer 
mechanisms? To make more specific theoretical claims about the 
effects of social purpose on policy responses and fit them in the 
relevant literatures, this dissertation locates social purpose in the three 
causal mechanisms of policy transfer (see Chapter 8). I do not claim, 
of course, that learning, coalition-building and external pressures 
become less relevant as causal explanations. Rather, I assert that the 
strength and consistency in political elites‘ commitment to the 
formulated social purpose may sharpen the theoretical predictions 
based on policy transfer mechanisms. 
In terms of learning, governments may learn about and adopt 
different policies for different reasons and at different speed rates. So 
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much is well known. This dissertation generally argues that domestic 
decision-makers at the top of political hierarchy and in more modest 
policy positions may learn via sorting the core questions of public 
policy through the broader set of political obligations they explicitly 
commit to. When given international answers how to respond to the 
HIV/AIDS crisis, elites are likely to ―filter‖ them to select the 
responses most similar to the kind of choices informed by their 
conception of common good. Put differently, elites for sure learn about 
the content and potential applicability of international approaches. Yet 
they do not choose to adopt them without qualifications. Social 
purpose is likely to define what kinds of actions will inspire elites to 
take action. All this entails a profound impact on many specific 
indicators of domestic HIV/AIDS policy. 
 In both cases, this early policy discrepancy did not 
predetermine what political elites are likely to learn and why, the 
opportunities for either the wholesale or partial adoption of the 
international consensus remained wide left wide open. However, with 
the advent of social purpose, elites chose to act in accordance to its 
contents and discredit the kinds of actions elites consider 
inappropriate. Thus, governments in both countries were not simply 
inspired by all the best cases from an externally available pool of 
recommendations and best cases. All this gave critical observers the 
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solid ground to indicate Russia‘s unwillingness to ―draw on the 
successful experiences of many countries around the world that have 
met this challenge to ensure the availability of treatment in a manner 
that is fair, efficient, and sustainable.‖5   
Coalition-building perspective typically gives us a strategic 
view of policy transfer: governments may adopt or challenge the 
policy in order to broaden their support, or reach out to additional 
would-be supporters, and cement the prospective support groups 
together. When governed by legitimate social purpose, governmental 
choices in policy coalitions are not motivated by the desire to expand 
domestic and international political support. In fact, building coalitions 
with their opponents presents elites with an additional challenge to 
their legitimacy, sense of self-efficacy and esteem. Rather, coalition-
building is likely to be conditional on whether or not these coalitions 
―fit‖ in and can maximize governmental delivery of the common good. 
 In this context, it becomes clear why South African Cabinet 
remained reticent of any links and relationships with increasingly 
powerful ―pro-treatment‖ coalition, without resorting to an individual-
level explanation. Despite the expected value of improving its 
international reputation, South African elites‘ commitment to its 
conception of common good collided with those actors, which 
                                                     
5
 TPAA 2003: v. 
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determined to bring Pretoria to compliance with the global consensus 
on the basis of a different conception of common good. Russian 
government was aggressive in regard to domestic civil society sector, 
especially those organizations actively engaged in advocacy and 
protest.  Yet the Kremlin accepted the nongovernmental organizations 
as somewhat subordinate actors inasmuch as their activity and service 
did not impinge on the principles of Sovereign Democracy. In this 
context, my research explained limited and conditional partnership 
with the groups committed to the different conception of common 
good was possible. 
In terms of external pressures, or substitution, Jacoby notes that 
it ―occurs when external actors attempt to promote and execute 
specific reforms on their own… when outsiders intervene directly, 
without active insider support, to push a reform they favor.‖6 It is 
clear, however, that international HIV/AIDS policy initiatives are not 
likely to be meaningfully and uniformly enforced by international 
actors across the globe. Thus, the wholesale adoption (or the radical 
norm displacement, to use constructivist parlance) is not likely to be 
observed. Elites can certainly calculate both benefits of conforming to 
the external influences and potential costs of challenging them. This 
means that elites will adopt certain international policy 
                                                     
6
 Jacoby 2006: 630 
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recommendations (for instance, in the context of issue-linkage), or 
back down in case if the deviation from the global baseline causes an 
international opprobrium. Yet elites are less likely to fall for external 
pressures policies if this external pressure is challenging their 
conception of common good. 
It can be reasoned that the sufficient material capacities are 
likely to be translated into independent health policies challenging the 
global consensus. Although both countries are expected to be sensitive 
to the external recommendations and assistance both Russia and South 
Africa chose to act as international leaders in response to HIV/AIDS.  
Russia and South Africa both attempted to promote specific policy 
choices in response to HIV/AIDS on their own, thus pitching 
themselves as pro-active policy international entrepreneurs. The 
Kremlin wanted to assert itself as a regional rule giver and sponsor. 
Pretoria in a similar, but more exotic ways, tried to give international 
publicity and empower traditional healing movement, after its 
experiment with counter-epistemic community of health dissidents had 
collapsed.   
 
EMPIRICAL SUMMARY OF HIV/AIDS POLICIES   
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In Chapter 2 I documented how international medical community, 
intergovernmental organizations, international financial organizations, 
specialized health agencies and AIDS advocacy and service 
organizations came to a shared understanding about the best measures 
to fight HIV/AIDS. At first, the efforts to promote this understanding 
globally were plagued at the international level with such detrimental 
problems as the necessity to conduct the permanent fundraising 
campaigns, donor fatigue in the developed states, constant squabble 
about the appropriate amount of donations as related to the country‘s 
GDP, preference for bilateral funding versus multilateral programs, 
uncoordinated effort in suggesting health policy guidelines, erratic 
supply of very expensive and relatively ineffective drugs, and the 
inability of various international actors to overcome their parochial 
political goals. However, around 1996 the majority of health-related 
global actors finally agreed what the HIV/AIDS treatment policy 
should be like and started actively promoting this understanding.  This 
became possible due to the combined effects of the biomedical 
technological breakthrough, steadily decreasing prices of 
antiretrovirals, and the simplification of treatment regimen.  WHO, 
UNAIDS, UNGASS and other influential international actors 
combined their efforts to promote this vision of the desirable response 
to the threat of HIV/AIDS.  
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 In the nutshell, the global consensus on the HIV/AIDS 
treatment comprises of three identifiable components. First, rolling out 
the approved antiretroviral treatment is a core policy prescription.   
AIDS therapy shifts what used to be a terminal disease to a chronic 
health condition and is absolutely indispensable for the dramatic 
improvement of patients‘ health and prolonging their lives as 
productive members of society. Questioning the biomedical consensus 
of ARVs (and HIV and AIDS hypothesis), and/or enforcing the 
substandard protocol at the expense of treatment constitute a 
significant deviation from the standardized policy prescription. 
Second, the universality of access to treatment is an additional policy 
prescription intended to ensure access to ARVs to all the infected 
population. Denying the universality of treatment and excluding 
principal vulnerable populations will make the containment of the 
disease more difficult, if not outright impossible. Third, partnership 
with relevant stakeholders is helpful in shaping domestic policy 
responses to specific conditions on the ground. Other potential benefits 
include diversifying services, improving outreach, and simply 
psychologically supporting patients and vulnerable groups. Restraining 
partnerships and excluding relevant stakeholders might be conducive 
to massive policy failures and create an environment, in which health 
issues might not get enough attention. 
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In regard to the first core component of HIV/AIDS policy, 
Russia subsumed the issues of HIV/AIDS under the looming 
demographic crisis and generally linked it to the growing consumption 
of narcotic substances, rather than addressing the epidemic as a public 
health crisis in its own right (Indicator 1a). The standardized protocol 
(in terms of what line of products should be purchased reflecting 
Russian state of epidemic) was often breached, despite the broad 
acknowledgement of the life-saving role of the ARVs. The consistent 
supply of the pharmaceuticals to the patients almost every year was 
punctuated by month-long delays (Indicator 1b). Although neither the 
Kremlin, nor the public health officials overtly questioned the 
importance of generic medicines for the check on prices and increase 
of coverage, the whole issue was downplayed in favor of developing 
and import-substitution pharmaceutical industry (Indicator 1c).  
In the context of the Russian epidemic the most vulnerable 
group was the intravenous drug users (IDUs), which in the 2000s 
became the principal driver of spreading the epidemic into the 
generalized population. The vulnerable populations definitely were 
disadvantaged, as the federal legal provisions stimulated 
criminalization of IDUs and put this group at the mercy of the lower-
level bureaucrats and officials from the so-called power ministries 
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(Indicator 2a). The government accepted the necessity of the 
universality of access to treatment and consistently worked to scale up 
the treatment access as evident in massive financial commitments to 
procure these medicines (Indicator 2b). At the same time, many highly 
visible representatives of Russian political elite and public health 
officials aggressively advocated very narrow prevention strategies, 
confined to abstinence, family values, and health lifestyle. 
Simultaneously, such legitimate prevention strategies as the substitute 
treatment and syringe exchange was by and large excluded from the 
preferred measures in protecting population‘s health (Indicator 2c).  
The Kremlin generally overemphasized the role of the 
government in curbing HIV/AIDS and intentionally downplayed the 
significance and desirability of partnership with other sectors. There is 
strong evidence to suggest that the National Priority Projects—
framework of disbursing resources and transforming the health care 
sector—was designed to fend off the potential role civil society and 
private sector could have played in domestic health policies. In the 
context of the expansion of the public sector and massive financial 
inflows into health care projects, it shied away from any meaningful 
engagement of the private sector (Indicator 3a), and forcefully 
imposed strict legal boundaries under what conditions non-
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governmental organizations can participate in curbing the epidemic 
(Indicator 3b). At the same time, Russia embarked on and even 
initiated a number of international AIDS initiatives, which are 
typically seen as commendable from the vantage point of international 
health community (Indicator 3c). 
South Africa elites questioned the sameness of epidemiological 
trajectory of the disease in South Africa and the rest of the world. Elite 
framed the domestic epidemic as a local developmental problem in 
opposition to the lifestyle issues and the massive consumption of 
various toxic drugs, including the antiretroviral medications, in the 
West (Indicator 1a). As an extension of this reasoning, political elites 
worked to revive and institutionalize the alternative/indigenous 
medicines as either a full substitute to the ―toxic AZT,‖ or an addition 
to the western biomedical products in general (Indicator 1b).  In this 
context, Pretoria for a while was not quite concerned about the rapid 
importation and domestic disbursement of generic pharmaceutical 
products; in certain cases even attempting to prosecute the smugglers 
of generics (Indicator 1c).   
In South African epidemiological conditions the most 
vulnerable group was mothers carrying the virus giving birth to 
children. Despite the decreasing prices and increasing efficiency and 
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safety of the available drugs, for a while the Cabinet was reluctant to 
offer mother to child prevention transmission program as too 
expensive and pharmaceutically unsafe (Indicator 2a). To keep the 
expenditures in the public sector as minimal as possible to prevent the 
undesired overspending, both Pretoria and provincial health officials 
consistently stalled the national roll-out programs on the ground and 
tried to block the universality of access to treatment in principle 
(Indicator 2b). The South African government was resolute to use 
complementary micronutrients and nutritional supplements for 
prevention of the development of opportunistic diseases (Indicator 2c).  
The critical evidence suggests that Pretoria chose to protect the 
relatively successful private sector and did not employ it to improve 
the dismal health care conditions in the public sector (Indicator 3a). 
The prospects of partnership with civil society sector were tainted by 
the latter‘s support of the western biomedical products. As a result, the 
Cabinet preferred to forge connection with organizations advocating 
alternative and complementary treatment (Indicator 3b).  Finally, 
Pretoria legitimized a counter-epistemic community of health 
dissidents and worked to make traditional healers to be recognized 
internationally. The government seemed to accept partnership with the 
international organizations, only when their financial assistance 
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alleviated the burden of the public sector, which was consistent with 
the emphasis on slashing the spending (Indicator 3c). 
 
FEEDBACK LOOPS AND IMPLICATIONS  
The findings of this dissertation strongly suggested that social purpose 
can filter outside norms, guidelines, and policy initiatives. It also 
confirmed that both countries of my analysis politicized the epidemic, 
often with adverse consequences for public health. It is reasonable to 
believe that in the long term domestic social purpose can be 
profoundly affected by the public policy outcomes it helped generate. 
Studying the feedback loops can be very informative in terms of the 
exogenous sources of social purpose change, yet this objective 
definitely goes beyond the scope of this research project. In this 
section I venture to offer only some cursory remarks.  
Overall, in the longer term, given the visible (positive or 
adverse) result of the implemented policy, national purpose may be 
profoundly affected by the feedback effects challenged and 
transformed if the policy turned out to have negative consequences, or 
reinforced if the results are positive. The next step in the research is to 
extend my dissertation work investigating to what extent, when, how 
and why does the success or failure to adopt international policy 
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prescriptions trigger a feedback effect on social purpose. In other 
words, it would be helpful to probe the conditions under which the 
success or failure to adopt international policy prescriptions triggers 
changes in the content of national identities and contestation around 
them.  
South African part of the story is more or less straightforward. 
President Thabo Mbeki‘s HIV/AIDS policies definitely contributed to 
the discrediting of the African Renaissance. In Russian case, the 
adverse effects of repressive measures, and multiple inefficiencies did 
not generate a massive retaliation against Sovereign Democracy. New 
President Dmitri Medvedev offered a new master-narrative of 
―modernization‖ (with 4-I emphasis on institutions, investments, 
infrastructure, and innovations), mildly assaulting Sovereign 
Democracy. Some political observers believed it to replace the 
imagery Sovereign Democracy in Russia, of which Medvedev had 
been publicly critical on several occasions.
 
In this context, it would be 
informative to examine whether or not new political emphases are 
likely to generate any real consequences for changing the current 
public health policy. 
It is also interesting to examine these variations as related to 
the degree to which elite-driven social purposes are embedded at the 
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broadest level of collective articulations, that is, popular culture. South 
African elites, for instance, failed to embed marketization as a pivotal 
component of national identity in the collective articulations. All 
Russian political obligations, on the other hand, were strongly 
embedded in the collective articulations as expressed in the country‘s 
popular culture. The role and importance popular culture plays in 
supporting national identity in general has been widely acknowledged 
in the relevant literature (Iver Neumann, Ted Hopf).  More inductive 
work to be pursued in order to ascertain the degree to which 
conceptions of common good remain supported because of being 
embedded in public culture.   
 
CONCLUSION   
In general, my empirical findings indicate that in responding to the 
domestic epidemic of HIV/AIDS the key decision-makers in both 
countries have significantly transformed the international standardized 
policy prescriptions to the pandemic in accordance with the social 
purpose‘s content. Rather than treating the epidemic as a pressing 
public health issue, the imperatives of Sovereign Democracy prompted 
the government to respond to the domestic epidemic as the issue of 
demographic survival and criminal drug abuse, subsequently eroding 
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the human rights component from the official policy, overstretching 
the public financial commitments, and refusing to cooperate with 
private sector. The imperatives of African Renaissance reframed the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic as a local developmental problem to be addressed 
by local solutions only. As a result, the Cabinet supported substandard 
biomedical treatments and indigenous healing practices, consistently 
resisted the universal and free rollout of treatment in order to avoid the 
undesirable governmental expenditures and redistributive strategies. In 
both countries, these policy choices resulted in the adverse 
consequences for public health and prompted a protracted contestation 
among various state and non-state actors around the principles of the 
desired public health policies.     
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APPENDIX  
 
 
Table 1.1 Variables and cases 
 
Independent variable   
  
Intervening variable  Dependent variable 
International consensus 
 
Social purpose  Domestic policy 
 
 
 
HIV/AIDS policy as a 
public health crisis requiring 
biomedical solutions 
 
―Sovereign Democracy‖ 
(Russia) 
 
 
―African Renaissance‖ 
(South Africa) 
 
demographic and criminal 
narcotic abuse, requiring strong 
state intervention 
 
 
local socioeconomic problem, 
requiring unique approach often 
at odds with the international 
consensus 
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Table 1.2 The HIV/AIDS policy baseline indicators 
 
Policy component Treatment 
Addressing the epidemic as 
a public health crisis with 
standardized protocol 
Universality 
Providing the access to treatment 
to everybody who needs it , 
ideally free of charge 
Partnerships 
Including all stakeholders in the 
policy formulation and 
implementation 
Indicators of  
standardized policy 
response 
(Chapter 2) 
1a. Public health crisis  
1b. Standardized protocol 
(ARVs) 
1c. Check on prices ( 
generics) 
2a.  Inclusion of vulnerable 
groups   
2b. ―Scaling up‖ access 
2c.  Prevention (ABC) 
3a. Public-private partnership (PPP) 
3b. Civil society /nonprofit sector  
3c. International organizations 
Indicators of 
opposite to the 
standardized policy 
response 
1a. Any secondary framing 
1b. Substandard protocols 
1c. No check/excessive 
control 
2a. Any forms of stigma and 
exclusion  
2b. ―Scaling down‖  
2c. No prevention/ or  as a 
substitute  
3a. Selective engagement  
3b. Exclusion from policy-making    
3c. Any restrictions and challenges 
Policy indicators in 
the Russian 
Federation 
(Chapter 6) 
1a. National security crisis 
1b. Breaking the protocol 
1c. Import substitution 
2a. Criminalization   of IDUs 
2b. Distribution crises    
2c. Alternatives to prevention 
3a.  Expansion of public sector  
3b. Exclusion from policy-making    
3c.  Asserting its own leadership 
Policy indicators in 
the Republic of  
South Africa 
(Chapter 7) 
1a. Socioeconomic crisis 
1b. Alternative medications 
1c. Restrains on generics 
2a. Limited rollout    
2b. Stalling treatment   
 2c. Alternatives to prevention 
3a. Priority to private sector 
3b. Exclusion from policy-making    
3c.  Counter-epistemic community 
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Table 1.3 Summary of comparisons and explanations 
 
 Social Purpose as an intervening variable (Chapter 3) 
Components  Political 
distinctiveness 
Economic 
empowerment 
Systemic role 
  The Russian Federation: ―Sovereign democracy‖  (Chapter 5) 
Strong state State-led economy Great power 
Treatment  
1a. Public health crisis  
1b. Standardized 
protocol (ARVs) 
1c. Check on prices ( 
generics) 
1a. Demographic crisis 
(strong state should be 
populous; narcotic 
consumption crises due 
to Russia‘ s weak 
position in the world) 
1b. Breaking the protocol 
(secondary factor: the 
overextended economic  
obligations exacerbated 
weak state capacity, 
inefficiency, and 
corruption)  
1c. Import substitution and the 
desirability of the 
―pharmaceutical sovereignty‖  
(undesirability of reliance on 
the foreign pharmaceutical 
sector, including generics) 
Universality 
2a.  Inclusion of 
vulnerable groups   
2b. ―Scaling up‖ 
access 
2a. Criminalization   of 
drug users  (in the 
context of strong state 
being incompatible 
with human rights) 
2b. Scaling up crises     
(secondary factor: the 
overextended economic  
obligations exacerbated 
weak state capacity, 
2c.  Alternatives to prevention 
(attempts to ban sexual 
education as anti-Russian 
conspiracy, which may lead to 
the  country‘s international 
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2c.  Prevention (ABC)  inefficiency, and 
corruption) 
weakness) 
Partnership 
3a. Public-private 
partnership (PPP) 
3b. Civil society 
/nonprofit sector  
3c. International 
organizations 
3b. Exclusion of civil 
society from policy-
making   
(NGOs only as service 
organizations, their 
political and advocacy 
incompatible with 
strong state) 
3a.  Expansion of public 
sector  
(massive public spending ; 
creating additional 
governmental bodies 
responsible for public 
policy; 
tendency to ignore private 
sector) 
3c. Asserting its own 
leadership 
(building redundant 
international and regional 
conferences, asserting regional 
leadership in curbing AIDS) 
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Table 1.3 Summary of comparisons and explanations, continued 
 
 Social Purpose as an intervening variable (Chapter 3) 
Components  Political 
distinctiveness 
Economic empowerment Systemic role 
 The Republic of South Africa: ―African Renaissance‖ (Chapter 6) 
Indigenousness Marketization Exceptionalism 
Treatment  
1a. Public health crisis  
1b. Standardized protocol 
(ARVs) 
1c. Check on prices ( 
generics) 
1b. Alternative 
medications 
1c. Restrains on 
generics 
(both incompatible 
with the stress on 
indigenous solutions 
to local problems) 
1b. Alternative medications 
(Marketization as an 
additional explanation: 
bioprospecting of genetic 
medicinal resources as 
important private economic 
activity) 
1a. Socioeconomic and 
developmental crisis 
(more encompassing than public 
health crisis, enrooted in South 
Africa‘s special historical and 
geopolitical circumstances) 
Universality 
2a.  Inclusion of 
vulnerable groups   
2b. ―Scaling up‖ access 
2c.  Prevention (ABC) 
 2a. Limited rollout   to 
MTCPT 
 (incompatible with the stress 
on marketization and avoiding 
redistribution strategies) 
2b. Stalling treatment   
 
2c. Alternatives to prevention 
(only partial explanation:  
stress on poverty eradication and 
healthy lifestyle in relation to 
indicator 1a 
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Partnership 
3a. Public-private 
partnership (PPP) 
3b. Civil society 
/nonprofit sector  
3c. International 
organizations 
3b. Selective inclusion 
in policy-making 
(exclusion of those 
which stressed ARVs, 
generics and 
universality of 
treatment; including 
those which promoted 
genetic resources)   
3a. Protecting private sector 
(incompatible with the stress 
on marketization and avoiding 
redistribution strategies) 
 
 
3c.  Counter-epistemic community 
(secondary factor: the desirability of 
providing  exceptional leadership in 
international organization; evidence 
strongly suggest individual-level 
explanation) 
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Table 2.1: Global policy consensus on HIV/AIDS 
  
Policy 
component 
(Chapter 2) 
1. Treatment 
Addressing the epidemic as a 
public health crisis with 
standardized protocol 
2. Universality 
Providing the access to 
treatment to everybody who 
needs it , ideally free of charge 
3. Partnerships 
Including all stakeholders in 
the policy formulation and 
implementation 
Indicators of  
standardized 
policy 
response 
 
1a. Public health crisis  
1b. Standardized protocol 
(ARVs) 
1c. Check on prices ( 
generics) 
2a.  Inclusion of vulnerable 
groups   
2b. ―Scaling up‖ access 
2c.  Prevention (ABC) 
3a. Public-private partnership 
(PPP) 
3b. Civil society /nonprofit 
sector  
3c. International 
organizations 
Indicators of 
opposite to 
the 
standardized 
policy 
response 
1a. Any secondary framing 
1b. Substandard protocols 
1c. No check/excessive 
control 
2a. Any forms of stigma and 
exclusion  
2b. ―Scaling down‖  
2c. No prevention/ or  as a 
substitute  
3a. Selective engagement  
3b. Exclusion from policy-
making    
3c. Any restrictions and 
challenges 
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Table 3.1 National purpose in Russia and South Africa 
Proposal‘s components Russia South Africa  
0. Title ―Sovereign democracy‖ ―African Renaissance‖ 
1. Political 
distinctiveness 
Strong state  Indigeneousness 
2. Economic 
empowerment 
State-led economy Marketization 
3. Systemic role  Great power in the multipolar world Continental leadership and exceptionalism   
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Figure 3.1: Major processes in social purpose 
Domestic elites 
  
 
 
Global context                                             Global context 
  
 
Flow of external health initiatives, including policy recommendations on curbing HIV/AIDS  
 
          SOCIAL PURPOSE as a filter 
 
 
 
 
  
Articulated audiences                                                                                                                                        General audiences 
 
 
 
496 
 
Table 3.2 Ranking social purpose 
 Activity Processes  Hypothesized effects on action 
A
b
sen
t 
 
Commitment 
 
Influence  
 
Articulation 
 Elites do not commit to any definite 
country-specific conception of 
common good 
 Domestic policy environment lacks 
any definite legitimating discourses  
 Absence of discernible and 
elaborate discursive streams in 
public culture 
 Elite‘s actions are not shaped social purpose, they do not 
imply commitment to a country-specific specific 
conception of common good 
 Alternative behavioral choices are possible, broadly  
advocated, and considered legitimate 
 Policy environment shaped by different bureaucratic 
agencies are expected to pursue their narrowly defined 
tasks  
F
ractu
red
 
 
Commitment 
 
Influence  
 
Articulation 
 Contending elites strongly commit 
to  alternative conceptions of 
common good 
 All contending conceptions of 
common good are strongly 
embedded in domestic policy 
environment  
 Public culture supports a plurality of 
contending articulations of common 
good 
 Only part of the elite is committed to the kinds of action it 
considers appropriate due to a specific conception of 
common good they embrace  
 Alternative behavioral choices are possible, broadly  
advocated, and considered legitimate 
 Broad conflicts in policy environment with unpredictable 
implications for public policy 
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R
estrain
ed
 
 
Commitment 
 
Influence  
 
Articulation 
 Elite strongly commits to a certain 
conception of common good, while 
its potential contender chose not to 
challenge it  
 This conception of common good is 
moderately embedded/legitimized in 
domestic policy environment  
 Public culture partially supports a 
dominant articulation of common 
good (or only some of its 
substantive components) 
 Elite is strongly committed to the kinds of action which  
social purpose underpins 
 alternative behavioral choices are generally delegitimized, 
but might be considered only with serious reservations 
 Minor conflicts in policy environment, yet the opponents 
of the enacted policy are significantly underprivileged  
C
o
n
so
lid
ated
 
 
Commitment 
 
Influence  
 
Articulation 
 Elite is strongly consolidated around 
a certain conception of common 
good 
 This  conception of common good is 
strongly embedded/legitimized in 
domestic policy environment  
 Public culture strongly supports a 
dominant articulation of common 
good, including its all substantive 
components 
 Elite is strongly committed to the kinds of action which  
social purpose underpins 
 Alternative behavioral choices are considered 
inappropriate and strongly delegitimized 
 The enacted policy not disputed and considered 
unproblematic, by all segment of society; long-lasting 
effects to be observed 
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Table 4.1 Indicators of national purpose 
 
C
o
n
so
lid
ated
 
 
Commitment 
 
Influence  
 
Articulation 
 Elite is strongly consolidated around 
a certain conception of common good 
 This  conception of common good is 
strongly embedded/legitimized in 
domestic policy environment  
 Public culture strongly supports a 
dominant articulation of common 
good, including its all substantive 
components 
 Elite is strongly committed to the kinds of 
action which  social purpose underpins 
 Alternative behavioral choices are 
considered inappropriate and strongly 
delegitimized 
 The enacted policy not disputed and 
considered unproblematic, by all segment 
of society; long-lasting effects to be 
observed 
 
Table 5.1 Indicators of national purpose 
 
R
estrain
ed
 
 
Commitment 
(section one) 
 
Influence  
(section two) 
 
Articulation 
(section 
three) 
 Elite strongly commits to a certain 
conception of common good, while 
its potential contender chose not to 
challenge it  
 This conception of common good is 
moderately embedded/legitimized in 
domestic policy environment  
 Public culture partially supports a 
dominant articulation of common 
good (or only some of its substantive 
components) 
 Elite is strongly committed to the kinds of 
action which  social purpose underpins 
 Alternative behavioral choices are 
generally delegitimized, but might be 
considered only with serious reservations 
 Minor conflicts in policy environment, yet 
the opponents of the enacted policy are 
significantly underprivileged  
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Table 6.1: Summary of the HIV/AIDS policy in Russia  
 
 
 
 
 
Policy component Treatment Universality Partnerships 
Definitions  Addressing the epidemic as 
a public health crisis with 
standardized protocol 
Providing the access to 
treatment to everybody who 
needs it , ideally free of charge 
Including all stakeholders in the 
policy formulation and 
implementation 
Indicators of  
standardized policy 
response 
(Chapter 2) 
1a. Public health crisis  
1b. Standardized protocol 
(ARVs)                       .  
1c. Check on prices  
2a.  Inclusion of vulnerable 
groups   
2b. ―Scaling up‖ access 
2c.  Prevention (ABC) 
3a. Public-private partnership (PPP) 
3b. Civil society /nonprofit sector  
3c. International organizations 
Indicators of opposite 
to the standardized 
policy response 
1a. Any secondary framing 
1b. Substandard protocols 
1c. No check/excessive 
control 
2a. Any forms of stigma and 
exclusion  
2b. ―Scaling down‖  
2c. No prevention/ or  as a 
substitute  
3a. Selective engagement  
3b. Exclusion from policy-making    
3c. Any restrictions and challenges 
Policy indicators in the 
Russian Federation 
(Chapter 6) 
1a. State weakness 
1b. Observing the 
protocol** 
1c. Import substitution 
2a. Criminalization   of IDUs 
2b.  ―Scaling up‖ access ** 
2c. Alternatives to prevention 
3a.  Expansion of public sector  
3b. Exclusion from policy-making    
3c.  Asserting its own leadership 
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Table 6.3:  Summary of the impact of national purpose on HIV/AIDS policy  
  The Russian Federation: ―Sovereign democracy‖   
Strong state State-led 
economy 
Great power 
Treatment  
1a. Public health 
crisis  
1b. Standardized 
protocol (ARVs) 
1c. Check on prices 
( generics) 
1a. State 
weakness 
(strong state 
should be 
populous; 
narcotic 
consumption 
crises due to 
Russia‘ s weak 
position in the 
world) 
1b. Observing the 
protocol 
(full match) 
yet  the 
overextended 
economic  
obligations 
exacerbated weak 
state capacity, 
inefficiency, and 
corruption )  
1c. Import 
substitution and the 
desirability of the 
―pharmaceutical 
sovereignty‖  
(undesirability of 
reliance on the 
foreign 
pharmaceutical 
sector, including 
generics) 
Universality 
2a.  Inclusion of 
vulnerable groups   
2b. ―Scaling up‖ 
access 
2c.  Prevention 
(ABC) 
2a. 
Criminalization   
of drug users  (in 
the context of 
strong state being 
incompatible with 
human rights) 
 
2b. Scaling up       
(full match) 
yet due to state 
frequent 
interruptions of 
regimen and 
procurement 
delays) 
2c.  Alternatives to 
prevention 
(attempts to ban 
sexual education as 
anti-Russian 
conspiracy, which 
may lead to the  
country‘s 
international 
weakness) 
Partnership 
3a. Public-private 
partnership (PPP) 
3b. Civil society 
/nonprofit sector  
3c. International 
organizations 
3b. Exclusion of 
civil society from 
policy-making   
(NGOs only as 
service 
organizations, 
their political and 
advocacy 
incompatible with 
strong state) 
3a.  Expansion of 
public sector  
(massive public 
spending ; 
creating extra- 
governmental 
bodies 
responsible for 
public policy; 
tendency to 
ignore private 
sector) 
3c. Asserting its 
own leadership 
(building redundant 
international and 
regional 
conferences, 
asserting regional 
leadership in 
curbing AIDS) 
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Table 7.1: Summary of the ARV policy in RSA, 2000—2008  
Policy 
component 
1. Treatment 
 
2. Universality 
 
3. Partnerships 
 
 Addressing the epidemic as 
a public health crisis with 
standardized protocol 
Providing the access to 
treatment to everybody who 
needs it , ideally free of charge 
Including all stakeholders 
in the policy formulation 
and implementation 
Indicators of  
standardized 
policy 
response 
(Chapter 2) 
1a. Public health crisis  
1b. Standardized protocol 
(ARVs) 
1c. Check on prices ( 
generics) 
2a.  Inclusion of vulnerable 
groups   
2b. ―Scaling up‖ access 
2c.  Prevention (ABC) 
3a. Public-private 
partnership (PPP) 
3b. Civil society /nonprofit 
sector  
3c. International 
organizations 
Indicators of 
opposite to the 
standardized 
policy 
response 
1a. Any secondary framing 
1b. Substandard protocols 
1c. No check/excessive 
control 
2a. Any forms of stigma and 
exclusion  
2b. ―Scaling down‖  
2c. No prevention/ or  as a 
substitute  
3a. Selective engagement  
3b. Exclusion from policy-
making    
3c. Any restrictions and 
challenges 
Policy 
indicators in 
the Republic 
of  South 
Africa 
(Chapter 7) 
1a. Socioeconomic crisis 
1b. Alternative medications 
1c. Restrains on generics 
2a. Limited rollout    
2b. Stalling treatment   
 2c. Alternatives to prevention 
3a. Priority to private sector 
3b. Exclusion from policy-
making    
3c.  Counter-epistemic 
community 
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Table 7.3:  Summary of the impact of national purpose on HIV/AIDS policy  
 
 
 The Republic of South Africa: ―African Renaissance‖ (Chapter 6) 
Indigenousness Marketization Exceptionalism 
 
Treatment  
1a. Public health crisis  
1b. Standardized protocol 
(ARVs) 
1c. Check on prices ( 
generics) 
 
1b. Alternative 
medications 
1c. Restrains on 
generics 
(both incompatible 
with the stress on 
indigenous solutions 
to local problems) 
 
1b. Alternative 
medications 
(Marketization as an 
additional explanation: 
bioprospecting of genetic 
medicinal resources as 
important private 
economic activity) 
 
1a. Socioeconomic and 
developmental crisis 
(more encompassing than 
public health crisis, 
enrooted in South Africa‘s 
special historical and 
geopolitical 
circumstances) 
 
Universality 
2a.  Inclusion of vulnerable 
groups   
2b. ―Scaling up‖ access 
2c.  Prevention (ABC) 
  
2a. Limited rollout   to 
MTCPT 
 (incompatible with the 
stress on marketization 
and avoiding 
redistribution strategies) 
2b. Stalling treatment   
 
 
2c. Alternatives to 
prevention 
(only partial explanation:  
stress on poverty 
eradication and healthy 
lifestyle in relation to 
indicator 1a 
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Partnership 
3a. Public-private partnership 
(PPP) 
3b. Civil society /nonprofit 
sector  
3c. International 
organizations 
 
3b. Selective 
inclusion in policy-
making (exclusion of 
those which stressed 
ARVs, generics and 
universality of 
treatment; including 
those which 
promoted genetic 
resources)   
 
3a. Protecting private 
sector 
(incompatible with the 
stress on marketization 
and avoiding 
redistribution strategies) 
 
 
 
3c.  Counter-epistemic 
community 
(secondary factor: the 
desirability of providing  
exceptional leadership in 
international organization; 
evidence strongly suggest 
individual-level 
explanation) 
 
Table 8.1: Summary of the relationship between variables & explanations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mechanisms Predicted behavior (Null Ho)  Potential impact of identity on behavior 
Peer learning 
Elites consider all technical information and 
best cases to develop a policy response 
Elites either are highly selective in adopting 
particular practices, or disregard all of it 
Coalition-
building 
Minority traditions push  elites to employ 
the policy  to widen coalition  and win 
uncommitted 
Elites disregard the value of coalition-building 
as a resource  to widen its  political support 
External 
pressures 
Elites calculate benefits of external 
influence and/or costs of non-compliance 
Elites pursue the selective adaptation of 
external demands  
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